Stock in trade of tradesmen, &c. rateable. Quere,

if property which the sessions conable be not rated, they ought to

sider to be rate

amend the rate by

inserting it, and not to quash the whole rate.

Same point, Whe

be rateable.

Quere.

Q. v. Barking; 2 Ld. Raym. 1280; Bott, 126; 1 Nol. P. L. 204. Upon quashing several orders made relating to the poor rates, the matter in difference was referred to the determination of the Lord C. J. Holt; but the parties, not satisfied with his opinion, signified their consent in writing to submit this question to the opinion of the judges of the K. B: to wit, whether a farmer for his stock shall not be chargeable and taxable to the poor rate, as well as a tradesman for his stock in trade? And the other three judges were of opinion that a farmer for his stock is not taxable, contrary to the opinion of Holt, C. J. Whereupon the following rule of court was made: 66 Upon mature deliberation, it is considered by the Court, that a farmer is not taxable to the poor rate for his stock; and that a tradesman is taxable for his stock in trade." [Or, as it is expressed in the record, Quod firmarius, anglicé, a farmer, non erit onerabilis et taxabilis ad ratus pauperum pro peculiis, anglicé, stock; et quod artifex, anglicé, a tradesman, est onerabilis et taxabilis pro peculiis, anglicé, stock, in arte, anglicé, trade.] The reason why a farmer is not liable to be rated by reason of his farming stock is, that the annual profits of the land being rated, the profits of the stock have already been assessed in those of the land. 2 Lord Raym.

1280.

Rex v. Witney, Oxfordshire, 5 Burr. 2634; 1 Bott, 141; 1 Nol. P. L. 167. An appeal against a rate for the relief of the poor of Witney, for that there were within the said parish many manufacturers, and other traders, who employed under them many servants and apprentices, and were not assessed in the said rate for their stocks in trade; the said rate was quashed on account of such omission, subject to the opinion of the court of K. B., on the following facts: It appeared there had long been many such manufacturers and traders within the said parish, who had been constantly assessed to the land-tax for their respective stocks in trade, but none of whom had ever been charged with the payment of any rate for the relief of the poor on account of such stocks. That as well the said manufacturers and traders, as all other occupiers of lands and houses within the said parish, had been and constantly are assessed in this and all former rates for the relief of the poor as well as to the land-tax for the lands and houses in their respective occupations. The counsel who argued in support of the order of sessions, cited and relied upon the case of Q. v. Barking, (supra). But the Court were not satisfied of the authority of that case. Lord Mansfield, C. J., expressly called it a strange case. They observed, that the opinion of three of the judges was only said to be, that a farmer for his stock was not taxable, contrary to the opinion of Holt, C. J. But it doth not appear that a question was directly put to them, whether a tradesman was taxable to the poor for his stock in trade? The Court, however, gave no explicit opinion upon the merits of the present case, though they seemed very far from allowing that a tradesman is rateable to the poor for his stock in trade. But here, the order of sessions is clearly wrong upon the face of it; because they ought not have quashed the whole rate, but to have added those persons and that property which it was thought were illegally omitted. And the order was quashed.

Rex v. Ringwood, Coup. 326; 1 Bott, 148; 1 Nol. P. L. 167. On ther stock in trade shewing cause against quashing an order of sessions which had quashed a rate for the relief of the poor of the parish of Ringwood, the sessions' order stated, that three persons were possessed as co-parceners, of stock, in the trade and business of common brewers and maltsters in the said parish, to the value of 4000l.; for no part of which the said co-parceners, or any of them, were or was in the said rate assessed to the relief of the poor of the said parish. And it did not appear to this Court that stock in trade had ever before been rated in the said parish. Therefore the court adjudged that the said recited rate ought to be quashed, and the same was quashed accordingly; and a new rate ordered to be made immediately, for the relief of the poor of the said parish, by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said parish of Ringwood. On hearing the cause, the Court declined entering into the merits; but as to this particular case, Lord Mansfield said, -I have no doubt what is to be done with it, as the authority of Rex v.

property is rateable.

Witney (ante, 64.) is precisely in point. I think the justices would not have Fifthly, What done very wrong, if they had acquiesced in the practice which has obtained ever since the statute of 43 Eliz., of not rating this species of property. The case of Rex v. Witney was determined upon this single ground, that the justices in session should not have quashed the whole rate, but should 2. Stock in trade. have amended it by inserting the particular persons and that property which was omitted, and which they thought rateable. So here, the justices at sessions should have amended the rate, if they thought this property rateable; and then on attempting to do it, they would have discovered the wisdom of conforming to the practice, which they expressly state in the case, of not rating it. If they had tried to have amended it, how would they have rated this stock? Are the hops, and the malt, and the boiler, to be rated at so much for each? Or is the trader to be rated for the gross sum which his whole stock would sell for? If the justices had considered, they would have found out the sense of not rating it at all; especially when it appears that mankind have, as it were, with one universal consent, refrained from rating it; the difficulties attending it are too great, and so the justices would have found them. And by the Court, the order of sessions was quashed.

