ards for explosion and ignition prevention. The Department representative warned, however, that, "We have just been lucky. One of these days, we will have a disaster."

The committee concluded that the safety of the miners necessitated the requirement that all electrical equipment in the face areas of coal mines be explosion proof, not just the small pieces of equipment; that the safety of the miners necessitated that the "barn door" be locked before our luck runs out.

As the record demonstrates, the committee was more than justified in reaching its conclusion for, in fact, there have been ignitions caused by sparks emanating from large pieces of equipment in nongassy mines as well as from small pieces of equipment. One such ignition killed 11 miners in 1962 in Herrin, Ill. The facts established by the investigation conducted by the Bureau of Mines at the time of the disaster demonstrate precisely why the distinction must be eliminated.

The mine involved had not been classified gassy by the State of Illinois. According to the report, "methane was never detected in the mine with a permissible flame safety lamp, except for the one time that the mine manager thought he might have found a very small amount in a roof cavity." Air samples collected during State inspections of the mine showed a maximum methane content of 0.08 percent which, under current law, is well below the nongassy classification limit of 0.25 percent.

A shuttle car was being repaired. It had been manufactured originally to meet the Bureau's standards. During the course of repair, howthe control panel was open.

ever,

The Bureau of Mines investigators, in reconstructing the facts after the disaster, believe that during the course of repair, the repairman energized the power to the shuttle car for test purposes. Since the control panel was open, sparks were permitted to emanate. According to the final report of the investigation, "Federal inspectors are of the opinion that the disaster was caused by the ignition of methane in the air current *** The gas was ignited by an arc or spark from the open control panel while repairs were being made on the shuttle car." Had the control panel been properly sealed when the machine started to operate, and under the Department of the Interior standards it must be, the ignition would not have occurred.

This may be called a borderline case since the particular equipment was manufactured in compliance with Bureau standards, it would not be prohibited by the bill. The fact is, however, that the machine was in a condition of non-compliance with standards at the time of the ignition, and this would be prohibited by the bill. It is also not arguable that 11 miners died in a mine when a spark ignited gas which the law said was not supposed to be there.

In addition to this major disaster caused by sparks emitting from a large piece of equipment in a so-called nongassy mine, the Department of Interior reports that three ignitions, in 1944 (Ohio, three injuries); in 1945 (Virginia, two injuries); and in 1952 (Pennsylvania, four injuries) had been caused by cutting machines which did not meet the Department's standards. This same general type of equipment is still in use in the so-called nongassy mines today, but would be prohibited by the bill.

As recently as June 10, 1969, while the bill was pending before the Committee, another ignition occurred in a nongassy mine, injuring and

hospitalizing 5 miners. This too, according to the Bureau of Mines, was caused by sparks emitted from a large piece of electrical equipment in nonpermissible condition at the time of ignition.

It is therefore clear that there is not only a possibility that these large pieces of equipment may cause ignitions unless they are required to meet the appropriate ignition and explosion prevention standards: the fact is that they have caused ignitions, including a major disaster. 2. Costs of conversion not prohibitive

In a report submitted to the committee prior to its executive consideration of the legislation, the Department of the Interior estimated that it would cost the Nation's coal mines a minimum of $79 million to a maximum of $360 million to meet the standards for ignition and explosion prevention. The report indicated that the Department's "best guess" was that it would cost approximately $155 million. Since this original estimate the Department, as a result of a survey, has substantially revised that estimate downward to $51 million.

This cost would be borne by three classes of mines. First is the group of mines which have been classified as gassy but, by virtue of a "grandfather" clause in the 1952 act, still use equipment which does not meet the safety standard. These mines must change or upgrade their grandfather equipment. Second is the group of large nongassy mines. These mines, also, must change or upgrade their nonpermissible equipment. The misunderstandings, difficulties, and extensive and lengthy analysis has centered around the third group, that is, the small nongassy mines which produce less than 8 percent of the Nation's coal, but account for 2,755 of the Nation's mines, more than 70 percent of our underground mines, employing approximately 15,000 to 20,000 miners. Although the committee's purpose was to develop those safety standards which are necessary to protect the miners, the committee was greaty concerned about the extent of the economic impact on the Nation's small, independent coal mine operators and their employees. Therefore, the committee, desiring to have available the most accurate information, requested the Department of the Interior to conduct a survey in order to refine the "best guess" estimate.

