In re Isaac Rosenfield. slightly varied in form. The change consists in substituting subsequently for "since." These words, although similar in meaning, are not identical. "Since," according to Worcester, means, "from the time of ;" and its meaning is illustrated by a line from Milton : "He since the morning hour set out from Heaven.” And Webster in his dictionary says, "the proper signification of since is, after, and its appropriate sense includes the whole period between an event and the present time. "I have not seen my brother since January." "Subsequently," according to the same authorities, means, "at a later time," or " afterwards," that is, at any time afterwards. * Now, the act described in the fourteenth item, is that of a merchant or tradesman, not keeping proper 162 books of account. If the limitation had been expressed by the words, "since the passage of this act," it might have been said that to bring a merchant or tradesman within its provisions, he must, during the whole period from the passage of the act, have neglected to keep proper books of account. Whereas, by using the word "subsequently," it would be sufficient to show that he had, at any time after the passage of the act, neglected to keep proper books of account. And this, no doubt, is what was intended by the provision. We see, therefore, why it was that, "in the fourteenth item,' it was thought necessary to repeat the limitation annexed to the sixth item, but to express it in a somewhat different form. The fact, then, of such repetition in the fourteenth item, does not prove that the limitation annexed to the sixth item was not meant to extend to all the intervening sections. But let us see what would be the result of the construction contended for by the counsel for the creditors. The act described in the sixth item, to which the limitation as to time is expressly annexed, is, the act of destroying, mutilating, altering, or falsifying, books, documents, papers, writings, or securities. This is certainly one of the grossest frauds that could possibly be committed by a bankrupt, and In re Isaac Rosenfield. if this must be committed since the passage of the act, in order to make it a ground upon which to refuse a discharge, it would be difficult to imagine upon what possible principle the same limitation was not extended to the acts described in the following items. A construction involving such a result certainly cannot be the true construction. At all events, it ought not to be adopted unless it is imperatively required by the language of the act. But again, by the construction contended for, if there is no limitation as to time with regard to the tenth item, there is none with regard to the ninth. The act described in the ninth item is, a "fraudulent preference contrary to the provisions of this act." Now, could it have been intended, that the mere fact of a bankrupt having, at any time before the passing of the act, given a preference to one or more of his creditors, would be a good ground upon which to oppose his discharge? By the term "fraudulent preference," of course, is meant only, a preference in fraud of the bankrupt act: that is, contrary to its provisions. But in New Jersey at least, before the passage of the bankrupt act, a debtor had a perfect right to prefer one creditor to another. This has been repeatedly decided by the supreme court of the state. Hendricks v. Mount, 3 South, 738; Tilton v. Britton, 4 Halst. 120. Nay, it has been held, that it was the duty of the debtor, under certain circumstances, to prefer one creditor to another. It cannot be imagined for one moment, that the framers of the law meant, that an act committed before its passage, and which was perfectly lawful at the time it was done, would be a ground upon which to refuse a bankrupt his discharge. Upon the whole, then, I am clearly of the opinion, that either the limitation as to time annexed to the sixth item, was intended to apply to all the intervening items between that and the fourteenth, or that these intervening items, having no limitation as to time annexed to them, must be construed in reference to the principle applicable to laws generally, which is, that they take effect only from the time of the passage. In re Louis Meyers. This is the view taken of the 39th section by those who have written upon the bankrupt act. James, after speaking of the fifth item says, "Next follows a series of misconduct or offences, which, to affect the bankrupt's order of discharge, must have been committed by him since the passage of the act. James Bankrupt Law, 129. See also Bankrupt Law by Avery & Hobbs, 214, 220. This also would seem to be the view taken by Judge Blatchford, in Rathbone's case, before referred to. One of the specifications was, fraud in an assignment made in 1854. It was objected to as being too vague. The objection was sustained, and leave granted to file new specifications. The specifications were then made more full and particular, and when the matter came up again, the judge said: "The second and third specifications relate solely to transactions by the bankrupt under and in regard to an assignment made by him