Ante, c. 11. The question was, whether Sissily Carr took an estate in fee, or only for life. Lord Kenyon said, where a devisee is directed to pay an annual rent-charge or a solid sum to another person, out of the estate devised, it had been properly decided that the devisee should take a fee, because he might be a loser unless the estate in his hands were at all events sufficient to enable him to bear those charges. Where a sum of money was given, it might be payable before the rents became due: and where an annual charge was made on the estate, it might continue beyond the life of the devisee; and therefore it was necessary in both those cases that the devisee should have a permanent fund. That this case had been compared to that of Doe v. Richards; but there the words were, my legacies and funeral expenses being thereout paid; which imported that those sums were to be paid by the devisee out of the interest given to her; and if she had died immediately after the devisor, and had only taken a life estate, the fund out of which she was to bear those charges might have failed: the Court was therefore compelled to make that decision, and he was now perfectly satisfied with it. But in this case the words of the will were, after payment of my just debts and funeral expenses. Now supposing the devisor had in the beginning of the will charged his debts and funeral expenses on his real estate, and had then, after a series of limitations, devised to his wife in the words here used, it could not have been contended that such a charge on the real estate would have passed the fee to his wife; and if not, the place in which the same words were introduced could not vary the question. He admitted that the real estate was charged with the payment of debts and funeral expenses, if the personalty was not sufficient for that purpose; but there were no words charging the estate in the hands of the wife with the payment of those debts. This therefore essentially differed the present case from that of Doe v. Richards; for there the debts were to be paid by the devisee, and were a charge on the estate in his hands; whereas here the debts were no charge on the devisee. Judgment was given that Sissily Carr took only an estate for life, 558. On a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber, this 1 Bos. & Pul. judgment was reversed, upon the ground that the words, all the rest of the real estate, created an estate in fee. Ca. 607. A writ of error was then brought in the House of 7 Bro. Parl. Lords, where the following question was put to the Judges: What estate the devisee Sissily Carr took in the premises in question? to which the Lord Ch. B. of the Exchequer delivered their unanimous opinion, that Sissily Carr took an estate for life; whereupon the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber was reversed, and that of the Court of King's Bench affirmed. 31. Previous to the hearing of this case in the House of Lords, the following case was determined by the Court of K. B., in conformity to the doctrine laid down by that Court in the preceding case. 8 Term R. 49. 32. A person made his will in these words: "As to Doe v. Allen, what real and personal estate it hath pleased Almighty God to bless me, I give and dispose of the same as followeth: first, my will is, that all my debts and funeral expenses be justly paid off and discharged out of my personal estate; and if the same shall fall short, I do hereby charge my real estate with the payment of the same. I do hereby give and devise all my messuagés, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever, situate lying and being, &c., unto W. Allen." And the question was, what estate passed by these words. Lord Kenyon said, that the debts were not at all events charged upon the real estate, but only contin Or an annuity Ager v. Poole, The word estate, when descriptive of local situation. Ch. 11. § 25. Chester v. Painter, gently, if the personal estate should not be sufficient, and therefore did not come up to the cases cited, of a gross sum to be paid out of the land devised, and consequently the words gave no more than an estate for life to the devisee. Judgment was given accordingly. 33. It has been stated in a former chapter, that a devise of land, charged with an annual payment to a third person for life, creates an estate in fee simple; but it is otherwise where the annual payment is only to continue during the life of the person to whom the land is devised. 