Opinion of the Court.

for settling the same; and that means any line run and measured with or without deviations from time to time from a straight line, or the line of latitude mentioned as might in their judgment be most convenient as the proper boundary for both States. It was made with numerous variations from a straight line, and from the line of the designated parallel of latitude for the convenience of the two States, and, with the full knowledge of both, was ratified, established and confirmed as the true, certain and real boundary line between them. And then, fifty-six years afterwards, in consequence of the line thus marked becoming indistinct, it was re-run and remarked, by new commissioners under the directions of the statutes of 1800 and 1801, in strict conformity with the old line. The compact of the two States, establishing the line adopted by their commissioners, and to which Congress impliedly assented after its execution, is binding upon both States and their citizens. Neither can be heard at this date to say that it was entered into upon any misapprehension of facts. No treaty, as said by this court, has been held void on the ground of misapprehension of facts, by either or both of the parties. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 How. 591, 635.

The general testimony, with hardly a dissent, is that the old line of 1802 can be readily traced throughout its whole length; and, moreover, that line has been recognized by all the residents near it, except those in the triangle at Denton's Valley and in another district of small dimensions, in which it is stated that the people have voted as citizens of Virginia and have recognized themselves as citizens of that State. That fact, however, cannot affect the potency and conclusiveness of the compact between the States by which the line was established in 1803. The small number of citizens whose expectations will be disappointed by being included in Tennessee are secured in all their rights of property by provisions of the compact passed especially for the protection of their claims. Some observations were made, on the argument of the case, upon the propriety and necessity, if the line established in 1803 be sustained, of having it re-run and re-marked, so as hereafter to be more readily identified and traced. But a careful exam

Opinion of the Court.

ination of the testimony of the numerous witnesses in the case, most of them residing in the neighborhood of the boundary line, as to the marks and identification of the line originally established in 1802, and re-run and re-marked in 1859, satisfies us that no new marking of the line is required for its ready identification. The commissioners appointed under the act of Virginia of 1856, and under the act of Tennessee of 1858, found all the old marks upon the trees in the forest through which the line established ran, in the form of a diamond; and whenever they were indistinct, or, in the judgment of the commissioners, too far removed from each other, new marks were made upon the trees, or if no trees were found at particular places to be marked, monuments in stone were planted. Besides this, the State of Virginia does not ask that the line agreed upon in 1803 shall be re-run or re-marked, but prays that a new boundary line be run on the line of 36° 30'. Tennessee does not ask that the line of 1803 be re-run or re-marked. Nevertheless, under the prayer of Virginia for general relief, there can be no objection to the restoration of any marks which may be found to have been obliterated or become indistinct upon the line as herein defined.

Our judgment, therefore, is that the boundary line established by the States of Virginia and Tennessee by the compact of 1803 is the true boundary between them, and that on a proper application, based upon a showing that any marks for the identification of that line have been obliterated or have become indistinct, an order may be made, at any time during the present term, for the restoration of such marks without any change of the line.

A decree will, therefore, be entered declaring and adjudging that the boundary line established between the States of Virginia and Tennessee by the compact of 1803 is the real, certain and true boundary between the said States, and that the prayer of the complainant to have the said compact set aside and annulled, and to have a new boundary line run between them on the parallel of 36° 30′ north latitude should be and is denied at the cost of the complainant; and it is so ordered.

Opinion of the Court.

CHICOT COUNTY v. SHERWOOD.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.

No. 170. Submitted March 24, 1893. - Decided April 3, 1893.

