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the orders of removal.

an

and report to

An order of re

of the pauper taken by one of

Thirdly, directed to be removed or passed, the execution of such order of removal or Of the order of vagrant-pass shall also be suspended for the same period, with respect to every

removal, 8c. other person named therein, who was actually of the same household or 7. Of suspending

family of such sick or infirm person or persons at the time of such order of removal made, or vagrant pass granted.

Sect. 4. Enacts, “That whenever it shall happen that any pauper is by Any magistrate age, illness, or infirmity, unable to be brought up to the petty sessions to be may take the ex- examined as to his or her settlement, it shall be lawful for any one magistrate infirm pauper as

acting for the district where such pauper shall be, to take the examination of to his settlement, the said pauper, and to report the same to any other magistrate or magispetty sessions. trates acting for the said district; and for the said magistrates, upon such

report, to adjudge the settlement of the said pauper, and make and suspend the order of reinoval, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if the said pauper had appeared before two magistrates."

Rex v. South Lynn, All Saints, M., 4 M. & S. 354. Removal of E. moval made by two justices upon

Smith, widow, and her children, from St. Margaret's to South Lynn, All the examination Saints. Order confirmed. Case : The order was founded upon the exami

nation of the pauper taken before one justice, and reported to the other, them pursuant to pursuant to 49 Geo. III. c. 124, s. 4. The pauper being at the time of stat. 49 Geo. 3, c. her examination ick, and unable to travel, the justices suspended the 274:S:n need not order. The question was, Whether this order was void, as it omitted to set circumstances of out that the examination was taken before one justice only, and was retaking the exami- ported to the other justice, so as to shew the particular jurisdiction and , .

authority of the justices under the statute ?—Lord Ellenborough, C. J. The justices have no jurisdiction at the common law, but only what is given to them by statute ; and the argument is as if this were a proceeding contrary to the common law. It seems to me that the statute in question does not make it necessary for the justices to state the proceedings had under it in their order.—Le Blanc, J. The statute enacts, That in case the pauper is by age, or other infirmity, unable to be brought up to be examined as to his settlement, it shall be lawful for one magistrate to take his examination, and report it to another, and for those magistrates, upon such report, to adjudge the settlement; but I do not find that the statute makes any alteration in

the form of the order.-Per. Curiam. Order confirmed. Where, at the

Rex v. Everdon, 9 East, 101. On the 19th of June, 1805, an order was time of making

made to remove a pauper from Everdon to Wappenham; at the same time moval, the pau- an order of suspension was made. By an order of 3rd December, 1806, be removed, and reciting the death of the pauper, and that 201. 8s. 6d. expence had been in

curred by the suspension, the same magistrates directed the parish officers of pension was Wappenham to pay that sum to Everdon. Against this last order an appeal made: Held, that his presence was

was lodged at the ensuing sessions, and the order quashed, &c. The case stated not necessary if that the order of removal was made upon the examination of the pauper's he be ill, and unfit father only, who swore that the pauper, from excessive infirmity and sickness,

was unable to be brought before the justices who made the original order for examination, and that the said justices at the same time made the order for suspension. The pauper died without having been removed, and she had never been before the justices at any time upon the matter, nor been examined by them when they made the order of suspension.—Lord Ellenborough, C. J., construed the words, “ In case any poor person shall from henceforth be brought before any justice or justices of the peace for the purpose of being removed,” to mean, in case a question concerning the removal of any poor person shall be brought before the justices of the peace, for the purpose of his removal, &c. And he said that the language of the act adverted to the case which most generally happens, where the pauper is brought before the magistrate to be examined as to his settlement; but that it appeared from Rex v. Bagworth, that it was not necessary in all cases, though if it can be, it is fit it should be so, but not absolutely necessary. And that all that the act meant was, not that where any person was brought personally, but where his case was brought judicially before the magistrates, for the purpose of his removal, that they should have power to suspend the execution of the order of removal, if it appeared to them by due examination of the facts, that from sickness or infirmity of the party the removal could not then safely be made. And he added, that in thus strain

the order of re.

an order of sus.

to move.

the orders of re

moval of the pau. per; and there.

