EQUITY.

1. A defendant in equity may let the facts averred in the bill go unchal-
lenged, and set up some special matter by plea sufficient to defeat the
recovery; and in such case no fact is in issue at the hearing but the
matter so specially pleaded. United States v. California & Oregon Land
Co., 31.

2. In these suits those defendants who were not the original wrongdoers
had the right to set up any special matter of defence which constituted
a defence as to them, and then the inquiry was limited to such matter
as between them and the government. Ib.

3. The essential elements which go to make a bona fide purchaser of real
estate are: (1) a valuable consideration; (2) an absence of notice of
fraud or defect; (3) presence of good faith. Ib.

4. The plaintiff below contracted to buy of defendant and the defendant
agreed to sell to plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, several pieces
or parcels of land. In pursuance of said contract, a deed was made
by the defendant to the plaintiff, wherein and whereby, by mistake
and inadvertence in describing the property conveyed, there was
omitted therefrom an important part of the property contracted to be
sold. The purchase price was a round sum for all the tracts, and was
paid. Held, that a case for a reformation of the deed was clearly
made out, unless the defendant should be able to show 'some good
reason why such admitted or established facts are not entitled to
their apparent weight. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining
Co., 293.

5. In equitable remedies given for fraud, accident or mistake, it is the
facts as found that give the right to relief, and, as it is often difficult
to say, upon admitted facts, whether the error which is complained
of was occasioned by intentional fraud or by mere inadvertence or
mistake, the appellant in this case has no reason to complain of the
language of the court below, in attributing his misconduct to mistake
or inadvertence rather than to intentional fraud; and he cannot raise
such an objection for the first time in this court. Ib.

6. A party having a claim for unliquidated damages against a corporation
which has not been dissolved, but has merely distributed its corporate
funds amongst its stockholders and ceased or suspended business, can-
not maintain a suit on the equity side of the United States Circuit
Court against a portion of such stockholders, to reach and subject the
assets so received by them to the payment and satisfaction of his
claim, without first reducing such claim to judgment, and without
making the corporation a defendant and bringing it before the court.
Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 603.

7. Corporations are indispensable parties to a bill which affects corporate
rights or liabilities. Ib.

8. A claim purely legal, involving a trial at law before a jury, cannot,

until reduced to judgment at law, be made the basis of relief in
equity. Ib.

9. The general practice in this country and in England, when a bill in
equity is dismissed without a consideration of the merits, is for the
court to express in its decree that the dismissal is without prejudice.
Ib.

ESTOPPEL.

See TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 3.

EVIDENCE.

See LOCAL Law, 5, 6;

TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

EXCEPTION.

See JUDGMENT, 1.

EXECUTIVE.

It is again decided that when a statute of the United States delegates to a
tribunal or officer full jurisdiction over a subject in which the United
States are interested, his or its determination within the limit of his
authority is conclusive, in the absence of fraud. United States v. Cali-
fornia & Oregon Land Co., 31.

EXTRADITION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.

FINDING OF FACTS.

1. When the record shows that the case was tried below by the court
without a jury, and there is no special finding of facts, and no agreed
statement of facts, but only a general finding, this court must accept
that finding as conclusive, and limit its inquiry to the sufficiency of
the complaint and of the rulings, if any be preserved, on questions of
law arising during the trial. Lehnen v. Dickson, 71.

2. No mere recital of the testimony, whether in the opinion of the court
or in a bill of exceptions, can be deemed a special finding of facts
within the scope of the statute. Ib.

Leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia or the officers of the

District acting under a judgment of that court will be denied, when
the ground of the application relates to an error in the proceedings of
that court, and does not go to its jurisdiction or authority. In re
Schneider (No. 2), 162.

See JURISDICTION, A, 4;

MANDAMUS, 2.

INDIAN.

1. Congress has not authorized the courts in this litigation to go behind
the treaty of August 6, 1846, 9 Stat. 871, with the Cherokee Nation.
United States v. Old Settlers, 427.

2. So far as there is a conflict between the treaties with the Cherokees and
subsequent acts of Congress, the latter must prevail. Ib.

3. The contention made by the Western Cherokees as to the ownership of
land to the west of the Mississippi was put to rest by the treaty of
1846, and cannot now be revived. Ib.

4. The rule that, when a party without force or intimidation and with a
full knowledge of all the facts in the case, accepts on account of an
unliquidated and uncontroverted demand a sum less than what he
claims and believes to be due him, and agrees to accept that sum in
full satisfaction, he will not be permitted to avoid his act on the
ground of duress, does not apply in this case, as it is evident that
Congress was convinced that a mistake had been made, and intended
to afford an opportunity to have it corrected. Ib.

