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could not be, if they were not in the parish at the time. Then it was urged, Seventhly, that here was no adjudication of a present settlement, only that the paupers
Effect of were last legally settled in M. N.-Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said, That it referred to the time of the complaint made, and the Court could not intend pealed against. an intermediate settlement between the hearing of the complaint, and the
2. Of what facts, making of the order of reinoval. And the Court considered the first order &c. of removal as good upon the face of it, and conclusive of the question of marriage, which was involved in the judgment of the justices. Orders quashed.
Rex v. Catterall, 6 M. f. S. 83. Order of removal of W. Waring, his The order is conwife and children, from Preston to Catterall, confirmed. Case: In 1810, gards the settleGeorge W., father of the pauper, not then emancipated, gained a settlement mentadjudicated. by renting a tenement in Catterall. In 1814, he was removed, by an order, from Claughton to Inskip, which order was confirmed, the sessions not being satisfied of the value of the tenement at Catterall. When the order was made, the pauper was emancipated, but had acquired no settlement in his own right. It was insisted, that the order of removal of the father was conclusive as to the son, and that the value of the tenement at Catterall could not then be proved.-Lord Ellenborough. I own, that it appears to me, that in conformity to the rules which are applicable to judgments in other cases, we ought to quash the order of sessions. There is no doubt that the son is privy to the father's settlement; it is not pretended that he had any other at the time of the adjudication of the fatlier's settlement, or that he acquired any subsequently to it. The question now is, Whether the son's settlement is to be governed by this adjudication, which, as it is a matter which regards the general municipal regulations of the realm, is of universal obligation and effect, unless fraud be shewn. This, then, being a fair bonâ fide adjudication, on the subject matter, is conclusive as to all the world. The pauper either derived a settlement from his father, or he did not. If not, this adjudication could not affect his settlement, but if he did, then is his settlement determined by that which has been pronounced with respect to his father, to which he is privy. - Bayley, J. The difficulty I have felt in coming to this . result, arose from the consideration lest we should thereby hold the son to be bound by an act to which he was not a party, and had no opportunity of giving an answer. But this difficulty is removed, when it is recollected, that this is not the son's appeal, and he might have appealed, if he had been prejudiced by his removal. I forbear to give any opinion as to the question, Whether it would have been conclusive against the individual, if he had appealed.— Abbott, J. It is important that this question should be settled on general principles, rather than upon nice and petty distinctions. Now the general rule is, that an order of removal, confirmed upon appeal, is conclusive as to all other parishes, as it regards the settlement thereby adjudicated: and it is immaterial, as it respects this general rule, whether the child, who derives the settlement from his father, be named in the order or not. So, I think, it has been adjudged in other cases. As, then, the adjudication, in 1814, decided that the parent's settlement was elsewhere than in Catterall, this was conclusive as to the son's settlement there, unless it could have been shewnı, that the father acquired such settlement after the emancipation of the son.-Holroyd, J., referred to Rex v. St. Mary, Lambeth,
and the opinions of Grose, J., and Le Blanc, J., in Rex v. Rudgely, and said, These authorities appear to me to be decisive, that the order in question, having been confirmed on appeal, is like a judgment of ouster, conclusive as to all the world, upon the point of the father's settlement, and of those deriving a settlement from him. Orders quashed.
Rex v. Knaptoft, 4 D. . R. 469; 2 B. &. C. 883; 2 D. 8. R. Mag. Ca. 347. An order of sesOrder for the removal of Elizabeth Burdett, from Gumley to Knaptoft, con
sions, made in
1815. quashing an firmed. The case is fully stated in the judgment delivered by Bayley, J. order for the reTwo questions were raised for our consideration in this case. First, Whether moval of the bro.
ther of the pau. the prior order of removal, and the judgment of the court of quarter sessions per to the appelquashing the same, were admissible in evidence in the present appeal? and lant parish, and second, Whether the question put to the pauper's father, and interdicted parol evidence to by the Court, ought to have been allowed and answered ? The order of ground of the
decision of the
the order of ses.
