Mr. Anderdon and Mr. Rogers, for the plaintiff. The VICE-CHANCELLOR: My opinion is, that as the exception expressly designates the interrogatory by its number, besides professing to set it out, the inaccuracy relied upon is immaterial. As the practice now prevails of numbering the interrogatories in a bill, exceptions might perhaps be usefully abridged by referring to the number of each interrogatory alleged to be insufficiently answered. Such a practice might possibly save the necessity of setting out the interrogatory itself. 1847. ESDAILE v. MOLYNEUX. THIS HUNT v. SCOTT. was a suit for the appointment of a new trustee of a will, and to obtain the opinion of the Court as to the right of the tenant for life under the trusts of the will, to the enjoyment of the proceeds of the personalty in specie. March 26th & 31st. Residuary dequest on trust vise and be to pay the dividends, interest, and annual produce of the testator's real and per sonal estates to the separate daughter or use of his daughters for cease, to pay, Richard Benstead, the testator, by his will dated December 1, 1817, gave, devised and bequeathed unto Thomas Scott and Titus Wood, and the survivor of them, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, all monies in the testator's house and monies due to him, and securities for life, and after money of every kind, and all other his personal estate, her or their deand all his real estate whatsoever and wheresoever, upon trust, to pay unto the testator's nephew, Richard Benstead, an annuity of £10, (to be continued such time only as the annuitant should be incapable of working at his business or doing anything to get his living), out of the interest, dividends, rents, and annual produce of his real and personal estate, for his absolute use and benefit, then upon trust to transfer, and equally divide the whole of personal estate among the daughter or daughters; and for want of issue of his such issue to pay certain legacies, and to sell the residue of the real and personal estate not consisting of money :-Held, to entitle the tenant for life to the enjoyment of the personalty in specie. 1847. HUNT v. SCOTT. pay to or permit and suffer the testator's wife to receive all the residue of the interest, dividends, rents, and annual produce of the testator's real and personal estate during the term of her natural life, for her use, and the bringing up of such the testator's child or children that might be living at the time of his decease, or born in due time afterwards, during the term of her natural life. And the testator directed that in case his wife should marry again, his trustees should pay to his wife, after payment of the annuity of £10, out of the said interest, dividends, rents and annual produce of his said real and personal estate, the sum of £50 per annum; and as to the residue of the interest, dividends, rents and annual produce of his real and personal estate, the testator directed that it might be paid and applied towards the bringing up and educating of such of the testator's child or children that might be living at the time of the second marriage. And the testator directed that the interest, dividends, rents and annual produce of his real and personal estate, payable to his wife during the term of her natural life, should be for her separate use. The subsequent trust was in the following terms :-" And after the decease of my said wife, upon trust, to pay and apply the interest, dividends, rents and annual produce of my said real and personal estate, towards the bringing up and educating such my child or children that may be then living, until he, she, or they attain the age of twenty-one years: then to pay, transfer, and equally divide the same between them; if boys, for their separate use and benefit absolutely, and if but one child or boy, then to pay and transfer the whole of my real and personal estate unto one child; but in case there shall be no boy, then, upon trust, to pay the interest, dividends and annual produce of my said real and personal estate unto such my daughter or daughters that may be living, during the term of their natural lives, and that the same shall not be subject to the control, disposition, or engagement of any person or persons with whom my daughter or daughters may happen to intermarry as the same is intended for her or their sole and separate use and benefit; and after her or their decease, upon trust, to pay and transfer, and equally divide the whole of my real and personal estate unto and amongst the issue of such of my daughter or daughters that may be living at the decease of any such my daughter or daughters; but in case there shall be no such issue, then I hereby give and bequeath the following legacies; unto the said Thomas Scott, the further sum of £30, for his sole