hinted at. It was answered, that by the express resolution in the case of Lidlinch, a bastard of a certificate woman is settled where born; and fraud shall never be presumed where it is not stated. 'Tis true, a certificate is conclusive against the parish who gives it: but that is only in such points as are included in the certificate. This certificate, undertaking to provide for her and her child, must mean a child in being. If she had no other child, they should have stated the matter specially.-Lord C. J. Lee and Mr. J. Wright agreed that they must take the child referred to by the certificate, to be a legitimate child then in being. And Mr. J. Foster observed, (to which observation the other two justices agreed,) that it did not at all appear, that the parish who gave the certificate knew that the woman was then with child: the order of sessions quashed. Rex v. Ipsley, Burr. S. C. 650; 2 Bott, 15; 2 Nol. P. L. 139. Anne Causier came into Ipsley, with a certificate from Studley, acknowledging Ann Causier, spinster, and the child or children that she now goeth with, (a) to be legally settled in Studley: and if at any time Anne, or her child or children which she now goeth with, shall become chargeable to Ipsley, Studley thereby promised when requested, to receive, and provide for them, as their inhabitants. The child was born at Ipsley, within about a month after she came to reside there under the certificate. It was argued, that the certificate could not operate as to the unborn child, but that the child was notwithstanding settled where born: that this was not a certificate within 8 & 9 W. c. 30. The undertaking relates to a nonentity, an embryo. An unborn child cannot be personally certificated. It is no part of the parent's family. And the act obliges only the certifying parish to provide for the pauper mentioned in the certificate, together with his or her family; and a bastard, in the sense of the act, is part of no person's family. -But the Court were clearly of opinion, that Studley was bound by this certificate, which takes notice of the woman's being then unmarried and with child; and acknowledges the child she then went with to be legally settled with them in their parish. And Lord Mansfield, C. J., observed, that the woman was very big with child; and was understood by both parishes to be so: and Studley expressly promised to provide for the infant she then went with. Therefore they ought to be bound by their certificate. An infant in ventre sa mere may be, to a variety of purposes, considered as poor. Rex v. Mathon, 7 T. R. 362; 2 Bott, 10; 1 Nol. P. L. 323, 324. R. Cagear was removed from Cradley to Mathon. Order confirmed. Case: Margaret Cagear, a single woman, settled at Mathon, and pregnant of an illegitimate child that was afterwards born a bastard, went to Cradley in 1738, under a certificate from Mathon, wherein Mathon, " engaged to relieve and receive Margaret Cagear with the child of which she was then pregnant, and all other children that she might thereafter have, until she or they should acquire a subsequent settlement, whenever she or any of them should become chargeable." She resided in Cradley under that certificate until her death; and in 1746 had the present pauper, an illegitimate child, who continued to reside in Cradley until removed by the present order, without having done any act to gain a settlement for himself. Rex v. Ipsley was cited, and it was urged, that there was the same reason to extend the present certificate to this pauper; the certificate mentioning the mother's situation, and extending to all after-born children.-Lord Kenyon, C. J. It is not now necessary to question the propriety of Rex v. Ipsley. That certainly went much beyond the former cases on this subject. However, that is distinguishable from the present case: that only extended to the child with which the woman was then pregnant; and a child in ventre sa mere is capable of being described. But this child was not born until eight years after the certificate was granted, and being illegitimate, he is not included in the general words in the certificate, which extends only to legitimate children. Order of sessions quashed. [It does not appear that the woman was stated to be unmarried in the certificate; but the case, called her "single woman."] (a) This distinguishes this case from the prior one of Rex v. Wyke. Secondly, Of settlement by birth. 2. Of a bastard. Bastard not to be nurse-child. 3. When Removable from Mother. It will have appeared from the above cases, that the settlement of the mother will frequently be in a different parish from that in which her child is settled, and as both may stand in need of parochial relief, the burthen will removed whilst a have to be divided between the two parishes. The many objections to the separation of the child from the mother, in the earlier period of infancy, need not be described; they are sufficiently obvious, and have yielded to the humane maxim of the law, that children shall go with the mother for nurture until the age of seven years, and during that time be inseparable from her. Thus, in Cripplegate v. St. Saviour's (post, Fol. 265; 2 Bott. 16, pl. 33), it was agreed by the whole Court, that the age of a nurse-child, so as not to be separated from its mother, is