father of the pau. per was not set.
ter that arose
Seventhly, removal, and the judgment thereon, were tendered, for the purpose of disEffect of an proving the pauper's settlement in the respondent parish: the question put order unap
to the pauper's father, he having stated that he was examined at the forpealed against.
mer appeal, was, What facts he had there stated ? We, who heard this case 2. Of what facts, argued, are decidedly of opinion that the prior order of removal and judg
ment were not, with any explanation, receivable in evidence on the second appeal. The prior order of removal was quashed. That may have been done upon any one of three grounds. Either, because the sessions were of opinion that the pauper was emancipated, and had acquired a settlement of
his own; or, because the respondents were not then in a situation to prove any settlement in the father's settlement in the appellant parish ; or, because the appellants the appellant parish, was were able to prove a settlement of his elsewhere. The case does not inform received: Held, us on which of these grounds the order was quashed, but it is conceded that that even if pare it was quashed upon the merits, and not upon any point of form. If we missible to prove believed that the ground of the judgment was the want of proof of the the ground of the father's settlement in the appellant parish, and had then thought that the sessions, still that evidence was, under those circumstances, admissible, we should have sent
the case back to the sessions for further explanation on that head; but we sions was not evidence that the are of opinion, that under none of the circumstances supposed, the evidence
was admissible, and, therefore, we think it better to dispose of the case in its
present shape. As a broad and general proposition, we may say, that the tled in the appel. lant parish in
order of removal, confirmed, or reversed upon appeal, or acquiesced in with1815, because the out appeal, is receivable in evidence, because it is a judgment of law. But ment was a mat. where, and under what circumstances, is it receivable? This inquiry is
answered by the rule laid down by De Grey, C.J., in the Duchess of kingcollaterally on ston's case, hy which we find that, to make the order receivable, the parties the trial of the first appeal
in the case must be the same, and the point in issue must be the same: these are both indispensable qualifications. If the matter in issue be collateral or incidental, the evidence cannot be received. The language of that learned judge, as applicable to the present case, is, “that a judgment directly upon the point, is, as evidence, conclusive between the same parties, upon the matter directly in question.” Does this case fall within that rule? Is the matter in question in the second appeal, the same as that in the former? Is the judgment offered in evidence in the second, directly upon the point which was in issue in the former? We think not.
From the very nature and substance of the order of removal, it is merely collateral to the issue raised in the second appeal. By the original order, an individual, not the pauper in this case, was removed; the question to be tried on appeal was, where his settlement was? The judgment decided that his settlement was in a particular parish. That was the point there, and that was the matter in question ; but it is not so here. The early case of Harrow v. Ryslip, will illustrate this position. The case was this: A. comes into Harrow, and being likely to become chargeable, was removed to Ryslip; Ryslip appealed, and, upon the appeal, A. was adjudged to be settled at Ryslir; afterwards Ryslip discovered that Hendm was the place of his last legal settlement, and sent him thither; and the question was, Whether, after the adjudication upon the appeal, Ryslip was not estopped against all the world, to say, that Ryslip was not the place of his last legal settlement et per Holt
, C. J.,“ Ryslip is estopped to say otherwise : for, if Ryslip had not been the very place of his last legal settlement, the justices must hare sent him back to Harrow, who were first possessed of him, for that reason, because they were possessed of him, and he did not belong to Ryslip. And now this is, in effect, the same question again, viz. Whether he belongs to Ryslip which question has been already determined by the justices on the appeal, who have adjudged that he was last settled at Ryslip.” The report goes on to say,—“ Afterwards, this was moved again, and then Holt and Gould held the adjudication was final as to Ryslip, against all persons and places, because the point of his settlement as to Ryslip was tried in the appeal; but as to Harrow, (for he had been formerly removed by them to Hendon, and that order reversed), they were at liberty to send him to any other place, and were not estopped; because the justices, on the appeal, did not adjudge him to be settled at Harrow, though they adjudged him now to
