A

6. A steam-tug, the property of a mu-
nicipal corporation invested with cer-
tain powers of local government in a
city, and used exclusively by an ex-
ecutive department of such municipal
government, as an instrument for per-
forming duties imposed on it by law,
is not liable to seizure in a suit in
rem against such steam-tug, in Admi
ralty, in the District Court, brought
to recover damages for an act of the
tug, while actually engaged in public
service under the orders of such de-
partment. The Fidelity,

7.

569

6. A bankrupt had a permit from the
Comptroller of the city of New York
to occupy a stand in a market, pay
ing therefor a weekly rental. The
license was revocable at the pleasure
of the Comptroller, and could not be
transferred without written permis-
sion. It was the custom of the city
to allow such a permit to be assigned.
It bore a value, as an article of sale.
The bankrupt paid $4,000 for his per-
mit, to his assignor. He placed that
value on it in a statement of his as-
sets made by him, as a basis for credit,
to a creditor who afterwards became
is assignee in bankruptcy.

The

7.

District Court, on the petition of the
assignee in bankruptcy, ordered that
the bankrupt execute a transfer to
the assignee of the right to the per-
mit, and a request to the Comptroller
to consent to such transfer. On a
petition of review, claiming that the
permit was not property which passed
to the assignee in bankruptcy: Held,
that the bankrupt was estopped from
asserting that the right enjoyed un-
der the permit was not property in
his hands; that the sale value of such
right would, when realized by the as-
signee, under the transfer papers, be
the proceeds of the property of the
bankrupt; and that the order of the
District Court was proper. In re
Gallagher,

410

N. & L. were copartners under the
name of N. & Co. They dissolved,
owing debts and having no assets.
Subsequently, they formed a new
partnership, under the name of N.,
agent, and failed, and were adjudged
bankrupts, having firm assets. A
creditor of N. & Co. claimed to prove
against the firm of N., agent, a delt
due by the firm of N. & Co.: Held,
that he was not entitled to share in
the assets of the firm of N., agent,
being excluded therefrom by the
provisions of § 5,121 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States. In re
Nims,
439

See INJUNCTION.
PATENT, 8.

BILL OF LADING.
See CARRIER, 1.

BOND.

See ADMIRALTY, 1 to 5.
BOTTOMRY.

BOTTOMRY.

1. The master of a vessel cannot hypo-
thecate his cargo, by bottomry, with-
out communicating with the owner
of the cargo, if communication with
such owner be practicable, and such
communication must state not merely
the necessity for expenditure, but,

2. A vessel, with cargo, bound from
Rio de Janeiro to New York, put
into St Thomas in distress. The mas-
ter, to raise money to repair the ves-
sel, gave a bottomry bond on vessel,
freight and cargo. He had notice

that C., at Philadelphia, was the con-
signee of the cargo. He made no
communication to him, and no suffi-
cient communication to the shipper
of the cargo. He could have commu-
nicated with both of them by tele-
graph: Held, that the bond was void
as respected the cargo, for want of
authority in the master to give it. id.

1. A bill of lading for coir yarn in
bales, shipped by a steamer from Liv-
erpool to New York, receipted for
the bales as "in good order and well
conditioned," and described them as
"in transit" from another steamer.
They were, apparently, in good ex-
ternal order. The voyage was ten
days. The bales, when discharged,
appeared to have been, at some time,
wet with sea water. The yarn inside
was damp to the touch, discolored,
and unfit for use to make fine goods.
The bales were properly stowed, and
nothing appeared as to how they
could have been damaged on the
steamer. There was no evidence as
to the condition of the bales when
shipped. On a libel, in Admiralty,
against the steamer, to recover for
the damage: Held, that the libellant
could not recover, because he had not
shown that the goods were damaged
while on board of the steamer.
Adriatic,

The

424

2. A vessel carrying fine table salt in
sacks, with powdered arsenic in casks,
stowed the arsenic so negligently

1.

2.

