338. ASSIGNMENT OF TIME IN INTERFERENCE CASES.In cases of interference the party who first filed so much of his application for a patent as illustrates his invention will be deemed the first inventor in the absence of all proof to the contrary. A time will be assigned in which the other party shall complete his direct testimony; and a further time in which the adverse party shall complete the testimony on his side; and a still further time in which both parties may take rebutting testimony, but shall take no other. If there are more than two parties, the times for taking testimony shall be so arranged, if practicable, that each shall have a like opportunity in his turn, each being held to go forward and prove his case against those who filed their applications before him. (Patent Office Rules, July, 1870.)

339. POSTPONEMENT.-If either party wishes the time for taking his testimony, or for the hearing, postponed, he must make application for such postponement, and must show sufficient reason for it by affidavit filed before the time previously appointed has elapsed, if practicable, and must also furnish his opponent with copies of his affidavits and with reasonable notice of the time of hearing his application. (Ib.)

340. FORM OF NOTICE OF TAKING TESTIMONY.—

BOSTON, MASS., March 29, 1869. In the matter of the interference between the application of Lyman Osgood for a paper collar machine and the patent No. 85,038, granted December 15, 1868, to Charles Comstock, now pending before the Commissioner of Patents.

SIR: You are hereby notified that on Wednesday, March 31, 1869, at the office of Sextus Tarquin, esq., No. 30 Court street, Boston, Massachusetts, at 9 o'clock in the forenoon, I shall proceed to take the testimony of Truman Truthful, Peter Pivot, and Welcome Story, all of Boston, as witnesses in my behalf.

The examination will continue from day to day until completed. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.

Before the Commissioner of Patents, in the matter of the interference between the application of Lyman Osgood for a paper collar machine and the letters patent No. 85,038, granted December 15, 1868, to Charles Comstock.

Depositions of witnesses examined on behalf of Lyman Osgood, pursuant to the annexed notice, at the office of Sextus Tarquin, No. 30 Court street, Boston, Massachusetts, on Wednesday, March 31, 1869. Present, Peter Proctor, esq., on behalf of Lyman Osgood, and Charles Cavil, esq., on behalf of Charles Comstock.

Truman Truthful, being duly sworn, (or affirmed,) doth depose and say, in answer to interrogatories proposed to him by Peter Proctor, esq., counsel for Lyman Osgood, as follows, to wit:

Question 1. What is your name, age, residence, and occupation?

Answer 1. My name is Truman Truthful; I am forty-three years of age; I am a manufacturer of paper collars, and reside in Chelsea, Massachusetts.

And in answer to cross-interrogatories proposed to him by Charles Cavil, esq., counsel for Charles Comstock, he saith:

Cross-question 1. How long have you known Lyman Osgood?

342. FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER.—

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

County of Suffolk.

}

At Boston, in said county, on the 26th day of April, A. D. 1869, before me personally appeared the above-named Truman Truthful, and made

oath that the foregoing deposition by him subscribed contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The said deposition is taken at the request of Lyman Osgood, to be used upon the hearing of an interference between the claims of the said Lyman Osgood and those of Charles Comstock, before the Commissioner of Patents, on the 3d day of May, A.

D. 1869.

The said Charles Comstock was duly notified, as appears by the original notice hereto annexed, and attended by Charles Cavil, esq., his counsel. SEXTUS TARQUIN,

Justice of the Peace.

The magistrate shall seal up the testimony, and write upon the envelope a short certificate, substantially in the following form, viz:

I hereby certify that the within depositions of Truman Truthful and Peter Pivot, relating to the matter of interference between Lyman Osgood and Charles Comstock, were taken, sealed up, and addressed to the Commissioner of Patents by me this 26th day of April, A. D. 1869.

343. PRESUMPTION.-The general head of presumptive evidence is usually divided into two branches, namely, presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law consist of those rules which, in certain cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. They are founded either upon the first princi

ples of justice, or the laws of nature, or the experienced course of human conduct and affairs, and the connection. usually found to exist between certain things. The general doctrines of presumptive evidence are not therefore peculiar to municipal law, but are shared by it in common with other departments of science. Thus, the presumption of a malicious attempt to kill from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, and the presumption of aquatic habits in an animal found with webbed feet, belong to the same philosophy, differing only in the instance, and not in the principle, of its application. The one fact being proved or ascertained, the other, its uniform concomitant, is universally and safely presumed. It is this uniformly experienced connection which leads to its recognition by the law without other proof; the presumption, however, having more or less force in proportion to the universality of the experience. And this has led to the distribution of presumptions of law into two classes, namely, conclusive and disputable. (Greenleaf on Evidence, p. 21.)

Conclusive, or, as they are elsewhere termed, imperative or absolute, presumptions of law, are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment, which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof that the fact is otherwise. They consist chiefly of those cases in which the long-experienced connection before alluded to has been found so general and uniform, as to render it expedient for the common good that this connection should be taken to be inseparable and universal. They have been adopted by common consent, from motives of public policy, for the sake of greater certainty, and the promotion of peace

and quiet in the community; and therefore it is that all corroborating evidence is dispensed with, and all opposing evidence is forbidden. (Ib.)

The second class of presumptions of law, answering to the præsumptiones juris of the Roman law, which may always be overcome by opposing proof, consists of those termed disputable presumptions. These, as well as the former, are the result of the general experience of a connection between certain facts or things, the one being usually found to be the companion or the effect of the other. The connection, however, in this class, is not so intimate or so universal as to render it expedient that it should be absolutely and imperatively presumed to exist in every case, all evidence to the contrary being rejected; but yet it is so general, and so nearly universal, that the law itself, without the aid of a jury, infers the one fact from the proved existence of the other, in the absence of all opposing evidence. In this mode the law defines the nature and amount of the evidence which it deems sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and to throw the burden of proof on the other party; and if no opposing evidence is offered, the jury are bound to find in favor of the presumption. A contrary verdict would be liable to be set aside, as being against evidence. (Ib., p. 38.)

Presumptions of fact, usually treated as composing the second general head of presumptive evidence, can hardly be said, with propriety, to belong to this branch of the law. They are, in truth, but mere arguments, of which the major premise is not a rule of law; they belong equally to any and every subject-matter; and are to be judged by the common and received tests of the truth