Thereupon, the Department conducted a survey of 10 so-called nongassy mines in each of nine States. On a basis of this survey, the Department concluded that the cost to all three groups of mines would be approximately $80 million.

Analysis of the raw data provided by this survey indicated that the selection of mines included in the 90-mine survey reflected an upward bias.

Upon reanalysis, the Department of the Interior agreed that the sampling did reflect a bias; that in fact, taking the bias into account as well as the new field testing and approval program the committee bill authorizes, the cost would be lower than their original and second estimates.

As the Department stated in its most recent report to the committee: Because of the bias mentioned above, you also asked if we could use the survey and make some estimates taking the bias into account. Probably the most appropriate way to make such an estimate is to use an average of the capital cost per yearly ton of coal produced. For these larger and more efficient mines covered by the survey a mine producing 20,000

tons per year would require an investment of about $16,000. If the equipment were used for 20 years this would represent a cost of 4 cents per ton of coal mined. There is, however, some tonnage produced in hand-loaded mines where permissible equipment would not be required. On the other hand, smaller mechanized mines, also not included in the survey, would be expected to have a higher investment per daily ton than those included in the survey. In our estimate, we have assumed these two factors to be in balance.

Using this method then, the cost for the small nongassy mines for the country as a whole to convert or rebuild the equipment would be $30 million.

If all the equipment could be converted rather than using a combination of conversion and rebuilt equipment, the cost would be about $21 million.

The total cost can thus be estimated at:

Grandfathered equipment (all upgraded)

Cost of upgrading or using rebuilt equipment in large
nongassy mines

Cost for converting or using rebuilt equipment in
small nongassy mines..

Total

Millions

$3.6

18. 1

30.0

51.7

These figures are lower than those in attachment A because we have assumed that the new concept of conversion which we have discussed with your staff using field approval for permissibility will be possible and because the size of the sample in the latest survey introduced a bias. Since, in fact, the upgrading of nonpermissible equipment would be expected to be a mixture of field conversion and purchase of rebuilt or new equipment, a more realistic cost estimate would be between $50 and $60 million. It is probable, however, that some portion of this sum would be expended anyway due to normal replacement needs.

Of this total, the Department now estimates that the cost to th Nation's independent coal mine operators who operate the small non gassy mines will be no more than $30 million, perhaps as low as $2 million. This is approximately $10,000 per mine, as opposed to th estimate of $260,000 per small mine originally suggested to the com mittee by opponents of the committee's recommendation. And th figure includes the cost of upgrading or replacing the small equipmen 3. Time period necessary for conversion

The Department of the Interior has consistently recommended th the nongassy classification be eliminated. However, the Departme has also recommended that it be permitted to grant extensions of tim for an indefinite period of years in which mines would be permitte to operate with equipment which does not meet the safety standard The justification originally offered by the Department for its positio on extensions is that it might take several years, perhaps even much as 10 years for the necessary replacement equipment to becom available. When the committee requested a more firm estimate of t necessary time for equipment to become available, the Department sponded that it would probably take 5 years for the mine equipme

manufacturing industry to produce a sufficient amount of replacement equipment. Subsequently, the Department on the basis of a new idea on field inspections (discussed below), which reduces substantially the necessity to purchase equipment, estimated the time required at 3 years. In view of the varying estimates on this question, the committee bill provides the time period of 4 years.

The Department was also requested to explore the possibility of converting the currently used equipment in such a way as to make it ignition-proof without the need for coal mine operators, particularly the operators of small mines, to purchase new or rebuilt equipment. The Department concluded that this could be done in some instances, but that much equipment now in use in the small mines could not, by conversion, be made to meet the Department's standards. This conclusion by the Department conflicted with the conclusions reached by other interested groups, including miners' representatives and some independent rebuilders and overhaulers of mining equipment.

