by the person himself taking under it, would vitiate his interest altogether. It was indeed formerly considered that an alteration, erasure, or interlineation would avoid the whole instrument, even in those cases where it was made by a stranger; but the law is now otherwise, as it is clearly settled that no alteration made by a stranger will prevent the contents of an instrument from retaining its original effect and operation, where it can be plainly shown what that effect and operation actually was. To accom

plish this, the mutilated instrument may be given in evidence as far as its contents appear, and extrinsic evidence will be admitted to show what portions have been altered or erased, as also the words contained in such altered or erased parts; but if, for want of such evidence, or any deficiency, or uncertainty arising out of it, the original contents of the instrument cannot be ascertained, then the old rule would become applicable, or more correctly speaking, the mutilated instrument would become void for uncertainty: (1 Prest. Abs. 156, 157.) In a recent case (Doe ex dem Tatham v. Gattamore, 17 L. T. Rep. 74), it was held that an erasure or interlineation appearing on the face of a deed is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, to have been made at the time of the execution of the deed.

8. Statement at the foot of the abstract.

How the statement at the foot should be penned.]—It is the proper, although by no means the general, practice to state at the end or foot of the abstract whether the vendor be married or single, and if married, whether his marriage took place prior to the year 1834, in order to show whether or in what manner his wife's right of dower may have attached on the abstracted premises. The abstract should likewise be accompanied by a statement of all matters relative to the legal character and station of every party interested in the property which do not appear on the face of the abstract, in order that the peruser of it may be enabled to ascertain with precision everything that is in any way connected with the title, and to point out the best mode of assurance to the purchaser without the necessity of calling for any further information: (1 Bart. Prec. XXXVII.)

II. DELIVERY OF THE ABSTRACT.

Vendor's solicitor should deliver abstract at the appointed time.]—The vendor's solicitor, whenever any particular time

is appointed for the delivery of the abstract, should take care to prepare and deliver the same accordingly. An omission to do this would at law, authorize the purchaser to annul the contract (Powell v. Pillett, Gilb. Rep. 188; Berry v. Young, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 640); and in equity, also, where time is made part of the essence of the contract (Bochin v. Wood, 1 Jac. & Walk. 239; Levy v. Lindo, 3 Mer. 84); but in the absence of a stipulation to the latter effect, a purchaser will not be released from his contract by such nondelivery, if he neglects to apply for the abstract within a reasonable time before the day appointed for its delivery (Jones v. Price, 3 Anstr. 942), or if, upon its being afterwards tendered to him, he makes no objection to receive it on account of the delay: (Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265.) Yet, even in equity, if a vendor neglects to prepare and deliver the abstract when pressed by the purchaser so to do, the latter will be entitled to avoid the contract as soon as the time fixed for completion is elapsed: (ib.)

When abstract should be delivered where no time of delivery is appointed.]-Even where no precise time is fixed for the delivery of the abstract, it ought to be delivered in a convenient time, although what limit is to be so considered is involved in doubt; the best and safest course, therefore, will be to deliver it without any unnecessary loss of time, as delay on the one side will form a reasonable pretext for the same line of conduct on the other, which, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, will be either more or less prejudicial to a vendor's interests.

Memorandum of time of delivery should be made.]—When the abstract is delivered, a memorandum of the day of the month and year of such delivery should be immediately noted by the party making such delivery, and retained by the vendor's solicitor, for the purpose of assisting the party's memory at any future time, in case it should become necessary to prove the time when such delivery actually took place.

Purchaser's solicitor should demand abstract, if not delivered in proper time.]-And as, on the one hand, a vendor's solicitor should be careful to deliver the abstract in proper time, so, on the other, the purchaser's solicitor should be equally vigilant; and whenever a time is specified for such delivery, the latter should make a point of demanding it on or before the specified day. It is not solely incumbent on

the vendor to move by making a tender of the abstract; it is in some degree, also, incumbent on a purchaser's solicitor to ask for it (Guest v. Homfray, 5 Ves. 283); and any laches on the part of the latter to do this, may afford ground for rescinding the contract, even where no actual time is appointed for the delivery of the abstract, if any considerable time has been allowed to elapse without any such demand having been made: (Harrington v. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 686.)

Vendor may be compelled to furnish an abstract.]-Should a vendor refuse or neglect to deliver an abstract, a court of equity will compel him to do so; nor will a vendor be allowed to substitute a delivery of the deeds themselves in the place of an abstract, and if he attempts to do so, the purchaser should immediately return the deeds, and insist upon being supplied with a proper abstract at the vendor's expense: (1 Prest. Abs. 34.)