in 1854. They do not set forth any ground that is covered by section 29 of the act." All the exceptions taken to the specifications filed in this case are therefore sustained. U. S. DISTRICT COURT, S. D. NEW YORK. The trust resulting in favor of creditors, in real estate held by the wife of a bankrupt, inures as assets to his assignee, when such property was purchased by the bankrupt, prior to his bankruptcy, and paid for with his own money in fraud of his creditors. Creditors waive all right of action against the bankrupt, on either their judgments or the original indebtedness, by proving their debts in bankruptcy, and all proceedings in such suits must be stayed under the 21st section of the bankrupt act. In re LOUIS MEYERS. On the 8th of June, 1865, Martin Maas recovered a judgment, in the supreme court of New York, against the bankrupt and one Sondheim, as joint debtors, for $1,130.70. It In re Louis Meyers. was duly docketed and execution was issued on it and returned unsatisfied. It is now wholly due, with interest from January 8, 1866. It was founded on two promissory notes of the debtors, one made July 18, 1860, at eight months, for $679.01, and one made August 25, 1860, at eight months, for $322.48, and an account for $9.62 for goods sold. The consideration for the notes and account was goods sold to the debtors by Maas in July, August, and September, 1860. On the 9th of April, 1866, Bache, Ulman & Bach recovered a judgment in the supreme court of New York against the bankrupt and Sondheim, as joint debtors, for $1,167.08. It was duly docketed, and execution was issued on it and returned unsatisfied, and it is now wholly due, with interest from its recovery. It was founded on a promissory note of the debtors, made August 10, 1860, at eight months, for 3781.56. The consideration for the note was goods sold to the debtors by Bache, Ulman & Bach in July, August, and September, 1860. On the 27th of March, 1868, Maas and Bache, Ulman & Bach commenced an action in the supreme court of New York against the bankrupt and his wife, the complainant in which, after setting forth the foregoing facts, averred that, while the bankrupt was so indebted to them, and while he was insolvent, and on or about the 14th of April, 1864, he purchased, with his own money and his own means, certain lands in the city of New York, with the dwelling-house thereon, particularly described in the complaint; that, on such purchase, the said house and lot of land were conveyed, by the direction of the bankrupt, and at his request, to his wife, by the vendors, by a deed of conveyance recorded July 5, 1864; that the bankrupt paid the whole or the greater part of the consideration or purchase money of the conveyance, and more than sufficient thereof to pay the amount of the said two judgments and interest; that the consideration or purchase money was $7,400; that the house and lot are now worth over $20,000; that the conveyance was voluntary and withɔut consideration, as between the bankrupt and his wife, and In re Louis Meyers. was founded upon no other consideration, as between grantor and grantee, than the purchase money so paid by the bankrupt, and was fraudulent, as against the plaintiffs in the suit, as his creditors; that, on such conveyance, the legal title, in fee simple, to the house and lot, vested in the wife of the bankrupt, and was still in her, and a trust resulted in favor of said plaintiffs, as creditors of her husband, to an extent sufficient to satisfy their demands, being the amount of the said two judgments and interest; and that Sondheim was insolvent and had been so since prior to the purchase of the house and lot. The prayer of the complaint was for judg ment, that the trust might be established and declared, that the plaintiffs might be declared to be entitled in equity to enforce the trust, that the wife of the bankrupt might be declared to be the trustee thereof, and that unless she should pay to the plaintiffs the amount due upon their judgments, with interest, the house and lot might be sold by a receiver, to be appointed by the court, and that out of the proceeds the judgments and interest may be paid. On the 13th day of February, 1868, and before the said suit was commenced, the bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The creditors above named proved their said debts in the bankruptcy proceedings. On the 10th of April, 1868, this court made an order staying all proceedings in the said action until the question of the discharge of the petitioner in bankruptcy should be determined by this court. The creditors now apply to the court for an order vacating and setting aside such order of stay. For the creditors, A. R. Dyett, Esq.; for the bankrupt, Messrs. Benedict & Boardman. BLATCHFORD, J. The order of stay was made under that part of section 21 of the bankrupt act, which provides that "no creditor proving his debt or claim, shall be allowed to maintain any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, but shall be deemed to have waived all right of action and suit against the bankrupt, and all proceedings already commenced, or unsatisfied judgments already obtained |