fay) the occupations of merchants, tradefmen, and manufacturers, are not held as degrading fituations. I once thought that the low eftimation in which commerce was held in France, might be reckoned among the caufes of the late revolution; and I am still of. opinion, that the exclufive fpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the wealthy of other claffes. But I found long fince, that perfons in trade and business were by no means defpifed in France in the manner I had been taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were fo far from being despised or neglected, that there was no country perhaps in the universe, in which they were fo highly efteemed, courted, careffed, and even feared; tradefmen naturally were not. fo much fought in fociety (as not furnishing fo largely to the fund of converfation as they do to the revenues of the ftate) but the latter defcription got forward every day. M. Bailly, who made himself the popular mayor on the rebellion of the Bastile, and is a pricipal actor in the revolt, before the change poffeffed a penfion or office under the crown, of fix hundred pound English, a year, for that country, no contemptible provifion: And this he obtained folely as a man of letters, and on no other title. As to the monied men-whilft the monarchy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as fuch, they did not enjoy the privileges of nobility, but nobility was of fo eafy an acquintion, that it was the fault or neglect of all of that description, who did not obtain its privileges, for their lives at leaft in virtue of office. It attached under the royal government to an innumerable multitude of places, real and nominal, that were vendible; and fuch nobility were as capable of every thing as their degree of influence or interest could make them, that is, as nobility of no confiderable rank or confequence. M. Neckar, fo far from being a French gentleman, was not fo much as a Frenchman born, and yet we all know the rank in

which he stood on the day of the meeting of the ftates.

As to the mere matter of eftimation of the mercantile or any other clafs, this is regulated by opinion and prejudice. In England a fecurity against the envy of men in thefe claffes, is not fo very complete as we may imagine. We must not impofe upon ourfelves. What inftitutions and manners together had done in France, manners alone do here. It is the natural operation of things where there exifts a crown, a court, fplendid orders of knighthood, and an hereditary nobility;-where there exifts a fixed, permanent, landed gentry, continued in greatnefs and opulence by the law of primogeniture, and by a protection given to family fettlements; where there exifts a ftanding army and navy-where there exifts a church establishment, which beftows on learning and parts an intereft combined with that of religion and the ftate;-in a country where fuch things exift, wealth, new in it's acquifition, and precarious in it's duration, can never rank first, or even near the first; though wealth has it's natural weight, further, than as it is balanced and even preponderated amongst us as amongst other nations, by artificial inftitutions and opinions growing out of them. At no period in the hiftory of England have fo few peers been taken out of trade or from families newly created by commerce. In no period has fo fmall a number of noble families entered into the counting-houfe. I can call to mind but one in all England, and his is of near fifty years ftanding. Be that as it may, it appears plain to me from my beft obfervation, that envy and ambition may by art, management and difpofition, be as much excited amongst these defcriptions of men in England, as in any other country; and that they are juft as capable of acting a part in any great change.-Memorial on the Affairs of France in 1791.

REVOLUTION.

Policy at the Revolution, different System purfued for Jome Years paft. (See KING'S MEN, CABINET (DOUBLE.)

Ar the revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to ftruggle againft all the difficulties which preffed fo new and unfettled a government. The court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of fuch intereft as could fupport, and of fuch fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common defence. This connection, neceffary at firft, continued long after convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in all fituations, be an ufeful inftrument of government. At the fame time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and character, the people poffeffed à fecurity for their juft portion of importance in the ftate. But as the title to the crown grew ftronger by long poffeffion, and by the conftant increafe of its influence, thefe helps have of late feemed to certain persons no better than incumbrances. The powerful managers for government were not fufficiently fubmiffive to the pleasure of the poffeffors of immediate and perfonal favour, fometimes from a confidence in their own ftrength, natural and acquired; fometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, which gave them a confideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many cafes an acceffion rather to the popular than to the royal fcale; and fome part of that influence which would otherwife have been poffeffed as in a fort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arofe, and

circulated among the people. This method, there fore, of governing, by men of great natural intereft, or great acquired confideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of abfolute monarchy. It is the nature of defpotifm to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure; and to annihilate all intermediate fituations between boundless ftrength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.

To get rid of all this intermediate and independant importance, and to fecure to the court the unlimited and uncontrouled ufe of its own vaft influence, under the fole direction of its own private favour, has for fome years paft been the great object of policy. If this were compaffed, the influence of the crown muft, of course, produce all the effects which the moft fanguine partizans of the court could poffibly defire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the peeple; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower forts. A new project was therefore devifed, by a certain fet of intriguing men, totally different from the fyftem of adminiftration which had prevailed fince the acceffion of the Houfe of Brunfwick. This project, I have heard, was firft conceived by fome perfons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.

The earliest attempt in the execution of this defign was to let up for minifter, a perfon, in rank indeed refpectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vaft and fudden elevation, was little known or confidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmiffion. But whether it was for. want of firmnefs to bear up against the firft oppofition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moft eligible; that idea was foon abandoned. The inftrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommo

date it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofed.

The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a line which fhould feparate the court from the miniftry. Hitherto these names had been looked upon as fynonymous; but for the future, court and adminiftration were to be confidered as things totally diftin&t. By this operation, two fyftems of administration were to be formed; one which fhould be in the real fecret and confidence; the other merely oftenfible, to perform the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be refponfible; whilft the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the court against the miniftry: this party was to have a large fhare in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally feparate from, and independent of, oftenfible adminiftration.

The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole fcheme ultimately depended, was to bring parliament to an acquiefcence in this project. Parliament was therefore to be taught, by degrees, a total indifference to the perfons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and character, of the ministers of the crown. By means of a difcipline, on which I fhall fay more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the most oppofite interefts, and the most difcordant politics. All connexions and dependencies among fubjects were to be entirely diffolved. As hitherto bufinefs had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no fort of confideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of parliament were to be hardened into an