3.

that, during the voyage, by severe
weather, the casks of arsenic were
broken, so that the arsenic escaped
and was distributed on some of the
sacks and in the vessel. The vessel,
without notifying the consignees of
the salt of what had occurred, and
without separating the sacks with
which the arsenic had come in con-
tact from the other sacks, allowed
the sacks to be indiscriminately dis-
charged, so that it was impossible
to make such separation afterward.
On examination of a sack it was
found that the arsenic had penetrated
the sack covering and impregnated
the salt. Nothing but an analysis of
each sack could have determined
whether the salt in it was fit for con-
sumption. The commercial value of
the salt was destroyed and it was sold
for fertilizing purposes: Held, that
the vessel was liable for the differ-
ence between the commercial value
of the salt, as sound salt, when it
was discharged, and what it sold for
for fertilizing purposes. The Niag-

4. Anilin v. Higgin.

rane,

76

Anilin v. Coch-

155
5. Eadie v. Slimmon. Robinson v. Mu-
tual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,

194

6. Barry v. Equitable Life Society, id.
7. Wilson v. Lawrence,
id.

CHARTER PARTY.

1. The libellants executed to the re-
spondents a charter party of a ves-
sel for a voyage from New York to
Rio de Janeiro, by which " forty-
five" running days were allowed for
loading and discharging, and, if the
vessel was longer detained, the de-
fendants were to pay damages, at so
much per day, provided such deten-
tion should happen "by default" of

the respondents: Held, that the re-
spondents took the risk of detention
by intervening Sundays and holidays
and by custom house and port regu
lations as to taking in or discharging
cargo, lack of wharfage or lighterage
facilities, not due to any fault of the
vessel, and the like; and that deten-
tion by any of those risks placed the
respondents in "default" and ren-
dered them liable for demurrage.
Davis v. Pendergast,
565

COLLISION.

1. A steamer, which is bound to keep
out of the way of another steamer ap-
proaching so as to involve a risk of
collision, has no right to attempt to
pass to the left, unless there is an im-
perative necessity for it, if that in-
volves a change of course or speed
by the other, until she has obtained
the consent of the other to such a
movement. The E. H. Coffin, 421

2. Where there has been a collision be-
tween two sailing vesse's, and one of
them was on the privileged tack, and
the other alleges that the former was
in fault for keeping her course, she
must show that there was time for
the former, after the risk of collision
was apparent to her, to avoid the col-
lision by chang ng her course; and,
in this case, te latter having been
in peril, the failure of the former to
take a step in extremis of that charac-
ter, was held not to have been a fault.
The Havre,
427

3. A vessel bound to keep out of the
way of another vessel, and having no
lookout, was, in this case, held to be
not in fault for a collision between
the two vessels, because the case was
one of inevitable accident. The
Southern Home,
447

4. The yellow fever having disabled
most of her crew, which was ade-
quate, it was proper for her to pursue
her voyage, without putting back or
seeking an intermediate port or an-
choring, her precautions, with the
remaining crew, being reasonable. id.

collided. They were approaching
each other very nearly end on, on
courses which crossed not far from
the place of collision. It being the
duty of the former vessel to keep out
of the way, she was held in fault for
attempting to pass so close to the
latter vessel, that a mistake of the
latter vessel in luffing caused the col-
lision. The latter vessel was held in
fault for luffing, because she had no
sufficient lookout, although the luf-
fing was just at the moment of the
collision. The Osseo,

537

1.

151

151
16, 17

CONTEMPT.

See ADMIRALTY, 4.

COSTS.

Cross libels were filed in the District
Court, in Admiralty, for a collision,
one being a suit in personam and the
other a suit in rem. In the first suit,
the District Court decreed damages
and costs against the respondent. In
the second suit, that Court dismissed
the libel, with costs. The respond-
ent in the first suit appealed, and the
libellant in the second suit appealed.
This Court, on the appeals, appor-
tioned the damages sustained by the
respective parties. One of the ves
sels was totally lost by the collision.
The aggregate costs of both parties
in this Court and in the District Court