use and benefit. Unto the said Titus Wood, the further sum of £34, for his sole use and benefit. Unto Ann Benstead, daughter of my brother Joseph, the sum of £30, for her sole use and benefit. And as to all the rest and residue of my personal estate and real estate, which does not consist of money, I direct the same to be sold, and the money arising therefrom, together with such other my personal estate that consists of money, to be paid to and equally divided between my nephews-Joseph, Richard, Gregory, Edward, Shadrach, and Meshach Benstead, for their sole and separate use and benefit, absolutely.” The testator died on the 2nd of November, 1842, leaving his widow and an only child, Rosanna Amelia Hunt (who, with her husband, were defendants,) him surviving. The widow had since died. The suit was instituted on behalf of the infant children of Mr. and Mrs. Hunt, against the surviving executor of the will, Mr. and Mrs. Hunt, and the parties other than the plaintiffs interested after Mrs. Hunt's decease, to have a new trustee appointed, and for a declaration as to the propriety of converting the testator's leasehold property into money. Mr. Wigram and Mr. Osborne, for the plaintiffs. Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Tennant, and Mr. Bennet, for the several defendants. All parties concurred in asking the Court to decide the 1847. HUNT บ. SCOTT. 1847. HUNT v. SCOTT. question as to the conversion of the leasehold estate without the usual class inquiries. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said he would read the will and give his decision on a future day. March 31st. The VICE-CHANCELLOR :— The question in this case I understand to be, whether, the testator's wife being dead, his only child, a daughter, is entitled for her life to his chattel leasehold property, in its actual state; or whether it ought to be sold, in order that the purchase-money may be invested, she taking for her life the income to arise from the investment. This question (the testator having had real estate when he made his will) has appeared to me one of some difficulty, considering the decisions that have taken place within the last fifteen years, or, perhaps, I should rather say notwithstanding those decisions. The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that Alcock v. Sloper (a), Collins v. Collins (b), and several subsequent cases having been determined as they were, I ought to say, that, under this will, the testator's daughter is entitled to enjoy the chattel leasehold property for her life in its actual state, and that it cannot, therefore, be sold during her life. The following was the form of the declaration (a) 2 M. & K. 699. (b) 2 M. & K. 703; and see Pickering v. Pickering, 4 Myl. & Cr. 289. 1847. THIS NECK v. GAINS. March 19th. May 23rd. was a suit arising out of partnership transactions, and Upon a bill was for discovery and relief. The bill was filed on the 30th October, 1846. usual To this bill a plea was filed on the 23rd January, 1847, and on the 12th of February plaintiff obtained the order to set down the plea for argument. On the 13th of February, the three weeks within which, by the Orders of 1845, the plaintiff was bound to set down the plea for argument, expired, but the plaintiff did not set it down until the 15th February. On the 20th February, the Court, after argument on motion, ordered the defendant's plea to be struck out of the book of causes, as having been set down irregularly after the time for setting it down had expired, with costs. On the 22nd of February, the plaintiff moved specially for leave forthwith to set down the plea for argument, or that the plaintiff might be at liberty to amend his bill as he might be advised; but, after argument, the Court declined to make any order. On the 10th of March, Mr. Toller took an order, ex parte, for the dismissal of plaintiff's bill, on the ground that the plaintiff had not set down the plea for argument, nor served course an order bill:-Held, that such order to dismiss the was irregular. An order to amend after a plea to all the relief, and an answer to the discovery asked by a bill, is not to be obtained as of course under the 66th an order for leave to amend, nor undertaken to reply to the defendant's answer within three weeks, the time limited by Order of May, the 49th Order of 1845. 1845, and an order so ob tained was dis charged with costs. Mr. Wigram and Mr. Stevens, for the plaintiff, now moved that the order of the 10th of March might be dis- March 19th. charged for irregularity, on the ground that the 47th, 48th, and 49th of the Orders of 1845, under which the order must have been intended to be supported, did not warrant it, the defendant's plea to the bill not being to all the discovery, and, therefore, not to the whole bill; so that the |