5. On examining the account between the United States and the Western
Cherokees, this court finds some small errors in the statement of it as
made by the Court of Claims, and, after correcting those errors, it
agrees with the Court of Claims that interest should be allowed on all
but a small part of it, and orders the judgment, as thus corrected, to
be affirmed. lb.

6. The decision of the Court of Claims respecting the amount of money
to be awarded to the Indians in these cases is affirmed; and it is
further suggested, as to the distribution of that amount among the
several claimants that it is a question of law, to be settled by the
court; but as the facts are not presented in an authoritative form, this
court acquiesces in the suggestion of the court below that it be dealt
with by the authorities of the government. Phineas Pam-to-pee v.
United States, 691.

INDIANA.

The State of Indiana is not entitled, under the act of April 19, 1816, c. 57,
and the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, to be paid by the United States
the two per cent of the net proceeds of sales by Congress of lands
within the State, which the United States agreed by the former act to
apply "to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State,"

and have actually applied to the making of the Cumberland road.
Indiana v. United States, 148.

INDICTMENT.

1. In a prosecution for conspiracy, corruptly and by threats and force to
obstruct the due administration of justice in a Circuit Court of the
United States, the combination of minds for the unlawful purpose
and the overt act in effectuation of that purpose must appear charged
in the indictment. Pettibone v. United States, 197.

2. A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two or more
persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal
or unlawful means.

Ib.

3. When the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an unlawful agreement
of two or more persons to compass or promote some criminal or illegal
purpose, that purpose must be fully and clearly stated in the indict-
ment; while if the criminality of the offence consists in the agreement
to accomplish a purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means, the means must be set out. Ib.

4. An indictment against a person for corruptly or by threats or force
endeavoring to influence, intimidate or impede a witness or officer in
a court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, must charge
knowledge or notice, or set out facts that show knowledge or notice,
on the part of the accused that the witness or officer was such. Ib.
5. A person is not sufficiently charged in such case with obstructing or
impeding the due administration of justice in a court, unless it appear
that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such
court. Ib.

INTEREST.
See INDIAN, 5.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

1. Under § 110 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, 13 Stat. 277, afterwards
embodied in § 3408 of the Revised Statutes, imposing a tax of of 1
per cent each month "upon the average amount of the deposits of
money, subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by
certificates of deposit or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at
some future day, with any person, bank, association, company or cor-
poration, engaged in the business of banking," moneys deposited by
the treasurer of the State of New York, in the bank of the Manhattan
Company, in the city of New York, intended to satisfy the interest or
principal of stocks of that State, and credited to said treasurer, and
then drawn for by him by drafts payable to the order of the cashier
of the bank, and then paid out by the bank for such interest or
principal, are subject to such tax. Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 412.

2. The bank received a salary from the State for rendering such services,
and did not charge any of the tax to the State. Ib.

3. Such tax was not a tax on the revenues of the State in the hands of a

disbursing agent. 1b.

4. Nor was the trust created in favor of each creditor of the State in the
hands of the bank, as to the deposit. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

1. When the parties to a suit tried in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, at circuit, cannot agree as to the exceptions, the trial term
may, under the rules, be extended into succeeding terms for the pur-
pose of settling them, and in case the judge presiding at the trial dies
without settling them, and in consequence thereof a motion be made
to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, the then presiding judge
in the Circuit Court may order the motion to be heard in General
Term; and an order to set aside the verdict and direct a new trial made
in General Term is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be
taken to this court. Hume v. Bowie, 245.

2. An order overruling a motion to remand a case to a state court is not
a final judgment. Bender v. Pennsylvania Co., 502.

See MANDAMUS, 3, 4, 5, 6.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. In this case it appears by the bill of exceptions that there was an appli-
cation at the close of the trial for an instruction that the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment for the sum claimed, which was refused and
exception taken, and this is held to present a question of law for the
consideration of this court, although there were no special findings of
fact. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 92.

2. When the trial court, in a case where some facts are agreed and there is
oral testimony as to others, makes a ruling of law upon a point not
affected by the oral testimony, this court may consider it notwith-
standing the fact that there was only a general finding of facts. Ib.
3. After the adoption of Article 233 of the constitution of Louisiana,
declaring certain designated state bonds void, the Treasurer of that
State fraudulently put them into circulation, and absconded. Payment
having been refused by the State to an innocent holder of such a bond,
which he had purchased for value: Held, in a suit brought by him to
recover back the purchase money, that such refusal by the State raised
no federal question. Bier v. McGehee, 137.

4. A writ of error from this court does not lie to a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing the petition
of a convict for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Schneider, Petitioner,
(No. 1,) 157.