Argument for Appellees. States have the plenary power supposed, yet, when Congress chooses to act, it is not concluded by anything that the States, or individuals by its authority or acquiescence, have done, from assuming entire control of the matter, and abating any erections that may have been made, and preventing any others from being made, except in conformity with such regulations as it may impose. It is for this reason, viz., the ultimate (though yet unexerted) power of Congress over the whole subject matter, that the consent of Congress is so frequently asked to the erection of bridges over navigable streams. It might itself give original authority for the erection of such bridges when called for by the demands of interstate commerce by land; but in many, perhaps the majority, of cases, its assent only is asked, and the primary authority is sought at the hands of the State." The Willamette Bridge and The Escanaba Bridge cases above cited. See also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 43. III. The foregoing propositions being established, the maintenance of appellant's contention that it has in this franchise a vested property as against the United States is impossible. The truth is that in condemning and paying the appellant for its material improvements Congress makes a concession which could not have been enforced by law. It was entirely competent for Congress to have enacted and enforced a law forbidding the collection of any further tolls by this corporation, as being an unlawful obstruction or interference with interstate commerce, making in said law no provision whatever for any payment to the owners of the property. It has not, however, seen fit to enforce the extreme legal rights of the Government, but recognizing the large expenditures of money made by this company, and the equity growing out of such expenditures, provision has been made for the reimbursement of all such expenditures. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 547. IV. But not only is the demand for compensation on account of the destruction of this franchise unfounded as against the United States, but such a demand could not be maintained even against the State of Pennsylvania. In the legis Argument for Appellees. lation constituting the charter of appellant, through which alone it obtains any rights in the premises, the State distinctly reserved the option to take possession of this property upon the payment of the cost of material improvements, and expenses, with six per cent interest, less dividends. In view of these enactments, it is clear that this corporation has no contract with the State of Pennsylvania for an unlimited franchise. Its property is always subject to be taken by the State as provided in the sections quoted. Much less can appellant demand compensation for the franchise from the government of the United States, with which it has no contract in the premises, and which is simply exercising a paramount authority derived directly from the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land. V. It is said that by the act of March 3, 1881, (21 Stat. 471,) Congress has impliedly recognized and confirmed a vested right in the premises. To this proposition there are two very ready answers. First: the legislation of 1881 does not by its terms amount to a contract between the government and appellant in the premises. The Bridge Company v. The United States, 105 U.S. 570. Second: it is incompetent for a legislature to barter away or conclude itself in the exercise of any constitutional grant of legislative power. The legislature of Pennsylvania, itself, has held that the right of the Navigation Company in the case at bar is a revocable license. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101; Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 W. & S. 9; S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 312; New York & Erie Railroad v. Young, 33 Penn. St. 175; McKeen v. Delaware Canal Co., 49 Penn. St. 424; Freeland v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 66 Penn. St. 91. See also Bailey v. Phil. Wilm. & Balt. Railroad, 4 Harr. (Del.) 389; S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 593; Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 80. In conclusion, we submit that the power of Congress over this subject matter is plenary. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 134. Mr. C. Newell and Mr. D. T. Watson also filed a brief for appellee. Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. It appears from the foregoing statement that the Mononga hela Company had, under express authority from the State of Pennsylvania, expended large sums of money in improving the Monongahela River, by means of locks and dams; and that the particular lock and dam in controversy were built not only by virtue of this authority from the State of Pennsylvania, but also at the instance and suggestion of the United States. By means of these improvements, the Monongahela River, which theretofore was only navigable for boats of small tonnage, and at certain seasons of the year, now carries large steamboats at all seasons, and an extensive commerce by means thereof. The question presented is not whether the United States has the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the Monongahela Company, for that is conceded, but how much it must pay as compensation therefor. Obviously, this question, as all others which run along the line of the extent of the protection the individual has under the Constitution against the demands of the government, is of importance; for in any society the fulness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value of the government. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as they were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the nature of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable rights. In the case of Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N. J. L. (2 Harr.) 129, 145, cited in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 178, it was said that "this power to take private property reaches back of all constitutional provisions; and it seems to have been considered a settled principle of uni Opinion of the Court. versal law that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of that power; that the one is so inseparably connected with the other, that they may be said to exist not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the same principle." And in Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, Chancellor Kent affirmed substantially the same doctrine. And in this there is a natural equity which commends it to every one. It in no wise detracts from the power of the public to take whatever may be necessary for its uses; while, on the other hand, it prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him. But we need not have recourse to this natural equity, nor is it necessary to look through the Constitution to the affirmations lying behind it in the Declaration of Independence, for, in this Fifth Amendment, there is stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take private property for public uses. And with respect to constitutional provisions of this nature, it was well said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, in Boyd v. The United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635: "Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis." The language used in the Fifth Amendment in respect to this matter is happily chosen. The entire amendment is a series of negations, denials of right or power in the government, the last, the one in point here, being," Nor shall private Opinion of the Court. property be taken for public use without just compensation." The noun "compensation," standing by itself, carries the idea of an equivalent. Thus we speak of damages by way of compensation, or compensatory damages, as distinguished from punitive or exemplary damages, the former being the equiv alent for the injury done, and the latter imposed by way of punishment. So that if the adjective "just" had been omitted, and the provision was simply that property should not be taken without compensation, the natural import of the language would be that the compensation should be the equiva lent of the property. And this is made emphatic by the adjective "just." There can, in view of the combination of those two words, be no doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken. And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is personal. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his property without just compensation, the personal element is left out, and the "just compensation is to be a full equivalent for the property taken. This excludes the taking into account, as an element in the compensation, any supposed benefit that the owner may receive in common with all from the public uses to which his private property is appropriated, and leaves it, to stand as a declaration, that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner. We do not in this refer to the case where only a portion of a tract is taken, or express any opinion on the vexed question as to the extent to which the benefits or injuries to the portion not taken may be brought into consideration. This is a question which may arise possibly in this case, if the seven locks and dams belonging to the Navigation Company are so situated as to be fairly considered one property, a matter in respect to which the record before us furnishes no positive evidence. It seems to be assumed that each lock and dam by itself constitutes a separate structure and separate property, |