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EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

1. A probate settlement of an adminstrator's account does not conclude as to property fraudulently withheld from it. Griffith v. Godey, 89.

See JURISDICTION, B, 1.

WILL, 2, 4.

EXECUTORY DEVISE.

See WILL, 2, 3.

FIVE-TWENTY BONDS.

1. The distinction between redeemability and payability commented on in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, defines the five-twenty bonds in suit in this case. Morgan v. United States, 476.

2. The obligations of the United States under the five-twenty bonds, consols of 1865, are governed by the law merchant regulating negotiable securities, modified only, if at all, by the laws authorizing their issue. Ib.

3. The five-twenty consols of 1865 on their face were "Redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after the 1st day of July, 1870, and payable on the 1st day of July, 1885." In conformity with provisions of law, notice was duly given as to the bonds of this class, in suit in these actions, that in three months after the date of such notice the interest on the bonds would cease: Held, That the exercise of the right of redemption made the bonds payable on demand, without interest, after the maturity of the call, until the date for absolute payment. Ib. 4. A holder of a called five-twenty consol could without prejudice, except

loss of interest, wait without demand, for the whole period, at the expiration of which the bond was unconditionally payable. Ib. 5. In stamping upon these bonds the faculty of passing from hand to hand as money, and in conferring upon the Secretary of the Treasury the power to receive them in payment, in the great exchange of bonds by which the annual interest on the public debt was reduced, it was intended to leave with the called bonds the character of unquestioned negotiability, and to protect bona fide purchasers for value, in the due course of trade, without actual notice of a defect in the obligation or title. lb.

See EVIDENCE, 3.

FORECLOSURE.

See ATTORNEY AND SOLICITO

HABEAS CORPUS.

Where a person is in custody, under an order of the Circuit Court, for

VOL. CXIII-50

contempt in refusing to answer under such an order, this court will release him by writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the order of imprisonment was without the jurisdiction of that court. Ex parte Fisk, 713.

INJUNCTION.
See WASTE.

INTEREST.

Under § 1091 of the Revised Statutes, and the ruling in Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, interest cannot be allowed on a recovery, against the United States in the Court of Claims, and there is nothing in the special act of August 14, 1876, ch. 279, 19 Stat. 490, conferring jurisdiction on that court in Harvey & Livesy's case which authorizes it. Harvey v. United States, 243.

See INTERNAL REVENUE.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

Interest on bonds of a railroad corporation earned by the company during the year 1871, but payable by the terms of the coupon January 1, 1872, is not subject to the tax authorized by § 15, act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 260, to be levied and collected for and during the year 1871. United States v. Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co., 711.

INTERVENOR.

See JURISDICTION, A. 6.

IOWA.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B. 3.

JUDGMENT.

When a court has jurisdiction by law of an offence and of the person charged with it, its judgments are, in general, not nullities: an exception to this rule if relied on, must be clearly found to exist. Ex parte Bigelow, 328.

See ESTOPPEL, 2, 3;

JURISDICTION, A. 4, 6, 9.

JURISDICTION.

A. OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. This court can acquire no jurisdiction under a writ of error where the

return to it is made by filing the transcript of the record here after
the expiration of the term of this court next succeeding the filing of
the writ in the Circuit Court. Caillot v. Deetken, 215.

2. While payment of the sum recovered below in submission to the judg-
ment is no bar to the right of reversal of the judgment when brought
here by writ of error, a compromise and settlement of the demand in
suit, whereby a new agreement is substituted in place of the old one,
extinguishes the cause of action, and leaves nothing for the exercise
of the jurisdiction of this court. Dakota County v. Glidden, 222.
3. When a jury is waived by stipulation, a general finding of the issues
by the court is not open to review. Santa Anna v. Frank, 339.
4. The declaration contained a special count upon municipal bonds and
coupons, and general counts for money had and received, etc. A
jury was waived, and the court found generally on all the issues.
The bill of exceptions contained all the evidence, but showed no ex-
ception to its admission. Held, That the general counts were suffi-
cient to support the judgment, and that questions raised as to the
subject matter of the special count were therefore immaterial. Ib.
5. A writ of error will not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction by rea-
son of failure to return with it an assignment of errors. Ackley v.
Hall, 106 U. S. 428, affirmed. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 545.

6. When a third party intervenes in a pending suit, to claim property in
the custody of the marshal by virtue of a writ of attachment issued
therein, a judgment dismissing his intervention is final as to that
issue; and one distributing the proceeds of the property to other
parties is also final. Ib.

7. When a writ of error gives the names of all parties as they are found
in the record of the case in the court below, and there is nothing in
the record to show that there were other parties, the writ is sufficient,
even if the defendants in error are there described by firm-names, as
A. B. & Co., etc. This case distinguished from The Protector, 11
Wall. 82. Ib.

