Loddington v. Kime, Tit. 16. c., 1 Ld. Raym. 205. The words sons, children, relations, &c. Marwood v. Cases temp. Lomax v. 1 Ves. 290. said, that all the children should take, and even grandchildren, if there had been any: and although the devise was to the issue begotten, that made no difference; the words begotten, and to be begotten, were the same, as well in the construction of wills, as settlements, and take in all the issue after begotten; and though, upon the death of the testator, there was then only a daughter born, yet upon the birth of another child the estate should open, and take in an after-born son. 44. In a case which has been already stated, it was -held that a devise to the issue male of E. Armyn and his heirs for ever was a good description of the person, and a word of purchase. 45. The words sons, children, relations, and descendants, are sufficient to describe the devisees in a will; provided they can be applied with certainty to persons answering those descriptions... 46. Lands were devised to the first son of A. who was not heir at law to A. his father. This was held a good description of the second son. 47. A person devised to his son Caleb for life, and after his decease to the first, second, third, &c. sons of his body begotten. Caleb had married about two months before the date of the will; he had a son who died soon, and afterwards had another son. Lord Hardwicke decreed, that the second son should take under the will, as first son; for these words were not to be always taken strictly in the sense of primoge nitus, or first-born; but in the sense of an elder son, senior, or maximus natus. Tit. 32. c. 21.-48. It has been stated, that in deeds, as the word procreatis extends to issue born after the execution of the deed, so the word procreandis will extend to issue born before. This mode of construction is of course Doe v. Hallett, extended to wills, in which the words to be begotten, and begotten, have the same sense; and in the preceding case Lord Hardwicke held that doctrine, which has been confirmed in a modern case. 1 Maule and Ź Selw. 124. MS. Rep. 49. A person devised her real estate to trustees, in Pyott v. Pyott, trust for her daughter Martha, with a proviso, that if 1 Ves. 335. she died before 21, or marriage, then in trust to convey all the residue of her estate, both real and personal, unto her nearest relation of the name of Pyott; and to his or her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns. The daughter died under age and unmarried. At the time of the will, and death of the testatrix, her nearest relations of the name of Pyott were the plaintiff Charles Pyott, and his sisters, the defendants, Ann and Blanche, who were both then unmarried, but were married at the time of Martha's death. They had besides these another sister, Caroline, who had been married many years before the testatrix's death, and was no party to the suit. The plaintiff had also had an elder brother John, who died before the testatrix, but left issue a son, Richard Pyott, who survived both the testatrix and her daughter, and was heir at law on the part of the mother to the testatrix; and to whom the trustees, after the daughter's death, conveyed the estate in question. This Richard Pyott devised the premises to trustees, in trust for the defendant Pyarea Pyott his wife, and E. Wilmot. The plaintiff by his bill claimed the testatrix's estate, as the nearest relation of the name of Pyott. The defendants Ann and Blanche, the plaintiff's sisters, insisted that they were entitled equally with the plaintiff, as they were both unmarried, and of the name of Pyott, at the time of the will, and death of the testatrix. And the defendant Pyarea Pyott and E. Wilmot, who stood in the place of Richard Pyott the heir at law, insisted that either he was the person meant by the nearest relation, or else that the devise was void for uncertainty; and so the premises descended to him, as heir to the testatrix on the part of her mother. Lord Hardwicke said, the first question was, whether the devise was absolutely uncertain, and he thought it was not. It was said, that by the words nearest rela Bon. v. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 532. tion, the testatrix meant some single person; but he was of opinion that the word relation here was to be taken as nomen collectivum, as much as kindred or heir. Suppose the devise had been to her nearest kindred, no doubt that it would have taken in several persons; wills and acts of parliament, Lord Coke tell us, were to be taken according to common parlance, and the word relation was often used instead of kindred, it being common to say, such an one has a numerous relation, whereby were meant many; and it was good English. But the present case differed from all that had been cited, because the personal estate was involved in the same devise with the real, and had this been a bequest only of personal estate, all those who were of the name of the Pyotts in an equal degree, and were of the nearest stock to the testatrix, would have taken by virtue of the statute of distributions; and if it was clear who should take the personal estate, it naturally