Opinion of the Court. 4 Wall. 519; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 671, 672. It has been distinctly held that a final judgment of this court is conclusive on the parties, and cannot be reëxamined. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 355. In Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69, 73, a case where this court had reversed a judgment of a Circuit Court and remanded the cause with a mandate to that court to enter judgment for the other party, and the court below had thereafter received affidavits showing new facts and granted a new trial, this court, by mandamus, ordered it to vacate the rule for a new trial, saying that the court below had no power to set aside the judgment of this court, "its authority extending only to executing the mandate." This principle was applied also in Ex parte Story, 12 Pet. 339; Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488; West v. Brashear, 14 Pet. 51; Bank of the United States v. Moss, 6 How. 31, 40; Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451; Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Wall. 121, 129; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253, 283; Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U. S. 361; Durant v. Essex Co., 101 U. S. 555; Mackall v. Richards, 112 U. S. 369, and 116 U. S. 45; Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415. But we have had this matter before us very recently. In Washington & Georgetown Railroad v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, this court affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which had in general term affirmed a judgment awarding to the plaintiff $6195 as a recovery in an action of tort for damages for personal injuries sustained through the negligence of the defendant. Neither the special term nor the general term had said in its judgment anything about interest. This court, in its judgment, merely affirmed, with costs, the judgment of the general term, but said nothing about interest. The mandate of this court contained its judgment, and then commanded the court below that such execution and proceedings be had in the cause "as, according to right and justice and the laws of the United States, ought to be had," notwithstanding the writ of error. The court below, on the presentation to it of the mandate, entered up a judgment against the defendant for interest on the judg Opinion of the Court. ment of the special term from the date of that judgment as originally entered. The defendant took exception to such action, and then applied to this court for a writ of mandamus to command the court below to vacate its judgment entered on the mandate of this court, so far as it related to interest. This court held that the mandamus must be granted, irrespectively of the question whether a judgment founded on tort bore, or ought to bear, interest in the Supreme Court of the District from the date of its rendition; and it issued the mandamus commanding the court below to vacate its judgment, so far as it related to interest, and to enter a judgment on the previous mandate of this court, simply affirming, without more, with costs, the original judgment of the general term. In re Washington & Georgetown Railroad, 140 U. S. 91. This court held that it was the duty of the court below to have entered a judgment strictly in accordance with the judgment of this court, and not to add to it the allowance of interest; and that the language of the mandate of this court, "that such execution and proceedings be had in said cause as, according to right and justice and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding," did not authorize the court below to depart in any respect from the judgment of this court. It further held that a mandamus would lie to correct the error, where there was no other adequate remedy, and where there was no discretion to be exercised by the inferior court, citing Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 376; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 329; and, also, Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 330; Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69; Durant v. Essex Co., 101 U. S. 555, 556; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275. In the present case, as we have before observed, there was no discretion to be exercised by the Circuit Court; and, although it might have been admissible to raise the question by a new appeal to the proper court, yet in view of the delay to be caused thereby, we do not consider that such remedy would have been, or would be, fully adequate, or that a writ of mandamus is now improper. Opinion of the Court. As to the suggestion that the views adopted by this court in its decision in Mc Donald v. Belding, 145 U. S. 492, decided by this court after the present cases were decided, would, if applied to the present cases, have caused a different result in them, we are of opinion that, without conceding that such would have been the result, this court cannot, on well-established rules and principles, permit the Circuit Court, of its own motion, to go back of, or subvert, what was settled by the opinion and mandate in the present cases. As to the provision in the decree presented to the Circuit Court, June 1, 1892, that the defendants pay all the costs of the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court, it is sufficient to say that the decree of November 11, 1887, awarded to the plaintiffs a recovery from Rugg of all costs of the suit. We therefore direct that a writ of mandamus be issued, in the terms prayed for in the petition. It is proper that