Jackson v. 3 Bro. Parl. Ca. 388. that these words only applied to the personal property of the testator, because they were accompanied with limitations peculiar to personal property. But the Court said, they could not restrain the meaning of those words to personal property, and negative the operation of them as to real estates. 75. G. Jackson being seised of several real estates, descendible freeholds, and chattels real, gave to his mother, Mary Jackson, some particular estates for life, without liberty of committing waste; he afterwards gave several legacies, and an annuity of 30l. to his heir at law, and then proceeded thus,-" I also give and bequeath unto my dearly beloved mother, Mary Jackson, all the remainder and residue of all the effects, both real and personal, which I shall die possessed of." The question was, whether this last clause passed all the testator's freehold estates to his mother in fee simple. The Court of King's Bench in Ireland gave judgment in favour of the heir at law. This was reversed by the Court of King's Bench in England; upon which a writ of error was brought in the House of Lords. It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, to be an established rule, that an heir at law should not be disinherited but by express words, or necessary implication. The residuary clause in this case contained no express devise of the real estates; the word effects being properly applicable only to personal estate. The subsequent words, "which I shall die possessed of," supported and strengthened this construction; because the express allusion of those words to a future acquisition was inapplicable to real estates, as none acquired after the publication of the will could pass by it; and the word possessed properly related only to personal estate; as to the word real, annexed to the word effects, it applied expressly to the chattels real left by the testator; nor was there any necessary implication that any greater interest in the real estates was intended for the mother, than the estate for life, without power of waste, expressly devised to her in two of the denominations. Such an implication, so far from being necessary, was incompatible with, and would merge and destroy, and in fact revoke, the mother's express estate for life, and restriction from waste; and would break through another rule, as well of law as of common sense, which says, that what is expressed shall not be destroyed by implication. Another rule of construction was, that where words used by a testator are indifferently applied to real and personal estates, they should not, if there was any thing to satisfy them, receive a construction prejudicial to the heir. Now in the present case the words bequeath, effects, aud possessed of, were indisputably much less applicable to real than to personal estate; they had never been admitted to apply to the former, but where insurmountable arguments of such an intent, afforded by other parts of the will, rendered that construction necessary. But here the other parts of the will were so far from requiring such a construction, that they were destroyed if it were admitted. The words, in their most proper sense, applied to personal estate; and the chattels real which the testator left, showed his reason for annexing the word real to effects, which otherwise properly meant moveables only; and fully satisfied those words: they could not therefore be extended to real estates. It was also an established rule that general words in one part of a will should be so construed as not to defeat the plain intention of the testator, to be collected from any other part of his will. Now, in the present case, the devise to the mother for life, without power of waste, was incompatible with an intention to give her the same lands in fee; and therefore the residuary clause must be so, construed as to avoid this inconsistency. On the other side it was contended, that it was manifest the testator did not mean to die intestate, Doe v. 11 East, 290. Doe v. Trout, as to any part of his real property; not only from the expressive words in the residuary clause, but also from the introductory words of the will," as to my worldly substance;" which had been always understood to consist of real and personal estate; and to indicate an intent in the testator who used them to dispose of all his property. The testator's first devise to his mother was only of a part of his real estate; creditors were entitled to another part, that is, so much as would be sufficient, by sale, to discharge their encumbrances; the legatees were entitled to a further part thereof; yet there still remained some part to dispose of; and this remainder the testator had, with perfect consistency, given to his mother, by the residuary clause. The views with which he made these two devises were sufficiently obvious; by the former, in all events, and subject to no encumbrance, he made a provision for his mother; by the latter, he gave her the residue which might remain, after all the encumbrances should be discharged. He had not therefore given part and the whole to his mother. In this case the heir at law was disinherited, both by express words, and by necessary implication; for, in the residuary clause, the testator had made use of the most expressive and comprehensive words, in giving to his mother the whole remainder of his real property. The Judges having been consulted, the Lord Chief Baron delivered their unanimous opinion, that Mary 13 East, 394. Jackson took an estate in fee in all the testator's property, under the residuary clause: and the judgment of 1 Taunt. 