The First Nat. Bank of North Bennington v. The Town of Bennington. by which it is bound, but it cannot have an injunction in this suit. Perhaps the complainant can be relieved in the District Court for this District, under its power as a Court of bankruptcy, ancillary to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District where the original petition was filed. (See Sherman v. Bingham, 3 Clifford, 552; Lathrop v. Drake, 1 Otto, 516.) The motion is denied. ants. Albert C. Aubrey and Louis Henry, for the plaintiff. Charles H. Phelps and Henry E. Davies, for the defend THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH BENNINGTON 28. THE TOWN OF BENNINGTON. A town in Vermont issued bonds under seal, in aid of a railroad, with interest coupons attached, not under seal. Each coupon contained an express promise by the town to pay, and was payable to bearer, and was signed by the proper officer: Held, that assumpsit was a proper form of action on the coupons. The statute of the State of Vermont, under which the bonds were issued, having been held to be valid under the Constitution of the State, by the highest Court of Vermont, this Court followed such decision. A national bank has, under § 5,136 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, authority to take and hold and sue upon such coupons. (Before WHEELER, J., Vermont, February 25th, 1879.) WHEELER, J. This is a motion for a new trial, in an action of assumpsit upon coupons from the bonds of the defend The First Nat. Bank of North Bennington v. The Town of Bennington. ant, issued in aid of the Lebanon Springs Railroad Company, a corporation existing under the laws of New York, under No. 1 of the special session laws of Vermont, 1867, after a verdict for the plaintiff, directed by the Court, at last term. The grounds urged in support of the motion are, that, upon the evidence in the case, the action cannot be maintained, because the bonds are under seal, and, therefore, assumpsit is not the proper form of action; that the statute under which the bonds were issued is contrary to the Constitution of the State; and that the plaintiff is without authority under the law to take and hold such instruments and maintain any action upon them. The statute authorized the issuing bonds or notes, with interest coupons attached, the bonds to be signed by the selectmen, and the coupons by the treasurer, of the towns. The bonds are under seal; the coupons are signed as the statute requires, and are not under seal. Each coupon contains an express promise to pay. It reads: "The town of Bennington will pay to the bearer," &c. It was intended to be separated from the bond, and to be evidence in itself of a debt, and to be paid and taken up as such. It is a negotiable instrument, and, if valid, constitutes a cause of action in the hands of any holder. (Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539; Knox Co. v. Wallace, Id., 546.) Therefore, a judgment upon one coupon, or a set of coupons, from a bond, is not conclusive between the same parties, or their privies, for or against the validity of other coupons from the same bond, unless the validity of all of them was tried and determined. (Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S., 351.) When a coupon is sued, an appropriate action to recover upon it, according to its nature, must be brought. These coupons are, in their nature, simple contracts, and assumpsit, although not the only remedy, for, debt would lie, is a proper remedy. It was maintained upon similar coupons in Aurora v. West, (7 Wall., 82.) All questions as to the validity of the statute under which the bonds and coupons were issued arise under the Constitution of the State, and not at all under that, or any law, of the The First Nat. Bank of North Bennington v. The Town of Bennington. United States. There is no Federal question involved. This Court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff has been organized as a corporation, and exists, under the laws of the United States, and those laws have given jurisdiction of suits by and against it. (Rev. Stat. U. S., sec. 629, Tenth.) This jurisdiction is concurrent with, and, although independent of, not over, that of the State Courts. The laws of the States, under the Constitutions of the States, when they do not conflict with the Constitution or the laws of the United States, are wholly matters of State concern and subject to State control. Of necessity, the construction given by the highest Court of a State, constituted for that purpose, to the Constitution and laws of the State, must stand as a part of them. A State would not be sovereign and independent as to a Constitution and laws which it could not, by its own appointed tribunals, construe, any more than it would be if it could not adopt or enact them. This right of the States to have their Courts of last resort construe their laws, both legislative and organic, has always been conceded. (Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175.) There never appears to have been any question about the right, nor any about following the decisions, unless they were fluctuating. And the decision of the highest tribunal of a State, maintaining the validity of a statute, under the. Constitution of the State, is always followed. (Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall., 190; Atlantic & Gulf R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S., 359; County of Henry v. Nicolay, 95 U. S., 619.) The question as to the validity of this statute, under the Constitution of the State, has been before, and been determined by, the highest judicial tribunal of the State, and at a general term of the highest Court, when all the judges sit together for the consideration of important questions, thus constituting it not only the highest in name, but also in ability, that can be had in the State. It would not be decorous toward, nor in accordance with the great respect entertained for, that Court, to examine the grounds of its decision, or do more than ascertain what it was, especially if in favor of the validity of the law. And it was so. (Bennington v. Park, The First Nat. Bank of North Bennington v. The Town of Bennington. 50 Vt., 178; Bank v. Concord, Id., 257.) The defendant has no rights in this behalf, except those which the tribunals of its own State, under whose laws it exists, would accord to it. The plaintiff had the right to invoke the aid of the Courts of either jurisdiction, but there the right of choice ended, as to both parties. The rule for determination must be the same in each. The statute (Rev. Stat. U. S., sec. 5,136, Seventh,) authorizes national banks, of which the plaintiff is one, to exercise all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt, &c. These coupons are doubtless promissory notes, within the statute 3 and 4 Anne, ch. 9, and of this statute, both of which use the term in the same sense, unquestionably. They are also evidences of debt. The coupons, and the right to sue upon them, are all that are now in question. No intimation of any views concerning the right to take and hold the bonds is intended by this discrimination, however. The motion is overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict. Edward J. Phelps and George W. Harman, for the plaintiff. Charles N. Davenport, Tarrant Sibley and A. B. Gardner, for the defendant. The First Nat. Bank of North Bennington v. The Town of Arlington. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH BENNINGTON V8. THE TOWN OF ARLINGTON. In an action against a town in Vermont, on coupons from bonds issued by it in aid of a railroad, it appeared that the bonds were signed by only two of the selectmen of the town, although there were three in office at the time, the statute requiring the bonds to be signed by the selectmen. The highest Court of Vermont having held that, under the General Statutes of Vermont, (title 2, chap. 4, sec. 2.) a majority of the selectmen had as full authority as a full board to issue such bonds under such a statute, this Court followed that decision. A provision in the statute, that the bonds should be registered in the office of the town clerk, was held to be directory merely, and a want of compliance with such provision was held not to affect the validity of the bonds. Evidence excluded of declarations made to tax payers before they assented to the issuing of the bonds, which induced them to assent. (Before WHEELER, J., Vermont, February 25th, 1879.) WHEELER, J. This is a motion for a new trial, in an action of assumpsit upon coupons from bonds of the defendant, after a verdict for the plaintiff at the last term, heard at the same time with the motion in First Nat. Bank of No. Bennington v. Bennington, (ante, p. 53.) All the reasons urged in behalf of the motion in that case have been urged in this, and are disposed of here upon the same grounds, in the same way. In addition, it is insisted, that the motion should be granted, because but two of the selectmen of the defendant signed these bonds, although there were three in office at that time; because the bonds were not registered in the town clerk's office; and because the defendant's offer to prove, that, before the assent of the tax payers was executed, Mr. Park, to whom the bonds were delivered, as director of the Lebanon Springs Railroad Company, and who was president of the plaintiff, addressed a public meeting of the tax payers, |