does so without prejudice to his right of rescinding the contract. The costs a purchaser's solicitor is entitled to for drawing requisitions upon title is 1s. per folio: (Gib. Costs.) Approval of title as appears from abstract no waiver of objections to title otherwise disclosed.]-The having approved of the title as it appears on the face of the abstract will not deprive a purchaser of his right to have the abstract verified with the title deeds (Southby v. Hutt, 2 Myl. & Cr. 217; Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Ha. 47), or to make any objections or requisitions which the abstract does not disclose, and which afterwards become known to him: (Sidebottom v. Barring. ton, 3 Jur. 947.) Agreement to waive all objections but one, if that objection be removed.]—And where a purchaser, having made several objections, agrees to withdraw all of them but one, and accept the title, provided that one is removed, the waiver of the other objections will be construed as conditional on the objection being so removed; and if this be not done, the purchaser, upon a bill filed against him for a specific performance, will be entitled to a general reference of title: (Lesturgeon v. Martin, 3 Myl. & Kee. 255.) VI. OF THE TITLE A PURCHASER MAY REQUIRE. 1. When a purchaser may insist upon a specific performance pro tanto with compensation. 2. When a vendor may compel specific performance with com pensation, when unable to complete the contract to its fullest extent. 1. When a purchaser may insist upon a specific performance pro tanto with compensation. Title must be free from all doubt or suspicion.]-A purchaser is entitled not only to a safe holding title free from any kind of incumbrance, but also to a title clear of all doubt and suspicion; for if a doubt arises upon its validity the purchaser may annul the contract; nor can any extent of indemnity which a vendor may offer, and have the ability to confer, vary the rule the slightest degree in this respect. Purchaser cannot claim indemnity for a doubtful title.]And as, on the one hand, a vendor cannot compel a pur chaser to take a doubtful title with an indemnity, so on the other, the purchaser cannot call upon the vendor to give him such indemnity. If any doubt arises upon the validity of the title, the purchaser must either rescind the contract in toto, or consent to take such a title as the vendor is able to give him: (Balmanno v. Lumley, 1 Ves. & Bea. 225; Paton v. Brebner, 1 Bli. 66.) Defect in quantity may be made matter of compensation.]— When the defect is not in the title itself, but arises with respect to the term of tenure of the property, or the quantity of the land, the contract may still be enforced, the purchaser being allowed a proportionate reduction of the purchase money to make up the deficiency. In some instances the right to call for a completion of the contract is confined to the purchaser only; whilst, in others, the vendor will have equal rights with a purchaser in this respect; but in no case, it seems, will a vendor be allowed this privilege, where it may not also be claimed by a purchaser. When purchaser may insist on specific performance with compensation, although vendor has no such right.]—If a vendor contracts to sell an estate in fee simple, in which he has only a term of years (see 2 Bro. C. C. 497; Drew v. Cork, 9 Ves. 268; Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190), or a copyhold or customary estate (Twining v. Morrice, 2 Bro. C. C. 226; Hick v. Phillips, Pre. Chev. 575), or to dispose of an entirety, when in fact he can only confer a title to a proportionate part (Attorney General v. Gower, 1 Ves. 218; Casamajor v. Strode, 3 Myl. & Kee. 726), or an underlease, where the contract was for the purchase of a lease, or a new lease where the contract was for the purchase of an existing lease (Mason v. Corder, supra), a purchaser may in every one of these instances compel a specific performance of the contract as far as the vendor is able to perform it, by taking the conveyance or assignment of such an interest as he really has a power to dispose of, and insisting upon having a proportionate sum by way of compensation allowed out of the purchase money to make up for the difference in value between the interest contracted for, and that which the vendor really had in the premises (Dale v. Lister, 16 Ves. 7, cited; Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Myl. & Kee. 629); nor can a vendor avoid complying with these terms, notwithstanding that he himself may have been deceived as to the true nature of the property; and yet in no one of the above-mentioned instances can he call upon a purchaser to complete the contract upon similar terms. So, as we have already remarked, where an estate is subject to a right of entry for the purpose or working mines, the purchaser will be entitled to claim compensation; and this a vendor will not be allowed to get clear of by offering to waive the contract, and to place the purchaser in the same situation as he would have been if such contract had never been entered into: (Seaman v. Vaudrey, 16 Ves. 323.) Rule as to compensation general, but not universal.]Lord Eldon has said, when alluding to a right of a purchaser to insist upon a specific performance with compensation, wherever vendor has not the interest he pretended to sell, that "generally, but not universally, a purchaser may take what he can get with compensation for what he cannot have:" (see 1 Ves. & Bea. 353; see also Western v. Russell, 3 ib. 187.) Exceptions to the above-mentioned rule.]