William H. Corner v. E. G. Miller et al. as claimant of the property and credits attached, and moves to quash the attachment for the reasons following, namely : That the defendant, Moody, on the 24th day of July, 1867, upon proceedings instituted on the 2d day of the same month, was duly declared a bankrupt under the act of congress, entitled "An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved March 2, 1867; and that the claimant afterwards became the assignee of the bankrupt; and that, as such, he had received from the register in bankruptcy an assignment of all the estate, real and personal, of the said bankrupt, by virtue of said instrument, all the property, estate, and credits of the said Moody invested in him, as such assignee; and that the attachment should be dissolved, and the property and credits in the hands of the garnishee ought to be adjudged and delivered to him. To the petition and motion the plaintiff demurred; and the question for determination is, whether the facts set forth by the claimant, and admitted by the plaintiff to be true, are sufficient to dissolve the attachment. The claimant relies upon the 14th section of the bankrupt law, "That as soon as said assignee is appointed and qualified, the judge, or, where there is no opposing interest, the register, shall, by an instrument under his hand, assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, with all its deeds, books, and papers relating thereto; and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of said proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereupon by law, the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, shall vest in said assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings." It is not denied that the attachment in this case is mesne process, and that, by a literal construction of the act, the property and credits in the hands of the garnishee, although attached as the property of the defendant Moody, vest in his William H. Corner v. E. G. Miller et al. assignee; and that, as the writ was issued and laid in the hands of the garnishee within four months next preceding the commencement of the proceedings against the bankrupt, that his assignee, who had received a conveyance of all his property and estate, is entitled to the funds and property in the hands of the garnishees, and the attachment should be dissolved. * But it was contended for the plaintiff that the act 99 did not apply to this case because, although approved on the 2d of March, 1867, it did not go into effect until the 1st day of June ensuing. This view was based on the 50th section, which declares "that this act shall commence and take effect, as to the appointment of the officers created hereby and the promulgation of rules and general orders, from and after the date of its approval; provided, that no petition or other proceeding under this act shall be filed, received, or commenced before the 1st day of June, 1867." And it was further contended, that whereas the attachment was issued on the 11th of April, 1867, before the act went into operation, to apply it to this case would give to it a retrospective effect so as to deprive a party of a vested right—a construction never adopted by the courts, either in England or the United States, unless the words of the statute be clear and unambiguous and incapable of a different construction. English Com. Law, 551; 7 John. R. 503. Certainly the words of this section are clear and unambiguous; they read thus: "Shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings." No language can be clearer, and there seems to be but one construction of which it is susceptible. But it is not admitted that the act did not take effect except "as to the appointment of the officers created thereby and the promulgation of rules and general orders" until the 1st day of June, 1868; but, to the contrary, it will be found that the most important rights and liabilities devolved upon parties immediately after the passage of the act; [see sections 23, 27, 29, 39, and 44] — for the right to compel a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy William H. Corner v. E. G. Miller et al. the disallowance of preferences, or of a discharge to a bankrupt, and the right to have him punished for a fraud upon his creditors. All these disabilities accrue as well before the 1st day of June as afterwards, and are the vital points and matter of the law. I therefore conclude that the act became a law in March, and that, by the 50th section, there was only a suspension of the remedies, that is of petitions, or other proceedings under the act, so that "they should not be filed, received, or commenced" before the first day of June afterwards, when the law should go into full operation; that is to say, should furnish all the remedial and other processes for the execution of its provisions. If these premises be correct, the plaintiff's first argument cannot prevail against the claim of the assignee. But this is not conclusive of the case, if the plaintiff has established his further allegation that, even if the law is explicit to give the right claimed by the assignee, the lien of the attachment was a vested right, and congress had no right to defeat or take it away. It would be difficult to imagine a more interesting question than this, affecting, as it does, the interests of so large a class of our citizens, and requiring an examination into the powers of congress, under the Constitution of the