1847. July 10th. Where a cause has been trans Court to an the correctness of the exercise of judicial authority by the STURGEON v. HOOKER. THE plaintiff was the assignee of the estate of an insol ferred from one vent debtor, named James Hooker, who, in 1834, was disbranch of the charged, under the provisions of the acts for the relief of other, the latter insolvent debtors, and who afterwards went to Hong Kong, will not question and, having acquired some property, died there in 1847 intestate. The widow of the insolvent took out letters of administration to his estate in this country. The Registrar of the Supreme Court at Hong Kong realised assets of the insolvent to the amount of £1300, and transmitted that amount to the provisional assignee of the Insolvent Debtors' Court, who paid the same into the Bank of England to the credit of the insolvent's estate. former on a previous appli cation. But where it appears that a plaintiff, on obtaining ex parte an injunction from one branch of the Court, had withheld in formation which might have induced the Court to make a different order, the injunction so ob The plaintiff by his bill (which was filed on behalf of himself and of the other creditors of the deceased insolvent against the administratrix and against the provisional asthat branch of signee of the Insolvent Debtors' Court) sought the usual accounts of the intestate's debts and of the assets in the hands of the defendant; that the intestate's assets might be aptained may be plied in payment of the debts contracted subsequently to the insolvency and his funeral and testamentary expenses, &c., and then in payment of the debts due to the plaintiff and the other creditors mentioned in the insolvent's schehas been trans- dule. The bill further prayed, that the £1300 might be properly secured, also for a receiver, and for an injunction dissolved on that ground by another branch of the Court to which the cause ferred. to restrain the provisional assignee from paying, and the administratrix from receiving, the £1300. On the 13th of May, 1847, the plaintiff obtained, upon an ex parte application to the Vice-Chancellor of England, an injunction in the terms of the prayer, but did not bring before the Court the fact of the payment of the £1300 into the Bank to the credit of the insolvent's estate. The cause was shortly afterwards transferred, and became attached to this branch of the Court. A motion was then made, upon notice, on behalf of the defendant Hooker, before the Lord Chancellor, to dissolve the injunction, but his Lordship declined to hear the motion (a). Mr. James Parker and Mr. Selwyn now moved before his Honor, upon notice, on behalf of the defendant Mrs. Hooker, that the injunction might be dissolved. First, because the facts, as they had been presented to the ViceChancellor of England, did not entitle the plaintiff to the injunction; and, secondly, on the ground of the payment of the £1300 to the proper account at the Bank of England not having been brought before the Court, although known to the plaintiff. Mr. Russell and Mr. Hallett, for the plaintiff, submitted that there had not been any intentional suppression by the plaintiff of any material fact. The VICE-CHANCELLOR: I am of opinion, that I am without jurisdiction as to the question, whether, upon the materials that were before the learned judge, who made the order and granted the injunction in question, it was a right or correct exercise of judicial authority on his part to do so; and, therefore, upon that question, I do not take the liberty of intimating any opinion. But I conceive it to be in the present case shewn, that the plaintiff, when he applied for the injunction, had in his power material information relating to the subject, which it was his duty to communicate to the Court on that occasion, and which information he did on that occasion not communicate by affidavit or otherwise to the Court. I think, so far as I can form an opinion upon the subject, that, if that in (a) See Sturgeon v. Hooker, 2 Phil. 289. 1847. STURGEON ท. HOOKER. formation had not been withheld, the Court would properly have refused the application, or properly directed notice of the motion to be given, or have properly made an order materially different from that which was made. The consequence is, that I must dissolve the injunction, and I must give the defendant the costs of the motion. The dissolution of the injunction to be without prejudice to any question in the cause. July 21st, & 1848, June 8th. Notice given to a landowner by pany of their intention to does not render LANGHAM v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. WILLIAM LANGHAM by his will, dated January a Railway Com- 15, 1830, after charging all his lands and hereditaments with rent-charges in favour of his widow and daughter, summon a jury, devised certain messuages, lands, and hereditaments at Holloway, unto his four sons, William Langham, since deceased, James George Langham, John Mackie Langham, and meantime under Samuel Frederick Langham, their heirs and assigns, equally to be divided among them as tenants in common. it inequitable for them to proceed in the the 8th Vict. c. 18, s. 85, to obtain possession. Nor is it a sufficient ground to