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with a printed heading, "Bought of Jackson and Hankin," the names of the defendants: the blanks in it were filled up with the name of the plaintiff and the quantity and price of the goods bought; it was then delivered to the plaintiff. Lord Eldon, C. J., said, "The single question is, whether, if "a man be in the habit of printing instead of writing his 66 name, he may not be said to sign by his printed name as "well as by his written name. . . . It has been decided "that if a man draw up an agreement in his own handwriting, beginning, I, A. B., agree, &c., and leave a place for a "signature at the bottom, but never sign it, it may be con"sidered as a note or memorandum in writing within the "statute, and yet it is impossible not to see that the insertion "of the name at the beginning was not intended to be a signature, and that the paper was meant to be incomplete "until it was further signed. This last case is stronger than "the one now before us, and affords an answer to the argument that this bill of parcels was not delivered as a "note or memorandum of the contract."

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Lord

In Schneider v. Norris (a), in 1814, there was a similar invoice, with "Bought of Norris and Co." printed on it; the body of it was filled up in the handwriting of Norris. The King's Bench held this a document signed by Norris. Ellenborough said, "I cannot but think that a construction "which went the length of holding that in no case a printing, or any other form of signature, could be substituted in lieu "of writing, would be going a great way, considering how many instances may occur in which the parties contracting are unable to sign. If, indeed, this case had rested merely on the printed name, unrecognised by and not brought home "to the party as having been printed by him, or by his "authority, so that the printed name had been unappropriated "to the particular contract, it might have afforded some "doubt whether it would not be intrenching on the "statute to have admitted it; but here there is a signing by

(a) Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286. See also Evans v. Hoare, 61 L. J. Q. B. 470; [1892] 1 Q. B. 593.

"the party to be charged by words, recognising the printed name as much as if he had subscribed his mark to it, which "is strictly the meaning of signing, and by that the party "has incorporated and avowed the thing printed to be his, "and it is the same in substance as if he had written Norris "and Co. with his own hand. He has by his handwriting in "effect said, I acknowledge what I have written to be for the "purpose of exhibiting my recognition of the within contract. "It appears to me, therefore, that the printed name thus recognised is a signature sufficient to take this case out of "the statute."

In Johnson v. Dodgson (a), in 1837, the defendant, who was the buyer, at the time of making the contract wrote in his pocket-book an entry, beginning, "Sold John Dodgson," and containing the terms of the bargain. He requested the plaintiff's traveller to sign this entry, which he did; Dodgson retained the book in his own possession. The Exchequer held this a memorandum, signed by Dodgson. Lord Abinger said, "The cases have decided that although the signature be "in the beginning or middle of the instrument, it is as "binding as if at the foot of it; the question being always open to the jury whether the party not having signed it "regularly at the foot meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to "be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there being a note in writing showing the terms. "of the contract, and recognised by him." Parke, B., said, "The point is in effect decided by the cases of Saunderson v. "Jackson (b) and Schneider v. Norris (c). There the bill of parcels was held to be a sufficient memorandum in writing, "it being proved that they were recognised by being handed over to the other party. Here the entry was written by "the defendant himself, and required by him to be signed by the plaintiff's agent: that is amply sufficient to show

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(a) Johnson v. Dodgson, 6 L. J. Ex. 185; 2 M. & W. 653.

(b) Saunderson v. Jackson, 3 B. & P. 238.

(c) Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286.

"that he meant it to be a memorandum of the contract "between the parties."

These three decisions, which, considering who decided them, comprise a very great weight of authority, are perfectly consistent, but it may be observed that the principles stated in the judgment of the Exchequer are far stricter than those of Lord Eldon. He seems to have thought that the name of the party appearing in a document recognised by him must be a signature, whatever the intention was. The Exchequer only say it is a signature when recognised as a binding memorandum. Lord Ellenborough seems to have decided Schneider v. Norris (a) on the principle that the circumstances there showed that Norris had "appropriated "the printed name to the purpose of exhibiting his recogni"tion of that particular contract," a phrase which seems to mark very well the difference between signing a name and merely writing it (b). It is to be observed, that the appropriation of the name in each of the cases was simultaneous with the completion of the instrument. It may, perhaps, be doubtful whether, if a writing containing the name of a party is complete under circumstances which show that it is not signed, it could be converted into a signed document by any subsequent parol expressions of intention whatsoever. And this is a doubt that may be of practical importance, for when one party only has signed a memorandum, which to be a memorandum of the bargain must contain the name of the other party, the contract is good or not at the election of the non-signing party. But it has never been decided that the party having by word of mouth clearly and unequivocally expressed his election to hold the signer to his bargain, was more bound than before. There seems no legal reason why he may not keep the signer of the contract bound till the last moment, and then adopt or repudiate the contract as he may think most convenient for himself, or if malicious, most inconvenient for the party who has signed. If, however, a

(a) Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286.