case was not

ing the words of the act, he did not go further than was done in Antony v. Thirdly, Cardigan, where the description of a person not having any child, was con- Of the order of strued to mean not having any child which could be a burthen to the parish removal, &c. where the father was hired and served. The other judges agreed, and the

7. Of suspending order of sessions quashed.

Rex v. Chagford, 4 B. f. A. 235. On the 2nd December, 1816, two jus- moval. tices removed William Endacott from Chagford to Staverton. This order The power given was suspended. On the 1st of July, 1817, the parish officers of Chagford, under 35 Geo. 3, believing the pauper sufficiently recovered to be removed, an order was c. 101, s. 2, of or. made and held for the payment of 221. 17s. {d., the expence of the sus

dering the

charges incurred pension. Immediately after this order was made, it was ascertained that during the susthe pauper was still too ill to be removed, and, on the 7th of July, the jus- pension of an tices signed a second order of suspension. On the 16th of May, 1819, the to be paid by the pauper's father died at Chagford, and, by his death, two freehold houses in parish to which Chagford descended to the pauper, as heir-at-law. The parish of Chagford is confined to two

, thereupon ceased to relieve the pauper. On the 7th of February, 1820, cases only, viz., another order was made for the

removal, and also for the payment of 601. 9s. the death or reexpences of the suspension. The pauper was never removed; but on the 18th of February, 1820, the appellants were, for the first time, served with fore, where a the order of removal, and with the several other orders here mentioned, and pauper, during on the same day payment was demanded of the expences incurred by the an order of resuspension. The parish of Staverton gave notice, that they intended to ap

moval, became

irremovable in peal against an order made by Baldwin Fulford and George Gregory, bear

consequence of ing date the 1st of July, 1817, so far as the same order directs the payment an estate de of 221. 17s. 14d.; and also of an appeal against another order, by Baldwin scending to him:

a Fulford and George Gregory, bearing date the 7th day of February, 1820, so far as that order directs the payment of 60l. 9s. The sessions quashed both within the act, orders, subject to a case.-After hearing Nolan and Tyrrell in support of the ped, that hae pauorder, and Tancred, contra, Abbott, C. J., said, In this case, we are called been removed, no upon to put a new construction on this act of parliament, which was passed ment of any in order to prevent a grievance, arising from the too great temptation afforded charges incurred to parish officers by orders of removal, to convey paupers from one place to during the susanother during sickness. The second section recites, that poor persons are original order of often passed to the place of their settlement during the time of their sick- removal could be ness, to the great danger of their lives; and it gives a power to magistrates, made. in order to remedy this inconvenience, of not carrying their order into immediate effect, but of suspending its operation for a time. But then, in order to prevent this from producing any hardship to the removing parish, it provides, that no act done by the pauper, during the suspension, shall give him a settlement; and empowers the magistrates to order the intermediate charges to be paid by the parish to which the order is made, in case any removal shall take place, or in case of the death of such poor persons, before the execution of such order. This power, however, seems to me to be confined to these two cases only, viz., the removal and death of the pauper. Whether or not it would have been expedient for the legislature to have provided for the present case, it is for this Court to say. All that we can do is to determine, that the non-removal of the pauper prevents the case from falling within the act. I should have thought, indeed, that as the order of the magistrates, not being within the act, was altogether nugatory, the proper course for the sessions to have pursued would have been, not to have quashed the order, but to have dismissed the appeal. However, as they have done substantially right, I think their order ought to be confirmed.-Bayley, J., observed, that a very long period had elapsed, during which this order remained suspended, and no notice of it was given to the opposite party. If that notice had been given, (and there are no words in the act that supersede the necessity of it) it might have enabled the other parish to have made prompt inquiry, and to have ascertained the fact relative to the settlement of the pauper.-Holroyd, J., thought the statute could not be construed so as to apply to this case, although probably the legislature would, if it had occurred to them, have provided for it. Order of sessions confirmed.

