and a half,-such was the national repugnance to that tax, that they sustained a signal defeat.1 Again in 1852, Lord Derby's ministry were out-voted on their proposal for doubling the house tax.2 But when the Commons have thus differed from the ministry, the questions at issue have involved the form and incidence of taxation, and not the necessities of the state; and their votes have neither diminished the public expenditure, nor reduced the ultimate burthens upon the people.

Stopping

Nor have the Commons, by postponing grants, or in other words, by 'stopping the supplies,' the supplies. endeavoured to coerce the other powers in the state. No more formidable instrument could have been placed in the hands of a popular assembly, for bending the executive to its will. It had been wielded with effect, when the prerogative of kings was high, and the influence of the Commons low: but now the weapon lies rusty in the armoury of constitutional warfare. In 1781, Mr. Thomas Pitt proposed to delay the granting of the supplies for a few days, in order to extort from Lord North a pledge regarding the war in America. It was then admitted. that no such proposal had been made since the Revolution; and the House resolved to proceed with the committee of supply, by a large majority. In the same session Lord Rockingham moved, in the House

1 Ayes, 201; Noes, 238: Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxiii. 451; Lord Brougham's Speeches, i. 495; Lord Dudley's Letters, 136; Horner's Mem., ii. 318.

2 Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., cxxiii. 1693.

3 Nov. 30, 1781; Parl. Hist., xxii. 751; Ayes, 172; Noes, 77. Mr. T. Pitt had merely opposed the motion for the Speaker to leave the

of Lords, to postpone the third reading of a land tax bill, until explanations had been given regarding. the causes of Admiral Kempenfeldt's retreat: but did not press it to a division.'

The precedent of 1784, is the solitary instance in which the Commons have exercised their power of delaying the supplies. They were provoked to use it, by the unconstitutional exercise of the influence of the crown: but it failed them at their utmost need,2—and the experiment has not been repeated. Their responsibility, indeed, has become too great for so perilous a proceeding. The establishments and public credit of the country are dependent on their votes; and are not to be lightly thrown into disorder. Nor are they driven to this expedient for coercing the executive; as they have other means, not less effectual, for directing the policy of the state.

upon the

of the

While the Commons have promptly responded to the demands of the crown, they have en- Restraints deavoured to guard themselves against im- liberality portunities from other quarters, and from Commons. the unwise liberality of their own members. They will not listen to any petition or motion which involves a grant of public money, until it has received the recommendation of the crown ;3 and they have further protected the public purse, by delays and other forms, against hasty and inconsiderate resolutions. Such precautions have been the more neces

1 Nov. 19; Parl. Hist., xxii. 865.

3 Standing Order, Dec. 11th, 1706.

2 See supra, Vol. I. p. 80.

4 See May's Law and Usage of Parliament, 6th ed., 549.

sary, as there are no checks upon the liberality of the Commons, but such as they impose upon themselves. The Lords have no voice in questions of expenditure, save that of a formal assent to the Appropriation Acts. They are excluded from it by the spirit, and by the forms of the constitution.

rights of the

Commons concerning

Not less exclusive has been the right of the ComExclusive mons to grant taxes for meeting the public expenditure. These rights are indeed inseparable; and are founded on the same principles. Taxation,' said Lord Chatham, is no part of the governing, or legislative power.

taxation.

6

The

taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned: but the concurrence of the peers and the crown to a tax, is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone." On these principles, the Commons had declared that a money bill was sacred from amendment. In their gifts and grants they would brook no meddling. Such a position was not established without hot controversies.2 Nor was it ever expressly admitted by the Lords: 3 but as they were unable to shake the strong determination of the Commons, they tacitly acquiesced, and submitted. For one hundred and fifty years, there was scarcely a

' Parl. Hist., xvi. 99.

2 The Reports of the conferences between the two Houses (1640– 1703), containing many able arguments on either side, are collected in the Appendix to the third volume of Hatsell's Precedents, and in the Report of the Committee on Tax Bills, 1860.

To the claim, as very broadly asserted by the Commons in 1700, at a conference upon the Bill for the sale of Irish Forfeited Estates, the Lords replied: 'If the said assertions were exactly true, which their Lordships cannot allow.'

dispute upon this privilege. The Lords, knowing how any amendment affecting a charge upon the people, would be received by the Commons, either abstained from making it, or averted misunderstanding, by not returning the amended bill. And when an amendment was made, to which the Commons could not agree, on the ground of privilege alone, it was their custom to save their privilege, by sending up a new bill, embracing the Lords' amendment.

The Lords to

reject a

In reply,

But if the Lords might not amend money bills, could not they reject them? This very power of the question was discussed in 1671. Commons had then denied the right of money bill. amendment on the broadest grounds. the Lords argued thus:- If this right should be denied, the Lords have not a negative voice allowed them, in bills of this nature; for if the Lords, who have the power of treating, advising, giving counsel, and applying remedies, cannot amend, abate, or refuse a bill in part, by what consequence of reason can they enjoy a liberty to reject the whole? When the Commons shall think fit to question it, they may pretend the same grounds for it.' The Commons, however, admitted the right of rejection. Your Lordships,' they said, 'have a negative to the whole.' "The king must deny the whole of every bill, or pass it; yet this takes not away his negative voice. The Lords and Commons must accept the whole general pardon or deny it; yet this takes not away their negative." And again in 1689, it was stated by a committee of the Commons, that the Lords are 'to Hatsell, iii. 405, 422, 423.

6

-an act of which

pass all or reject all, without diminution or alteration.'1 But these admissions cost the Commons nothing, at that time. To reject a money bill, was to withhold supplies from the crown,the Lords were not to be suspected. The Lords themselves were fully alive to this difficulty, and complained that 'a hard and ignoble choice was left to them, either to refuse the crown supplies when they are most necessary, or to consent to ways and proportions of aid, which neither their own judgment or interest, nor the good of the government or people, can admit.'2 In argument, the Commons were content to recognise this barren right; yet so broad were the grounds on which they rested their own claims of privilege,-and so stubborn was their temper in maintaining them,-that it may well be questioned whether they would have submitted to its practical exercise. If the Lords had rejected a bill for granting a tax,-would the Commons have immediately granted another? Would they not rather have sat with folded arms, rejoicing that the people were spared a new impost; while the king's treasury was beggared by the interference of the Lords?

Taxes were then of a temporary character. They were granted for one year, or for a longer period, according to the exigencies of the occasion. Hearth money was the first per

Temporary and permanent taxes.

1 Hatsell, iii. 452. This admission, however, is not of equal authority, as it formed part of the reasons reported from a committee, which were re-committed, and not adopted by the House. 2 Conference, 1671; Hatsell, iii. 405.