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when negotiations had been commenced for a fusion of parties, resolutions were laid before his Majesty expressing the opinion of the House of Commons, that the situation of public affairs required a 'firm, efficient, extended, and united administration, entitled to the confidence of the people, and such as may have a tendency to put an end to the divisions and distractions of the country." Similar advice was tendered to the Prince Regent in 1812, after the death of Mr. Perceval; and to William IV., in 1832, on the resignation of Earl Grey.2

But this constant responsibility of ministers, while it has made their position dependent upon

Impeachments.

the pleasure of Parliament, has protected fallen ministers from its vengeance. When- the acts and policy of statesmen had been dictated by their duty to the crown alone, without regard to the approval of Parliament, they were in danger of being crushed by vindictive impeachments, and attainders. Strafford had died on the scaffold: Clarendon had been driven into exile :3 Danby had suffered a long imprisonment in the Tower; Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond had been disgraced and ruined,5 at the suit of the Commons. But parliamentary responsibility has prevented the commission of those political crimes, which had provoked the indignation of the

'Parl. Hist., xxiv. 450; Ann. Reg., 1784, p. 265.

2 Supra, Vol. I. p. 125, 143; Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxiii. 249. 9 Having gone abroad pending his impeachment, an Act of banishment and incapacity was passed by Parliament.

4 Not being brought to trial, he was admitted to bail by the Court of King's Bench, after an imprisonment of five years. St. Tr., xi. 871.

5 Oxford was imprisoned for two years in the Tower. Bolingbroke and Ormond, having escaped, were attainted.

Commons; and when the conduct or policy of ministers has been condemned, loss of power has been their only punishment. Hence the rarity of impeachment in later times. The last hundred years present but two cases of impeachment,-the one against Mr. Warren Hastings, on charges of misgovernment in India,—the other against Lord Melville, for alleged malversation in his office. The former was not a minister of the crown, and he was accused of offences committed beyond the reach of parliamentary control; and the offences charged against the latter, had no relation to his political duties as a responsible minister.

Impeach

abated by a

The case of Mr. Warren Hastings finally estabblished the constitutional doctrine, that an impeachment by the Commons is not ter- ments not minated by any prorogation or dissolution dissolution. of Parliament. It had been affirmed by the Lords in 1678, after an examination of precedents: when Lord Stafford fell a victim to its assertion; and six years afterwards, it had been denied, in order to secure the escape of the 'popish lords,' then under impeachment.2 Lord Danby's lingering impeachment had been continued by the first decision, and annulled by the last. The same question having arisen after the lapse of a century, Parliament was called upon to review the precedents of former impeachments, and to pass its judgment upon the contradictory decisions of the Lords. Many of the precedents were so obscure as to furnish arguments

1 March 18th, 19th, 1678. Lords' Journ., xiii. 464, 466.
2 May 22nd, 1685. Lords' Journ., xiv. 11,

on both sides of the question: conflicting opinions were to be found amongst text-writers; and the most eminent lawyers of the day were not agreed.' But the masterly and conclusive speech of Mr. Pitt was alone sufficient to settle the controversy, even on the grounds of law and precedent. On broad constitutional principles, the first statesmen of all parties concurred in upholding the inviolable right of the Commons to pursue an impeachment, without interruption from any act of the crown. It could not be suffered that offenders should be snatched from punishment, by ministers who might be themselves concerned in their guilt. Nor was it just to the accused, that one impeachment should be arrested before a judgment had been obtained; and another preferred, -on the same or different grounds, perhaps after his defence had suggested new evidence to condemn him. Had not the law already provided for the continuance of impeachments, it would have been necessary to declare it. But it was agreed in both Houses, by large majorities, that by the law and custom of Parliament, an impeachment pending in the House of Lords continued in statu quo, from one Session and from one Parliament to another, until a judgment had been given.2

'Lord Thurlow, Lord Kenyon, Sir Richard Arden, Sir Archibald Macdonald, Sir John Scott, Mr. Mitford, and Mr. Erskine contended for the abatement: Lord Mansfield, Lord Camden, Lord Loughborough, and Sir William Grant, maintained its continuance.

2 Com. Deb.; Parl. Hist., xxviii. 1018, et seq.; Lords' Deb.; Ibid., xxix. 514; Report of Precedents; Lords' Journ., xxxix. 125; Tomline's Life of Pitt, iii. 161.

relations of

with the

As parliamentary responsibility has spared ministers the extreme penalties of impeachments,-so it has protected the crown from those dangerous Improved and harassing contests with the Commons, the crown with which the earlier history of this Commons, country abounds. What the crown has lost in power, it has gained in security and peace. Until the Commons had fully established their constitutional rights, they had been provoked to assert them with violence, and to press them to extreme conclusions: but they have exercised them, when acknowledged, with moderation and forbearance.

govern

At the same time, ministers of the crown have encountered greater difficulties, from the Strong increased power and independence of the and weak Commons, and the more direct action of ments. public opinion upon measures of legislation and policy. They are no longer able to fall back upon the crown for support: their patronage is reduced, and their influence diminished. They are left to secure a majority, not so much by party connexions, as by good measures and popular principles. Any error of judgment, -any failure in policy or administration, is liable to be visited with instant censure. Defeated in the Commons, they have no resource but an appeal to the country, unaided by those means of influence, upon which ministers formerly relied.

Their responsibility is great and perilous: but it has at least protected them from other embarrassments, of nearly equal danger. When the crown was more powerful, what was the fate of ministries?

The first ten years of the reign of George III. witnessed the fall of five feeble administrations; and their instability was mainly due to the restless energies of the king. Until Mr. Pitt came into power, there had not been one strong administration during this reign. It was the king himself who overthrew the coalition ministry, the absolute government of Mr. Pitt, and the administration of All the Talents.'

For more than ten years after Mr. Pitt's fall, there was again a succession of weak administrations, of short duration. If the king could uphold a ministry, he could also weaken or destroy it. From this danger, governments under the new parliamentary system, have been comparatively free. More responsible to Parliament, they have become less dependent upon the crown. The confidence of the one has guarded them from the displeasure of the other.

No cause of ministerial weakness has been more frequent than disunion. It is the common lot of men acting together; and is not peculiar to any time, or political conditions. Yet when ministers looked to the crown for support, and relied upon the great territorial lords for a parliamentary majority,-what causes were so fruitful of jealousies and dissensions, as the intrigues of the court, and the rivalries of the proprietors of boroughs? Here, again, governments deriving their strength and union from Parliament and the people, have been less exposed to danger in this form. Governments have, indeed, been weakened, as in former times, by

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