Rex v. Engleficld, 13 East, 317. Order was made for the reinoval of where an order Joseph Timms, Elizabeth his wife, and two infant children, by name, from for the removal

,

the orders of re. moval.

who afterwards

and children re.

reason for the

the order of removal.

able time. There

order of removal was made and

Thirdly, Englefield to Cassington ; the order was suspended as to Joseph, until it Of the order of should appear that he was sufficiently recovered from his illness to be rernoved removal, &c. without danger; and a third order was made on 17th March, 1810, which

stated that Joseph died on the 7th instant, and that the charges incurred by 7. Of suspending

the suspension amounted to 411. 4s. 6d., which they directed the parish of

Cassington to pay: After the death of Joseph, his wife and children were and children, was removed, under the first mentioned order, from Englefield to Cassington ; suspenofedhehas: and on appeal against such order, and also the order for payment, the three band's sickness, orders were quashed, because the order suspending the order of removal had

not been itself taken off by an order of magistrates on the death of Joseph. died, and the wife

A difficulty occurred, upon the opening of the case, which the Court thought moved, without could not be got over; upon what ground the sessions could quash these taking of the sus orders which, upon the face of them, were all good, when the real objection pension, is no

to the removal of the wife and two children, if any, was the want of another sessions quashing order of magistrates taking off the suspension of the original order of re

moval. The respondents' counsel, indeed, suggested, that the death of the
husband operated as a natural death to the order of suspension, but the
Court did not decide the case on that ground, and it was observed, e contrà,
that the terms of the order of suspension did not apply to the case of death,
but it was to operate till the sick person could be safely removed. For the
other reason, however, the Court quashed the order of sessions, and Le Blane,
J., referred to the precedent of a permission to remove after an order of sus-
pension, given in the new (viz. the 21st) edition of Burn's Justice, as being

best adapted to such a case.
A suspended Rex v. Lampeter, 3 B. f. C. 454 ; 5 D. f. R. 310; 2 D. f R. Mag. Ca.
order of removal 437. Order was made on the 14th May, 1821, for the removal of Guen Rees,
within a reason. widow, from Lampeter to Llanfairclydoge, but on the same day suspended on

account of the age and infirmity of the pauper, which rendered it unsafe for fore, where an

her to travel. The same justices, on the 16th February, 1824, made an order,

which recited that the pauper was dead, and that an expense of 12. 138. 6d. suspended on the had been occasioned by the suspension which they directed the parish of count of the age

Llanfairclydoge to pay. Both these orders were served upon the appellants, and infirmity of for the first time, on the same 16th February upon which they appealed the pauper ; and

against the order of removal; and the sessions held that the order of three years, but removal and suspension never having been served in the pauper's lifetime, no notice of the

nor after her death, until the money was demanded, the order of removal had order of removal was served on

become a nullity.—Abbott, C. J. I am of opinion that the sessions came to the parish to the right conclusion in this case. The utmost effect of Rex v. St. Mary-lewhich she was

bone is this; that the death of a pauper, during the suspension of an order moved, till after for his removal, does not render that order a nullity; and that a subsequent her death : Held, order for payment of the expenses is a grievance upon the parish to which was not within a the pauper is ordered to be removed, for which an appeal will lie against reasonable time, that order. No question arose in that case, respecting the necessity of serving

or giving notice of the order of removal, or the order for suspending it; that
question arises, for the first time, in the present case. The legislature has
not fixed any precise time for the service, but it is evident from the 49 Geo.
III. c. 124, s. 2, that such an order may be served previous to a removal ;
and if a suspended order may be served, and reason and convenience require
that it should be served before removal, the service should be within a reason-
able time. In this case, a period of three years elapsed between the issuing
of the original order of removal, and the death of the pauper, and during all
that period no notice was given, either of the original order, or of the order
of suspension. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the order of removal in this
case, was not served within a reasonable time, and consequently that the
order of sessions must be confirmed.-Bayley, J., observed, that by the delay
of three years, the opportunity of examining the pauper had been lost, and
the expense incurred in supporting the pauper may be thrown upon persons

not inhabitants of the parish during that period. - Littledale, J., concurred. The justices cap. Rex v. K'ynaston, 1 East, 117. A rule to shew cause why a mandamus not refuse indors. should not issue to Mr. K., a magistrate of Essex, commanding him to back

the warrant of distress issued by the magistrates for the borough of Colches-
ter, for 201. 16s. 3d., being the expences incurred by the parish of Lerden in