An action will lie in a Circuit Court of the United States in the State of
Arkansas at the suit of a citizen of New York, against a county in Arkan-
sas, to recover on bonds and coupons issued by the county to aid in the
construction of a railroad and held by the citizen of New York, notwith-
standing the provisions in the act of the Legislature of Arkansas of Feb-
ruary 27, 1879, repealing all laws authorizing counties within the State to
be sued; requiring all demands against them to be presented to the County
Courts of the several counties for allowance or rejection; and allowing
appeals to be prosecuted from the decisions of those courts.
An answer to a declaration on such bonds and coupons setting out the statu-
tory provisions under which the bonds were issued and averring that the
election under which they were claimed to have been authorized was not
a free and fair election but was a sham" as shown by papers filed with
the county clerk," and reciting various irregularities which were alleged
to appear by reference to certified copies of the papers sent into the
clerk's office" from some of the various precincts of the county, and con-
cluding “and so the county says that there was in fact no election held in
said county on February 27, 1872, to determine whether or not the county
would subscribe to the capital of said railroad company and issue bonds
to pay the same" presents no issuable question of fact, going to the
merits of the suit, and if demurred to, the demurrer should be sustained.
While matters of fact, well pleaded, are admitted by a demurrer, conclusions
of law are not so admitted.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. D. H. Reynolds for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action by the defendants in error, citizens of the State of New York, against Chicot County, Arkansas, upon 17 bonds and 80 interest warrants or coupons thereto attached, forming a portion of an issue of bonds made and executed by that county, in 1872, for the amount of a stock subscription made by it to the Mississippi, Ouachita and Red

VOL. CXLVIII-34

Opinion of the Court.

River Railroad Company. The bonds and coupons sued on were in the following form:

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, State of Arkansas. "No. 3.

$500.

"It is hereby certified that the county of Chicot is indebted unto and will pay the Mississippi, Ouachita and Red River Railroad Company or bearer, on the first day of January, 1887, five hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum, payable semi-annually, on the first days of January and· July of each year, at the Union Trust Company, in the city of New York, on the presentation and surrender of the proper coupon hereto annexed. This bond is one of a series of two hundred, numbered from one to two hundred, inclusively, of like date, tenor and amount, issued under an act of the general assembly of the State of Arkansas, entitled 'An act to authorize counties to subscribe stock in railroads,' approved July 23, 1868, and in obedience to the vote of the people of said county, at an election held in accordance with the provisions of said act, authorizing the subscription of one thousand dollars to the capital stock of said railroad company.

"In witness whereof, the said county has caused to be affixed hereto its seal, and has caused the same to be attested by the signature of its county and probate judge, countersigned by the signature of its county clerk, who also signs the coupons hereto annexed, at their office, in said county, this 11th day of May, 1872. JAS. W. MASON,

"County and Probate Judge.

"M. W. GRAVES, County Clerk.
"Receivable in payment of all county taxes.

"STATE OF ARKANSAS:

"The treasurer of the county of Chicot will pay fifteen dollars to bearer at the office of the Union Trust Company, in the city of New York, on the first day of January, 1887, being amount-interest on bond No. 3.

"M. W. GRAVES, County Clerk."

Opinion of the Court.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of the bonds and coupons sued on, and the county prosecutes this writ of error therefrom, assigning as grounds of reversal, first, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and, secondly, that said court erred in sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrer to the plea or answer of the county, and in rendering judgment against it, upon its declining to make further answer in bar or defence of the action.

After being summoned in the usual manner the defendant moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that, since the passage of an act of the legislature of Arkansas, on February 27, 1879, Gannt's Dig. (1884), 350, repealing all laws authorizing counties in the State to sue and be sued, the county could not be sued or proceeded against in any court, state or federal, by complaint and summons, or otherwise than in the manner provided by said act; that the county had not been brought into the Circuit Court in any manner authorized by law, so as to acquire jurisdiction over the same; that the plaintiffs had not presented their demand to the county court of Chicot County, duly verified according to the requirements of the statute, for allowance or rejection, and that without such verification and demand no case against, or controversy with, the county could arise of which any state or federal court could take cognizance or jurisdiction. The second section of the act of February 27, 1879, on which this motion was based, provided "that hereafter all persons having demands against any county shall present the same, duly verified according to law, to the county court of such county for allowance or rejec tion. From the order of the county court therein, appeals may be prosecuted as now provided by law. If in any appeal the judgment of the county court is reversed the judgment of reversal shall be certified by the court rendering the same to the county court, and the county court shall thereupon enter the judgment of the superior court as its own."

The Circuit Court overruled this motion to dismiss the suit, and this action of the court constitutes the first error relied on for reversal of its judgment. It is claimed for plaintiff in error that, inasmuch as the courts of general jurisdiction in Arkansas