ing justices; it is sufficient if they can make out a primâ facie case otherwise. Regina v. the Inhabitants of Yelvertoft, 476 2. A justice has no power to issue a summons, calling on the overseer of a parish to produce the rate books at petty sessions, for the purpose of proving that a pauper has been assessed to the poor-rate; and service of such a summons on the overseer will not authorise the reception of secondary evidence of the contents of the rate books. Regina v. Orton, 567 3. Taken in prisoner's presence. See COMMITMENT. 4. And upon oath. See COMMIT MENT. 5. Necessity of setting out in commitment. See COMMITMENT. 6. The examination in support of a settlement by estate, alleged that letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to the pauper, and that he, as administrator, occupied the estate, &c. The letters of administration were produced before the removing magistrate, and a copy of them was sent to the appellants, with the examination, but the fact of their production was not stated. This objection being taken in the grounds of appeal: Held, that it sufficiently appeared that the letters of administration were produced before the removing magistrate. Regina v. St. Anne's, Westminster, 608 See COMMITMENT. EXAMINATIONS. 1. It is no objection to an order of removal, that the examination upon which it is founded discloses evidence (by relief) of a subsequent settlement of the pauper in a third parish. And, therefore, where the examination stated an acknowledgment of a EXAMINATIONS. settlement in S., the appellant parish, by relief, and a subsequent acknowledgment by relief in C., and the sessions refused to enter into the question of the settlement in S., on the ground that they were concluded by the statement of a subsequent settlement in C., and therefore quashed the order of removal, this Court quashed the order of sessions. Regina v. Whitwick, 22 2. The copy of examinations sent with an order of removal should contain every thing necessary to shew that each examination was taken by persons having proper jurisdiction, and the copy sent by the respondents to the appellants is to be presumed to be a correct one. A copy of examinations was sent in the following form:-The examination of S. S., the pauper, taken upon oath before us, two justices in and for the county of W., who upon her oath saith, &c. (stating the evidence). Taken and sworn before us, this 31st of December, 1842. William Dickens, H. Townsend." Then followed, on the same sheet of paper-"The examination of P. R., of &c. who upon oath saith, &c. (stating the evidence). Taken and sworn, this 31st day of December, 1842, before us, William Dickens, H. Townsend:" Held, insufficient, there being nothing to connect the two examinations, so as to shew that the latter was taken by persons having authority to administer an oath. It is sufficient that an order should adjudicate generally, that an illegitimate child, under sixteen, is settled in A., (the parish where its mother is settled), without stating the fact that that settlement is derived from its mother. Regina v. Shipston-uponStour, 302 3. The examination of J. M., the pauper's husband, on which the order for the removal of the pauper and her children was founded, was headed as taken "touching the place of his lawful settlement." The other examinations purported to be taken "at the time, place, and in manner aforesaid: -Held, that the examinations were sufficiently taken. The examination of the overseer stated, that he "had made diligent search and inquiry, with the object of discovering whether J. M. had any legal settlement, and had not been able to discover that the said J. M. had, by his own act, or the act of his parents or their ancestors, or otherwise, acquired any settlement:" -Held, that such statement was sufficient, and that the precise nature of the inquiries need not be stated; and that it was not necessary to negative the birth of J. M. in Scotland, Ireland, or the Islands. Regina v. Leeds, 257 4. An order was made for the removal of a pauper to Y., upon examinations which, after shewing Y. to be his mother's birth settlement, contained the following statement by his father: "I was born, I believe, in London, but in what parish I never knew:" -Held, that these examinations did not throw upon the removing parish the necessity of making further inquiry into the father's settlement, and justified the order of the removal to that of the mother. The examination of T. (the brother of C., the mother) stated, "I believe I am fifty-nine years old; C. was my sister, and younger than me; she was born at Y., and is the person mentioned in the certificate now produced as having been baptized at Y., July 6th, 1788."