289. the Court of King's Bench in England was affirmed. Morgan v. Surman, Markant v. 1 Ab. Eq. 211. 76. But where the words, residue of my estate, property, or effects, appear, from the context of the will, to have been confined by the testator to personal property only, they will not be construed to extend to real estates. 77. A man having settled all his estate of inheritance on his wife for life, for her jointure, made his will, and thereby devised several pecuniary legacies; and then said," All the rest and residue of my estate, chattels real and personal, I give and devise to my wife." The question was, whether the reversion of the jointure lands passed to the wife. Lord Harcourt decreed it did not, because the precedent and subsequent words explained his intent to carry only his personal estate; for in the first part of the will, having given only legacies, and no land, the words, all the rest and residue of his estate, were relative, and must be intended estate of the same nature with that he had before devised, which was only personal; for having before given no real estate, there could be no rest or residue of that, out of which he had given away none. Then the words, chattels real and personal, explained the word estate, and showed what sort of estate he meant; and made the devise as if he had said, all the rest of my estate, whether chattels real or personal, &c.; and so confined and restrained the extended sense of the word estate. Perkins, 78. A testator devised as follows: "All those my Timewell v. freehold lands and hop grounds, with the messuages 2 Atk. 102. or tenements, barns, &c. in the tenure of L.; and all other the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, consisting in money, plate, jewels, leases, judgments, mortgages, &c. or in any other thing whatsoever or wheresoever, I give to A. B. and her assigns for ever." Justice Fortescue, at the Rolls, held that the residue of the testator's real estate did not pass by this devise; Camfield v. for although the word estate, when unrestrained, would Gilbert, include lands as well as personal estate, yet here it was expressly confined to personals, as plate, &c.; and had the testator intended to give all his real estate, why did he mention a part of it only? 79. In a modern case, the Court of King's Bench held, that the words, residue and remainder of effects, did not extend to real estates; from the apparent intention manifested by the testator, of not extending the word effects to real estates. 3 East, 516. Miles, 6 Goodtitle v. Doe v. 11 East, 322. Williams v. Thomas, 12 East, 141. Doe v. Hurrell, 5 Barn, and Ald. 18. Effect of additional words. § 55. 80. With respect to additional words, the Courts Tit. 32. c. 20. appear to have always been disposed to adopt the rule established for the construction of deeds; namely, that where there is a correct and specific description of the property devised, a mistake in any additional words will have no effect. But where the first description is merely general, there additional words will be considered, either as explanatory or restrictive, according to the intent of the testator. Chamberlain v. Thus, in the following cases, a mistake in the additional words was held to have no effect. 81. A person being seised in fee of a house called the White Swan, in Old-street, devised it in these words; "I devise the house or tenement wherein William Nichols dwelleth, called the White Swan, in Old-street, to H. G., my daughter's son, for ever." The jury found that the said W. Nichols, at the time when the will was made, and when the testator died, occupied the alley of the said house, and three upper rooms; and that divers other persons occupied the garden, and other places in the said house. The question was, whether all the house passed, or only the entry, and the three rooms which were in the possession of W. Nichols. The Ch. J. Hyde doubted; but Jones, Whitlocke, and Croke were of opinion that all the house passed to the devisee; for the devise being, "that house or tenement," and the conclusion, "called the White Swan," did both of them necessarily import the whole house. For the sign of the White Swan could not be intended to refer to the three rooms: and the words after, viz. "wherein W. Nichols dwelleth," did not abridge or alter that devise; and the house being named by the particular name of the White Swan, although W. Nichols never inhabited it, but only occupied three rooms, passed by the devise. If the house had not been described by the particular name of the White Swan, and the testator had devised the house in |