1. In the admiralty and maritime law of the United States the following
propositions are established by the decisions of this court:
(a) For necessary repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign
port, a lien is given by the general maritime law, following the
civil law, and may be enforced in admiralty;
(b) For repairs or supplies in the home port of the vessel, no lien
exists, or can be enforced in admiralty, under the general law
independently of local statute;
(c) Whenever the statute of a State gives a lien, to be enforced by
process in rem against the vessel, for repairs or supplies in her
home port, this lien, being similar to the lien arising in a
foreign port under the general law, is in the nature of a mari-
time lien, and therefore may be enforced in admiralty in the
courts of the United States;
(d) This lien, in the nature of a maritime lien, and to be enforced by
process in the nature of admiralty process, is within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, sitting in
admiralty. The J. E. Rumbell, 1.
2. In the admiralty courts of the United States, a lien upon a vessel for
necessary supplies and repairs in her home port, given by the statute
of a State, and to be enforced by proceedings in rem in the nature of
admiralty process, takes precedence of a prior mortgage, recorded
under section 4192 of the Revised Statutes.
ARKANSAS.
See JURISDICTION, B, 5.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
A bank in Ohio contracted with a bank in Pennsylvania, to collect for it
at par at all points west of Pennsylvania, and to remit the 1st, 11th
and 21st of each month. In executing this agreement the Pennsylvania
Bank stamped upon the paper forwarded for collection, with a stamp
prepared for it by the Ohio Bank, an endorsement "pay to" the Ohio
Bank "or order for collection for " the Pennsylvania Bank. The Ohio
Bank failed, having in its hands, or in the hands of other banks to
which it had been sent for collection, proceeds of paper sent it by the
Pennsylvania Bank for collection. A receiver being appointed, the
Pennsylvania Bank brought this action to recover such proceeds.
Held,
(1) That the relation between the banks as to uncollected paper was
that of principal and agent, and that the mere fact that a sub-
agent of the Ohio Bank had collected the money due on such
paper was not a commingling of those collections with the
general funds of the Ohio Bank, and did not operate to relieve
them from the trust obligation created by the agency, or create
any difficulty in specially tracing them;
(2) That if the Ohio Bank was indebted to its sub-agent, and the
collections, when made, were entered in their books as a credit
to such indebtedness, they were thereby reduced to possession,
and passed into the general funds of the Ohio Bank;
(3) That by the terms of the arrangement the relation of debtor and
creditor was created when the collections were fully made, the
funds being on general deposit with the Ohio Bank, with the
right in that bank to their use until the time of remittance
should arrive. Commercial Bank v. Armstrong, 50.
See DEED, 1, 2;
EQUITY, 3.
1. The boundary line between the States of Virginia and Tennessee, which
was ascertained and adjusted by commissioners appointed by and on
behalf of each State, and marked upon the surface of the ground
between the summit of White Top Mountain and the top of the
Cumberland Mountains, having been established and confirmed by
the State of Virginia in January, 1803, and by the State of Tennessee
in November, 1803, and having been recognized and acquiesced in by
both parties for a long course of years, and having been treated by
Congress as the true boundary between the two States, in its district-
ing them for judicial and revenue purposes, and in its action touching
the territory in which federal elections were to be held and for which
federal appointments were to be made, was a line established under
an agreement or compact between the two States, to which the consent
of Congress was constitutionally given; and, as so established, it takes
effect as a definition of the true boundary, even if it be found to vary
somewhat from the line established in the original grants. Virginia
v. Tennessee, 503.
2. The history of the Royal Grants, and of the Colonial and State Legisla
tion upon this subject reviewed. Ib.
3. An agreement or compact as to boundaries may be made between two
States, and the requisite consent of Congress may be given to it subse-
quently, or may be implied from subsequent action of Congress itself
towards the two States; and when such agreement or compact is thus
made, and is thus assented to, it is valid. Ib.
4. What "an agreement or compact" between two States of the Union is,
and what "the consent of Congress" to such agreement or compact is,
within the meaning of Article I. of the Constitution, considered and
explained. Ib.
5. A boundary line between States or Provinces which has been run out,
located and marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and
acquiesced in by the parties for a long course of years, is conclusive.
Ib.
This case is affirmed on the authority of United States v. Alexander, 148
U. S. 186. United States v. Truesdell, 196.
Woodruff v. Okolona, 57 Mississippi, 806, approved and followed. Barnum
v. Okolona, 393.
Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, distinguished from this case. United
States v. Alexander, 186.
Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 98, distinguished. Pennsylvania Co. v.
Bender, 255.
Bridge Company v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, distinguished from this
case. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 312.
Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293, explained, and distinguished
from this case. Ankeny v. Clark, 345.
See CONTRACT, 2;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 11.
CASES QUESTIONED OR OVERRULED.
See COURT MARTIAL, 3;
1. Under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 6, this court has power, in a
case made final in the Circuit Court of Appeals, although no question
of law has been certified by that court to this, to issue a writ of
certiorari to review a decree of that court on appeal from an inter-
locutory order of the Circuit Court; but will not exercise this power,
unless it is necessary to prevent extraordinary inconvenience and
embarrassment in the conduct of the cause. American Construction Co.
v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway, 372.
2. This court will issue a writ of certiorari to review a decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, by which, on appeal from an interlocutory order of
the Circuit Court, granting an injunction, appointing a receiver of a
railway company, and authorizing him to issue receiver's notes, the
injunction has not only been modified, but the order has been reversed
in other respects. Ib.
3. A decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, by which, on appeal from an
interlocutory order of the Circuit Court, vacating an order appointing
a receiver, the order appealed from has been reversed, the receivership
restored and the case remanded to the Circuit Court to determine who
should be receiver, will not be reviewed by this court by writ of
certiorari, either because no appeal lies from such an interlocutory
order, or because the order appointing the receiver was made by a
Circuit Judge when outside of his circuit. Ib.
4. A Circuit Judge having taken part in a decree of the Circuit Court of
Appeals on an appeal from an interlocutory order setting aside a
previous order of his in the case, this court granted a rule to show
cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to the Circuit Court of
Appeals to bring up and quash its decree because he was prohibited
by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 3, from sitting at the hearing.
lb.
See CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS, 3;
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.
CHEROKEE INDIANS.
See INDIAN, 1 to 5.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
1. In order to give this court jurisdiction over questions or propositions
of law sent up by a Circuit Court of Appeals for decision, it is necessary
that the questions or propositions should be clearly and distinctly
certified, and should show that the instruction of this court is desired
in the particular case as to their proper decision. Columbus Watch Co.
v. Robbins, 266.
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