In re Hugh Campbell. tions, while, at the same time, the mortgagee, or other lien creditor, shall be permitted to have their satisfaction out of the property mortgaged or subject to lien. A legal right without a remedy would be an anomaly in the law. Peck v. Jenness, 7 Howard, 623. It is true that the first section of the act declares that the jurisdiction conferred on the * district court of xxxvii the United States shall extend to "all cases and controversies arising between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy." But as the supreme court of the United States say, in that very able opinion delivered by my brother, Mr. Justice Grier, in the case of Peck v. Jenness, before quoted in 7 Howard, the court of common pleas of Armstrong County have full and complete jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; and its jurisdiction had attached long before any act of bankruptcy was committed. It is an independent tribunal, not deriving its authority from the same sovereign, and, as regards the district court, a foreign forum, in every way its equal. The district court has no supervisory power over it. court. When the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another These rules have their foundation not merely in comity but in necessity. For if one may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be without remedy, being liable to a process for contempt in one if they dare to proceed in the other. Neither can one take property from the custody of the other by replevin or other process, for this would produce a conflict of jurisdiction extremely embarrassing in the administration of justice. The fact, therefore, that an injunction issues only to the parties before the court, and not to the court itself, is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum. It follows, therefore, that this court has no supervisory In re Hugh Campbell. power over the court of common pleas of Armstrong County by injunction or otherwise, unless it is conferred by the bankrupt law. But we cannot discover any provision in that act which limits the jurisdiction of the state courts, or confers any power on the bankrupt court to supersede their jurisdiction or wrest property from the custody of their officers. On the contrary it provides, in the 14th section, that the assignee may prosecute and defend all suits at law or in equity, pending at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, in which such bankrupt is a party, in his own name, in the same manner and with the like effect, as they might have been prosecuted or defended by such bankrupt." In other words, as to the estate and property of the bankrupt, the assignee is subrogated to all his rights and responsibilities. The act sends the assignee to the state court, and admits its power over him. It confers no authority on this court to restrain proceedings therein, by injunction or other process, much less to take property out of its custody or possession with a strong hand. Finding no such grant of power either in direct terms or by necessary implication from any of the provisions of the bankrupt law, we are not at liberty to interpolate it on any supposed grounds of policy or expediency. We shall therefore be compelled to dissolve this and all other injunctions, in similar cases. I have not submitted this opinion to my brother Grier, but it may be a source of gratification to the profession to learn that, sitting with him, recently, at circuit in Philadelphia, we conferred upon this case, and I am pleased to say that we concurred in the legal principles upon which it should be decided. Injunction dissolved. In re Alfred L. Wells, Jr. U. S. DISTRICT COURT, N. D. NEW YORK. Where a trader stops payment of his commercial paper and does not resume pay- In re ALFRED L. WELLS & ALFRED L. WELLS, JR., ex HALL, J. The petition in this case alleges two acts of bank- The petition also shows that at the time above mentioned the firm was insolvent; that judgments had been taken against them; and that suits upon other demands against them had been commenced, and were being prosecuted to judgment and execution. The execution of a general assignment for the common and equal benefit of all their creditors, is admitted; but it is denied that it was executed with the intent to delay or hinder creditors. As there is no replication to the answer containing this denial, and as the case has been brought to a hearing on the petition and answer, this intent, if it be not conclusively presumed as a matter of law, must be regarded as disproved; and as there is no allegation that the assignment referred to was made with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the bankrupt act, we are not now called upon to decide whether a general assignment making a disposition of the bankrupts' property substantially the same as that contemplated by the 1 Cited in Jersey City Window Glass Co. 1 N. B. R. 113, quarto; Ballard & Parsons, 2 N. B. R. 84, quarto. for the In re Alfred L. Wells, Jr. bankrupt act, can be considered an act of bankruptcy if made in good faith before the first day of June last, (and consequently before any petition could be filed under that act,) and for the single purpose of preventing a portion of his creditors from obtaining a preference over his other creditors. We think there is no conclusive legal presumption that the assignment was made to delay or hinder creditors. It may, perhaps, be truly said it was made with intent to delay and hinder the particular creditors who were striving to obtain a preference over the other creditors of the respondents, by pressing the suits they had already commenced to judgment and execution; but this intent is not such an intent as the bankrupt act contemplates. Such an assignment, under such circumstances and with such intent, would not be held void under the statute of this state, which avoids conveyances made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors; and notwithstanding the provision of the 35th section of the bankrupt act, that a sale, assignment, transfer, or conveyance not made in the usual course of business of the debtor, shall be prima facie evidence of fraud, we are of the opinion that, under the denials contained in the answer in this case, we cannot properly hold that the making of the assignment, under the circumstances stated, was an act of bankruptcy. Upon the second allegation of an act of bankruptcy, the petitioners are entitled to an adjudication in bankruptcy against the respondents. It is true that the construction of the provision of the bankrupt act on which this allegation is based, is not entirely free from doubt, but the construction which justifies such an adjudication has been adopted in another district, and is, as we think, a reasonable and just construction of such provision. It was contended upon the argument that this provision, which authorizes proceedings in invitum against any person, "who being a banker, merchant, or trader, has fraudulently stopped or suspended and not resumed payment of his commercial paper within a period of fourteen days," does not authorize such proceedings unless the original stoppage or suspension of payment was fraudu lent no matter how long such suspension may be continued. In re Alfred L. Wells, Jr. We understand that the United States district court of South Carolina has decided that such is not the true construction of the provision referred to, and that its true construction requires an adjudication in bankruptcy against a banker, merchant, or trader who "has suspended and not resumed payment of his commercial paper within a period of fourteen days," although such suspension or stoppage of payment was not fraudulent; and this, we think, is the fair and proper construction. The provision embraces the two cases; the one of an original fraudulent stoppage of payment, in which proceedings may be instituted at once; and the other of a suspension of payment not fraudulent, and not per se an act of bankruptcy, but which, if continued for more than fourteen days, becomes an act of bankruptcy by its continuance. The construction of the language of this particular provision under consideration, is, we think, best calculated to carry out the general intentions of congress, as expressed in the bankrupt act; and such construction, if not strictly required by, is certainly not inconsistent with the language of the particular provision alluded to. It can hardly be supposed that congress intended that the creditors of a banker, merchant, or trader who had fraudulently stopped payment of his commercial paper, should be compelled to allow him fourteen days to consummate his fraudulent purposes, and perhaps secretly remove from the United States with the mass of his property before they could take proceedings against him. There is certainly no more reason for allowing such delay after a fraudulent act of that character than there is in a case where a bankrupt has fraudulently concealed or transferred a portion of his property. But when the suspension of payment is from necessity and without fraud, the period of fourteen days is properly allowed *the honest trader, that he may, in case he is insolvent xxxviii and is only temporarily embarrassed, take the necessary measures to enable him to pay his dishonored paper, and prevent his business being broken up by proceedings in bankruptcy. The accidental loss or miscarriage of expected |