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she survived

ordered to be re.

and that the order of removal was void.

for distress.

the maintenance of D. Glover and family in his illness, during the suspen- Thirdly, sion of an order for removing him to his parish, and 30s. for the reasonable Of the order of charges of the levy. D. G., on the 31st of May, 1799, as he was driving a

removal, &c. waggon on the public road leading through Lexden, had the misfortune to

7. Of suspending break both his legs, and was immediately taken to the workhouse there, the orders of rewhere he continued till the 31st of July. On the 6th of May, two justices moval. took the pauper's examination, and made an order for removing him and his wife, who was then attending him, from Lexden to Coggeshall in Esser; and, at the same time, the magistrates indorsed an order of removal, by virtue of the 35 Geo. JII. c. 101, stating, that it would be dangerous to remove him at that time; and he continued there, accordingly, till the 31st of July, when the order of removal was, by their permission, executed. The same magistrates, afterwards, made an order on the parish officers of Great Coggeshall, to repay the parish of Lexden, 201. 16s. 3d., for expences incurred in the cure and maintenance of the pauper: and the overseers of Great Coggeshall, not paying this within three days after demand, nor giving notice of appeal, as required by the same act, the magistrates granted a warrant of distress: but Great Coggeshall, being without the jurisdiction of the magistrates granting the warrant, the parties applied to the defendant, who was an acting magistrate within the jurisdiction of Great Coggeshall, to indorse the warrant of distress for execution, which he refused; whereupon, the present rule was obtained.—Lord Kenyon, C. J., after looking into 35 Geo. III. c. 101, said, It was impossible to make any question upon this part of it: it is peremptory upon the magistrate, under these circumstances, to indorse the warrant; he has nothing to do with the propriety of making the original order, or granting the original warrants; he acts merely ministerially; in like manner as justices do in allowing a poor rate, whose signatures are mere matter of form. The justices, indeed, by whom the original order and warrant were issued, had a discretion to exercise upon the matter submitted to them: but the magistrate who merely indorses the warrant of another, under this act, is not answerable for the legality of it, which remains at the hazard of him who first granted it; here, also, the order, being for payment of above 201., might have been appealed against, by the parties who were dissatisfied with it, and then the merits of the question might have been discussed; but the Court cannot do otherwise, at present, than make the rule absolute.

Rex v. Bradford, 9 East, 97. An order was made on the 7th of July, Of appeal against 1307, for the removal of Sarah Spires, from Bradford to Melksham, and

an order of jus.

tices for payment suspended. On the 16th of September following, they made a third order, of the charges of directing the first order to be executed, and 411. 148. 9d. expence, which had an order of sus

pension. been incurred by the suspension of it, to be paid hy Melksham to Bradford. On the 17th of September, the pauper was carried to Melksham; and a motion was made at the Michaelmas sessions following, to enter and adjourn an appeal against the last order for the payment of the expences, which was agreed to by the Court; but they reserved the question, whether any appeal were allowed to the sessions, the appellants not having given notice of appeal within three days after the removal of the pauper to the respondent parish. But Lord Ellenborough, C. J., held the meaning of the clauses to be clearly this ; if the party aggrieved by the order, and intending to appeal against the amount of the charges, will give notice of the appeal within three days after demand made, he shall be relieved from the inconvenience of a distress: but though he neglect to do so, he only subjects himself to that inconvenience; for his right of appeal, which is afterwards given, is not thereby taken away; and if he afterwards think proper to appeal, within the time appointed by law for appeals against orders of removal, he is expressly empowered to do so. Order of sessions confirmed.

Rex v. St. Mary-le-bone, Middlesex, 13 East, 51. An order was made Appeal against on 3rd July, 1809, for the removal of James Harlow from Hitchin to St. an order for costs Mary-le-bone, the execution of which was, at the same time, suspended by pounds, where reason of the sickness of the pauper. By an order of the 18th of September the pauper died following, the same justices, reciting that J. H. was dead, directed the expence incurred by the suspension to be paid. St. M. appealed against the order of removal, and the order for the payment of the charges. The

.

the orders of re. moval.

