1845. THE QUEEN v. Inhabitants of WESTMINSTER. between the same parishes, the examinations should shew that the order for such previous removal was produced and proved before the removing justices, or its absence properly accounted for. The same rule prevails ST. ANNE'S, as to the production of an indenture: Regina v. Flockton(a). There would have been no difficulty in stating in the examinations that the letters were produced. [Wightman, J.-In Regina v. Mildenhall (b), the order was in fact not produced. Patteson, J.-In that case the order itself would have required some proof; letters of administration do not.] Cur. adv. vult. Lord DENMAN, C. J, now delivered the judgment of the Court. We think that there really is no doubt upon this subject. It is impossible not to see that the letters of administration, which were sent with the examination, were produced before the magistrate who made the order. We should be shutting our eyes if we raised any doubt upon the subject, and we are able to decide this without at all interfering with the decision in Regina v. Mildenhall (b), in which the document which was acted upon did not appear to have been produced before the removing justices. (a) 2 Q. B. R. 535. Order of sessions confirmed. (b) Id. 517. 1845. May 3rd. A ground of appeal setting THE QUEEN v. The Inhabitants of RIPON. ON appeal against an order of two justices, dated out a settlement the 18th of November, 1842, removing William Leaf, by payment of his wife, and three children, from the township of Hunslet, in the borough of Leeds, to the township of rates stated that the pau per was duly rated &c. for Ripon, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, the sessions and in respect confirmed the order subject to the opinion of this Court on a case, substantially as follows: of a tenement, to wit, a tenement consisting of two dwelling &c., duly occupied &c. :" Held, insuf The appeal came on to be tried at the sessions for houses, situate, the borough of Leeds, 1843. At the trial, the respondents, having proved a settlement of the pauper in the appellant township by apprenticeship, closed their case, and the appellants offered to give evidence of a settlement by the pauper in the township of Holbeck, constituting the by payment of rates, under the following ground of ficient, as it did not shew that the dwell ing-houses, tenement in question, were 64 separate and distinct," as 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, s, 2. "That, after the said supposed service under the said required by the indenture of apprenticeship, to wit, in 1836, the said pauper was duly rated and charged with his share towards the poor-rates of and for the township of Holbeck, for and in respect of a tenement, to wit, a tenement consisting of two dwelling-houses, situate in the said township of Holbeck, of the value of 107., and held and rented by the said pauper of one C. Crosland, for the term of one whole year, to wit, from the 1st of November, 1836, to the 1st of November, 1837, at and for the rent of not less than 107., to wit, for the rent of 147, 58., and which said tenement was duly occupied for the said year, under the said yearly hiring, and the said rent for the same was duly paid; and the said pauper duly paid the said rates for and in respect of the said tenement, and during the whole of the said year, and for forty days after the payment of the said rates resided in the said township of Holbeck." The respondents objected that the above ground of appeal was insufficient, for not stating that the tenement or dwelling-houses in respect of which the pauper was alleged to have been rated were "separate and distinct," as required by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 57. After argument, the objection was held good, subject to the opinion of this Court. If this Court shall be of opinion that the ground of appeal was insufficient, then the order of justices, and the order of sessions are to be confirmed. If otherwise, to be quashed. Hall and Pashley, in support of the order of sessions. -The settlement on which the appellants rely is a settlement by payment of rates, gained after the 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, came into operation. By the 2nd section of that act it is declared, that "no person shall acquire a settlement in any parish or township by reason of settling upon, renting, or paying parochial rates for any tenement, not being his own property, unless such tenement shall consist of a separate and distinct dwellinghouse or building, or of land, or of both, bond fide rented by such person in such parish or township, at and for the sum of 107. a year at the least, for the term of one whole year." In the ground of appeal, however, nothing is stated about either of the dwelling-houses which the pauper rented being "separate and distinct." The statement is, therefore, deficient, both as omitting the words used in the act, and because it leaves the fact itself doubtful. Equivalent words to those in the act might have been sufficient, Regina v. Wymondham (a); but none such are to be found here. It is consistent with what is stated, that the pauper was living where no settlement could at that time have been acquired. (a) 2 Q. B. R. 541. 1845. THE QUEEN v. Inhabitants of RIPON. In law, a single room may be a dwelling-house or mansion: 3 Inst. p. 65; Co. Litt. 48, 5; Rex v. St. George's, Hanover Square (a), Rex v. Whitechapel (b): and indeed, the very object of 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, was to prevent the acquisition of settlements by persons occupying only portions of houses, which shews the importance of the omission of the words "separate and distinct." Both distinctness of tenure, as well as of building, has been held to be contemplated by the act; Regina v. Caverswell (c), Rex v. Wakering (d), Rex v. Usworth (e), Rex v. Henley-upon-Thames (f); here, neither is shewn. Suppose a declaration, containing an averment that the plaintiff was possessed of a tenement consisting of two dwellinghouses, in the words used in this ground of appeal, and a plea traversing that averment, the declaration would be sustained in law by proof of a joint holding; Wallis v. Harrison (g); in which case Lord Abinger, C. B., says a man is seised, though another person is seised with him; the words, therefore, in this case, should have been explicit enough to negative such a possession as would fail to confer a settlement, as no inference can be made in favour of it: Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding (h). Pickering contra.-The objection to the ground of appeal is, that because a person says he holds a dwellinghouse, it is possible that, consistently with this allegation, he may hold it jointly with another person, or only part of it, and, therefore, he must be presumed to do so. The cases cited are not disputed, but they only shew that where anything is made by a statute a condition of gaining a settlement, then such condition must be stated; (a) Burr. S. C. 692. (c) 10 A. & E. 270. (e) 5 A. & E. 261. 1845. V. Inhabitants of RIPON. but here the question is, whether the words used in the ground of appeal are not sufficient to shew, primâ facie, THE QUEEN a settlement. The meaning of the words "separate and distinct" is to be found in Rex v. Wootton (a), where Patteson, J., says, "I have always thought, that the words 'separate and distinct dwelling-house or building,' in these statutes, meant separate and distinct as to any other person; that the tenant should not hold part of a house." And the words used here clearly bear this meaning. If it had been found by a special verdict, that a man was seised in fee, could it be objected that there was no finding that he was solely seised in fee, or would not his exclusive seisin be sufficiently shewn without such a statement? If this were not so, it must be necessary, in setting out a settlement of this nature, not only to aver that the tenement was separate and distinct," but that it was held "bonâ fide," as those words occur in the statute; and it is quite as easy, in the absence of any allegation, to presume mala fides, as a joint occupation. In Regina v. The Recorder of Pontefract (b), the same objection was taken without avail. 66 Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, s. 2, requires that the tenement shall consist of a separate and distinct dwelling-house or building, or of land, or of both, bonâ fide rented at the sum of 10l. a year for one whole year; now, the objection to the ground of appeal in this case is, that it does not state that the tenement was separate and distinct; and whatever meaning is to be given to them, I think we ought to hold that these words should be stated, or other words equivalent to them, in the ground of appeal setting out the settlement. This ground of appeal does not; so, in conformity to |