the decree presented to the Circuit Court on June 1, 1892, should be entered. So far as it directs that the title to the land be divested out of the defendants and be vested in the plaintiffs, it corresponds with the terms of the decree of the Circuit Court of November 11, 1887. So far as the petition for a mandamus asks that the judge of the Circuit Court be commanded to order the issue of a writ of possession, it corresponds with the decree of the Circuit Court of November 11, 1887, which ordered a writ of possession to issue, and that a service of a copy of the decree should be the writ. So far as the decree presented to the Circuit Court on June 1, 1892, ordered that the account be stated in accordance with the directions contained in the mandate, and directed the terms in which the account should be taken, and as to the rental value of the lot, the interest, taxes, value of improvements and the amount paid by the defendant to the United States, with interest, the directions in such proposed decree correspond with the terms of the opinion of this court. In all the particulars which we have above considered, case No. 12 original is also embraced. The same rulings are made as to that case as have been made in regard to No. 13 original, and a writ of mandamus in the same terms will be issued. Writs of mandamus accordingly. Statement of the Case. HUME v. BOWIE. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 1107. Submitted February 6, 1893. Decided March 20, 1893. When the parties to a suit tried in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at circuit, cannot agree as to the exceptions, the trial term may, under the rules, be extended into the succeeding term for the purpose of settling them; and in case the judge presiding at the trial dies without settling them, and in consequence thereof a motion be made to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, the then presiding judge in the Circuit Court may order the motion to be heard in General Term; and an order to set aside the verdict and direct a new trial made in General Term is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken to this court. THIS was an action brought by William B. Bowie in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Frank Hume as indorser upon a promissory note. The defendant pleaded to the declaration, issue was joined, and on the trial of the cause a verdict was rendered May 25, 1888, in favor of the defendant. During the trial various exceptions were reserved to the rulings and instructions of the court, which were duly noted at the time by the presiding justice upon his minutes. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled June 2, 1888, and an appeal to the general term was thereupon taken, and a bond on appeal duly executed and approved. The record discloses that on January 3, 1888, the court in general term entered an order directing that, in addition to the Circuit Court to be held by Mr. Justice Hagner on the fourth Monday of January, 1888, a second Circuit Court should be held at the same time by Mr. Justice Merrick, the court to be held by Mr. Justice Hagner to be known as division number one, and the court to be held by Mr. Justice Merrick to be known as division number two. On April 27, 1888, the court in general term ordered that the Circuit Courts then being held in divisions numbers one and two should be continued further by the same justices through the May term Statement of the Case. thereof. This case was tried in the Circuit Court, division number two, by Mr. Justice Merrick; verdict returned May 25; motion for new trial overruled June 2; appeal prayed June 5; bond approved June 12. On July 14, 1888, an order was entered by that justice providing that "the May term of the Circuit Court, division number two, is hereby entered as extended that the bills of exceptions not yet filed may be settled, to wit:" (Here follow names of cases, including this case.) On the same day, in division number one, the court ordered "the term of this court extended for the purpose of settling bills of exceptions and case in the following cases: (Cases named); and thereupon the May term adjourned without day except as above stated." On January 24, 1889, an order was entered by the general term assigning the justices to serve for the year 1889, as follows: "First, for the General Term, Justices Hagner, James, and Merrick; second, for the Circuit Court, Chief Justice Bingham; third, for the Equity Court and Orphans' Court, Justice Cox; fourth, for the District Court, Justice James; fifth, for the Criminal Court, Justice Montgomery." April 8, 1889, the death of William B. Bowie was suggested, and Anne H. Bowie, executrix, was substituted as party plaintiff, and, on April 23, she filed her motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and to grant a new trial, "because the bill of exceptions containing the exceptions reserved on the trial of the cause cannot be settled, signed and sealed as required by law, the justice of this court, who presided at the trial of this cause, (in division No. 2, May term, 1888, of this court,) having departed this life without having settled or signed and sealed the same." Due notice of this motion was given and it was finally called up on June 8, 1889, before Chief Justice Bingham, holding a special term and Circuit Court, and "at the request of both parties by their respective attorneys was directed to be heard in the general term in the first instance." Subsequently the death of Anne H. Bowie was suggested and Richard Irving Bowie as administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, substituted. |