be settled at Ryslip; so that the other point was not tried.” The language Seventhly, of the Court, in one part of this case, applies to the instance where the order Effect of an of removal is confirmed, and that on the other, where it is reversed; and points out the distinction, already alluded to, between a judgment of con- pealed against. firmation and one of reversal. In the latter instance, the sessions do not
2. Of what facts, find where the pauper is settled, and thus, the order of removal, confirmed, &c. or unappealed from, is conclusive evidence, that the settlement is in the place to which he is removed ; reversed, it conclusive evidence, that the settlement is not there; and beyond this point, no case, with which we are acquainted, has ever yet gone. There are, undoubtedly, cases which shew, that where the point in issue is decided, all results flowing out of that point are decided also; as, for instance, that a wife's removal to the place of her husband's settlement, is conclusive to shew that that is his place of settlement. But no case has ever gone further than to hold, that the point decided is conclusive upon the same point, and, therefore, receivable in evidence; other points, collateral or incidental to the point decided, and uudetermined by it, are excluded from its operation, and cannot be proved by giving the point decided in evidence. It is the same with respect to judgments; they are merely evidence of the point decided. It is admitted, that the pauper has no settlement in the parish to which he has been removed, unless his father has acquired a settlement there. Then the father's settlement was a question which came in incidentally, but incidentally only, and was not the point decided by the judgment in the first appeal, which, consequently, was not admissible' as evidence in the second. For these reasons, we are of opinion, that the order of sessions in this case was right, that the sessions properly rejected the evidence tendered, and that the rule for quashing their order must be discharged. Order of sessions confirmed.
Rex v. Kenilworth, 2 T. R.598. Thomas Byfield, his wife and children, An order of rewere removed from Birmingham to Kenilworth. Order confirmed. Case: moval, unappeal. The pauper, on the 10th May, 1765, hired for a year to J. Chatterton, of conclusive of the Birmingham, and that day entered into his service, and continued in the place of settlesame until Ist of April, 1766, when he was taken up on a charge of bas
ment up to that tardy, and married the next day. His master did not make any complaint against him, nor discharge him from his service. On the 3rd of April, he was removed from Birmingham to Kenilworth, where he remained until the 7th of April, and then returned back to Birmingham, into his master's service, who willingly received him again, and he continued in his service till the end of the year, and received his full year's wages. The order of removal was not appealed against.-Buller, J. There is no proposition in the law of settlements more clear than this, that an order of removal, unappealed against, is conclusive against all the world, and this is so clearly and universally established, that it ought never to be impeached. At the same time, the rule is, that the order of removal, though unappealed from, does not at all affect a subsequent settlement. After the order of removal, unappealed from, the pauper could not legally return to the parish from whence he had been removed: it would have been a crime in him to do so: and if he could not return without committing a crime, he could not be liable to an action by the master for not completing his contract. If the law intervenes and disables a person from completing his contract, it puts an end to the contract: In this case the pauper returned after the order of removal to the parish of B. where he served a month; but that could not gain him a settlement there, for the act subsequent to the order of removal, by which he was to gain a settlement, should be complete in itself.—Grose, J. I doubt whether the party was liable to be removed, but there having been an order of reinoval, unappealed from, it is decisive. Order confirmed.
