Opinion of the Court. to the judicial department. De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 12 Wheat. 599, 601, 602; Chouteau v. Eckhart, 2 How. 344, 374; Tameling v. United States Freehold Co., 93 U. S. 644, 661; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238. For the adjustment and confirmation of claims under grants from the Mexican government of land in New Mexico, and in Arizona, which was formerly a part of it, Congress had not, when this case was decided below, established a judicial tribunal, as it had done in California, and as it has since done in New Mexico and Arizona by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, 26 Stat. 854. But Congress reserved to itself the determination of such claims; and enacted that the surveyor general for the Territory, under the instructions of the Secretary of the Interior, should ascertain the origin, nature, character and extent of all such claims; and for this purpose might issue notices, summon witnesses, administer oaths and do all other necessary acts; and should make a full report on such claims, with his decision as to the validity or invalidity of each under the laws, usages and customs of the country before its cession to the United States; and that his report should be laid before Congress for such action thereon as might be deemed just and proper, with a view to confirm bona fide grants, and to give full effect to the treaty of 1848 between the United States and Mexico. Acts of July 22, 1854, c. 103, § 8, 10 Stat. 309; July 15, 1870, c. 292, 16 Stat. 304. In Tameling v. United States Freehold Co., above cited, it was therefore held that the action of Congress, confirming, as recommended by the surveyor general for the Territory, a private land claim in New Mexico, was conclusive evidence of the claimant's title, and not subject to judicial review; and Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "No jurisdiction over such claims in New Mexico was conferred upon the courts; but the surveyor general, in the exercise of the authority with which he was invested, decides them in the first instance. The final action on each claim, reserved to Congress, is, of course, conclusive, and therefore not subject to review in this or any other forum. It is obvi Opinion of the Court. ously not the duty of this court to sit in judgment upon either the recital of matters of fact by the surveyor general, or his decision declaring the validity of the grant. They are embodied in his report, which was laid before Congress for its consideration and action." 93 U. S. 662. See also Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 366, and 122 U. S. 365, 371. The action of Congress, when taken, being conclusive upon. the merits of the claim, it necessarily follows that the judiciary cannot act upon the matter while it is pending before Congress; for if Congress should decide the same way as the court, the judgment of the court would be nugatory; and if Congress should decide the other way, its decision would control. There is nothing in Pinkerton v. Ledoux, 129 U. S. 346, cited by the appellant, inconsistent with this conclusion. The point there decided was that the report of the surveyor general, not acted on by Congress, was no evidence to support ejectment upon a grant from the Mexican government, known as the Nolan grant; and Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering judgment, said: "The surveyor general's report is no evidence of title or right to possession. His duties were prescribed by the act of July 22, 1854, before referred to, and consisted merely in making inquiries and reporting to Congress for its action. If Congress confirmed a title reported favorably by him, it became a valid title; if not, not." And he guardedly added: "This case seems to have been very perfunctorily tried and discussed. There is a question which may be entitled to much consideration, whether the Nolan title has any validity at all without confirmation by Congress. The act of July 22, 1854, before referred to, seems to imply that this was necessary." 129 U. S. 351, 352, 355. The case is one of those, jurisdiction of which has been committed to a particular tribunal, and which cannot, therefore, at least while proceedings are pending before that tribunal, be taken up and decided by any other. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447; New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261. In this case, Congress has constituted itself the tribunal to Syllabus. finally determine, upon the report and recommendation of the surveyor general, whether the claim is valid or invalid. The petition to the surveyor general is the commencement of proceedings, which necessarily involve the validity of the grant from the Mexican government under which the petitioners claim title; the proceedings are pending until Congress has acted; and while they are pending, the question of the title of the petitioners cannot be contested in the ordinary courts of justice. Upon this short ground, without considering any other question, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona is MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurred in the result. Affirmed. UNITED STATES v. FLETCHER. FLETCHER v. UNITED