able for their railway at an amount equal to the rent which a lessee would pay, making the same uses of the railway as the company; [that is, that the company were rateable, after due deductions according to the Parochial Assessment Act, (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, s. 1), on the sums which they received as fares and tonnage for goods and passengers which they carried, as well as on the amount of tolls which they received from other carriers on their railway;] and that an estimate of the company's liability, founded on the amount chargeable in respect of tolls only, was erroneous.

The parish officers adopted, and the sessions approved the following mode of calculating the net annual value of the company's rateable property in their parish.

They ascertained the gross receipts of the company for one year, £440,366, and made therefrom the following deductions:

1. £5 per cent., for interest on £255,000, the capital employed in engines, carriages, and other moveable stock, in their business as carriers.

2. £20 per cent., on the same capital, for tenants' profits and profits of trade.

3. £12 108. per cent., on the same, for the depreciation of such stock, beyond usual repairs and expenses.

4. £198,962, for the annual cost of conducting the business.

5. £9150, for the land occupied by stations and other buildings, separately rated in the parishes in which they are situate.

6. £30 per mile, for the reproduction of rails, chairs, sleepers, &c.:

Held, that these deductions (the reasonableness in amount of which is a question for the sessions) included all that was properly referable to the

trade, as distinguished from the increased value given by it to the land, and that the balance (£135,589) was properly taken as fairly representing the rent which a yearly tenant would give for the occupation of the railway. Regina v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 203

4. Woods.

The 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 27, enacts that a highway rate shall be made by the surveyor upon all property now liable to be rated to the relief of the poor, and that the same rate shall extend to such woods, &c. as have heretofore been usually rated to the highways:-Held, that the words usually rated, did not mean usually rateable, and that the sessions were to determine whether such woods had been usually rated, with reference to the custom of the particular parish, as to such woods.

Therefore, where the sessions on appeal had found that woods in a particular parish had not been rated to the highways from 1809 to 1835, (the time when the statute came into operation), and had decided that such woods were not liable to be rated, this Court confirmed the order of sessions. Regina v. Rose, 272

5. Tolls of Market.

By a local act (8 & 9 Geo. 3, c. xliv) trustees were appointed and empowered to purchase lands for the site of a market, and were directed, out of monies to be borrowed under the act, 1. To pay the expenses of obtaining the act; 2. To pay the debts incurred by the purchase of the land, and of erecting the buildings, and lighting certain streets in the town of T., and of purchasing the stalls standing in the then market, and certain mortgages made under the act, with interest; 3. After the discharge of the same, and of all debts, 3 B 2

it was directed, that "the said market and buildings, and the tolls, rents, and profits thereof, should be in trust for the use and benefit of the parish of St. M., in the said town of T., for ever, and be applied to the clothing, educating, and placing out apprentices so many of the children of the poor inhabitants of the said parish as the trustees should from time to time appoint."

Section 25 provided that the share and proportion which the several grounds did contribute or pay, or were charged with towards the poorrates in the year 1768, according to the rents of the same as they were then rated, should be for ever paid by the trustees in respect of the buildings to be erected by virtue of the

act.

A subsequent act (57 Geo. 3, c. lxv) empowered the trustees to extend the market, and to purchase lands for that purpose, and enacted, that the

8 & 9 Geo. 3, c. xliv, and all the authorities, powers, provisions, regulations, clauses, matters, and things, except such as were thereby altered, varied, or repealed, or were repugnant to, or otherwise provided for by that act, should be in full force and effect, and extend to that act as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if all such authorities, &c. therein contained were repeated and re-enacted in the body of that act with relation thereto.

The trustees, under the first act, purchased lands in the parish of St. M., and, under the second, land in the parish of B., both in the town of T., and erected thereon a markethouse, &c. They occupied the premises and collected the tolls, with which they paid the expenses of the market and the interest of the mortgage debts. No surplus ever existed after such payment, and no part of the mortgages had been paid off:

Held, 1. That the special provisions of the 8 & 9 Geo. 3, c. xliv, with respect to rating, were not incorporated into the 57 Geo. 3, c. lxv, by the general words of the clause of reference in the latter. 2. That the trustees, being occupiers of premises in the parish of B., which produced a valuable return, although not profitable in any given year, and the destination of the funds under the statute not being to strictly public purposes, were rateable, according to the Parochial Assessment Act, to the relief of the poor of the parish of B. Regina v. The Trustees of the Taunton Market,

6. Dock Duties.

543

By stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 56, ss. 15 & 17, the Hull Dock Company were incorporated and empowered to make, build, erect, and provide a basin, or quay, or wharf, and other works, and to support, maintain, and keep the same in repair.

