a difpofition to think charitably of all the actions of men in power, and to live in a mutual intercourse of favours with them; an inclination rather to countenance a strong use of authority, than to bear any fort of licentiousness on the part of the people; these are unfavourable qualities in an open election for members of parliament.

The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former, is juftified by reafon; because a man of fuch a character, even in its exorbitancies, does not directly contradict the purposes of a truft, the end of which is a controul on power. The latter character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this truft but very imperfectly; and, if deviating to the leaft excefs, will certainly fruftrate inftead of forwarding the purposes of a controul on government. But when the house of commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to be changed but reverfed. Whilft any errors committed in fupport of power were left to the law, with every advantage of favourable conftruction, of mitigation, and finally of pardon; all exceffes on the fide of liberty, or in purfuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known law, but by a difcretionary proceeding which brought on the lofs of the popular object itfelf. Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly penal, at least highly dangerous. The favour of the people might lead even to a difqualification of reprefenting them. Their odium might become ftrained through the medium of two or three conftructions, the means of fitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This is punifhing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an affembly, ftill in fome fort popular, led to the greatest honours and emoluments in the gift of the crown. Now the principle is reverfed; and the favour of the court is the only fure way of ob

taining and holding thofe honours which ought to be in the difpofal of the people.

It fignifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example, the only argument of effect in civil life, demonftrates the truth of my propofition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning the pernicious tendency of this example, until I see fome man for his indifcretion in the fupport of power, for his violent and intemperate fervility, rendered incapable of fitting in parliament. For as it now ftands, the fault of overftraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you pleafe, afferting popular privileges, has led to difqualification; the oppofite fault never has produced the flightest punishment. Refiftance to power, has fhut the door of the house of commons to one man; obfequioufnefs and fervility to none.Thoughts on the Caufe of the prefent Dif

contents.

PARLIAMENT AND PREROGATIVE

SEE MINI

STER'S, FAVOURITE, REVOLUTION.)

I WOULD not increase an evil, because I was not able to remove it; and because it was not in my power to keep the house of commons religiously true to its first principles, I would not argue for carrying it to a total oblivion of them. This has been the great scheme of power in our time. They who will not conform their conduct to the public good, and cannot fupport it by the prerogative of the crown, have adopted a new plan. They have totally abandoned the fhattered and old-fashioned fortrefs of prerogative, and made a lodgement in the ftrong hold of parliament itself. If they have any evil defign to which there is no ordinary legal power commenfurate, they bring it into parliament. In parliament the whole is executed from the beginning to the end. In parliament the power of obtaining their object is abfolute; and the fafety in the pro

ceeding perfect; no rnles to confine, no after-reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot with any great propriety punish others, for things in which they themselves have been accomplices. Thus the controul of parliament upon the executory power is loft; because parliament is made to partake in every confiderable act of government. Impeachment, that great guardian of the purity of the conftitution, is in danger of being loft, even to the idea of it.

By this plan feveral important ends are anfwered to the Cabal. If the authority of parliament fupports itfelf, the credit of every act of government which they contrive, is faved; but if the act be fo very odious that the whole ftrength of parliament is infufficient to recommend it, then parliament is itself discredited; and this difcredit increases more and more that indifference to the conflitution, which it is the conftant aim of its enemies, by their abufe of parliamentary powers, to render general among the people. Whenever parliament is perfuaded to affume the offices of executive government, it will lofe all the confidence, love, and veneration, which it has ever enjoyed whilft it was fuppofed the corrective and controul of the acting powers of the ftate.

PARLIAMENT (SEPTENNIAL.)

Ibid.

I know, that fince the revolution, along with many dangerous, many ufeful powers of government have been weakened. It is abfolutely neceffary to have frequent recourse to the legislature. Parliaments muft therefore fit every year, and for great part of the year. The dreadful disorders of frequent elections have alfo neceffitated a feptennial instead of a triennial duration. Thefe circumftances, I mean the conftant habit of authority, and the unfrequency of elections, have tended very much to draw the houfe of commons towards the character of a ftanding fenate. It is a diforder which has arifen from

the cure of greater diforders; it has arifen from the extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchical government, with external ftrength and with internal tranquillity.Ibid.

PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE.

ALL the people have a deep intereft in the dignity of parliament.Letter to Sir H. Langrishe, M. P.

PARLIAMENT (TRIENNIAL AND PLACE BILL. A triennial Parliament, or a Place Bill, not competent to effect the Ends propofed by them.

THE firft ideas which generally fuggeft themselves, for the cure of parliamentary diforders, are, to fhorten the duration of parliaments; and to difqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a feat in the House of Commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in those remedies, I am fure, in the present ftate of things, it is impoffible to apply them. A reforation of the right of free election is a preliminary indifpenfable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the conftitution, is a matter of deep and difficult research.

If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublefome to me as to another, to extol these remedies, fo famous in speculation, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted feriously to refort in practice.

I confefs that I have no fort of reliance upon either a triennial Parliament, or a Place Bill. With regard to the former, perhaps it might rather ferve to counteract than to promote the ends that are propofed by it. To fay nothing of the horrible diforders among the people attending frequent elections, I Loid bể fearful of committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the country into a conteft with

R

the Treafury. It is eafy to fee which of the contending parties would be ruined firft. Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, fo as to endeavour to ground his fpeculations on his experience, muft have obferved how prodigioufly greater the power of Miniftry is in the firft and laft feffion of a parliament, than it is in the intermediate period, when members fit a little firm on their feats. The perfons of the greateft parliamentary experience, with whom I have converfed, did conftantly, in canvafling the fate of queftions, allow fomething to the Court fide, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. The evil complained of, if it exifts in the prefent ftate of things, would hardly be removed by a triennial parliament; for, unless the influence of Government in elections can be entirely taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will harrafs private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the fettled fyftematic intereft of Government, and to the refources of a boundless civil lift. Certainly fomething may be done, and ought to be done, towards leffening that influence in clections; and this will be neceffary upon a plan either of longer or fhorter duration of parliament. But nothing can fo perfectly remove the evil, as not to render fuch contentions, too frequently repeated, utterly ruinous, firft to independence of fortune, and then to independence of fpirit.

As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in adverfe line, I hope I may be excufed in another obfervation. With With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this fubje&t with any man much converfant with public bufinefs, who confidered fhort parliaments as a real improvement of the conftitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular caufc, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of fuch perfons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the