-The exceptions to the rule seem to be:-1. Where the right which the vendor is unable to confer is of such a nature that its actual pecuniary value cannot be arrived at-as, for instance, a right of sporting reserved over the property; for it would be impossible to estimate what difference in value such a reservation made, and such a right would break in too much upon the enjoyment and ownership of a purchaser to enable equity with propriety to compel him to take the estate with compensation (Burnell 1. Brown, 1 Jac. & Walk. 168); and it appears to be doubtful whether compensation could be claimed in respect of the land lying dispersed, instead of being contained in ring fence within which it was described to be (Fewster v. Turner, 6 Jur. 144), although it is perfectly clear such misdescription would afford a purchaser ample ground for rescinding the contract. 2. Where it appears that at the time of entering into the contract the purchaser knew that the vendor could not execute the agreement, then, upon the principle laid down by Lord Redesdale in Laurenson v. Butler (1 Sch. & Lef. 13), that under such circumstances the agreement must be presumed to have been executed under a mistake, and therefore the purchaser will not be allowed to insist upon a specific performance as to the interest to which a vendor may be actually entitled: (see also Mortlock v. Butler, 19 Ves. 292; Harnet v. Yielding, 2 Sch. & Lef. 549.) 3. A third exception to the above rule is where a person, who has only a partial interest, has contracted to sell the fee, and where compelling him to convey such an interest as he actually possesses in the premises might be prejudicial to the interests of other persons interested in the property, not parties to the contract. Thus, for example, where a tenant for life without impeachment of waste, with remainders over to other parties, contracts to sell the fee, a court of equity, on the grounds above-mentioned, has refused the purchaser specific performance with a compensation. So where a tenant for life without impeachment of waste, with a reversion in fee after an estate to his sons in tail male, with full knowledge of the nature of his title, entered into a contract for sale of the estate as owner with a purchaser who was at the time ignorant of the true state of the title; and afterwards the vendor endeavoured to withdraw from the contract, and the purchaser insisted upon a specific performance by the vendor's conveying such an estate as he could, with a compensation; the court observed, that without derogation in every respect from the jurisdiction, it was apparent that the courts would not in every case compel a vendor to convey such an estate as he could. And upon the general principle that the court will not execute that which is unreasonable, or would be prejudicial to persons interested in the property, but not parties to the contract, the court, before directing the partial execution of the contract by ordering the limited interest to be conveyed, ought to consider how that proceeding might affect the interests of those who were entitled to the estate subject to the limited interest of the vendor. The vendor had a life estate without impeachment of waste, with remainder to his sons in tail male; and having regard to the settlement, and the protection intended to be afforded to the objects of it-conceiving that the consequences of a partial execution of the contract might be prejudicial to those objects-seeing the difficulty of ascertaining, upon satisfactory grounds, the just abatement from the purchase money (for it was more easy to compute a just compensation where it is to be given for the defects in the quantity or quality of the land sold, than where it is to be given for the deficiency of the vendor's interest)—and considering also that nothing had been done upon the contract, so that the purchaser, though suffering the disappointment of not making himself the owner of an estate he desired to possess, had sustained no damage for which compensation might not be given by a jury, it appeared to the court that a conveyance of the vendor's life estate and ultimate reversion to the purchaser ought not to be decreed: (Thomas v. Dering, 1 Kee. 729.) 4. The fourth exception is where a purchaser has been guilty of wilful misrepresentation, in which case he will not be allowed to insist upon a vendor's conferring such an interest as he can pass at a proportionate price. Hence, when upon a treaty for an exchange, C. informed T. that the tenants of the latter were agreeable to the exchange, and thereupon the agreement was made, which stipulated for possession on both sides; it appeared upon a bill filed, that the tenants had not consented; and the bill sought that T. should buy out his tenants, or that the value should be proportionately reduced. The opinion of the court being against the plaintiff, he offered to waive the part of the contract which stipulated for possession, and not to require the tenants to be bought out. But this was denied to him, because, as the contract was obtained by misrepresentation, it was void both at law and in equity; for that when an agreement is obtained by fraud, the effect is not to cut it down or modify it only, but to vitiate it in toto, and the party who has been drawn into it is totally absolved from obligation. In what form compensation is usually allowed.]—When a purchaser is entitled to compensation, although it is usually allowed him in the shape of an abatement of a proportionate part of the purchase money, still it will sometimes be made to him in other ways; as where, upon the sale of woodlands, the value of the timber was correctly stated, but the land was represented to contain more by twenty-six acres than the actual quantity, he was allowed, as compensation, the estimated value of twenty-six acres of woodland, minus the wood: (Hill v. Buckley, 17 Ves. 394.) 2. When a vendor may enforce a specific performance with compensation. The instances in which a vendor, when unable to perform his contract to the full extent, will be allowed to carry it out as far as he can, and making compensation to the purchaser between the property contracted for and that the following heads:-1. To certain cases where the property has been misdescribed as to its extent. 2. Where the |