Course purchaser's solicitor should pursue where he refuses to receive abstract for non-delivery in proper time.]—If a purchaser's solicitor is desirous of relying upon the nondelivery of the abstract on the appointed day, or if no day has been named within a reasonable time before the day fixed for the completion, he should refuse to receive it; or if it be forwarded to him in such a manner, or under such circumstances, as to afford him no opportunity for making such refusal, he should return it, unperused, as soon as possible: (Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265.)

How to act where willing to complete contract.]-Still, if the purchaser should be willing to complete the purchase, provided it can be done at the appointed time, but to rescind it altogether if this cannot be accomplished, his solicitor, at the same time that he returns the unperused abstract, should offer to receive it again, yet without prejudice to the purchaser's right to rescind the contract if, upon the investigation of the title, it should be discovered that it is impossible to complete the contract within the time originally appointed, or at some other specified period.

III. THE PERUSAL OF THE ABSTRACT BY PURCHASER'S
SOLICITOR.

Objects to be kept in view in the perusal of an abstract.]— The principal objects to be kept in view in perusing an abstract of title, are

1. To see that the title is carried back sufficiently far. 2. To discover the legal operation of the various instruments, as well as the capacity of the several parties, always bearing in mind that the same terms, when used in various instruments, have often a different force and operation; as, for example, a limitation to A. and his heirs to the use of B., his heirs and assigns, which, when contained in a deed of grant and release, will vest the legal estate in B., will only give him an equitable estate when contained in a deed of bargain and sale, or of appointment executing a power; and many terms which, in a will, are capable of passing a fee simple estate, will pass a mere life interest when contained in a deed; and at the same time, it must be remembered that the same expressions, when applied to property of different tenures, as freehold and leasehold, will frequently receive a different construction, and the same words which would pass only a life interest or an estate tail in freeholds, will often pass the absolute interest in leasehold or other personal property. (Bennett v. Lewknor, Roll. Rep. 356; Crawford v. Trotter, 4 Mad. Rep. 360; but see Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wms. 663, and observations thereon, 1 Hughes Pract. Sales, 2nd edit., 321.) It must also be recollected that the same words also may pass a different interest when they relate to an equitable, than they would if applied to a legal, estate (Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Wms. 471); or where applied to persons standing in a particular degree of relationship to each other: (Morgan v. Griffiths, Cow. 234.)

3. That there is a clear deduction both of the legal and equitable estate.

4. That all particular estates are either determined, or are capable of being conveyed to the purchaser, or otherwise disposed of, so as to enable the vendor to confer a good and unimpeachable title, in pursuance of the terms of the contract.

5. To ascertain if there are any charges or incumbrances affecting the property, and if so, whether they are of such a nature that the vendor is unable to discharge them, or of a kind that he can get in, and thus pass an unincumbered estate to the purchaser; or in other words, whether the incumbrances are matters of title, or of conveyance only, a subject upon which we shall enter more fully hereafter.

6. It must be seen that the parcels comprised in each particular instrument under investigation are the same as were comprised in the former documents; and if the identity is not sufficiently disclosed by the abstract, it must be authenticated by extrinsic evidence; such as poor rates, or land tax assessments, when, if it should appear that such assessments

have been made without any variation, except in the change of the owner's name, it may reasonably be presumed that all is right.

Analysis will tend to assist investigation.]-By making an analysis of the abstract, the labour of investigating the title will be both simplified and accelerated. This, in ordinary cases, may be done in the following simple manner:

"1796. 3rd & 4th June. Indres. of le. and rele. Rele., A. B. conveyed to C. D. in fee. 1800. Oct. 7th, C. D. devises to E. F. in fee. 1801. Nov. 10th, testator died. 1802. Jan. 17th, will proved in Prerog. Court of Canterbury. 1803. 1st and 2nd March, E. F. conveys to I. H. in fee to uses to bar dower. 1805. 12th May, I. H. mortgages in fee to J. L. by appointment;"

and thus continue to set out the various instruments according to their respective dates and order.

Inquiries to be made when any important document is omitted.]—After making an analysis of the abstract, the peruser's attention should be particularly directed to see whether every document necessary to the elucidation of the title is there set forth; and if it should appear that any are omitted, or simply referred to, or merely mentioned in the recitals, their production should be insisted on. This frequently occurs where persons seised in fee have left wills, but have made no disposition thereby of the abstracted property; in which case the will itself, or a probate copy, ought to be produced, as affording the most satisfactory evidence of that fact, as well as to show that it contains no words of general devise sufficient to comprehend such property.

Inquiry should be made as to marriage settlement.]-Inquiry should also be made as to whether any owners of the property executed a marriage settlement, and if so, the production of it should be required, in order to ascertain whether or not the abstracted premises are in any way affected by it; and nothing should be taken for granted where proper evidence of the fact can be procured.

Bare statements never to be relied on.]—It is never safe to rest satisfied with the bare statement in the abstract of the fact of "fine levied," or recovery suffered accordingly;" but the production of the chirograph of the fine, or exempli

66