W. F. Marh and C. E. Lynn. The church now numbers twenty-two, and maintains a Sabbath-school in connection with its other services.

ELM GROVE CHRISTIAN CHURCH of St. Mary's township dates its existence from January, 1871. The original members were Samuel Barston, E. Barstonn, D. D. Wilson, Sarah H. Wilson, Aaron Townsend and wife, Henry McLauffin and wife, Reuben Gillen and wife, Hannah Clark, E. Wilson and wife, Mrs. Mary Pierce, Mrs. Mach and others. The society possessing no church holds its services in the school-house and at private dwellings. The pastors have been W. A. Denton, and elders Miller, Pursel, Warn, Hardeman and George Wagner. The membership is now eleven.

These various societies, together with the city churches, have all been alive to the religious interests of the county. It would be simply impossible to attempt to measure the vast good they have accomplished, the peace they have brought to minds disturbed on account of sin and its consequences, to understand how fully and completely they have shed light into darkened minds, and to value the lives they have recovered to humanity and to God. Though each holds its peculiar dogmas, and adopts each its special creed, they have, in the main, been united in their efforts to discharge the trusts devolving them. Knowing full well that controversy leads men away from religion and things divine, they have contented themselves with that strongest of all arguments, and the one most productive of good-faithful and christian living. The years of the past only afford an earnest of what may be accomplished yet in the future, and to still greater results should the religious element of the county address its energies. These brief sketches of churches cannot fail to bring to mind many incidents and scenes, some painful, others blessed, in the lives of many who may read them, for most are identified with some one or another of them. But they ought also to awaken them to lives of renewed and consecrated endeavors.

CRIMINAL HISTORY.

The record of crime in the county, could it all be written, would form a volume by itself. By crime is meant all that does violence to the laws of the land, the laws imposed by custom, or those sensibilities to which protection is insured by the moral sense of the community. Taken in this view the record is both long and startling. But in the narrower sense of personal violence and grevious personal injury, the county can by no means claim immunity from crimes of both a revolting and horrible

nature. Some of these have received the attention of grand juries, and aroused public sentiment to a point of high excitement, and only occasionally have the perpetrators been brought to justice. It has almost seemed that the blood of the innocent have called in vain for vengeance. The wheels of human justice revolve but slowly, and rarely surely. Occasionally has justice been meted, but with a sparing hand; at other times the most fearful crimes have been consummated, one in the history of this county especially, implicating many yet living, and have been compassed under the auspices of those riotous gatherings known as lynchers. The Lawn case will long be remembered as the most dastardly and unwarranted crime ever perpetrated in the state. No matter how men may hope to excuse themselves, or to stay the reproaches of conscience, a deed of this kind must lead to long hours of remorse and self-condemnation. And the surer still will this occur when it is remembered that an armed mob of many men attacked two defenseless fellows, enticed them from the jurisdiction of another county to this, and without the semblance of justice or the consciousness of right proceeded summarily to hang them. It is to be regretted that the facts in this celebrated case cannot be gleaned in order to give its history, for crime of this nature deserves naught but the severest condemnation, even to the extreme penalty of the law.

It is not pleasant to dwell upon crime in any form, and less than all other crimes, the crime of murder. There have been given therefore the three most celebrated cases in the county's history, the facts of some of which are scarcely known to even many who were residents at the time they were committed. A deep and abiding hatred of these forms of violence is one of the best features of public sentiment to-day, and the law-loving citizen could but wish his county had no such record. And yet it must be recorded that through the negligence of officials and the law's delay there has never been a single conviction for murder in the first degree, and not one judicial execution, while there are several clear cases of homicide on record in the county, May the future be free from crime of this class, and the fair name of Mills forevermore untainted.

THE MURDER OF JOHN KRETZINGER.

In November of 1856, William Winters shot and killed John Kretzinger in Glenwood. The men had been about the town all day of the 20th, eating and drinking together, and as usual for men under such circumstances, had some misunderstanding or difficulty in the forenoon. Bystanders had supposed the matter amicably adjusted. In the afternoon Winters seemed to be anxious to shoot some one, and handled his revolver in a manner so careless as to endanger the lives of persons on the streets. Several parties attempted to get possession of the dangerous weapon, but

were deterred from fear of personal danger, Finally Kretzinger walked towards Winters with both hands up, saying, "He will not shoot; I'll get it away from him." As Kretzinger approached Winters fired, the ball taking effect in the left temple. Kretzinger lay in a precarious state until that night, and then quietly passed away. Winters was indicted in the February term of the district court, 1857, and plead not guilty, and filed his plea to that effect. The trial began at a special term of the district court, held at Glenwood, commencing June 2, 1857. The presiding judge was E. H. Sears, of Sidney, Fremont county, Iowa. The prosecuting attorney was Hon. J. W. Russell; the counsel for the defense being W. S. Graff, Hon. Ben. Rector, and J. A. Harvey.

