subject to reversal because of decisions made in subsequent cases by
the courts of the State, after its admission, while the former cases
were pending on appeal in this court. Ankeny v. Clark, 345.

7. Defects in the pleadings in this case, if any, not having been questioned
below, cannot operate here to invalidate the trial there. Ib.

See EQUITY, 4, 5, 9;

FINDING OF FACTS;

JUDGMENT, 1;

JURISDICTION, A, 1, 2;
LOCAL LAW, 3;

MANDAMUS, 3, 4, 5, 6.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

See BANK.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. By the acts of July 22, 1854, c. 103, § 8, and July 15, 1870, c. 292, a
private claim to land in Arizona under a Mexican grant, which has
been reported to Congress by the surveyor general of the Territory,
cannot, before Congress has acted on his report, be contested in the
courts of justice. Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., 80.
2. A suit under the act of February 25, 1885, 23 Stat. 321, c. 149, to pre-
vent the unlawful occupancy of public lands, is a summary proceeding
in the nature of a suit in equity, which may be tried by the court
without the intervention of a jury, and is not governed by Rev. Stat.
§ 649. Cameron v. United States, 301.

3. The provisions of the said act of 1885 do not operate upon persons who
have taken possession of land under a bona fide claim or color of
title. Ib.

4. Color of title exists wherever there is a reasonable doubt regarding the
validity of an apparent title, whether such doubt arises from the cir-
cumstances under which the land is held, the identity of the land con-
veyed, or the construction of the instrument under which the party in
possession claims title. 1b.

5. On the facts in this case, as detailed in the opinion of the court: Held,
(1) That the lands in question were not public lands of the United
States, within the meaning of that term as used in the acts of Con-
gress respecting the disposition of public lands; (2) That the defend-
ant held them under claim or color of title, under an expediente of the
Mexican government; (3) That in thus holding the court intimates
no opinion as to the validity of the defendant's title. Ib.

6. An employé of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad, residing
within the Territory of Oklahoma before, up to and on the 22d day of
April, 1889, was thereby disabled from making a homestead entry upon
the tract of land on which he was residing. Smith v. Townsend, 490.
7. The right conferred by the act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, c. 120, as
subsequently amended, upon the corporation afterwards known as the
Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, to construct its

VOL. CXLVIII-47

road substantially in a direct line to Denver, and from thence north-
erly, to connect with the Union Pacific Railroad at Cheyenne, and to
acquire a grant of public lands thereby upon each side of its railroad
as constructed, was not affected by the act of March 3, 1869, 15 Stat.
324, c. 127, in such a way as to make the Union Pacific, Eastern Divi-
sion, terminate at Denver, and to cause its land grants to terminate
there; but, on the contrary, the act of 1862, being a grant in præsenti,
the Company's right to lands upon each side of its road became fixed
from the moment it proceeded, under the act of 1866, to establish its
line of definite location so as to make the same extend from Kansas
City westwardly to Denver, and thence northwardly to Cheyenne, and
the act of 1869 is not to be construed as breaking the continuity of the
line. United States v. Union Pacific Railway, 562.

See CONTRACT, 3;

INDIANA.

QUITCLAIM DEED.

See DEED.

RAILROAD.

1. A travelling salesman for a jewelry firm bought a passenger ticket for
passage on a railroad, and presented a trunk to be checked to the
place of his destination, without informing the agent of the company
that the trunk contained jewelry, which it did, and without being
inquired of by the agent as to what it contained. He paid a charge
for overweight as personal baggage, and the trunk was checked. It
was of a dark color, iron bound, and of the kind known as a jeweller's
trunk. It had been a practice for jewelry merchants to send out
agents with trunks filled with goods, the trunks being of similar
character to the one in question, and, as a rule, they were checked as
personal baggage. But there was no evidence tending to show that
the railroad companies, or their agents, knew what the trunks con-
tained: Held, (1) There was no evidence showing, or tending to show,
that the agent of the railroad had any actual knowledge of the con-
tents of the trunk; (2) There was no evidence from which it could
fairly be said that the agent had reason to believe that the trunk
contained jewelry; (3) The agent was not required to inquire as to
the contents of the trunk, so presented as personal baggage; (4) The
company was not liable for the loss of the contents of the trunk.
Humphreys v. Perry, 627.