Rex v. Corsham, 11 East, 388. The pauper was removed from East Even when a Moulsey to Corsham; and it was confirmed by the sessions, who stated, that question of set. on the 5th of April, 1807, he had been removed from Charlton to Garsdon, between two and no appeal had been entered against that order; which removal was other parishes. subsequent to a settlement he had gained in Corsham.—Lord Ellenborough. If the pauper were settled at Garsdon, at the time the former order was
Seventhly, made, could not Corsham, as well as all other parishes, have taken advantage
ted to, is the most authentic proof of his settlement being there at the time pealed against. the order was made, and we must intend every thing in support of that 2. Of what facts, settlement so adjudged. It is, in effect, a statutable certificate, if I may so
express myself, that the pauper was then settled at Garsdon. The statute gives him a settlement there; and the fact stated by the sessions of a prior settlement in Corsham is immaterial.-Le Blanc, J. If the former order were not conclusive as to the settlement being in Garsdon at the time, Garsdon would escape the effect of it altogether, for this order would be conclusive upon Corsham, so as to prevent Corsham removing to Garsdon. Order
is final; but an
(Eighthly)-Effect of Confirming or Quashing Orders of
Removal Appealed against. Eighthly, If a person has an inchoate right of settlement in the parish removing Effect of him (ex. gra. as being entitled, when so removed, to administration of an
firming or estate in the parish,) which he afterwards perfects (by obtaining a grant of quushing orders administration) before the appeal against the order of removal is heard, this of removal, &c. does not authorise the sessions to quash such order. The proper course, in
such case, is to remove him back by a new order. Rex v. Widworthy, Andr. 4, (ante, 597.)
Mynton v. Stoney Stratford, 2 Salk. 527.—By Holt, C.J., and the Court. upon the appeal
If on appeal to the sessions an order be discharged, that judgment binds order discharged only between the parties: but when, upon appeal, an order is confirmed, that binds only the is conclusive to all persons as well as to the parties, for it is an adjudication parties.
that this is the place of the party's last legal settlement, which cannot be avoided by the parish against whom it is made.
Little Bitham v. Somerby, 1 Stru. 232. A person is sent by an order to Somerby, as the place of his last legal settlement. Somerby appeals, and the order is confirmed. Soon after, without stating that he had gained any new settlement, Somerby sends him to a third place.-By the Court. An order of reversal is final only between the two parishes; but if it be confirmed, it is final as to all the world; and, therefore, no new settlement
appearing, the order of removal from Somerby must be quashed. An order of re. Harrow v. Ryslip, 2 Salk. 524; 3 Salk. 261. A person comes into Harmoval confirmed,
row, and was removed to Ryslip. Ryslip appealed. Order confirmed. the then place of Afterwards Ryslip discovered that Hendon was the place of his settlement,
and sent him thither; and the question was, Whether, after the adjudication upon the appeal, Ryslip was not estopped against all the world, to say that Ryslip was not the place of his settlement? By Holt, C. J. Ryslip, is estopped to say otherwise; for if Ryslip had not been the very place of his last legal settlement, the justices must have sent him back to Harrow, who were first possessed of him, for that reason, because they were possessed of him, and he did not belong to Ryslip. And now this is, in effect, the same question again, namely, Whether he belongs to Ryslip? Which question has been already determined by the justices on the appeal, who have adjudged that he was last settled at Ryslip. Now this point being determined, the appeal must be final and conclusive, otherwise there would be
no end of things. Order quashed, St. Michael's, Bedington, v. Kingston Bowsey, 2 Salk. 486. Order reconclusive only between the versed on the appeal is conclusive only as to the parish acquitted, but the parties.
first parish may remove again to any parish not party to the former removal.
Foston v. Carleton, 1 Str. 567. A person was removed from Foston to Carleton. On appeal, the order is quashed; and at three months'end a new order is made to remove him from Foston to Carleton.—But by the Court. The last order must be quashed. Barrow v. Ingoldsby, E., 11 Anne, was at the distance of nine months, but the Court quashed it, because there could be no inconvenience in putting them to shew a new settlement.
is conclusive of
But it is conclu. sive as between them.