inferred whom the testatrix meant should take the real, there being but one intent as to both; and this of the personal was a proper key to explain how the real estate was intended to go. . The next question was, who was to take? At the time of making the will, there were three persons in equal degree of the name of Pyott, and a fourth who had been so, but was married: two of the three married before the happening of the contingency, upon which they were to take, and so lost their name; whence it was insisted by the plaintiff, that these, not being of the name when the contingency happened, could not claim with him, but he alone was entitled; and for this was cited Jobson's case, Cro. Eliz. 576. He was not well satisfied with that determination; for what was meant was a description of the person, without any regard to the continuation of the name; and had the daughter been unmarried at the devisor's death, she would immediately have taken, nor could her subsequent marriage make her lose her right; it being im material, if she was to change her name, at what time she did it. But that case differed from the present, being a remainder to the next of his kin, of his name, after an estate tail to A. Taking therefore the word relation to be nomen collectivum, there was no ground to construe this description to refer to the very name of Pyott, but rather to be a description of the stock, and as if she had said the stock or blood of the Pyotts. For taking it otherwise, and suppose some nearer relation of the testatrix, but of another name at her death, had afterwards changed by act of parliament his former name to Pyott; or if a woman had married some man of the name of Pyott, but no way related to the testatrix, such a one would certainly not be entitled to take; and yet every argument drawn from the bearing the name of Pyott, at the happening of the contingency, would hold equally strong for him or her, as it did for the plaintiff's taking alone, in exclusion of his sisters. This showed it therefore to be too narrow a construction, and that the word relation and name meant the stock of the Pyotts; which she meant to distinguish from any other stock of consanguinity to her. It was like a devise upon condition to marry a person of the devisor's name: the devisee married a man who had changed his name to that of the devisor: held, this was no performance of the condition, for that name meant family. The personal estate was coupled with the real, and one rule must govern both, and the sister that was married was, he thought, equally entitled to take with the plaintiff and the two other sisters. The testatrix had made no provision that the persons taking should continue to bear the name; and therefore the plaintiff and his three sisters should take equally. 50. A testator devised his estate to three persons for life, and after their death, to the descendants of Francis Ince, then living in and about Seven Oaks, in Kent. Sir T. Clarke, M. R. said, that a devise to descendants at large had been good; here the devisor added Leigh v. 15 Ves. 92. 512. a description of such as he intended should take, which was sufficiently precise and certain; it would be unjust to confine it to the heirs at law, because the word descendants meant all those who proceeded from his body, and therefore the grandchildren of Francis Ince were entitled: but a great grandchild, being born after the will made, was excluded by the words, then living. 51. Lord Leigh devised his estates to his sister Mary Leigh, in strict settlement; remainder "unto the first and nearest of his kindred, being male, and of his name and blood, that should be living at the determination of the several estates therein-before devised, and to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten." It was held by Lord Eldon, in conformity to the Denn. Bagshaw, opinions of Mr. Justice Lawrence and Mr. Baron Term, Rep. Thompson, whom he had called to his assistance, that a person claiming under this limitation must be of the name, as well as the blood; and that the qualification as to the name was not satisfied, by having the name taken by the King's licence, previous to the determination of the preceding estates. Doe v. 3 B & A. 474. Doe v. Over, 1 Taunt. 203. 17 Ves. 255. 52. A person devised all his freehold estates to his wife during her natural life; and at her decease to be equally divided amongst the relations on his side. It was held, that all those should take who would be entitled to personal estate under the statute of distributions, that is, first cousins; as well in the paternal as in the maternal line. And the devise spoke at the time of the testator's death, not at the time of framing the devise; therefore one who was related in equal degree at the time of making the will, having died before the testator, leaving a son, the son was held not entitled to a share, as a relation.* * There is a reference in the above case, (1 Taunt. 266.) and also in 19 Ves. 301. to a case in 1732, decided by Sir Joseph Jekyll, in which it is stated to have been held, that, under a limitation to the family of J. S., the real estate went to the heir at law, and the per |