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5. On the 1st of February, 1865, B., representing himself to be the agent of the Confed
erate States government, to take tobacco into Maryland and exchange it for bacon, applied to D., living near the Potomac River in W. County, to store for him in D.'s barn for the night eighty-four boxes of tobacco. D. being unwilling to do it, B. agreed with him that if he would receive the tobacco in his barn, and should sustain any damage or injury from the forces of the United States in consequence of the tobacco being there deposited, B. would make good all losses he might sustain thereby. Under this agreement the tobacco was deposited in D.’s barn, where it remained until the 17th of March, B. undertaking to pay for any loss D. might sustain thereby. At that time the enemy's gun-boats on the river approaching D.'s house he removed and concealed the tobacco, and his houses and out-buildings and furniture were destroyed by the enemy ; his loss amounting to $6,352. Held: (1.) B. being the agent of the Confederate government, which could enforce obedience upon all within its jurisdiction, the contract was lid, and B. is bound to pay D. for the loss which he sustained. (2.) If B. was not the agent of the Confederate government, and was prosecuting a private enterprise, against the laws and policy of that government, D. is not particeps criminis with B., in an equal degree, if at all, and he is entitled to recover. (3.) To make a contract unlawful as being against public policy or law, it must be manifestly and directly so; and it is not enough that the contract is connected with some violation of the law
however remotely or indirectly. Ib. 6. Where a contract to build a railroad provides that the plaintiff shall increase his force
when notified by defendant's engineer, and that in case of his failure to do so for ten days after such notice the defendant may put on a force of its own, or re-let the work and charge the expenses or loss, if any, to the plaintiff, the only damages that can be claimed by the defendant for a failure by the plaintiff in that regard is, the expense of such force put on by defendant, or the loss, if any, incident to the re-letting of the
work. Mc Donald v. S. V. g. St. L. R. R. Co. 29. 7. When a contract by plaintiff to build a railroad provides that estimates of work done
and materials furnished should be made from time to time by defendant's engineer, and that such estimates should be conclusive between the parties, and the report of the referee is silent as to whether his findings in favor of the plaintiff for work done and materials furnished were or were not based upon such estimates, or whether as such estimates were in fact before time, there is no basis for an exception to the report that
such findings were not based upon such estimates. Ib. 8. Where a broker agrees to carry for and on account of a customer, for the period of
twelve months, a certain number of shares of railroad stock, at a specified price per share, he is not bound to retain in his possession during the pendency of the carrying contract the identical stock which he agreed to carry ; he may sell the whole or any part thereof ; all that the law requires of him is, that during the pendency of the contract he should have on hand, in his possession, or under his control, an equal number of other shares of the same stock, ready for delivery when his customer should pay what he owed on account thereof, or to be sold on his account when he should so direct. Price v. Gover, 153. See Common CARRIER ; EVIDENCE, 9, 10, 11 ; INTEREST, 1.
COPYRIGHT. 1. A gratuitously prepared for B certain notes to two editions of a book the copyright
of which В owned. The notes were copyrighted by B ; but it was agreed that in any subsequent editions of the book B would make no use of the notes prepared by A and copyrighted as aforesaid. B procured a subsequent edition of the book to be published with notes by C, which were alleged to infringe the notes of A. Upon suit by A, it was ruled that the publication of the edition with notes by C, the same being an infringement as charged, was a violation of A's rights in the premises. Lawrence v.
Dana, 402. 2. Where literary matter is prepared gratuitously for another, and a copyright obtained
by the person for whom the service has been performed, such copyright is valid, notwithstanding the absence of a written assignment by the person who prepared the
matter. 16. 3. It is not necessary that in a second or subsequent edition of a book the notice of copy
right prescribed by statute should specify the date of the original copyright, in addi
tion to the date of the subsequent one. Ib. 4. What constitutes the infringement of a copyright in annotations or notes. The rule
of comparison and coincidence of errors and citations expounded. Abridgment defined and distinguished. 16.
5. Where the editor of a second or subsequent edition of an annotated work makes notes
be separated and distinguished from those contained in the original, he is
they cannot be separated, they infringe the original. Ib.
nation and report. The reference should be made even where the infringement has
ence only where the infringement can be readily ascertained. Ib.
by the statute is essential to the acquirement of a copyright, is not changed by the
paying their debts, the interests of the creditors will be so far regarded that no de-
stockholders to enforce their personal liability. Ossipee Man. Co. v. Canney, 514.
called by publication at least fifteen days prior thereto. Only fourteen days' notice
4, General Statutes. Ib.
color of the charter, is an organization under the charter, within the meaning of the
statute of 1846, chapter 321, section 7. Ib.
provisions of chapter 136, section 4, General Statutes (of N. H.), he will be regarded
he subscribed. 1b.
under chapter 136, section 4, General Statutes. The stockholder wrote to the treas-
and shall have it the first of next month, so thought I would not bor-
the assessment had been demanded of the corporation. Ib.
in chapter 135, General Statutes (of N. H.), can be enforced against individual
section 2. 16.
a corporation to contract debts or incur liabilities exceeding one half of its capital
such corporation. Ib.