Thirdly,

sessions dismissed both appeals, and also stated, that neither of the orders Of the order of of removal or suspension thereof, were served on the parish officers of St. M., removal, 8c. until after the death of the pauper, which happened between the 3rd and

11th of July, 1809; after which time the parish officers of St. M. were 7. Of suspending

served with the orders, and 5l. 2s. 8d. given thereby was demanded, at which time they gave notice of appeal to the parish officer of H., against the order of removal of 3rd July, 1809, which said order was suspended on the day of the date thereof; and also against the order of adjudication, dated 18th September, 1809, &c., for the payment of 51. 28. 8d. for the charges incurred by the suspension, dated 11th December, 1809. The respondents offered no evidence that the pauper was settled in the parish of St. M., but contended that no appeal could lie against the order of removal, as it had never been executed; and that there can be no execution of an order of removal, but by delivering the pauper to the officers of the parish, until which time the parish is not aggrieved, and until aggrieved (under all the antecedent subsisting laws relating to the settlements of the poor) no right of appeal can arise. That the order for the payment of the 51. 2s. 8d., being less than 201., no appeal is given, and the session have no authority to review or alter the sum.—Lord Ellenborough, C. J. The appeal is by the 3 W. & M.c. 11, s. 9, given to the party aggrieved by the determination of the justices respecting the settlement of the pauper; then, though the grievance grow by a subsequent statute, the party is still aggrieved by the order of removal. Before the 35 Geo. III., there was no grievance to the parish to which the order of removal was made, until it was executed: but that statute attaches a contingent consequence to the order itself in this case, which, coupled as it is with the order for payment of costs, makes it a grievance, though the pauper died before any removal in fact took place. Then the appeal against the order of costs is not against the quantum, but against the liability of the parish to pay any costs at all in this case; taking it as a consequence of the order

of removal appealed against. Order of sessions quashed. Time of appeal- Rex v. Alnwick, 5 B. f. A. 184. Order of removal, dated the 6th of ing, how comput. August, 1814, of Margaret Walker, from Alnwick to the parish or parochial

chapelry of Haydon, at the Michaelmas sessions in 1820, was discharged. moval, dated 1st

Case: The pauper, at the time of the above order, was in such a state of August, 1814, and health that she could not be removed without danger; the execution of the pension indorsed order was, therefore, suspended. About the 6th September, 1814, a copy thereon, and a of the order and indorsement was served upon one of the overseers of Hay. copy thereof, was,

don, by a person sent by one of the overseers of Alnwick, such person not upon the appel- then having the order with him; and on the 4th October, 1815, another lants, but the original was not part of the original order of removal and indorsement was served upon one produced at the of the overseers of Haydon by the overseers of Alnwick. This last had not

been executed by the removing justices on the 6th August, 1814, but by subsequently, in 1815, another them in September, 1815. It, however, bore date the 6th August, 1814. part of the order The order, originally executed, was not at any time shewn to any of the

overseers of Haydon. The suspension was taken off in August, 1819, and same justices, but an order was then indorsed by the justices for the payment of 1611. 17s. 5d., bearing date in

the charges incurred by the suspension. On the 5th of September, 1820, the August, 1814, was served upon the

pauper was removed from Alnwick to Haydon, and an appeal against the appellants. The order of removal was entered at the Michaelmas sessions, 1820. It was

contended, that the appellants could not be heard, as they had omitted to when an appeal" appeal against the order of removal within the time allowed by law: the was duly entered: 49 Geo. III. c. 124, s. 2, enacting, that when the execution of any order Held, that the

of removal shall be suspended, the time of appealing against such order original order

shall be computed according to the rules which govern other like cases, from 1814 and 1815,

the time of serving such order, and not from the time of making such

removal. The Court permitted the case to proceed. After hearing Marryat tive, and that the in support of the order, and Littledale, contra, Abbott, C. J. The objection in time, notwith made here to the judgment of the court of quarter sessions, is, that they have standing 49 Geo. allowed this appeal, when, in point of law, the appellants were not entitled

to it, not having appealed within the time allowed by law. That question depends entirely upon the validity of the service of the order. Now, that service, in order to be valid, must either be by delivery of the order itself,

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pauper was pot removed till 1819,

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