As a result of its reconsideration, the Department, on July 17, recognized that a problem of logistics was the major stumbling block to writing legislation which would both protect the safety of miners and avoid the necessity of wholesale expensive purchases of new or rebuilt equipment. A new program of field inspection authorized by the bill will enable the Department to overcome this problem of logistics.

When the Department first established its safety standards for electric face equipment, it was establishing those standards primarily for the large gassy mines. Those mines for the most part, used equipment manufactured by well established companies historically engaged in making specialized mining equipment.

The procedure adopted by the Department for approval of this equipment was to require the manufacturer to submit a prototype to the Bureau of Mines' testing laboratory in Pittsburgh, Pa. After rigorous testing, which might take up to 3 years, the equipment could be approved. This procedure was adopted without the need for considering the special problems it might create for the small mine operators, since the small mine operators, with rare exception, were not originally covered by the requirements for explosion-proof equipment.

There are a few companies engaged in manufacturing and rebuilding nonpermissible equipment. Without any great difficulty, these companies can link themselves to the Pittsburgh testing laboratory.

As the committee has learned, however, many small mine operators, using traditional American ingenuity, have manufactured homemade mining equipment. These pieces of equipment may differ from each other in each of the 3,000 small mines. There obviously is no prototype which can be sent to Pittsburgh for inspection. Nor could any small mine operator afford the expense and delay that would be necessitated by such a procedure.

A simple solution to the problem was finally arrived at. The small mine operator could convert his homemade equipment to assure its safe operation, with relatively little cost, if the Department could bring its approval system to the small mine: if, so to speak, Pittsburgh could be moved to Kentucky.

The bill, therefore, provides the authority to the Secretary of the Interior to adopt a field approval system, under which the equipment used by small mine operators can be tested at the mine for ignition

prevention and other safety characteristics. This relatively simple solution will not only permit the conversion of equipment in a shorter period of time than originally estimated, but at a clearly reduced cost to the small mine operator. Yet, it will not lower the safety standards; it will not sacrifice the miners' safety to economic considerations.

6. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF NONGASSY CLASSIFICATION

During the course of the hearings and executive consideration, the committee has heard from several witnesses representing the interests of the small-mine operators. The committee invited the smallmine operators to submit a legislative proposal (S. 1907) which was fully considered by the committee and the committee has adopted several of the small mine operators' proposals.

Among these proposals, were significant improvements in provisions regarding roof control, special provisions to protect against penetrations by the operator into oil and gas wells and improved provisions prohibiting the use of open flames. Senator Cooper (R. Ky.) had suggested these provisions (designated as amendments Nos. 23 and 37 to S. 1300) and they were incorporated into the committee bill during executive consideration.

The committee also gave very careful consideration to the views of the senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper)-one of the States whose small mines would be most significantly affected by the elimination of the nongassy classification. Upon invitation of the Labor Subcommittee, Senator Cooper appeared in one of its executive sessions. He discussed the historical basis for the nongassy distinction, and laid emphasis on the adverse economic impact upon small mine operators, and their employees, that would result from requiring all large electrical face equipment to be explosion-proof under Bureau standards.

Senator Cooper's presentation to the subcommittee was candid and informative. His presentation pointed out that open flames and smoking, in the great bulk of cases, were responsible for the ignitions that have occurred in nongassy mines since 1952; that small nonpermissible electrical face equipment is the next principal cause for such ignitions; and that the most expensive equipment to change over or to replace, the large nonpermissible face equipment (such as shuttle cars and continuous miners), has not caused a single ignition during the period from 1952 to the present.

As previously indicated, the thrust of this viewpoint was that, to prohibit use of the large nonpermissible equipment would be to impose a heavy cost burden on the small-mine operation, driving small-mine operators out of business and producing unemployment among miners, without achieving a commensurate net gain in improving safety in the mine operation.

The Department of the Interior, after Senator Cooper had met with the Subcommittee on Labor, conceived of the field inspection system and provided its new, significantly reduced estimates on costs. (See p. 30.) It also provided more complete data on ignitions which disclosed that large nonpermissible electric face equipment, indeed, has caused ignitions in nogassy mines-three pre-1952 ignitions from nonpermissible equipment and one post-1952 ignition from permissible equipment in nopermissible condition which killed 11 men. (See p. 29.)