ceeded the limit beyond which it is forbidden, by chapter 135, section 4, to contract
debts, and could not by inquiry have ascertained that fact, the doctrine of ultra vires
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
sanity specially, must be satisfied of it by the evidence. Ortwein v. Commonwealth,
the finding of it as a fact, and as a ground of acquittal. Ib.
tory, not merely doubtful. Ib.
of reason positively appeats. Ib.
doubtful; nothing less than satisfaction can determine a reasonable mind to believe a
fact contrary to the course of nature. Ib.
the freedom of moral action. Ib.
must satisfy the jury that insanity actually existed at the time of the act; a doubt as
to the insanity will not justify the jury in acquitting. Ib.
ner, as read in the newspapers, and part from rumor, but his opinion was so unfixed
enced by previous impressions, he was not incompetent. lb.
opinion is a prejudgment with such fixedness and strength as would probably influ-
the trial. Ib.
or other foreign country, is not larceny in the State of Ohio. Stanley v. The State, 14.
room, the doors of the two rooms entering upon the same porch near each other.
what will be a constructive breaking, see the opinion of Moncure, P. Ib.
trunk and its contents, of a stated value, C., though acquitted of the burglary, may
be found guilty of the larceny. Ib.
well be apprehended that the surgeon of a party to a duel would be regarded in law
imputed illicit intercourse to C. and another, but in which no epithet, in the form of a
See EVIDENCE, 1 et seq. ; INSANITY ; JURISDICTION, 1, 2.
and was also described by boundary lines, which include the road-bed : Held, that the repugnancy between the two descriptions is not irreconcilable, and that the road-bed is included in the conveyance.
DIVORCE. The St. of 1874, c. 397, § 1, providing that “all divorces, nisi heretofore decreed under
and by authority of "the St. of 1870, c. 404, “ shall be deemed and taken to be, and have the force and effect of, absolute divorces from the bonds of matrimony," and that the justices of this court, upon petition and notice, may authorize the party, against whom such divorce has been granted, to marry again, is unconstitutional. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 194.
DOWER. 1. Where a wife joins in a mortgage of her husband's property, her right of dower can
be barred only by a sale of the mortgaged property under a power of sale contained in the mortgage, or a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, where she can be made a party to the proceedings, and not by a sale in the bankruptcy court free of the
incumbrance. In re Bartenback, 33. 2. Money paid by the assignee by direction of the bankruptcy court, to obtain a release
of dower in mortgaged property in order to a sale of the same free of the incumbrance, for the purpose of avoiding the delay and expense of a foreclosure, must be borne by the parties interested in the proceeds, proportionately to their respective interests. Ib.
EVIDENCE. 1. By the 8th section of the Bill of Rights of Virginia a person is not only secured
against giving evidence against himself on his own trial, but he cannot be required on the trial of another, to testify, if his evidence will tend to criminate himself. Cullen
v. The Commonwealth, 349. 2. Even if a person might be required to give evidence on the trial of another which
might tend to criminate himself, if the statute afforded him a complete indemnity, by discharging him from all prosecution for the offence (of which quære ?), the Act of October 7, 1870 (of Va.), does not afford that indemnity; and, therefore, in requiring any person engaged in a duel to testify against another prosecuted for having
fought, &c., such duel, is unconstitutional. 16. 3. The fact that the witness has testified before the coroner, and stated the facts, does
not deprive him of his privilege; and that having been done without being advised of
his privilege, it is not a waiver of it by him. Ib. 4. All persons examined as witnesses must be fully possessed of their understanding;
that is, such understanding as enables them to retain in memory the events of which they have been witnesses, and gives them a knowledge of right and wrong; and, therefore, idiots and lunatics, whilst under the influence of their malady, not possessing
this share of understanding are excluded. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 390. 5. A witness is not excluded by this rule merely because he is a lunatic. That is not
enough per se to exclude him; but he must at the time of his examination be so under the influence of his malady as to be deprived of that “ share of understanding ” which is necessary to enable him to retain in memory the events of which he has been a witness, and gives him a knowledge of right and wrong. If at that time he has this
share of understanding he is competent. Ib. 6. Of the competency of the witness in such case the court is the judge, whilst the
weight of the testimony and the credit to be attached to it is to be left to the
jury. Ib. 7. On a trial for forgery M. was introduced as a witness for the commonwealth, and
gave important testimony against the prisoner. He was examined and cross-examined for two days, and neither the counsel nor the court suspected he was deranged, though they thought he was drinking deeply. After the conviction and sentence of
the prisoner he moved for a new trial, on the ground that M. was deranged when he
witness, he was a competent witness; and the judgment affirmed. Ib.
scribed in such manner as would sustain an indictment for stealing it, supposing it to
be the subject of larceny, the indictment is sufficient. Ib.
without interest, in funds current in the State of Virginia, being money borrowed.
from that date, and no more. Wrightsman v. Bowyer, 308.
ment rendered by a court within the Confederate States, during the time of their de
ate States. Rogers v. Tullos, 147.
discounts of drafts or bills to a considerable amount. While the account was still run-
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10; RIPARIAN Rights, 7.
ecution is conclusive upon the question of its value, until invalidated by some proceed-
the debtor and
signing to each owner thereof his equal portion in severalty, he cannot be compelled,