(b) See Murphy v. Boese, 44 L. J. Ex. 40 ; L. R. 10 Ex. 126, post, p. 81.

recognition of a contract containing his name is a signature, he might soon be driven either to recognise the contract, and so be bound, or to repudiate it, and so set the other side free. But though this would be just and convenient, it would be a strain upon the cases, and a very great strain upon the words of the section.

In the last case on this subject, Hucklesby v. Hook (a), in 1900, the buyer had written an offer to purchase upon a sheet of letter paper belonging to the seller and bearing at the top the seller's printed name and address, and it was held that, as the seller had not written any part of the document, there had been no appropriation by him of the printed name as a signature; and Schneider v. Norris (b) was distinguished on this ground.

In the case of Stewart v. Eddowes and Hudson v. Stewart (c), in 1874, the signature was upon the memorandum, but not for the purpose of recognising the contract, that recognition being a subsequent act, and it was held sufficient. There Hudson employed Eddowes to sell a ship to Stewart. An unsigned memorandum of the proposed terms was submitted to Stewart, who made some alterations in it and signed it. The alterations were subsequently struck out with his consent, and the memorandum was sent to Hudson, who made some other alterations and returned it to Eddowes, who signed it on behalf of Hudson and took it to Stewart, who acquiesced in the alterations and approved of the agreement. It was objected for Stewart, in the action to recover the balance of the purchase-money, that parol evidence to show that he had acquiesced in the contract as altered was inadmissible. But the Court held that it was admissible, Coleridge, C. J., saying, "There was no variation of the contract, for there was no "contract between the parties until the proposal was sub"mitted to Stewart, and Stewart on meeting Eddowes agreed "that his handwriting should operate as a signature to what "then became a complete agreement between the parties."

(a) Hucklesby v. Hook, 82 L. T. 17.

(b) Ubi supra.

(c) Stewart v. Eddowes, Hudson v. Stewart, 43 L. J. C. P. 204 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 311.

Any mark which is intended to be a signature is sufficient (a); but there must be something which is intended to be a signature; a mere description will not satisfy the statute (b).

And most probably a stamp intended as a signature would be sufficient, for, as Willes, J., said in Bennett v. Brumfitt (c), "The using a stamp is only a compendious way of writing "the party's name."

In Geary v. Physic (d), in 1826, Abbott, C. J., said, "There "is no authority for saying that where the law requires a "contract to be in writing, that writing must be in ink." In that case a promissory note had been indorsed in pencil.

Who is an agent authorized to sign.

The section is satisfied if the memorandum of the contract is signed by the party to be charged, or his agent in that behalf. There is nothing in the wording of the section to alter the general law of agency. The agent does.not require an authority in writing to enable him to sign the note, and in Maclean v. Dunn (e), in 1827, it was decided that in this, as well as in other cases of agency, a subsequent ratification was equivalent to a previous authority. To establish a subsequent ratification, however, the principal must be in existence when the contract is made, and the agent must have proposed at the time to be acting on behalf of a principal (ƒ). The fact of agency may be established and any person may be proved to be an agent for this purpose, in the same manner and subject to the same rules as in cases of agency for any other purpose. It has indeed been decided that the one party cannot be an agent for the other, but this is very doubtful law. It is quite right and proper that such an unusual thing

(a) Baker v. Dening, 8 A. & E. 94; Helshaw v. Langley, 11 L. J. Ch. 17. (b) Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2.

(c) Bennett v. Brumfitt, in 1867, 37 L. J. C. P. 35; L. R. 3 C. P. 31.

(d) Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 237.

(e) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

(f) Keighley v. Durant, 70 L. J. K. B. 622; [1901] A. C. 240.