restrain the Com pany from changing the aspect of the property, that The testator died June 26, 1838. His son, William Langham, died November 23, 1840, having, by his will and a codicil, devised his share to William Mansfield and George Wagstaff, and their heirs, upon trust for his wife for life, with remainder in trust for his children in fee as tenants in common, and with power of sale. accurately awarding compensation with reference to its original state. A nomination by the justices, under 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 85, of the surveyor employed by the Company, and who has already in the course of such employment valued the land, does not necessarily invalidate a bond under the section. The approval of sureties in a bond under the same section may be given by the justices, on an ex parte application of the Company. But if such a bond be made to landowners jointly, they being tenants in common of the land, it is not a sufficient compliance with the act. Semble, that the condition of the bond must be for payment absolutely, and not on demand. After service of subpoena and the appearance of a defendant, a motion for an injunction cannot be made ex parte. The three surviving sons of the first testator, and the devisees in trust of the second, were the plaintiffs. By the Great Northern Railway Act, 1846, with which is incorporated the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the Great Northern Railway Company were empowered to construct their railway upon a portion of the land devised by the above-mentioned will. On the 30th January, 1847, the Company's solicitors addressed to the plaintiffs, James George Langham, John Mackie Langham, Samuel Frederick Langham, and to four other persons, named Thomas Ingleby, Richard Porter, James Tyler, William Grover, and to all and every person and persons whom it might concern, a notice "that the line of the railway would pass through the plaintiffs' messuages, lands, and hereditaments therein referred to, as distinguished by the numbers 504, 586, 589, 515, 515a., and 589, and containing altogether 4A. 1R. 1P., and that it was the intention of the Company to take and use the same messuages, lands, and hereditaments, and that it was the intention of the Company to contract for, and that they were then willing to treat and agree for the purchase thereof, and of all subsisting leases, terms, estates, and interests therein, and required the delivery to the Company, or their agents, of a schedule of all the plaintiffs' title-deeds to the property, and a statement in whose custody the same were." In consequence of this notice the plaintiffs employed a valuer, who surveyed the lands mentioned in the notice, and valued them at 79607. 15s., and communicated to Mr. George Smith, the Company's surveyor, the result, and the willingness of the three first-mentioned plaintiffs to sell to the Company their property at or about that price. The Company, by their agent, Mr. Smith, offered the sum of £3300, and no more, for the entirety of the messuages, lands, and hereditaments of the plaintiffs, and refused to pay any higher price for such property. The secretary of the Company thereupon signed and delivered 1847. LANGHAM v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY Co. 1847. LANGHAM v to the plaintiffs, on the 12th April, 1847, a printed notice, dated the 9th day of April, and addressed to all the plaintiffs, two of them, William Mansfield and George Wagstaff, NORTHERN being therein described as devisees in trust of William Langham, the younger, deceased. GREAT RAILWAY Co. The notice stated that the Company required to purchase and take, for the purposes of their railway, the property therein described, and that the Company were then willing to treat and agree for the purchase thereof, and of all subsisting leases, terms, estates, and interests therein, and as to the compensation to be made to all parties for the damage that might be sustained by them by reason of the execution of the works of the railway, and called for the particulars of plaintiffs' estates and interests in the property, and the amount of the same, which the plaintiffs were willing to receive for the property, and a schedule of plaintiffs' title-deeds, and a statement in whose custody such titledeeds were, following the same or nearly the same terms or expressions as had been used in the notice dated the 30th day of January, 1847. The notice of April, 1847, was the first that had been sent to, or received by, or on the part of plaintiffs, William Mansfield and George Wagstaff, or either of them, from or on the part of the Company, of their intention to take the lands. The plaintiffs, William Mansfield and George Wagstaff, on the 24th April, 1847, sent to the Company's solicitors an answer, of which the material part was as follows: "We beg to inform you, that, as devisees in trust under the will of the late William Langham, (the son of the late William Langham, the original owner of the property,) we claim to be entitled to one undivided fourth part, share, and interest of and in the freehold property in question; and Messrs. Farebrother, Clark, & Lye having reported to us that the value of the entirety of the property, exclusive of |