until seven years of age. So also in the case of Skeffreth v. Walford, 2 Sess. Ca. 90; 2 Bott, 11. The order was to remove a woman to her settlement; and her bastard child, of two years of age, to a different parish, at a distance from the mother, being the place of its birth. It was objected, that the child being a nurse-child, they could not separate it from the mother, on account of the care necessary to nurture so young a child; which none can be supposed so fit to administer as its mother; and therefore it should have been sent with her to the place of her settlement. And the order was quashed by the Court. Except when deserted by the mother. To be maintained whilst a nursechild by its own parish. But the reason upon which this rule is founded, does not apply if the mother voluntarily desert her child, and in that case it may be sent to its place of settlement. And although where the child continues with its mother as a nurse-child, and during that time is not removable to its place of settlement, yet the parish where the child's proper settlement is, shall maintain the child in the parish where it resides with the mother. The point, viz., “that children under seven years of age, living with their mother for nurture at the place of the mother's settlement, but their own settlement being in another parish, are to be maintained by such other parish in which such children are settled, was determined in the case of Rex v. the Inhabitants of Hemlington, Doug. 9, (n. 2); Cald. 6; 2 Bott, 16; 2 Nol. P. L. 304, 924. The case was this:-Elizabeth, a single woman, with her child Mary, went under a certificate from Hemlington to Darlington, in which last parish she had two bastard children, and there became chargeable. An order being thereupon made for the removal of her and Mary to Hemlington, she took the two children who were born in Darlington with her, they being both under the age of emancipation. Two justices made an order on the parish of Darlington for the maintenance of the two children born in that parish, which order upon an appeal was quashed. Davenport showed cause in support of the order of sessions. After mentioning the cases of Wangford v. Brandon and others, stated in 3 Burn's Justice, p. 336, 337, 13 ed., he made similar observations upon them, to those which are to be found in Burn's note; viz., that what had been said in those cases relative to the present question was only matter of argument, the point in dispute in all those cases having been the settlement, not the maintenance. He mentioned that Burn, in another place, p. 326, seemed fully of opinion, that the parish of the mother is liable; and contended, that it was contrary to the spirit and intention of the 18 Eliz. c. 3, to burthen the parish where bastards are born, with their support. That the inconvenience of such a practice would be very great in many cases where the two parishes might be situated at opposite extremities of the kingdom. That there is no statute which gives the justices any authority to make an order for the maintenance of children on a parish where they do not actually reside. That it would be much more expedient, that the parish which is bound to maintain the mother, should also maintain, as casual poor, the children which she had a right to bring with her, and which could not be taken from her before the age of seven; and that he had been informed, that the practice had been conformable to what he contended for. Wallace was about to reply, but the Court said that the point was clear and settled.-Lord Mansfield, C. J., said, Mr. Davenport has cited no authorities in support of Dr. Burn's proposition, and there are many against it; viz., Rex v. St. Giles's in the Fields, Burr. S. C. No. 2; Rex v. Wangford, 2 Wils. ; 3 Fort. 307; and Rex v. Saxmundham, 2 Bott, 35; which is directly in point. The practice is also agreeably to those cases.—Aston, J., cited another case, where it was directly held that the parish, where the settlement of the nurture-child is, shall maintain it.— Judgment, to quash the order of sessions and confirm the original order by which the parish of Darlington was charged. (a) The point of the case of Saxmundham is merely given in Fortescue, without the facts or the reasoning of the Court. But the case of the Inhabitants of Shermandbury v. Bolney, Carth. 279, which Mr. Davenport mentioned in his argument, was exactly the same with the present; for there can be no distinction (as to this question) between bastards and legitimate children, who have a different settlement from their mother. In that case, a woman with three children, all under seven, being settled in Shermandbury, married a person settled in Bolney. After the marriage, the mother and the three children were sent to Bolney. The parish of Shermandbury, before the marriage, allowed 3s. per week for three children; and the payment being discontinued after the marriage, on complaint of the parish of Bolney, two justices made an order that Shermandbury should continue to pay the 3s. The sessions, and afterwards the Court of B. R., confirmed the order of the justices. And the Court said, "This case is within the equity of the statute for the relief of the poor, and there is no reason that Shermandbury should be discharged of the children by their mother's marriage." The order may be enforced by indictment, or perhaps the parish officers, in whose behalf it is made, might maintain a special action of assumpsit against those upon whom it was made. Vide Rex v. Toms, Dougl. 