34. A person devised lands to D. his wife, yielding and paying therefore yearly during her natural life, to the right heirs of his father, forty shillings, &c. The Court was of opinion that D. took only an estate for life. 35. It has also been already stated that the word estate will create a fee simple, when it appears to have been used by a testator to denote all his interest in the lands devised; but where it appears to have been used as merely descriptive of the local situation of the lands devised, it will then pass no more than an estate for life. 36. Upon an appeal to the King in Council from a 2 P. Wms. 335. decree made in the Island of Antigua, the case was: A person having real and personal estate, gave and bequeathed one third part of all his estate whatsoever to his wife Ann; and devised to his son John,' and to his heirs, two thirds of all his real and personal estate. It was determined by Lord Ch. J. Raymond, Sir J. Jekyll, and Lord Ch. J. Eyre, that the wife took only an estate for life; the word estate being rather a description of the thing itself, than of the testator's interest in it: and by the next clause it appeared, that where the testator intended to give a fee, there he took care to add the word heirs to the word estate. 37. A person having devised his estate to his nephew Rogers v. Briggs, Thomas Hutton and his heirs, added these words: "And if my said nephew shall have no issue male, then Andrews, R. my said estate shall go to the daughter or daughters of 210. my brother Richard, and to the daughter or daughters of my brother Matthew, remainder to his right heirs." The question was, whether by the devise to the daughters of Richard and Matthew, an estate in fee or for life passed. The Court was clearly of opinion that an estate for life only passed to the daughters: for as it was argued that although in wills the word estate was sufficient to carry a fee, yet in this case, where the consequence was the disinheriting an heir at law, a fee should not pass thereby, unless the intent of the testator was very plain and apparent for that purpose. That the intent was not so apparent as to force the Court to put such a construction on the devise to the daughters as was insisted on; but on the contrary, from the contexture of the whole will, it seemed plain that the word estate was always, and particularly in the devise in question, used as descriptive only, and synonymous with lands; so that there would be putting a force on it to make it carry a fee. And besides, the devise over to the testator's heirs showed that he thought he had further interest to dispose of, after the devise of the daughters, to whom he did not seem to intend so much as an estate tail. Judgment that the daughters of Richard and Matthew took only estates for life. Goodright v. 11 East, 220. Barron, hereditament. 38. The word hereditament only creates an estate The word for life, in a will; for it does not denote the measure or quantity of the estate; as it has a proper and appropriate meaning, and extends to annuities, advowsons in gross, and many other things.* * The word "perpetual" as applicable to an advowson, is only descriptive of the thing devised, and not of the quantum of interest.— 2 B. & B. 27, 1 Pri. 353. See Doe v. Wood, 1 B. & A. 518. Where the general intent requires it. Lowe v. Davies, 1561. 39. Although an estate be devised to a person and the heirs of his body, yet if the general intent of the testator can only be carried into effect by construing the words heirs of the body to be words of purchase, the devisee will only take an estate for life. 40. A person devised to his son B. J. and his heirs. 21d. Raym. lawfully to be begotten, that is to say, to his first, second, third, and every son and sons lawfully to be begotten of the body of the said B. J. and the heirs of the body of such first, second, third, and every son and sons successively, lawfully issuing; and in default of such issue, then to his right heirs for ever. Doe v. Laming, 2 Burr. 1100. It was resolved that B. J. took only an estate for life, the word heirs being fully explained by the subsequent words, to be a word of purchase. 41. Lands held in gavelkind were devised to Ann 1 Black. R. 265. Cornish and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten or to be begotten, as well females as males, and to their heirs and assigns for ever; to be equally divided, share and share alike, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants. Lord Mansfield said, that the devise could not take effect at all, but would be absolutely void, unless the heirs of the body of Ann Cornish took as purchasers. The lands devised were gavelkind, and it was manifest the testator did not mean that his estate should go in a course of descent in gavelkind, for he gave it to the heirs of the body of Ann Cornish, as well females as males; therefore they could not take otherwise than as purchasers. It would be a void devise if the words were to be construed as words of limitation; for the testator breaks the gavelkind descent, by giving it to females as well as males. He likewise added, "and to their heirs and assigns for ever to be divided equally share and share alike." Nay, he went further, "as tenants in common and not as joint-tenants." But this could not be, if they were to take in a course of gavelkind descent, for in such |