this Court. And in a case where a decree containing a declaration of right alone or an injunction alone would not be correct, I suppose that a decree containing a declaration of right and an injunction, but nothing else, would not be correct. When, therefore, in what I am proceeding to say, I shall use the term relief, I wish to be understood as meaning relief beyond a mere declaration of right. Next, as to the injunction or injunctions asked. The provisional injunction is only as to the sum of 1487. 3s. 4d. The permanent injunction is as to that and more. But so far as it extends to more, it is asked in terms, as I conceive, too general and too vague to be granted; and with regard to the 1487. 3s. 4d., its amount, when the number, variety, and extent of the interests to which that sum is alleged to be subject are considered, must be thought very slight and trifling. This, however, is not all: for, conceding or assuming that there may be cases in which an injunction may be proper without any other relief, without a view to other relief, and without the supposition that there is to be other relief, the present, I apprehend, is not one of those cases. I do not conceive that on this record an injunction could be proper without other relief, without any view to other relief, and without the supposition of there being other relief to be granted. What other relief then could be granted on this record, the facts being as, and only as, stated in the present bill?-Beneficially or usefully I apprehend none; for, as I conceive, the Court does not possess the capacity and means of acting efficaciously, so as, avoiding injustice, to do justice for the purposes or any of the purposes for which the bill seeks to bring it into action in the circumstances that the bill states. The prayer beyond the declaration of right and the injunction or injunctions asked is thus: "And, if necessary, that an account may be taken of the property and funds of said Lodge, and that the rights and interests of plain 1847. CLOUGH v. RATCLIFFE. 1847. CLOUGH v. RATCLIFFE. tiffs and all other persons therein, may be ascertained and declared, and that all necessary directions may be given for giving full effect to such rights and interests, either in manner aforesaid or by repayment to plaintiffs of the amount in which they shall be found to be respectively interested in the said property and funds; and that in the meantime said defendants, Miles Whitham, Joseph Herald, and Thomas Tindley may be restrained by the order and injunction of this Court from receiving or interfering in any manner with the said sum of 1487. 3s. 4d. or any part thereof, until the further order of this Court, and, if necessary, that a receiver may be appointed of the property and assets of said lodges, and of the payments becoming from time to time due to the same, with proper directions for applying the same in conformity with the rules of said Lodge, and that all proper inquiries may be directed and accounts taken, and directions given for effecting the purposes aforesaid, and for further relief." The bill must, I think, be understood as denying a dissolution of the society to have taken place, and also, probably, as not seeking a dissolution of it, nor, as I apprehend, in a suit constituted as this is, relating to an association of the description stated on the record, can the Court put an end to the association, or break it up, or change its governing body or bodies, or undertake the regulation or administration of such proceedings or concerns as the proceedings or concerns of such an association must be; and if all individuals interested were added as parties to the bill, neither would the suit be manageable, whether it is so now or not, nor would the matter be mended. A bill for relief, not stating facts, upon proof or admission of which, without more, there ought, in the actual state of parties on the bill, to be granted the relief, or part of the relief, specifically prayed, or some relief not inconsistent with that specifically prayed, is demurrable. And that description is, I apprehend, applicable to the present bill. I allow, therefore, the demurrer, but without costs. Leave to amend has once been given, and I think, in a case at least such as this is, that it would not be right to give leave to amend again. I may add, that though I think a conclusion against the bill warranted by principle and authority, and (if I may speak of myself) not at variance with any decision that I have had occasion to pronounce in any other cause, it is a conclusion at which I have arrived not without hesitation, and of which I am not confident of the correctness; neither am I sure that I ought to have given the leave which I did give to amend, or that I went, upon the occasion of disposing of the former demurrer, so fully into the case as I ought to have done. If I was in error in that instance, or am in the present, the mischief, I hope, cannot be considerable. The case, as it now stands at least, is perhaps in principle one of some importance, although the bill does not in my view of it render necessary a decision whether the association in question is one, if not unlawful by the common law, rendered criminal or unlawful by statute, a point strongly argued for the defendants, upon which, if I have formed, I decline stating any opinion; nor do I decide whether the absence of the Attorney-General from this record is material or immaterial, correct in form or substance or incorrect. 1847. CLOUGH v. RATCLIFFE. 1847. March 18th. When there are c. 85 does not dence of one admissible in favour of the other. THIS MONDAY v. GUYER. was a bill for the specific performance of an agreement entered into between the plaintiff and two defendants, named Guyer and Tadd, for the surrender by the defend ants to the plaintiff of a term of years vested in the derender the evi- fendants as joint tenants, in consideration of the plaintiff building a house upon the land comprised in the term, and granting a lease of it to the defendants for a term of years, and at a rent in the agreement respectively mentioned. The defendant Tadd was examined in the cause as a witness, on behalf of the other defendant. Mr. Bacon and Mr. Beales, for the defendant Guyer, proposed to read this evidence, and referred to the act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, providing (among other things) that in courts of equity any defendant in a cause may be examined as a witness on behalf of a co-defendant, saving just exceptions, and that any interest which such defendant may have in the matters in question in the cause shall not be deemed a just exception, but shall only be considered as affecting or tending to affect the credit of the witness. Mr. Russell and Mr. Piggott, for the plaintiff, objected to the reception of the evidence, on the ground that the act did not apply to the case of two defendants who had exactly the same defence, and said that no authority could be found for the admission of such evidence. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said he would not be the first judge to hold that a defendant could be examined as a witness on behalf of another defendant, who had exactly the same interest, and rejected the evidence. HILTON V. GIRAUD. 1847. March 26th. HENRY WRIGHT being entitled to a large personal Shares in the estate, consisting, among other things, of shares in the London Dock Company, and in the East and West India Dock Company, by his will dated the 11th of December, 1838, (after various specific legacies) gave and bequeathed all the rest and residue of his goods, chattels, personal estate and effects, to the several persons who had been appointed by the Lord High Chancellor of England to be trustees of charitable estates given or to be given for the town of Faversham, and their successors, to be legally appointed for that purpose, upon certain public charitable trusts in the will expressed. One of the executors and trustees of the will, who was also one of the trustees of the charitable estates of Faversham, filed the present bill for the administration of the testator's estate, making the other exccutor and trustee, the next of kin of the testator, the remaining trustees of the charitable estates for the town of Faversham, and the Attorney-General, defendants. On the 19th of March, 1842, an order was made for taking the accounts of the testator's estate, and for the usual inquiries. The cause now coming on upon further directions, a question arose whether the shares in the London Dock Company and in the East and West India Dock Company, were subject to the Statute of Mortmain or not. By the act 9 Geo. 4, c. 116, s. 2, the London Dock Company is constituted a corporation, with power to purchase and hold lands, tenements, and hereditaments, to them, their successors and assigns, for the purposes therein mentioned. By the 9th section, all the docks, basins, wharfs, quays, warehouses, erections, buildings, lands, grounds, tenements, London Dock Company and in the East and West India pany, held not to be interests in land within the Statute of Mortmain, 9 Geo. 2, c. 36. |