8. When the final judgment of a State court necessarily involves an ad-
judication of a claim, made therein, that a statute of the State is in
derogation of rights secured to a party by the Constitution, this court
has jurisdiction of the cause in error, although the State court did
not in terms pass upon the point. Chicago Life Insurance Co. v.
Needles, 574.

9. When separate creditors unite in a suit in equity, each claiming his
proportionate share of property of the common debtor in respondent's
hands, and each recovers a separate decree for his pro rata share,
the jurisdiction of this court, on appeal, is, as to each creditor's ap-
peal, to be determined by the amount in dispute in his case. Fourth
National Bank v. Stout, 684.

See HABEAS CORPUS ;

PRACTICE, 3.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT Courts.

1. A proceeding in a State court against an administrator, to obtain pay-
ment of a debt due by the decedent in his lifetime, is removable into
a court of the United States, when the creditor and the administrator
are citizens of different States, notwithstanding the State statute may
enact that such claims can only be established in a probate court of
the State, or by appeal from that court to some other State court.
Hess v. Reynolds, 73.

2. Consistently with the act of March 3, 1875, determining the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Courts of the United States, the holder of the bond of
a municipal corporation issued under authority of law, for the pay-
ment, at all events, to a named person or order, of a fixed sum of
money, at a designated time, indorsed in blank, may sue thereon
without reference to the citizenship of any prior holder, and un-
affected by the circumstance that the municipality may be entitled
to make a defence, based upon equities between the original parties.
Ackley School District v. Hall, 135.

3. A bill in equity, filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of New
Jersey by citizens of that State, stockholders in a New Jersey railroad
corporation, against that corporation, and a Pennsylvania railroad
corporation, and several individuals, citizens respectively of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, and directors in one or both corporations,
alleged that, without authority of law, and in fraud of the rights of
the plaintiffs, and with the concurrence of the individual defendants,
the New Jersey corporation, pursuant to votes of a majority of its
stockholders, made, and the Pennsylvania corporation took, a lease of
the railroad and property of the New Jersey corporation; and prayed
that the lease might be set aside, the Pennsylvania corporation or-
dered to account with the New Jersey corporation for all profits re-
ceived, the amount found due ordered to be paid to the New Jersey
corporation by the Pennsylvania corporation, or, upon its failure to
do so, by the individual defendants, and the New Jersey corporation
ordered to administer the property in conformity with its charter,
and to pay over to the plaintiffs their share of that amount. The
defendants answered jointly, denying the illegality of the lease, and
removed the case into the Circuit Court of the United States, under
the act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, as involving a controversy between
citizens of different States, and a controversy arising under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. The Circuit Court, upon the
plaintiffs' motion, remanded the case to the State court. Held, That
the case was rightly remanded. Central Railroad v. Mills, 249.

See CONFLICT OF LAW, 4, 5;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES;

VIRGINIA MILITARY DISTRICT IN OHIO, 1.

C. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.

A District Court of the United States in proceedings for confiscating real
estate under the act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, had no jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of a mortgage upon the estate proceeded
against. Avegno v. Schmidt, 293.

D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

While it would seem clear that a suit may be maintained in the Court of
Claims against the United States to recover for the use of a patented
invention by an officer of the government for its benefit, if the right
of the patentee is acknowledged; Semble, that it may even be main-
tained when the exclusive right of the patentee is contested. Hollister
v. Benedict & Burnham Manufacturing Co., 59.

E. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.

The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether an arraignment of a prisoner under several indictments;
an order of the court that the indictments shall be consolidated and
tried together; an empanelling of a jury for that purpose; an opening
of the case on the part of the prosecution; and a discharge of the
jury at that stage in order to try the prisoner before the same jury
on the indictments separately, so put the prisoner in jeopardy in re-
gard to the offences named in the consolidated indictments, that he
cannot be afterwards tried for any of those offences. Ex parte
Bigelow, 328.

LAND GRANT.

1. By the act of March 3, 1857, Congress granted to the then Territory of
Minnesota in aid of the construction of certain railroads certain alter-
nate sections of land along the lines of the roads, and further pro-
vided that "in case it shall appear that the United States have, when
the lines or routes of said roads and branches are definitely fixed, sold
any sections, or any parts thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the
right of pre-emption has attached to the same, then it shall be lawful
for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor of said Ter-
ritory or future State, to select, subject to the approval of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, from the lands of the United States
much land . . . as shall be equal to such lands as the United
States have sold or otherwise appropriated, or to which the rights of
pre-emption have attached as aforesaid," &c. Held, That the indem-
nity clause in this act covers losses from the grant by reason of sales
and the attachment of pre-emption rights previous to the date of the act,
as well as by reason of sales and the attachment of pre-emption rights
between that date and the final determination of the route of the
road. Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. Barney, 618.

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