Rex v. The Overseers of Andover, Coup. 550; 1 Bott, 153; 1 Nol. P. L. 200, 217. The case was, the overseers made a new rate, in which they omitted to rate tradesmen for their stock, which had been formerly rated in that parish. Upon which the other inhabitants of the parish appeal to the sessions. And the sessions make order whereby they adjudge," that Mr. Joseph Wakefield is a proprietor of stock in trade, as draper, in the parish of Andover, to the amount of 300l., and that the profits of that trade are 157. a-year; and that he ought to be rated towards the relief of the poor of the said parish, in respect of such stock and profits 77. each rate, in the rate so appealed against." And there was the like adjudication as to several other tradesmen. And the Court ordered the said rate to be amended, by putting into it a rate on the said several tradesmen, in respect of such their stock and profits. It was objected, that this order on the face of it was bad, inasmuch as it did not appear, that the several persons whose names were added to the rate by order of sessions, had notice of the appeal, or litigated the question at the sessions. They were, therefore, without redress; for it necessarily precluded them from their appeal. The sessions as to them, made an original rate, without having given them an opportunity of defending themselves. The Court held this to be a fatal objection; and therefore that the order of sessions ought to be quashed. Lord Mansfield, C. J., upon the general point said, It is a very different question, whether personal estate is to be rated to the utmost extent, or not to be rated at all. It would make the poor laws very oppressive, if a man were to be taxed to the extent of his whole personal estate and income. In that case, every man who has money in the funds would be liable; lawyers for their fees, soldiers for their pay, and the like. But where men are occupiers of houses, and have stock in trade, whether such stock in trade may be taken into consideration, is a very different question. Some personal estate may be rateable. But it must be local visible property within the parish. It would be material to state what has been the custom of rating. If the usage should be to take in stock in trade, there would be a very good right to support it. Let them, therefore, try it on the special circumstances of the case. Mr. J. Aston said, that if upon the general question it should turn out to be the law that personal property is rateable, it must be then rated, though it was never rated before. On the present question, the rule was made absolute, for quashing the order of sessions.

If personal estate must be local be rateable, it visible property within the parish.

The sessions cannot add to a rate the names of not notice of the appeal, or do not tion at the seslitigate the quessions.

those who have

Rex v. Hill, Cowp. 613; 1 Bott, 155. The appellant Hill was a clothier, Stock in trade and an inhabitant of the parish of Bradford. The churchwardens and overmay be rated. seers charged him to the poor rate in respect of his stock in the clothing trade, which he had in the said parish. Against which rate he appealed, alleging that he was not liable. The sessions upon the appeal adjudge him liable, and confirm the rate. Lord Mansfield, Ĉ. J., stopped the counsel in the argument for the defendant, by asking, What usage heretofore had been

able.

Fifthly, What in this place with respect to rating stock in trade? Unto which it was property is rate- answered, that the usage was waived, and that the counsel at the sessions had agreed to bring the general question before the Court. Lord Mansfield said, they had no right to do so, and thought it ought to be sent back 2. Stock in trade. to the sessions to state the usage. Afterwards, the case being sent back, and the sessions returning, that it had been the usage heretofore in the parish of Bradford to rate persons for their stock in trade, the Court ordered the rate to stand.

Rex v. Rodd, Cald. 147; 1 Bott, 161; 1 Nol. P. L. 166. Upon the appeal of James Rodd against a rate made for the relief of the poor of the borough or parish of Bridgewater, wherein he was charged four shillings in respect of his stock in trade, above what he was therein charged for his house and shops, and other real property. The sessions confirmed the rate, and stated specially, That within the said borough it had been usual ever since the existence of rates for the relief of the poor, to assess the inhabitants of the said borough, for and in respect of their personal property, or stock in trade; and amongst them such as have been of the same trade, and of similar circumstances with the appellant. The question, therefore, submitted to the court was, whether the said Rodd was rateable for his stock in trade? It was admitted that it was not possible to distinguish this from the above case of Rex v. Hill. By the Court: rate affirmed.

