3 Bcs. & P. 620. are stated in 8 Viner's Ab. 213. pl. 4., that the Judges Poole v. Poole, were much divided. Moor says, it was adjudged that Rose had only an estate for life, and the inheritance in her heir by purchase, resting in abeyance all her life, and settling in the instant of her death. Amb. 459. Or to heirs with words limiting a particular kind of estate. Cont. Rem. 286. 45. Mr. Fearne has observed, that there may possibly be some cases where the superadded words of limitation may be admitted to control the preceding words heirs, heirs male, &c., though in the plural number, when such superadded words limit an estate to such heirs, heirs male, &c. of a different nature from that which the ancestor would take, if the preceding words heirs, heirs male, &c. in those cases, were taken as words of limitation. As in the case 1 Rep. 95. b. put by Anderson, of a limitation to the use of a man for life, and after his decease, to the use of his heirs, and the heirs female of their bodies. Here the first word heirs would have given a fee to the ancestor, if taken as a word of limitation; whereas the subsequent words, and the heirs female of their bodies, grafted on the word heirs, could give only an estate tail female to the heirs. In such cases the general effect of the first words, heirs of the body, &c. seemed to be altered, abridged, and qualified by such subsequent express words of limitation, annexed to them, as could not possibly be satisfied by considering the first words as words of limitation. But he observes, we must take care to confine this observation to those cases where the ingrafted words describe an estate descendible in a different course, and to different persons, as special heirs, from what the first would carry the estate to; viz. to males instead of females, or vice versa; for where the first words give an estate tail. general, and the words ingrafted thereon are words serving to limit the fee, it seems, by the general and better opinion, that the annexed words of limitation are not to be attended to; as in the cases of Goodright v. Pullyn, and those of Wright v. Pearson, Ante, § 17. monger, and King v. Burchell, where the ingrafted words limit- Doe v. Ironed the whole fee. That there does not appear to be ante, c. 10. the same inconsistency in construing the first words, which describe heirs special to be words of limitation, where the superadded words extend to heirs special; as there is where the first words, and those ingrafted on them, distinguish two different incompatible courses of descent, and would not carry the estate to the same persons. In the latter case it is absolutely impossible, by any implied qualification, to reconcile the superadded words to those preceding them, so as to satisfy both, by construing the first as words of limitation; whereas in the former case, the superadded words are not contrary to, or incompatible with the preceding, but in their general sense include them; and there is no improbability in the supposition, that they were used by the testator in the same qualified sense as the preceding; and then both may be satisfied, by taking the first as words of limitation. for life. 46. Where the remainder is given to the heir of the Or to the heir first devisee, for the life only of such heir, the first devisee will take no more than an estate for life. Collins, Com. 47. Francis Harvey devised in these words," I White v. give to my son, Frank Mildmay, my farm called East R. 289. House Farm, &c., to enjoy the rents and profits thereof during the term of his natural life, with power to make a jointure of all or part, if he should marry; and after his death and jointure, if any be made, to the heir male of his body lawfully begotten, during the term of his natural life; and for want of such heir male, I give the said farm to my son Carew Mildmay, &c." It was agreed that the limitation to F. M. to enjoy and take the profits during his life, and after his decease to the heirs male of his body, would make an estate tail. So if it had been to the heir male of his body in the singular number, where nothing appeared which explained the intent to the contrary: but here the intention appeared to be that such heir male Or to issue, with words of limitation. should have the land only for life, which showed that the testator did not intend that those words should be taken as words of limitation; and nothing appeared in the nature of the expression which imported that they should be taken so. Heir male, or next heir male, were words of purchase; and in this case, where the devise was to F. M., and after his decease to the heir male of his body, during his life; the express limitation during his life, showed that he intended his son should have it in remainder for his life only; and when he devised it over, for want of such heir male, to C. M., this did not import that C. M. should not have it till T. M. died without heirs male generally, but for want of such heir male, who was to have it for life. * 48. Where an estate is devised to a person for life, remainder to his issue, with words of limitation superTit. 