After the organization of the court the proceedings began by impannelling the following jury: Julius Barnes, William Madison, Thomas E. Burns, George Clark, N. A. West, J. L. Shields, Harvey Summers, Moses Mumpstead, Henry Raines, Edward Gilliland, Peter Hunter, and Charles Kesterson. After the reading of the indictment the counsel for the prosecution addressed the jury as follows:

"Gentlemen of the Fury:

"The oath which you have just taken imposes upon you grave duties, and hearty and solemn responsibilities. The prisoner at the bar stands before you charged with one of the highest crimes known to human laws; he is charged with having, with malice aforethought, taken away from a fellow being that life which God can alone give, and alone has a right to take. He has been arraigned and plead not guilty to the indictment, and put himself upon the county for trial. For him, in this instance, you are that county; he is in your charge, and you have sworn to make true deliverance between him and the state, and a true verdict to render according to the law and evidence given you. It is your duty to divest yourselves of all prejudice and bias, and enter upon the discharge of your very important duties, with perfect impartiality, and to decide this cause according to the law and the evidence as given in court. You should not let your sympathies for the deceased, nor your resentment, nor abhorence of the homicide committed in your midst, influence you in the least, but should let all your acts be squared by impartiality and candor. You have important and delicate duties to perform, both to the accused and to society. While you should be careful that no feelings of hatred, spite or illwill towards the accused should influence you in your deliberations, you should be equally careful that no feeling of sympathy for the prisoner move you from the strict line of duty. The peace, morality and safety of society, depend upon a firm and efficient execution of the laws and the prompt and impartial administration of justice. And while you do justice to the prisoner you should not be unmindful of society, and of the obligation which you have assumed to it by the oath you have just taken."

Counsel here proceeded to take the evidence in the case, deducing substantially the facts as first above given. After the opening argument by the counsel for the prosecution, the defense addressed the jury, resting their case upon the ground of a "delirious and insane condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the commission of the deed under which he acted, superinduced by the continual indulgence in the use of intoxicating liquor for several days previous thereto, connected with the series of petty annoyances and provocations of those by whom he was surrounded."

After the conclusion of the addresses to the jury the court charged that body as follows:

"Gentlemen: The office you are now called on to exercise is the most solemn duty that ever falls to the lot of man to perform, and calls for your serious, calm and deliberate consideration. The life of a human life is in your hands; by your verdict his destiny for time will be fixed. Prejudice, hatred or illwill against the accused on the one hand, and human sympathy on the other, should have no influence on your minds in arriving at your final decision. Judge as you would be judged is your high and responsible duty. Remember that the spirit of the law is not vindictive. While it is its first object to protect society from the vicious, it is not so much its object to punish as to reform the delinquent and protect and preserve itself. But the first great object of law is to protect the lives and persons of those placed under its care, and where it fails in this it fails in the primary objects, for which it was instituted, and to do this, to answer the end of its creation, proper, salutary and adequate judgment must be inflicted, strongly, yet justly and mercifully inflicted. And it is your duty gentleman to apply these considerations to the case now to be submitted to your decision.

"With the facts in that case the court has nothing to do. The law has made you the exclusive judges of the facts and I cheerfully leave them where the law has wisely placed them. But the law makes it the duty of the court to lay before you the rules of law by which these facts are to be governed. And to that law your attention is now called.

“And first: It is not every killing that the law calls murder. There is such a thing as justifiable homicide-as where it is done in self-defense, and is actually necessary to protect oneself from death or great injury, or where it is done in the protection of a member of his family, or becomes necessary to enforce or execute the laws, and it may also be justifiable under certain circumstances, even in the protection of property. And again, killing may in some cases be excusable-as where a man commits the act when not in the possession of his reason-a man is not accountable for his acts when actually insane-as a temporary insanity produced by his own wilful act. But

"Second: Killing a human being with malice aforethought is murdermalice is the essence of all crime. But malice may be express or implied. Express malice is where one out of actual ill-will deliberately takes the life of another. Implied malice is where one without manifesting any particular ill-will deliberately kills another, or where he does an act showing a reckless disregard of consequences, the immediate and natural result of which is the death of a human being-or where he does the act in the deliberate attempt to commit another crime; and by our statute that crime must be a felony. By malice aforethought, is simply meant that the accused actually formed the determination to kill the person alleged to have been murdered. The length of time for which such determination had been formed is immaterial; it is enough if the accused at the time of the commission of the act, without sufficient cause, actually intended to kill the deceased. But

"Third: To constitute murder in the first degree, there must be not only malice aforethought as above explained, but there must be a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. The term deliberate is here the controlling word that distinguishes the first from the second degree of murder; and it is to be taken in contrast with the word haste or the want of time to deliberate-and without this element of deliberation your verdict should not be for murder in the first degree. But the time necessary to form a deliberate intent, is a matter left wholly for your consideration, and from your knowledge of the operations of mind as applied to the circumstances of this case you are to decide. But

"Fourth: It is contended on the part of the defendant that the prisoner at the time of committing the act, was in a state of mind that rendered him incapable of forming a deliberate intent or determination, and therefore that he could not be guilty of the crime alleged, not being accountable for his acts at the time. This renders it necessary for me to define the law to some extent governing such a state of facts. And to do this it will be necessary to give the legal distinction between delirium tremens and intoxication. For although delirium tremens is the result of intemperance, and therefore in some sense is voluntarily brought on, yet it is distinguishable, and by the law is distinguished from that madness which sometimes accompanies drunkenness. If a person suffering under delirium tremens is so far insane as to render him irresponsible, the law does not punish him for any crime he may commit. But if a person commits a crime while intoxicated, under the immediate influence of liquor, the law does punish him. It is no excuse, but rather an aggravation of his offense, that he first deprives himself of reason before he does the act. There would be no security for life and property if men could commit crimes with impunity, provided they would first make themselves drunk enough to cease to be reasonable beings. And, therefore, it may be a