1844. THE QUEEN p. Inhabitants of LIDFORD. chargeability sufficient to give the magistrates jurisdiction. Before the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, there was no mode of questioning the evidence, either of the chargeability or settlement, which was taken before the justices. The 81st section provides, "that the respondents shall not go into or give evidence of any other ground of removal, except those set out in the examinations." That section clearly contemplates other grounds of settlement, not the preliminary matters of chargeability and residence. The intention was to leave them as they were before, with the right to the appellants to deny and refute them. The evil to be remedied was to prevent one parish tricking another; but that is not likely to be the case in matters of residence and chargeability. [Williams, J.-Suppose no relief or chargeability were stated, how could the question be raised by the appellants, they cannot go into other grounds?] They could say now, as they could before the act, that the pauper was not chargeable when removed. [Coleridge, J.-How could they know the fact in the case of a removal from Yorkshire to Cornwall? You ought to give all the information, to enable the other parish to say whether they will or will not appeal. You do not deny that there must be evidence of chargeability, therefore that must be sent with the examinations. It will not do to send what are thought the material parts of them (a). Lord Denman, C. J.-The very thing contemplated by the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, was, that there should be an actual burthen on the parish.] The fair construction of the 81st sect. of 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, is, that the legislature had in view a substantial grievance, and have not alluded to residence or chargeability, even by fair and reasonable intendment. The danger of an order made without sufficient evidence on these subjects was so minute as not (a) Regina v. Outwell, 9 A. & E. 836. 1844. to be contemplated. [Coleridge, J.-Your construction might be good under some circumstances, but holding THE QUEEN the rule strictly may prevent some great abuses.] Greenwood and Rowe, contrà, were not called upon. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The objection must prevail. PATTESON, WILLIAMS, and COLERIDGE, Js., concurred. Orders quashed. v. Inhabitants of THE QUEEN V. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. (BECKINGTON v. ELLAND). June 3rd. Where an inferior court de clines to exercise a jurisdiction imposed on it by law, this Court will, enforce its proceeding; but, when it has acted, its judgment can only IN this case a rule nisi for a mandamus had been obtained in Michaelmas Term last, calling upon the justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire to enter continuances and to hear an appeal against an order of removal. The sessions had refused to hear the appeal, on the ground by mandamus, that the examinations sent with the order of removal were defective, in not stating the settlement intended to be relied on with a sufficient degree of particularity. In Easter Term, pending this rule, the case of Regina V. The Justices of Kesteven (a) was decided, in which it was held, that, where the sessions had come to a decision on the insufficiency of the statements in the grounds sions refused to of appeal, and had refused to allow the appellants to go into evidence, this Court would not interfere by mandamus, thereby to review the correctness of their decision. be reversed in this Court on a case stated for its opinion. Therefore, where the ses hear evidence on an appeal, on the ground nations were deficient in particularity, this Court refused a that the exami In this term, Hall moved for a rule to shew cause why mandamus to (a) Antè, p. 151. compel them. 1844. THE QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. he should not be permitted to file additional affidavits, Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court. This was a case against the justices of the peace for the West Riding, which arose in this way:— In a former term, cause was shewn against a rule for a mandamus (g), requiring the Court of quarter sessions to enter continuances and to hear an appeal, on the ground that it had improperly refused to do so when the case was called on for trial. The cause shewn was, that that Court had heard the appeal and decided upon it, and that we could not subsequently enter upon any inquiry as to whether their judgment was right. In giving effect (a) Vol. 2, p. 1185. (f) Rex v. Justices of Wiltshire, 10 East, 404. (g) Regina v. The Justices of Kesteven, antè, p. 151. to this argument we were under the necessity of re-considering some former decisions of this Court, by which it was determined that a mandamus would be the proper mode for compelling the sessions to correct their error; and we felt it our duty to overrule expressly the case of Regina v. The Justices of Carnarvonshire (a) and Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding (b), and perhaps some other cases. The more the question is considered, the more clearly will be shewn the propriety of our last decision. The practice which had crept in, from the desire entertained by the Court, that in all cases a fair trial of the issue between the parties should be had, would have led to perpetual interference with every proceeding of the quarter sessions, both embarrassing and derogatory to a tribunal exercising very important functions. All now understand, that, when any such tribunal declines to exercise a jurisdiction imposed on it by the law, this Court will enforce its proceeding; but that, when it has acted, its judgment can only be reversed here on a case stated by itself for our opinion. There is certainly no want of facility in granting such cases, and they are conveniently disposed of on grounds well understood between the parties, while the conflict of affidavits on such matters is of itself a real evil. As soon as the said rule was discharged, another, involving the same point, was brought before us; we inquired of the learned counsel who appeared in support of it, whether the two cases could be distinguished; the learned counsel did not attempt to shew that our preceding decision was wrong, and that the former authorities ought still to prevail; but he expressed an opinion that the two cases might probably be distinguished, and, 1844. THE QUEEN v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. 1844. v. The Justices of the WEST RIDING. . that he might have the opportunity of distinguishing THE QUEEN them, the rule was enlarged to this term. When, however, it was called on, no attempt at such distinction was made. It was then thought right to inform us, at much length, that the parties had been misled by our mistake in former decisions, and that hardship and injustice would result to the losing parish if we should now refuse them those means of questioning the judgment below which we had led them to suppose that they possessed. But we cannot allow any weight to these observations; parties must indeed act on the authority of our decisions, but those decisions, when pronounced erroneous, cannot give them any shadow of right against their adversaries who have acted on that which is now declared to be the law, in spite of that erroneous decision, even at the moment when it was pronounced. But these observations were rather made as introductory to an application for a rule to shew cause why the appellants should not be at liberty to file affidavits in support of their application for a mandamus. So confident, it was urged, had both parties been that this Court would continue to act as it had done before, that the appellants actually refused to take up a case granted by the Court of quarter sessions, both parties agreeing to be bound by the opinion of this Court on the disputed question, when discussed in the proceedings by mandamus. We have paused to consider, whether, in the exercise of our discretionary power, we ought not to grant this application: two cases were cited where the Court was supposed to have so done, Rex v. The Justices of Wilts (a), and Rex v. The Justices of Lancashire (b); but in the latter the Court either corrected a mistake in the judgment of the Court below, in believing that they had no |