STATES. APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. Nos. 918, 919. Submitted December 12, 1892. - Decided March 6, 1893. The proceedings, findings and sentence of a military court-martial being transmitted to the Secretary of War, that officer wrote upon the record the following order, dating it from the "War Department," and signing it with his name as "Secretary of War:" "In conformity with the 65th of the Rules and Articles of War, the proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of the President. The proceedings, findings and sentence are approved, and the sentence will be duly executed." Held, that this was a sufficient authentication of the judgment of the President and that there was no ground for treating the order as null and void for want of the requisite approval. When a court-martial has jurisdiction, errors in its exercise cannot be reviewed in an action against the United States by the officer courtmartialed to recover salary. Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, questioned upon the ground that the report of that case shows that the circumstances were so exceptional as to render it hardly a safe precedent in any other. Statement of the Case. THE claimant filed an amended petition in the Court of Claims, December 16, 1890, as a substitute for his original petition filed December 11, 1889, seeking to recover from the United States a certain amount of money as arrears of pay alleged to be due him as captain on the retired list of the army, to which the government filed a general traverse December 22, 1890. Thereupon due proceedings were had, and the court, on June 8, 1891, found, in substance, the following facts: Bird L. Fletcher, the claimant, was, on December 27, 1859, enlisted as a private in the general mounted service of the United States Army. After successive promotions, by which he became corporal and second lieutenant, he was brevetted first lieutenant on May 10, 1863, for gallant and meritorious service in the cavalry action at Franklin, Tennessee. He was made first lieutenant on October 12, 1864, in which rank he served until August 25, 1867, when he was promoted captain. On June 19, 1868, he was placed on the retired list of the army, by order of General Grant, upon the finding of a board of examination that he was incapacitated for active service, and that his incapacity was the result of sickness and exposure incident to the service. The order retiring him directed that his name be placed upon the list of retired officers of the class provided for by the act of Congress of August 3, 1861, in which the disability results from long and faithful service, or from some injury incident thereto. A court-martial was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 10, 1872, before which Fletcher was brought for trial upon a charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and upon this charge, which was supported by the averments of six specifications, he was tried. He was not represented by counsel on the trial, but conducted his case in person, and to the charge and all the specifications pleaded. not guilty. The specifications related to the incurring and non-payment of certain indebtedness, and Fletcher was found guilty of all of them, some parts of the first, second and fifth excepted, and guilty of the charge, and sentenced to be dismissed the service. Statement of the Case. The proceedings, findings and sentence of the court-martial were transmitted to the Secretary of War, who wrote upon the record the following order: "WAR DEPARTMENT, July 24th, 1872. "In conformity with the 65th of the Rules and Articles of War, the proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of the President. "The proceedings, findings and sentence are approved, and the sentence will be duly executed. WM. W. BELKNAP, From the date of this order, July 24, 1872, Fletcher received no pay as an officer of the army. He did not dispute at the War Department the validity of the dismissal, in pursuance of the sentence of the court-martial, for the period of nearly sixteen years, but did promptly petition Congress for redress, and urge his restoration to the retired list; and he made application for pay to the accounting officers of the Treasury after March 1, 1888. His complaint stated that March 27, 1888, he addressed a petition to the President of the United States, and this resulted in a report of the judge advocate-general to the Secretary of War, April 17, 1888, that, in accordance with Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, there was no evidence that the proceedings in Fletcher's case had been laid before, or approved by, the President, and that the case was still subject to the President's action. The Secretary of War then transmitted the report and the original record to the President, stating that the proceedings of the court-martial awaited his action, as it appeared from the facts in the report that Fletcher was still undoubtedly an officer of the army, and recommending that the sentence be approved. On July 5, 1888, the President made an order approving the proceedings, findings and sentence of the court-martial. In his amended petition in the Court of Claims, the claimant alleged that the proceedings, findings and sentence of the |