-Held, that this examination was not inadmissible, though T. appeared to be speaking to a fact which must have occurred when he was about three years old. The respondents, at the trial of an appeal, are not bound to call all the witnesses examined before the removing justices; it is sufficient if they can make out a primâ facie case otherwise. Regina v. Yelvertoft, 476 5. An order for the removal of a pauper from L. to M. was made upon an examination which stated that he had never gained a settlement in his own right; that his father, who died when the pauper was twenty-seven years old, was an acknowledged parishioner of M. at the time of his death, and about half a year before his death received relief from M. while residing in L: Held, that the examination disclosed sufficient primâ facie evidence of the pauper being settled in M., and that it was not necessary to negative in it the fact of his having been emancipated at the time when his father received the relief from M. Regina v. Lilleshall, 579 6. An order for the removal of an illegitimate child was made upon the examination of C. H., who stated, "I am the mother of T. H. the pauper. In or about the year 1833, he was born, out of wedlock, in P:". Held, insufficient, as the pauper, if born after the passing of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, (14 August, 1834), by section 71, would have the settlement of his mother, instead of the birth settlement which he would have had before that act; and, therefore, that it ought to have been ascertained whether or not he was born on or before that day. Regina v. St. Paul's, Covent-Garden, 617 EXAMINATIONS AND GROUNDS OF DERIVATIVE SETTLEMENT, 476. EMANCIPATION, 576. HEADING, 230, 257. HIRING AND SERVICE, 20, 900, 105, 167. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 257. INQUIRING INTO SETTLEMENT, 257, 476. PARTICULARITY, 247, 571. PAYMENT OF RATES, 188, 612. PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE, 608. RELIEF, 22, 105. RENTING TENEMENT, 5, 10, 186, 397, 400, 485. SEVERAL SETTLEMENTS, 387, 476. SIGNATURE, 64. SUBSEQUENT SETTLEMENT, 22. And see SETTLEMENT. FOREIGNER. See COMMITMENT. FRIENDLY SOCIETY. The stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, (Friendly Societies Act), provides for the establishment of societies for raising funds for the “ mutual relief and maintenance of the members, their wives, children, or other relations, in sickness, infancy, advanced age, widowhood," &c. The stat 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 40, s. 2, reciting the above, extends its provisions to "any other purpose which is not illegal: Held, that these words are to be understood with relation to purposes ejusdem generis with those specified in the former part of the section; and, therefore, that a society, having for its object the loan of money to its members, but not by way of charitable relief, (though not constituted under the provisions of the Loan Societies Acts), was not within the intent and meaning of the above statutes, so as to 1. An information under the Game Acts, (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, s. 30, and 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 65, s, 9.) was stated to be by Sir O. M., a credible witness, and contained the following allegation in the body of it:"And the said information having also been verified on the oath of W. A., another credible witness." The jurat was, "exhibited by Sir O. M., and sworn before me,' &c. It was signed by Sir O. M. and W. A. It was proved, by parol evidence, that W. A. swore to the charge at the time the information was laid, but there was no separate deposition by W. A. as to the charge. The charge was afterwards heard before two magistrates, when the defendant gave evidence, on which he was indicted for perjury:-Held, that there did not appear to have been any sufficient deposition to the charge at the time the information was laid; therefore the defendant was entitled to be acquitted, on the ground that the magistrates who heard the charge acted without jurisdiction. v. Scotton, Regina 27 2. A conviction under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 1, (Night Poaching Act), must allege, that the defendants by night were in certain land for the purpose of taking game (and semble, by night) in such land. It is not suffi cient to follow the precise words of the statute. Therefore, in an action of trespass against justices, where they justified the imprisonment of the plaintiff under a conviction which stated, in the words of the statute, that he and three others did, by night, unlawfully enter certain land with a net for the purpose of taking game, to wit, &c., it was held insufficient, though the plea alleged, that they did by night enter the land for the purpose of taking game by night in the said land. Semble, that there is a distinction as to this between summary convictions and misdemeanours under sect. 9 of the statute. Where an act is made punishable by summary conviction, which act may be lawful if done under certain circumstances, such circumstances should be negatived in the conviction. Fletcher v. Calthrop, 529 See CONVICTION. GAOL. The 6 Geo. 1, c. 19, s. 2, reciting that "vagrants and other criminals, offenders, and persons charged with small offences, are, for such offences, or for want of sureties, to be committed to the county gaol, it being adjudged that, by law, the justices of the peace cannot