5. On the 1st of February, 1865, B., representing himself to be the agent of the Confederate States government, to take tobacco into Maryland and exchange it for bacon, applied to D., living near the Potomac River in W. County, to store for him in D.'s barn for the night eighty-four boxes of tobacco. D. being unwilling to do it, B. agreed with him that if he would receive the tobacco in his barn, and should sustain any damage or injury from the forces of the United States in consequence of the tobacco being there deposited, B. would make good all losses he might sustain thereby. Under this agreement the tobacco was deposited in D.'s barn, where it remained until the 17th of March, B. undertaking to pay for any loss D. might sustain thereby. At that time the enemy's gun-boats on the river approaching D.'s house he removed and concealed the tobacco, and his houses and out-buildings and furniture were destroyed by the enemy; his loss amounting to $6,352. Held: (1.) B. being the agent of the Confederate government, which could enforce obedience upon all within its jurisdiction, the contract was valid, and B. is bound to pay D. for the loss which he sustained. (2.) If B. was not the agent of the Confederate government, and was prosecuting a private enterprise, against the laws and policy of that government, D. is not particeps criminis with B., in an equal degree, if at all, and he is entitled to recover. (3.) To make a contract unlawful as being against public policy or law, it must be manifestly and directly so; and it is not enough that the contract is connected with some violation of the law however remotely or indirectly. Ib. 6. Where a contract to build a railroad provides that the plaintiff shall increase his force when notified by defendant's engineer, and that in case of his failure to do so for ten days after such notice the defendant may put on a force of its own, or re-let the work and charge the expenses or loss, if any, to the plaintiff, the only damages that can be claimed by the defendant for a failure by the plaintiff in that regard is, the expense of such force put on by defendant, or the loss, if any, incident to the re-letting of the work. Mc Donald v. S. V. & St. L. R. R. Co. 29. 7. When a contract by plaintiff to build a railroad provides that estimates of work done and materials furnished should be made from time to time by defendant's engineer, and that such estimates should be conclusive between the parties, and the report of the referee is silent as to whether his findings in favor of the plaintiff for work done and materials furnished were or were not based upon such estimates, or whether as such estimates were in fact before time, there is no basis for an exception to the report that such findings were not based upon such estimates. Ib. 8. Where a broker agrees to carry for and on account of a customer, for the period of twelve months, a certain number of shares of railroad stock, at a specified price per share, he is not bound to retain in his possession during the pendency of the carrying contract the identical stock which he agreed to carry; he may sell the whole or any part thereof; all that the law requires of him is, that during the pendency of the contract he should have on hand, in his possession, or under his control, an equal number of other shares of the same stock, ready for delivery when his customer should pay what he owed on account thereof, or to be sold on his account when he should so direct. Price v. Gover, 153. See COMMON CARRIER; EVIDENCE, 9, 10, 11; Interest, 1. COPYRIGHT. 1. A gratuitously prepared for B certain notes to two editions of a book the copyright of which B owned. The notes were copyrighted by B; but it was agreed that in any subsequent editions of the book B would make no use of the notes prepared by A and copyrighted as aforesaid. B procured a subsequent edition of the book to be published with notes by C, which were alleged to infringe the notes of A. Upon suit by A, it was ruled that the publication of the edition with notes by C, the same being an infringement as charged, was a violation of A's rights in the premises. Lawrence v. Dana, 402. 2. Where literary matter is prepared gratuitously for another, and a copyright obtained by the person for whom the service has been performed, such copyright is valid, notwithstanding the absence of a written assignment by the person who prepared the matter. Ib. 3. It is not necessary that in a second or subsequent edition of a book the notice of copyright prescribed by statute should specify the date of the original copyright, in addition to the date of the subsequent one. Ib. 4. What constitutes the infringement of a copyright in annotations or notes. The rule of comparison and coincidence of errors and citations expounded. Abridgment defined and distinguished. Ib. 5. Where the editor of a second or subsequent edition of an annotated work makes notes 6. The proper equity practice in copyright cases is to refer them to a master for exami- 7. The rule laid down in Wheaton v. Peters, that the performance of every act required CORPORATION. 1. In an action by an insolvent corporation to collect an assessment for the purpose of 3. A de facto organization of a corporation, formed and operated in good faith, under 4. In a suit brought against a stockholder to recover an assessment made under the 5. A corporation brought a suit against a stockholder to recover an assessment made 6. Payment only of the debts of a corporation, in the cases and to the extent specified 7. The provisions of chapter 135, section 4, General Statutes (of N. H.), which forbid 8. When a creditor of a corporation had no knowledge that the corporation had ex- debts, and could not by inquiry have ascertained that fact, the doctrine of ultra vires See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. CRIMINAL LAW. 1. Under the Act of 31st March, 1860 (of Pa.), the jury, before finding the fact of in- 435. 