Sect. 42 empowers the company "in consideration of the charges and expenses to which the making, building, erecting, and providing the said works, and the supporting the same, will amount," to take certain tonnage dues from all vessels coming into or going out of the harbour of Kingstonupon-Hull, and the company's basin or docks within the port of Kingstonupon-Hull, or unlading or lading any of their cargo within the said port.

The company were in possession of three docks at Hull; viz. the Old Dock, and the Humber Dock, with a lock, pit, and entrance basin thereto, all built by the company soon after the passing of the above act; and the Junction Dock built by them subsequently, and communicating with the other two. Under sect. 42, the company were in the receipt of the following tonnage dues:

1. For vessels using the entrance basin without going into the docks.

2. For those passing through the old harbour to the Old Dock, and using that or the other docks.

3. For those passing through the entrance basin into the Humber Dock, and using that of the other docks.

4. For those discharging their cargoes in the river Humber, without entering the harbour entrance, basin, or docks.

5. For those which discharge their cargoes in the old harbour, either on the west or east side thereof, without entering the docks or basin.

Held, that the company were rateable to the poor in respect of tonnage dues received by them from the first three classes, and not in respect of those received from the last two. Regina v. The Hull Dock Company, 621

7. Shareholders of Bridge and Tolls. The property in Putney bridge was vested in trustees upon trust to permit thirty shareholders to receive the tolls, and to have the entire management of the bridge. The shareholders were assessed jointly for the relief of the poor of Putney, and, the amount not being paid, a summons was issued to all the shareholders to appear before a police magistrate of the district. A., a shareholder living at the toll-house on that side of the bridge which was not within the parish making the rate, appeared in pursuance of the summons served on him, but refused to pay the whole amount of the assessment, whereas an application was made to the magistrate to grant a distress-warrant, which he refused to do:

2. Where a peer had been arrested by a warrant of two justices, and bound by recognisances with two sureties to keep the peace, the Court refused an application for a certiorari to bring up the recognisances, (made on the ground of the justices having no jurisdiction in such a case), as the applicant was not in custody; and, in the event of its being necessary to enforce the recognisances, their validity would be tried in another way. Ex parte Lord Gif

ford,

490 3. At the quarter sessions, articles of the peace being exhibited against A. and B., it was ordered that A. and B. should enter into recognisances before a justice, to keep the peace for six months. On being brought up by warrant before a justice for this purpose, they refused to enter into such recognisances, whereupon he committed them to prison for the residue of the said six months, unless in the meantime they should enter into the said recognisances:-Held, that, as the justice had only power to enforce the order of sessions, he had exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering the imprisonment. In re Ashton,

185

RECORDS.

See SESSIONS.

RELIEF.

and service with Spilling, set forth in the examination. Regina v. Beding

105

which it is founded discloses evidence (by relief) of a subsequent settlement of the pauper in a third parish.

And, therefore, where the examination stated an acknowledgment of a settlement in S., the appellant parish, by relief, and a subsequent acknowledgment by relief in C., and the sessions refused to enter into the question of the settlement in S., on the ground that they were concluded by the statement of a subsequent settlement in C., and therefore quashed the order of removal, this Court quashed the order of sessions. Regina v. Whitwick,

22

2. The examination of a pauper, after setting forth a settlement alleged to have been gained by him in the appellant parish, by hiring and service with one Spilling, stated that he had six children, aged respectively eighteen, sixteen, fourteen, twelve, nine, and four years; and, amongst other instances of relief, that, on several of his wife's confinements on the birth of the said children, whilst residing in the respondent parish, he had been allowed medical attendance upon his wife, by and at the expense of the appellant parish.

The appellants, in one of their grounds of appeal, objected "that the pauper never acquired a settlement in E. by hiring and service, or by any other means:"

Held, that the dates of such relief sufficiently appeared by the examination.