Rex v. Dursley, 6 T. R. 53; 1 Bott, 210, 290; Nol. P. L. 200, 201, 221, 222. J. Harris appealed to the Gloucester sessions against a poor rate for the parish of Dursley, upon the following ground, amongst others, that Messrs. Tippotts and Co., and several others, were not rated for their goods, stock in trade, and personal effects; and the Court being of opinion that stock in trade and personal property ought to have been rated, quashed the rate. The above case of Rex v. Hill, and the case of Rex v. Maddern (post), were cited to shew that stock in trade is rateable. By Lord Kenyon, C. J. There is no doubt but that personal property is rateable; but the difficulty in this case is to know for what these persons should have been rated. They appeared, indeed, in the possession of stock in trade, some to the amount of 100l., others 50l., but the sessions have not stated whether or not this property belonged to the several persons whom the appellant wished to include in the rate, or, if it did, whether or not it produced profit, or was not liable to incumbrances equal to the value of the property itself. The bare possession of personal property is, to be sure, evidence from which the justices may draw the conclusion that the possessor should be rated; but here the justices, after stating the possession, have raised a doubt respecting other facts, which they should have enquired into and determined upon. They have raised a mist which we cannot dispel. The facts are not sufficiently disclosed to enable us to draw the conclusion that these persons ought to be rated. Order of sessions quashed.

In Rex v. Sherborne, 8 East, 537; Bott, Cont. 67; 1 Nol. P. L. 200. Two persons appealed against a poor rate, wherein they were rated for stock, meaning stock in trade. It appeared that the appellants were silk throwsters, occupying certain buildings in Sherborne, in which persons were employed by them to clean, spin, and throw silk sent them in a raw state from London, for that purpose. The silk, after being so improved, was sent back, and they were paid for the process. The rate was imposed in respect of the profits derived from this silk as stock. But the Court decided at once that it was impossible it could be considered to be stock as a subject of rating.

Rex v. Darlington, 6 T. R. 468; 1 Bott, 215; 1 Nol. P. L. 200, 221. G. Allan and others, appealed, because seven persons were not rated for their stock in trade. The sessions quashed the rate, and stated as follows. That it did not appear whether stock in trade had or had not been rated in D. prior to 1745; from 1746 to 1752 it had; and again from 1788 to 1794 it had been rated; in August, 1794, a rate was made, which continued in force the remainder of the year, which was not appealed against, in which the above seven persons were rated for their stock in trade as yielding certain profits (stating them), and which the appellants contended was an admission that, to that time, those seven persons possessed stock in trade

producing the profits there stated. This rate was paid by some of the traders, but not by others; to enforce payment from whom no step had been taken. The appellants then proved that those seven persons, when the rate was made in January, 1795, kept shops in Darlington, and that each possessed a visible stock in trade there, and appeared to carry on business to the same extent as in 1794. The circumstances of the ability of those seven persons, or that they respectively made profit of their stock in trade, or that it was exclusive of their debts, or that it was a clear residue after debts paid, did not appear otherwise than as above stated. Lord Kenyon, C.J. The case of Rex v. Dursley (ante, 66) has been particularly pressed upon us as a decision of our own; but the present case is clearly distinguishable from that. There the sessions had forborne to draw any conclusion from the facts proved before them, and left a mass of evidence for our consideration, but so incomplete, that we could not say, upon the facts stated, whether the parties ought or ought not to have been rated; whereas, here the justices have drawn the conclusion. It was competent to them to decide on the weight of the evidence; they have decided, and we cannot now say that the conclusion they drew was certainly wrong. With regard to the other question, this was a case in which the sessions could not alter the rate, because, by the addition of these seven persons, the proportion of every other person would have been altered; therefore, they were bound to quash the rate. The other judges concurred. Order of sessions confirmed.

after

Rex v. Ambleside, 16 East, 380. R. S. appealed against a poor rate for Ambleside. The ground of appeal was, "Because one W. W., and other persons named in the rate, were not then assessed or rated for or in respect of his and their stock in trade." The rate in question was made in respect of real property only, and no stock in trade or other personal property was included in the rate. W. W. had stock in trade which was visible personal property within the said township, producing profit, and no assessment was made upon him in the said rate in respect thereof; but no stock in trade or other personal property had ever been rated within the township. The ses sions quashed the rate, subject, &c. Upon this case being called on, P. Courtenay had stated that the question intended to be submitted, was, whether if stock in trade produce a profit, the usage can vary its rateability? -Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said, "Is there not another question; whether the rate ought not to have been amended, instead of being quashed? As to the rateability of stock in trade, that has been settled in Rex v. Darlington, 6 T. R. 468, if it be ascertained to be profitable. It is then an objection applicable to one person, and the justices should have amended the rate, and not quashed it. The 41 Geo. III., U. K. c. 23 (post) was passed for the very purpose of enabling them so to do, in order to prevent the inconvenience of the parish being without funds for the maintenance of its poor in the mean time. We say, therefore, that this rate was not properly quashed, but ought to have been amended. If there are any circumstances to take it out of the general rule, as stated in Rex v. Darlington, they should be stated: if there are none such, the property is rateable. Rex v. White, 4 T. R. 774, is also to the same effect." Order of sessions quashed.