2. The cases on the subject, reviewed. Ib.

See CONTRACT, 3.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. Under § 643 of the Revised Statutes, the jurisdiction of the state
court is not taken away until a petition for removal is filed in the

Circuit Court of the United States, and a writ of certiorari or of habeas
corpus cum causa, issued by the clerk of that court, and served upon
the state court or its clerk. Virginia v. Paul, 107.

2. A prosecution of a crime against the laws of a State, which must be
prosecuted by indictment, is not commenced, within the meaning of
§ 643 of the Revised Statutes, before an indictment is found; and
cannot be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States by a
person arrested on a warrant from a justice of the peace with a view
to his commitment to await the action of the grand jury. Ib.

3. Under the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, a cause could not
be removed from a state court, unless the application was made before
or at the term at which it could first be tried. Rosenthal v. Coates, 142.
4. A cause could be removed on the ground of local prejudice, under Rev.
Stat. § 639, sub-div. 3, only where all the parties to the suit on one
side were citizens of a different State from those on the other. Ib.
5. In a suit by an assignee under an assignment for the benefit of creditors
to disencumber a fund in his possession of alleged liens in favor of
several different creditors, the fact that each defendant had a separate
defence did not create a separable controversy as to each. Ib.

6. The removal acts do not contemplate that a party may experiment on
his case in the state court, and, upon an adverse decision, then transfer
it to the federal court. lb.

7. Under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. c. 373, § 2, pp. 552, 553, a
finding by the Circuit Court of the United States, on an application
for the removal of a cause from a state court, that the application is
sufficient, and such as entitles the defendant to remove the cause to
a federal court, does not of itself work such removal, but an order of
the court to that effect, equivalent to a judgment, must be made.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Bender, 255.

8. A defendant, residing within a State in which an action is commenced
in a court of the State, is not entitled, under the act of March 3, 1887,
24 Stat. 552, c. 373, to have the suit removed to the Circuit Court of
the United States. Martin v. Snyder, 663.

If there were any doubt with regard to the interpretation of the act of
March 3, 1869, 15 Stat. 324, c. 127, the construction placed upon it by
the Land Department for eighteen years,under which lands have been
put upon the market and sold, would be entitled to considerable
weight. United States v. Union Pacific Railway, 562.

See EXECUTIVE.

The plaintiffs, having been held liable to the owners of bonds improperly
cancelled as parties to the transaction, are not entitled to be subro-
gated to the heirs of the estate in the suit against the United States;
since a person who invokes the doctrine of subrogation must come
into court with clean hands. German Bank v. United States, 573.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. To make a tax sale valid, observance of every safeguard to the owner
created by statute is imperatively necessary. Marx v. Hanthorn, 172.
2. When not modified by statute, the burden of proof is on the holder of
a tax deed to maintain his title, when questioned, by showing that the
provisions of the statute have been complied with. Ib.

3. It is competent for a legislature to declare that a tax deed shall be prima
facie evidence, not only of the regularity of the sale, but also of all
prior proceedings, and of title in the purchaser; but as the legislature
cannot deprive one of his property by making his adversary's claim
to it conclusive of its own validity, it cannot make a tax deed conclu-
sive evidence of the holder's title to the land. Ib.

4. The reasonable meaning of the Oregon statutes regulating notices and
sales of property for taxes, (Gen. Laws, ed. 1874, 767, §§ 90, 93; Hill's
Ann. Laws, 1309,) is that such notice and advertisement should give
the correct names of those whose property is to be sold. Ib.

5. Notice in Oregon that the property of Ida J. Hawthorn was to be sold
was not only not notice that the property of Ida J. Hauthorn was to
be sold, but was actually misleading, and such want of notice or
misleading notice vitiated the sale. Ib.

See INTERNAL REVENUE;

TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

1. A municipal charge for the use of the streets of the municipality by a
telegraph company, erecting its poles therein, is not a privilege or
license tax. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 92.

2. A telegraph company has no right, under the act of July 24, 1865,
c. 230, 14 Stat. 221, to occupy the public streets of a city without
compensation. Ib.

3. This case presents no question of estoppel. Ib.

4. Whether such tax is reasonable is a question for the courts. Ib.

TENNESSEE.

See BOUNDARY.

TEXAS.

See LOCAL LAW, 4, 5.

TRUST.

See BANK;

INTERNAL REVENUE, 1.

VIRGINIA.

See BOUNDARY.

VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See CONTRACT, 8.

WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT.

See JURISDICTION, C.

WELL.

See JURISDICTION, C.