Held, also, that, under this ground of appeal, the sessions were right in admitting evidence to shew that the relief given by the appellants had been given under a mistaken belief that the pauper had acquired a settlement in their parish by the hiring

coming chargeable to the parish of A. was taken into the parish workhouse there, where he remained for some months; he was then sent to B., out of the limits of the parish of A., to the establishment of a contractor for the maintenance of paupers belonging to A. and other parishes, where he was maintained at the expense of A. :-Held, that this establishment might, for such purposes, be considered as the parish workhouse of A., and, therefore, that the maintenance of the pauper there by A. was not such relief out of that parish as to be an acknowledgment of his being settled in it. Regina v. St. Giles-inthe-Fields, 137

RENT.

See SETTLEMENT, IV. V.

SCIRE FACIAS. See RECOGNISANCE, 1.

SERVANT.

See COMMITMENT; CONVICTION.

SESSIONS.

1. The stat. 1 W. 4, c. 21, s. 6, enacts, "that, in all cases of application for any writ of mandamus whatsoever, the costs of such application, whether the writ shall be granted or refused, and also the costs of the writ, if the same shall be issued and obeyed, shall be in the discretion of the Court."

A peremptory writ of mandamus issued to a court of quarter sessions, directing the justices to erase from the records of the court an entry made at a previous sessions, which was manifestly wrong, and made with

out jurisdiction, but in accordance with the practice of the sessions, and which entry had been made on application by the respondents, without the knowledge of the appellants. Upon motion for costs to be paid by the respondents-Held, that, as the erasure of such entry was an act which the sessions could not do, and as the entry was made by the fault of the justices, or the clerk of the peace, the Court would not order the respondents to pay the costs. Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding, 98

2. The examination of a pauper stated a settlement in P., the appellant parish, by apprenticeship to J. Green, for six years, under an indenture dated 24th March, 1828, and the requisite service, and forty days' residence in

P.

The grounds of appeal stated, "that the pauper, after his service with the said master, and by his consent, for part of the time of the said apprenticeship, to wit, from May, 1833, to the end of the said term, served one S. Nowell, of Grosvenor-square, Pimlico, under the said indenture, in third parish, H., and resided therein more than forty days during such service, being single," &c.

a

At the trial, the case of the respondents being admitted, they objected that the grounds of appeal were not sufficient in particularity as to the house in H. where the alleged service took place, to entitle the appellants to give evidence in support of that settlement. The sessions, after argument, being of that opinion, confirmed the order without hearing the evidence. Upon motion for a mandamus to them to enter continuances and hear the appeal-Held, (overruling Regina v. The Justices of Carnarvonshire, 2 Q. B. R. 325, and Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding, Id. 331), that, as the sessions had not

declined jurisdiction, but had entertained the point, which was one peculiarly for their consideration, (not being a preliminary question of law, as whether a particular rule of practice is consistent with law), this Court would not interfere by mandamus.

Where such questions are raised at sessions, the justices, if they have any doubt, should not stop the case, but hear and determine it upon the facts, and reserve the point for the consideration of this Court.

The sessions confirmed the order of removal, subject to a case which concluded thus: "The question for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench is, whether the grounds of appeal were insufficient; if so, the order of removal to stand confirmed, otherwise, continuances are to be entered and the appeal heard:"-Held, that this Court would not hear a case stated with such a conclusion, merely for the purpose of putting the sessions in motion.

Quære, whether the reservation of a case in such a form, which precludes the appellants from bringing it up, deprives them of their claim to the remedy by mandamus. Regina v. The Justices of Kesteven,

151

3. Where grounds of appeal against an order of removal set up a settlement in a third parish by apprenticeship, but gave no date of the apprenticeship, and the sessions, therefore, held them insufficient, and confirmed the order, this Court refused to interfere on the ground that the sessions were the proper judges whether the date was necessary. Regina v. The Justices of Cornwall, 161, n.

4. Where an indictment for forcible entry found at the quarter sessions had been quashed by a subsequent sessions, this Court granted a certiorari to bring up the indictment, in order that the Court might see what had been done upon it at the sessions; it not appearing whether it had been