Rex v. Bradenham, Burr. S. C. 394 ; 2 Bott, 918. Order of removal, Eighthly, dated December 30, 1754, of John Saunders, and Sarah, his wife, and four Effect of conchildren, from Thame to Bradenham. Bradenham appealed to the next firming or (Epiphany) sesions, and the order was discharged." March 28, 1755, quashing orders a new order was made for removing Sarah, the wife of J. S., and of removal, &c. her children, from Thame to Bradenhum. Upon appeal, the sessions Same point. adjudge the last settlement of Sarah Saunders and her children to be in Bradenham, and confirm the order. On removal of these four orders into the King's Bench, it was argued, that the order of reversal was conclusive between the two parishes, that so there might be an end of things; and that one sessions shall not counteract and control the acts of a former, unless they state specially, which they have not done here.—By the Court. The last orders must be quashed. We must take the appeal, on which the original order is discharged, to be on the merits. The matter has been determined already, between these two parishes, and it must be conclusive. But it is said, there are cases where there may be a new removal, as supposing there had been one or two years' distance between the two orders of removal, or a sufficient time to gain a new settlement; yet the Court will not intend one gained, unless it is stated in the order. And in this case there is no such time.
Rex v. Osgathorpe, 2 Stra. 1256. A person was removed, by an order, But special matfrom Diseworth to Osgathorpe ; which was quashed. He was, by a second ter may be set order, sent from Diseworth to Osgathorpe as a certificated man; and, upon sions upon the an appeal, it was stated, that the first removal was before he became charge- second appeal, able, and the second after he became so; and the sessions were of opinion, vent the first that the first determination was not final, and therefore confirmed the order from being second order. It was moved to quash these two last orders, because a final. reversal is final between the parties. But by the Court. So it would be if the special matter did not appear; a certificated person cannot be sent back, until he is actually a charge; a removal before is premature. The consequence of which, only is, that he must be suffered to remain till he doth become chargeab but not to make a premature removal final for ever. The last orders must be confirmed.
Rex v. Wheelock, 5 B. &. C. 511. This was an application for a manda- Appellant may mus, to direct the sessions to make a special entry that an order had been show, by order, quashed for want of proof of chargeability, which, though the fact, the ses- which the former sions had refused to do. A rule nisi was refused, Bayley, J., saying, The order was quashrespondents are not, at all events, concluded by the judgment of the sessions, but may, in the trial of another appeal against another order of removal of the same party, explain, by evidence, to the sessions, the particular ground on which the former order of removal was quashed.-Holroyd, J., concurred.
Rex v. St. Andrew, Holborn, 6 T. R. 613. M. Carter and her illegiti- If quashed on mate son were removed from St. Andrew, Holborn, to Northau. Case: By form, not concluan order, dated 24th July, 1794, M. Carter removed to Northau. On ap- parties.
sive between the peal, the order, for want of a proper adjudication of the last legal settlement of the pauper, which was apparent on the face of it, was quashed. On the 25th of Jannary, 1795, the present order was made, whereby M. Carter and her son were again removed from St. Andrew, Holborn, to Northaw. Upon appeal, the sessions were of opinion, that the first warrant and judgment, having been quashed, was binding between the two parishes. The last order quashed. —Lord Kenyon, C. J., said, that as the first order in this case was quashed for defect of form, which appeared by the minute of the sessions, it was essentially different from the cases cited, where the order was quashed generally, which must be taken to be on the merits. And it is undoubtedly law, that if an order of removal be quashed for form, it does not conclude the parties. Order of sessions quashed.
Rex v. Cirencester, Burr. S. C. 17; 2 Bott, 521. The pauper was re- Order quashed is moved from Minety to Coln, St. Aldwin's; and, on appeal, the order was not conclusive, reversed. Afterwards, he was removed from Cirencester to Coln St. Ald- except between win's. The former removal was on complaint of Minety; the latter on the pauper was complaint of Cirencester : the pauper was sent on both complaints to Coln not then settled St. Aldwin's. On appeal against this latter order, the sessions quashed the parish.