A shipowner is liable to be rated for a ship of which he makes profit, if its principal port be within the parish, (Rex v. Jones, 8 East, 451; Rex v. Liverpool, 8 East, 455; Rex v. Collinson, ibid), whether such ship be within the parish at the time of making the rate or not. Rex v. Howard, 8 East, 455; Rex v. Shepherd, 1 B. § A. 109.

3. Household Furniture, Money, and Funded Property, not rateable.

property not rateable.

In Rex v. White, 4 T. R. 771; 1 Bott, 89, 202; 1 Nol. P. L. 216, 218, 3. When personal 219, it was ruled that household furniture was not rateable to the poor. And also that money, out at interest or not, is not rateable. In Rex v. the Churchwardens and Overseers of St. John's Maddermarket in Norwich, 6 East, 182; 1 Bott, 239; 1 Nol. P. L. 160, 216. A. S. appealed to the sessions against an assessment of 1001. stock charged upon

Household furni

ture.

Money at interest.

able.

3. Personal property.

Vested in the public funds.

Fifthly, What her for the relief of the poor, which appeal was allowed. Upon a case stated, property is rate- it appeared that the rate was made by virtue of a local statute (10 Anne, c. 6), which enabled the overseers, &c., of that parish "to assess a certain sum upon the inhabitants, &c., and on all persons having and using stocks and personal estates in the said parish, or having money out at interest." That "money out at interest, as well without as within the said city and county of Norwich," had been constantly assessed to the poor's rates. That the appellant was possessed of money vested in the public funds, or on government security, and then standing in her name in the books of the governor and company of the Bank of England in the 5 per cent. bank annuities. And the question submitted was, as to the rateability of this stock.—Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. Money out at interest, however the lender may stipulate not to call for the principal for a given period, is still a loan of money, with forbearance for a certain time. It implies that the principal is to be repaid at some time or other, when the lender will be entitled to receive it as money, and not a substitute for the principal in a mere annuity. But with respect to stock, the payment of the principal can never be compelled. All that the government engage for is a perpetual annuity redeemable at their own will and pleasure. If this then be not rateable under the local act, neither is it so under the 43 Eliz. c. 2, (the only other statute by which it could be rateable), not being local visible property within the parish. It is therefore not rateable under either statute. The other judges agreed.

4. Profits from personal labour not rateable.

Salaries are not rateable.

So the profits of an attorney.

5. Tithes are.

The vicar is

4. Profits earned by Personal Labour are themselves merely personal, and not rateable.

Rex v. Shalfleet; Sherrington's case, 4 Burr. 2011; 1 Bott, 138; 1 Nol. P. L. 165. It appeared that the appellant inhabited a tenement at S. for the purpose of superintending the saltworks there, for which he received a salary of 401. per ann. from the government; and that he was rated for this salary. And Lord Mansfield, C. J. said, "We are all of opinion that this is not such a species of property as can be rated to the relief of the poor, as personal estate within the parish."

In Rex v. White and others, 4 T. R. 771; 1 Bott, 202, it was also held that a collector of the customs for his salary, or a captain in the navy, a merchant's clerk, or the master of a merchant vessel, for their pay, are not rateable to the poor.

In Rex v. J. Startifant, 7 T. R. 60; 1 Bott, 217; 1 Nol. P. L. 165, the defendant appealed against a poor rate in which he was assessed in respect of his profits and fees of his profession as an attorney. And the Court, without hearing any argument, said that such a rate could not be supported.

5. Tithes are.

The words of 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, are, "by taxation of every inhabitant, parson, vicar, and other and of every occupier of lands, houses, tithes impropriate, propriations of tithes, coal mines, &c." ante, pp. 44, 47.

In general no incorporeal hereditament or mere easement, however valuable, is rateable to the poor,-see 9 B. & C. 827,—and, therefore, it is only under the words of the statute that tithes are rateable.

Rex v. Turner, 1 Str. 77; 1 Bott, 126; 1 Nol. P. L. 145, 175. The chargeable in re- defendant being assessed towards the poor rate for his tithes as vicar, appealed spect of his tithes to the sessions, where he was absolutely discharged.-But by the Court: As vicar he is chargeable by the 43 Eliz., and the sessions hath only power to moderate, but not discharge. And the order of sessions was quashed. And a parson who lets to cach parishioner his own tithes, is properly the his tithes by parol occupier, and ought to be rated. 16 Vin. Abr. 427.

Parson who lets

should be rated. The farmer of

tithes, who holds

the same under

a

deed and lets the tithes again is

prima facie liable

to the poor rate.

Rex v. Lambeth, 1 Str. 525; 1 Bott, 127; 1 Nol. P. L. 175; S. C. 8 Mod. 61. The parson lets his tithes to farm; the farmer agrees with the tenant of the land that, in consideration of his paying so much, he shall retain the tithe and gather in the whole crop without dividing. Which of the two is chargeable to the poor rate, as occupier of the tithes, was the question. The sessions discharge the lessee of the parson, and tax the