401. In Rann v. Green, 1 Cowp. 474, the Court held, that when persons acting under a private act of parliament, make an order by authority of such act for the payment of money, the law raises an assumpsit. The same reason must hold in the case of a public act. Order of two Justices upon the Churchwardens and Overseers of D. for maintenance of a poor Child settled in D., but residing with its Mother in H. for nurture. County of To the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of in the county of in Whereas S. S., esquire, one of his Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county, did, on the complaint of the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of H., in the county of Y., issue a summons under his hand and seal, dated the day of instant, and directed to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of D., in the said county of thereby requiring them, or some or one of them, to appear before him, and such other of his Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county of as should be at in the same county, this day at o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause why an order should not be then and there made for the payment, by the same churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of D., of a weekly sum to the said churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of H., for the maintenance of A. B., a bastard, born in the said parish of D., and then resident in the said parish of H. as a nursechild with his mother, M. B.: And whereas A. O., one of the overseers of the poor of the said parish of D., having appeared before us, S. S. and R. C., esquires, two of his Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county of in pursuance of the before-mentioned summons for that purpose, hath not showed to us any sufficient cause why an order should not be made upon them, the said churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said parish of D., to pay a weekly sum to the said churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said parish of H., towards the maintenance of the said bastard child, [or, And whereas it hath been duly proved to us, upon oath, that the said churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said parish of D., have been duly summoned to appear before us, the said justices, to show cause why an order should not be then and there made; but they or any of them have not appeared in pursuance thereof, and have not (a) This point was also decided in the case of Simpson et al. v. Johnson et al. Dougl. 7. Secondly, Of settlement by birth. 2. Of a bastard. Secondly, Of settlement by birth. 2. Of a bastard. showed to us any sufficient cause why the said order should not be made :] And whereas Given under our hands and seals at one thousand eight hundred and aforesaid, the day of S. S. (L. S.) Thirdly, Of settlement by parentage. 1. Derived from the father. ren derive their (Thirdly)—Of Settlement by Parentage. 1. Derived from the Father. 2. Derived from the Mother. 1. Derived from the Father. Settlement by parentage, and settlement by marriage, form the two species of what are called derivative settlements, and it is only legitimate children Legitimate child who can acquire a settlement by parentage; for a bastard, according to Holt, C. J., has no father, or rather none that the law looks upon as such, and consequently can derive no settlement from the relation of child and parent. Hard's Case, 2 Salk. 427. settlement from their parents. Children, wher ever born, take their parents' settlement, and each successive settlement acquired by him. It seems to have been erroneously thought at one time, that if a legitimate child were born whilst the parents were in a state of vagrancy, or in a parish different from that in which the parents were settled, or was born an idiot, that it was settled where born. Ib. Coxwell v. Shillingford, Fost. 313; Fol. 269. But the rule is, that a legitimate child is only entitled to a settlement where it is born, in case the parents have no settlement, or none that is known in this country. This applies to foreigners who come into England and have children here-they themselves having acquired no settlement. But in the case of children of Irish and Scotch parents, and forming part of the family of such parents, they are not to be relieved in the place of their birth if their parents become chargeable, but must be removed with their parents to Ireland or Scotland, under 59 Geo. III. c. 12, s. 33. If, however, the child only becomes chargeable, as where a daughter born in this country of Irish parents became pregnant with a bastard child, and was therefore chargeable, but the parents had never asked for relief; it was held that the daughter was removable to the place of her birth. Rex v. Whitehaven, 5 B. & A. 720. See further, ante, 232, Casual Poor. However, the place of birth of legitimate children is not their place of settlement, for wherever they may happen to be born, they take the settlement of their father, or in default of his settlement being known, of