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enforcing obedience to the exigency of a rule of court. But now, by stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19, all rules of court by which any sum of money, or any costs, charges, or expenses, are payable to any person, may be enforced in the same way as a judgment, namely, by execution, the nature of which we shall hereafter be obliged to consider.

Before concluding this part of the subject, we must advert to the other mode of summary interference, namely, by Summons and Order. As proceedings now go on during vacation, it is absolutely necessary that some tribunal should be then sitting to dispose of applications by the parties; and, even in term time, when the courts are sitting, there are many questions too insignificant to bring before them. Accordingly, almost any point of practice which is not, by the express words of some statute, (1) ordered to be brought before the court, may be disposed of by a judge at chambers. By stat. 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Wm. 4, c. 70, s. 4, a judge of any one of the superior courts may hear at chambers matters arising not only in his own, but in the other two courts, and, accord

(1) Note. In some cases, by the express provisions of some statute, the application must be made at chambers, and the full court has no jurisdiction to entertain it; but if in such a case the judge feel doubts, he may direct the matter to be argued in banc, in

rder to obtain the advice, though not the decision, of his brethren. Smith v. Bird, 3 Dowl. 641. Sometimes a statute excludes the judge's jurisdiction. See Geach v. Coppin, 3 Tyrwh. 75. Unite v. Humphrey, 3 Dowl. 532.

ingly, during the circuits, one judge always remains in town and transacts the business of all the three courts.

The origin of this mode of proceeding before a judge at chambers is not precisely ascertainable; an excellent account of the principles on which it depends is given in the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in Doe d. Prescott v. Roe, 9 Bing. 104. See also R. v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2570. Wood v. Plant, 1 Taunt. 44.

The mode of applying to a judge at chambers (except in some cases in which the application is necessarily ex parte, there being no one on whom a summons could be served) is by summons, which is issued by the judge's clerk, and a copy of it served upon the opposite party. This summons operates as a stay of proceedings from the time at which it is attendable until disposed of. (1) If the party on whom it is served do not appear, the applicant's attorney having waited half an hour, may take out a second summons; and, if that also be neglected, the order will be made out as directed by Reg. Gen., Trin. 1831. If the other party appear, then the application is discussed before the judge, and determined by him, unless the case be so important or involve so much doubt that he is anxious to refer it to the full court, in which case he will stay proceedings until term. The order, when obtained, must be drawn up and

(1) See Morris v. Hunt, 2 B. & A. 355.

served forthwith, otherwise it may be treated as abandoned. (1) 8 2907 adt doufa o*

It was once doubted whether a judge disposing of an application at chambers could give costs. It is now clearly settled that he may do so: but whether he will or not is left entirely to his own discretion. (2) There is one case indeed in which it is imperative on the judge to give costs, and that is when he strikes out superfluous counts or pleas, under the sixth section of the pleading rules of Hilary Term, 1834. depen

A judge's order is an authority to the officer to draw up a rule of court to the same effect, and therefore, if disobeyed, it may be made a rule of court, and enforced, like any other rule of court, by attachment. If the party against whom it is made be desirous of appealing, he may move the full court to rescind it. But, even if he succeed in doing so, the court, out of respect for the judge who made the order, is not in the habit of setting such a proceeding aside with costs. (3)

This jurisdiction of a judge at chambers, though it certainly produces celerity and diminishes expense, is liable to some objections; and it is better to make an application of any importance to the court than at chambers: for, first, the proceedings at chambers take place in private, and, as affidavits are not absolutely necessary there, unless the judge require them, (4) it

(1) See Charges v. Farhall, 4 B. & C. 865.
(2) Re Bridge, 2 Ad. & Ell. 48.
(3) See Hargrave v. Holden, 3 Dowl. 176.
(4) See Joseph v. Perry, 3 Dowl. 699.

is to be feared that facts are sometimes asserted there to which the parties asserting them would not venture to swear in answer to a motion, knowing that their affidavits would be subjected to the scrutiny and observation of counsel. In court, too, if it be a matter of practice within the Master's department, he is there present, and may be referred to, and the successful party may obtain his costs, which he can rarely do at chambers, while, on the other hand, if the decision at chambers be against him, he will not, even though he appeal successfully to the court, be able to obtain his costs of doing so.

Having considered the nature and extent of that summary and equitable jurisdiction which the courts possess, and which they exercise by rule or order, whenever during the progress of a suit it becomes necessary so to do, we proceed to the ordinary and regular steps in an action; while considering which it must be borne in mind, that if, in taking them, any irregularity is committed, or if any extraordinary hardship is likely to arise from the strict enforcement of the rules by which they are governed, or if they are on any occasion perverted, so as to be made engines of fraud or oppression, the party grieved may, at whatever stage of the proceedings such an exigency occurs, have recourse to the summary, the equitable, jurisdiction of the court, which will interfere in the manner already explained, for the purpose of enforcing regularity or of preventing its own rules, which are intended to promote the ends of justice, from being turned into pretexts for fraud and injustice.

Before, however, describing the proceedings In the action, it will be right to state more clearly than has hitherto been done, the nature and application of the different forms in which an action may be brought.

An action is that formal course of proceeding which a party seeking to enforce a right is by law bound to adopt: and it is proper, indeed necessary, for the due administration of justice, that such stated forms of proceeding should be appointed, and that persons seeking to obtain justice should be bound to observe them; for courts of justice are created, not for the benefit of this or that particular individual, but for the safeguard and advantage of the whole community; and it is therefore right that they should adopt such forms as are best calculated as well to economise their own time and labour, which are the property of the public, as to forward the interests of justice in the majority of cases, though, in some particular instances, they may be found inconvenient.

The forms of action are divided into three classesReal, Mixed, and Personal. Real Actions are brought for the recovery of real property only. Mixed Actions for the recovery of real property, and also damages against the party detaining it. Personal Actions for the recovery of personal property, or, as is the more usual case, of damages for some injury. As it is to the consideration of personal actions only that these pages are devoted, real and mixed actions shall be dismissed with a single observation, viz., that they were, till lately, though of rare practical occurrence,

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