32. c. 22. added, the word issue will in that case be considered a word of purchase. $28. Loddington v 49. Sir Michael Armyn devised certain lands to Evers Armyn for life, and in case he should have any issue male, then to such issue male, and his heirs for ever; and if he should die without issue male, then he devised over, It was agreed by all the Judges of the Court of K. B., that Evers Armyn had but an estate for life, and that the issue male of Evers Armyn, if there had been any, would have taken a fee by purchase. For, first, they held that though the word issue was sometimes construed as heirs, and as a word of limitation, yet in a devise it might be a word of purchase as well as of limitation; when it was taken as a word of limitation, it was collective, and signified all the de * It does not appear to have ever been decided that a devise of a legal estate to A. for life, remainder to his issue, created an estate tail; but in the case of Glenorchy v. Bosville, which will be stated hereafter, Lord Talbot was clearly of opinion that these words would create an estate tail. scendants in all generations; but when it was taken as a word of purchase, it might denote a particular person, and be designatio persona. The second question then would be, whether the intention of the testator appeared, that the word issue should be designatio persona, or whether he designed it to be a word of limitation; and they held that the testator designed Boothby v. it to be a description of the person, because he added Vernon, a further limitation to the issue, viz. and to the heirs of such issue for ever. 50. A will was made in these words,-" To the intent that all my lands should remain in my name and blood, I devise to J. S., my near kinsman, such and such lands, &c., to have and to hold for the term of his natural life only, without impeachment of waste; then to the issue male of his body lawfully to be bègotten, if God shall bless him with such issue; remainder to the heirs male of the body of that issue." Backhouse v. Wells, Vide Sparrow Ante, c. 12. v. Shaw, Lord Ch. J. Parker delivered the opinion of the whole Court, that the devisee was made tenant for life, remainder to the issue in tail. The words of the will, he said, were so express to this purpose, that neither any words that could have been used, nor any arguments, could make it plainer; this he said was both the obvious and the legal sense of the words, and what they would have imported in a conveyance. 51. J. Newson devised a moiety of certain lands, Doe v. Collins, after the death of his wife, to his daughter Susan, during the term of her natural life, and after her decease, to the issue of her body lawfully begotten, and their heirs for ever. Susan had one daughter born before the will was made, and two born after, Lord Kenyon said, that in a will, issue was either a word of purchase, or of limitation, as would best answer the intention of the devisor: though in the case of a deed, issue was universally taken as a word of purchase. Therefore, without disputing any of the former cases, but, on the contrary, in confirmation 4 Term R. 294. Unless the general intent require a diffe rent construction. King v. Melling, 1 Vent. 225. 232. 2. Lev. 58. of them all, and relying upon them for the foundation of this judgment, namely, that the intention of the devisor must prevail, he was of opinion that the devisor, in this case, used issue as a word of purchase, and consequently that Susan took only an estate for life, and her children took an estate in fee simple. Judgment was given accordingly. 52. It has been stated in Chap. XII., that where a testator appears to have had a particular intent, and also a general intent, both of which cannot, by any mode of construction, be carried into effect; the courts will construe the will in such a manner as to effectuate the general intent, though by that means the particular intent be defeated. 53. A person devised lands to A. for his natural life, and after his decease he gave the same to the issue 2 P. Wms. 472. of his body lawfully begotten, on a second wife; and for want of such issue, to B. and his heirs for ever. Provided that A. might make a jointure of all such premises to such second wife. King v. 1 Eden, 424. Lord Hale was of opinion that this was an estate tail in A.; and though the three other Judges of the Court of K. B. were of a contrary opinion, yet upon error brought in the Exchequer Chamber, the judgment was reversed, and Lord Hale's opinion established. 54. John Blunt devised an estate to his cousin John Harris, to hold the same during the term of his natural life, and from and immediately after the determination of that estate, he gave the same to the issue male of John Harris, lawfully begotten, and to his and their heirs, share and share alike; and for want of such issue, then he gave the same to the issue female of John Harris, lawfully begotten, to her and their heirs, share and share alike, if more than one, and for want of such issue, then he gave the same unto his cousin William King, his heirs and assigns for ever, with a condition that if the said John Harris, |