commit them to any other prison for safe custody,' enacts, that such persons may be committed either to the common gaol or house of correction, as the justices in their judgment shall think proper. The 4 Geo. 4, c. 64, providing for the classification of offenders, enacts, (s. 5), "That, where the house of correction and gaol are parts of the same building, or inclosed in the same boundary wall, and under the same keeper and visiting justices, the classification in the whole of such buildings, and not in each part separately, required by the act, shall be carried into effect:" Held, that the effect of the stat. 6 Geo. I was to make a house of correction a public prison for the custody of offenders; and that a commitment 1. The stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 95, enacts, that, in an indictment for the non-repair of a highway, "the costs of the prosecution shall be directed by the Judge of assize, before whom the indictment is tried, or the justices at sessions, to be paid out of the highway rate." An indictment under this statute was tried at the assizes, the defendants were found guilty, and the Judge thereupon made a verbal order for the costs of the prosecution. A bill of costs was sent to the defendants, but was never taxed. The recognisances, having been respited from time to time, were ultimately discharged, and an application was made to the Judge who tried the case to enforce his order for the costs, but he declined to interfere. This Court refused to grant a mandamus to the surveyor of the parish to pay the costs, their amount not having been ascertained. Semble, the amount of costs should be ascertained by the Judge who tries the case at the assizes or sessions, or by the officer of the Court under his direction, at or immediately after the trial. Regina v. Clark, 143 2. By the 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 64, the Court before whom any indictment is tried for not repairing highways, is empowered to award costs to the prosecutor, if it shall appear to the Court that the defence to such indictment was frivolous. By the 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, s. 1, "the penalties, forfeitures, matters and things in the former act contained relating to highways are extended, as far as the same are applicable, to county bridges, as if the same were therein repeated and re-enacted." The 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, is repealed by the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50; which, by sect. 98, empowers the Court before whom any indictment shall be preferred for not repairing highways to award costs to the prosecutor, where the defence appears to be frivolous. Sect. 5 provides that the word "highways" shall include all bridges "not being county bridges." To an indictment for the non-repair of a county bridge, the defendants pleaded that a particular hundred was liable to repair it. The jury found the defendants guilty, and the Judge who tried the case, thinking the defence frivolous, gave a certificate for costs: Held, that, although the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, did not apply to county bridges, and repealed the 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, yet, that the 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, incorporated the latter act, and kept alive the power in the Jndge of granting the certificate for costs. Regina v. Merionethshire, 316 3. Where, in an indictment against a township for the non-repair of a highway for carriages, the defendants were acquitted on the ground that it was not such highway for carriages, as stated in the indictment:-Held, that the prosecutor was not entitled to costs under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 95, and the Court set aside the Judge's certificate. Sect. 95 does not attach where the way indicted is not proved to be a highway. Regina v. Heanor, 466 66 II. SURVEYOR. 1. At a special session for the highways, an order was made, reciting a complaint by the surveyor, under stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, that the owner had refused and neglected to cut, prune, or plash certain hedges, whereby the sun and wind were excluded from a certain carriage-way or cart-way contrary to the statute," &c.; that the owner had appeared, and the offence was proved; and the justices did thereby order the owner "to cause the said hedges to be cut, pruned, or plashed, and the said obstruction complained of, to the injury or damage of the said highway, removed within ten days from the service hereof." The order was served on the owner, who cut some part of the hedge, but the surveyor, thinking the order was not properly obeyed, summoned him before two justices, who imposed a penalty on him, and after ten days the surveyor himself cut the hedge: Held, 1. That the order was bad in part, because it did not specify in what manner, or to what extent, the owner was to cut the hedge; but that it would have been good if it had directed the owner to cut the hedge in such a manner that the highway might |