2. A reasonable doubt of the fact of insanity in a criminal case is not a true basis for 3. The evidence to establish insanity as a defence in a criminal case must be satisfac- 4. A person charged with a crime must be judged to be a reasonable being, until a want 5. To make a want of reason to appear, the evidence must be satisfactory, not merely Ib. 6. Insanity, as a defence, must be so great as to have controlled the will and taken away 7. When the killing is admitted, and insanity is alleged as an excuse, the defendant 8. Where a juror had formed his opinion in part from testimony taken before the coro- 9. The inquiry as to the juror's incompetency from previous opinion is, whether his 10. Evidence before a coroner has not the same weight as that given on the trial. Ib. 13. The breaking which will constitute burglary may be actual or constructive. For 14. The indictment charging not only the breaking and entering, but the stealing of the 15. Under the principles of the common law and the statutes against duelling, it may 349. 16. A mailed a postal card directed to B, having written upon it certain words which See EVIDENCE, 1 et seq.; INSANITY; JURISDICTION, 1, 2. DAMAGES. See ADMIRALTY, 5; Bills and NOTES, 9; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 2. DEED. Where land was described in a deed of conveyance as lying north of a specified road, and was also described by boundary lines, which include the road-bed : Held, that the repugnancy between the two descriptions is not irreconcilable, and that the road-bed is included in the conveyance. Williams v. Sparks, 48. DIVORCE. The St. of 1874, c. 397, § 1, providing that "all divorces, nisi heretofore decreed under and by authority of" the St. of 1870, c. 404, "shall be deemed and taken to be, and have the force and effect of, absolute divorces from the bonds of matrimony," and that the justices of this court, upon petition and notice, may authorize the party, against whom such divorce has been granted, to marry again, is unconstitutional. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 194. DOWER. 1. Where a wife joins in a mortgage of her husband's property, her right of dower can be barred only by a sale of the mortgaged property under a power of sale contained in the mortgage, or a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, where she can be made a party to the proceedings, and not by a sale in the bankruptcy court free of the incumbrance. In re Bartenback, 33. 2. Money paid by the assignee by direction of the bankruptcy court, to obtain a release of dower in mortgaged property in order to a sale of the same free of the incumbrance, for the purpose of avoiding the delay and expense of a foreclosure, must be borne by the parties interested in the proceeds, proportionately to their respective interests. Ib. DUELLING. See CRIMINAL LAW, 15; EVIDENCE, 2. EQUITY JURISDICTION. See JURISDICTION, 10 et seq. EVIDENCE. 1. By the 8th section of the Bill of Rights of Virginia a person is not only secured against giving evidence against himself on his own trial, but he cannot be required on the trial of another, to testify, if his evidence will tend to criminate himself. Cullen v. The Commonwealth, 349. 2. Even if a person might be required to give evidence on the trial of another which might tend to criminate himself, if the statute afforded him a complete indemnity, by discharging him from all prosecution for the offence (of which quare ?), the Act of October 7, 1870 (of Va.), does not afford that indemnity; and, therefore, in requiring any person engaged in a duel to testify against another prosecuted for having fought, &c., such duel, is unconstitutional. Ib. 3. The fact that the witness has testified before the coroner, and stated the facts, does not deprive him of his privilege; and that having been done without being advised of his privilege, it is not a waiver of it by him. Ib. 4. All persons examined as witnesses must be fully possessed of their understanding; that is, such understanding as enables them to retain in memory the events of which they have been witnesses, and gives them a knowledge of right and wrong; and, therefore, idiots and lunatics, whilst under the influence of their malady, not possessing this share of understanding are excluded. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 390. 5. A witness is not excluded by this rule merely because he is a lunatic. That is not enough per se to exclude him; but he must at the time of his examination be so under the influence of his malady as to be deprived of that "share of understanding" which is necessary to enable him to retain in memory the events of which he has been a witness, and gives him a knowledge of right and wrong. If at that time he has this share of understanding he is competent. Ib. 6. Of the competency of the witness in such case the court is the judge, whilst the weight of the testimony and the credit to be attached to it is to be left to the jury. Ib. 7. On a trial for forgery M. was introduced as a witness for the commonwealth, and gave important testimony against the prisoner. He was examined and cross-examined for two days, and neither the counsel nor the court suspected he was deranged, though they thought he was drinking deeply. After the conviction and sentence of the prisoner he moved for a new trial, on the ground that M. was deranged when he 8. If, in an indictment for a forgery, the document alleged to have been forged is de- 9. By bond dated July 7, 1863, B. promises to pay to W., three years after date, $2,000 10. It is competent to show by parol evidence that the word "dollars," used in a judg 11. The firm of P. & M. kept an account with a bank in Baltimore and received from it See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10; RIPARIAN Rights, 7. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. 1. The appraisal of a committee setting off a debtor's homestead upon the levy of an ex- 251. 2. Whenever the estate of tenants in common is practically incapable of division by as- |