their mother. Thus if a father whose settlement is in A. removes to B. and before he has gained a settlement there, has a son born in B., the son is settled in A. But if the father gain a new settlement either in B. or any other parish, he gains it for his son as well as for himself, so long as the son remains part of his family, or is as it is called unemancipated. Such was the judgment of Holt, C. J., in Cumner v. Milton, 2 Salk. 528; where a man settled at Cumner and having several children born in that parish, afterwards removed to Milton with his children and gained a settlement there, where he becoming chargeable, the justices erroneously supposed the children were removable to Cumner, and made an order accordingly, which was quashed. The same principle was recognised in St. Giles's, Reading, v. Eversly, Blackwater, 1 Stra. 580; 2 Lord Raym, 1332; where it was ruled by all the Court, after the case had been twice argued, that where a father gains a second settlement after the birth of his child, that settlement is immediately communicated to the child. And a child may be sent to the place of his father's settlement, without ever having been there before. To this effect is Sowton v. Sydbury, Andr. 345; in which case the question was, whether the children, being above the age of nurture, shall be removed with the father to the father's settlement, where the child had never inhabited?-By Lee, C. J. In the case of Eversly, Blackwater, the Court were of opinion, that a child might be sent to the settlement of his father, though it had never been there before, contrary to an opinion of Lord Parker in a former case. And he said, "The true distinction, I think, is, that where children have gained no settlement, but continue part of their father's family, they shall follow their father's settlement." Thirdly, Of settlement by parentage. 1. Derived from the father. Where the father gains a settlement after the child takes it also. child's birth, the Therefore a child with the father to his settlement, may be removed though it have never been there before. The death of the father before the child is born, will not defeat its right The child born to a settlement where the father was last settled before his death. Rex v. Clifton, Vin. Abr. 382; 2 Bott, 19; 1 Nol. P. L. 274. Rex v. St. Mary, Cardigan, 6 T. R. 116; 1 Nol. P. L. 277. E. J., her daughter M., and J. and J. J., sons of her husband by a former wife, were removed from St. Mary, Cardigan, to L. Order quashed. Case: The pauper's husband was settled in L.: he was convicted of sheep-stealing in 1770, and sentenced to death, but before execution he escaped from gaol. Two years afterwards he returned to Cardigan, and continued there till 1792; during that time he married, and his wife had by him, John, one of the persons removed; on her decease he married C. J., and had the pauper Mary: he afterwards absconded in 1792. The wife's settlement before marriage was in St. Mary, Cardigan. It was argued that the father's settlement was destroyed by his attainder.-Lord Kenyon, C. J. A settlement is not the property of any man; it cannot escheat, neither can it be called a franchise: in the case of a franchise it was rightly decided, that by attainder the franchise was lost, and that the party had no right to vote at an election. But this person was before his attainder settled in the parish to which the paupers were removed, and I think that the father's settlement was communicated to them. It would be another question whether the man himself could acquire a settlement after the attainder. [As to this see the next case.] after the father's death. Father attaint for felony. order under the sign manual, Rex v. Haddenham, 15 East, 463; Bott, cont. 169; 1 Nol. P. L. 277. Discharged by Removal of E. Hill, from Thame to Haddenham, was on appeal confirmed. Case: E. Hill was born in Thame, in May, 1791, and at the time of her birth the settlement of her father, S. Hill, was in Thame. She has not acquired any settlement in her own right. In 1790, S. Hill was convicted of horse-stealing, and received sentence of death. An instrument, under the sign manual, was then produced, which recited, that S. Hill had been convicted of horse-stealing, and had sentence of death passed upon him; and that the king was induced to grant him a free pardon; and it directed S. Hill to be forthwith discharged out of custody, and that he be inserted in the next general pardon that shall come out for the Oxford circuit, without any condition whatsoever. Given, &c. By his Majesty's command, W. W. Grenville. Search had been made in the office of the clerk of assize of the Oxford circuit, and it did not appear that any general pardon including S. Hill had been made out: it did not appear, by any evidence, that any general pardon, including S. Hill, or any special pardon to him under the great seal, had been granted. Pursuant to the direction of the instrument under the sign manual (a), S. Hill was shortly after discharged, and has been since at large unmolested. In 1803, S. Hill purchased, for 100 guineas, two cottages in Haddenham, copyhold of inheritance, held of the (a) The effect of a pardon under a sign manual, is now equivalent to one under the great seal. 6 Geo. IV. c. 25, s. 1; See also Doe d. Evans v. Evans, |