United States, to divest rights that have attached among the citizens of the several states. The right to pass a bankrupt law is contained in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution, which declares that congress shall have power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." In the exercise of this power congress enacted a general bankrupt law in April, 1800, and in August, 1841, and again the present act of 1867. Previous to the adoption of the Constitution, the states severally possessed the exclusive power to pass such laws, and they conferred, by that instrument, the power upon the general government. In so doing, they limited the right which they before had over contracts, and accepted the provision in the Constitution, article 1, section 10, that no state shall pass any "law impairing the obligations of contracts; under this restriction, they retain a right to pass bankrupt or William H. Corner v. E. G. Miller et al. insolvent laws, as the grant to congress is not exclusive, unless the power be exercised by a state so as to impede, or conflict, with a bankrupt law of the United States. Thus, the insolvent law of Maryland seems to have been suspended, and superseded, in its operations, by the act of 1867, except in cases where the debts of the applicant, provable under that act, shall not exceed the sum of $300. On the subject of the relative powers of the states, and of congress, to discharge the debts of a bankrupt, Mr. Justice Woodbury says: "Where future acquisitions are attempted to be exonerated, and the discharge extended to the debt or contract itself, if done by the states, it must not, as here, apply to past contracts, or it is held to impair their obligation. Congress alone can do this, as to prior contracts, by means of an express permission in the Constitution to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy; and which laws, when not restrained by any constitution, or clause like this, as to states impairing contracts, may, in that way, be made to reach past obligations." Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 Howard, and cases there cited; 5 Gill, 442. The bankrupt act of 1800, section 63, provided, "that nothing contained in this act shall be taken or construed to invalidate or impair any lien existing at the date of this act upon the lands or chattels of any person who may become a bankrupt." Here, by clear implication, a lien might be invalidated, or impaired, that attached after the passage of the act and before the bankruptcy. That such was the meaning of the law appears in Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 298, which was the case of an attaching creditor and others against an assignee under that act. Chief Justice Marshall says, as to the attaching creditors, "by the bankrupt law of the United States their priority, as to the funds of the bankrupt, is lost. They can only claim a dividend with the other creditors. So far, then, as the effects attached are the effects of the bankrupt, their lien is removed by the bankruptcy. The act of 1841, section 2, after setting forth what acts of the bankrupt shall be a fraud upon the act, and void, contains 408 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REGISTER. William H. Corner v. E. G. Miller et al. a proviso"that nothing in this act shall be construed to annul, destroy, or impair any liens, mortgages, or other securities or property, real or personal, which may be valid by the laws of the states, respectively, and which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the second and fifth sections of this act." Here, whatever was a valid lien or mortgage or security by the laws of the several states, was excepted by the express language of the act. The supreme court, under this provision, considered that an attachment on mesne process in New Hampshire created a charge on the property attached in favor of the plaintiff, which, in the language of the statutes and courts of that state, was called a security and a lien. They proceed to quote the fourth section of the act, that "the certificate or discharge, when duly granted, shall in all courts of justice be deemed a full and complete discharge of all debts, contracts, and other engagements of such bankrupt which are provable under this act, and shall or may be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought in any court of judicature whatever;" and then say, "it is contended, as the lien of the attachment was defeasible, and could only be rendered absolute and of practical benefit to the plaintiff by the recovery of a judgment for his demand, which is effectually barred by the plea, that therefore the action and the lien must fall together." "This conclusion would be undoubtedly correct if we construe this section of the act by itself, and without regard to other provisions of the same act." The other provision alluded to is the second section before cited, saving all liens, securities, &c., so that the court decides that without such a reservation, the plea would be good and the attachment would fail, and if so, then under our practice a motion to quash based on the same reasons would have prevailed. By Justice Grier, Peck v. Jenness, 7 Howard, 618. Now the act of 1867 has no such exception or saving clause, and must therefore be construed under this decision as a bar to an attachment on mesne process; even if it did not contain the clause relied on in this case à fortiori, how could the court |