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ADMIRALTY. 1. Common carriers of passengers are bound to use extraordinary care and diligence, and

are excused only by reason of force or pure accident. Koch v. Oregon Steamship Co.

381. 2. An undertaking to carry a passenger in the steerage of a steamship from San Francisco

to Portland includes the furnishing of such passenger with a berth, unless there is a

fair understanding to the contrary. 16. 3. A steerage passenger is entitled to the use of the steerage room, to walk about, or sit

down in, during the voyage, without the risk or inconvenience of freight therein; but if freight is stowed therein it is at the risk of the carrier, and it is his duty so to stow and secure it that no harm will be caused to the passengers by it ; nor can the carrier impose any arbitrary regulation upon the passengers with a view of diminishing such risk, - such as to remain in their berths during the voyage, or any unusual portion

of it. Ib. 4. Where a number of boxes of tin were stowed in the after part of the steerage, so as to

make a pile six feet in length, three feet in width, and from five to eight feet in height, without any means of preventing the top tiers from sliding off on the floor in case of rough weather ; and a steerage passenger sat down by the side of said pile, and was injured by the rolling of the ship, causing some of the boxes to fall upon her. Hell, that the stowing of the tin in the manner in which it was done was gross negli

gence, and the carrier was liable to the passenger in damages for the injury. Ib. 5. Disfigurement of the person, caused by such an injury, is a proper subject of damages;

but in estimating them it is proper to consider the condition and circumstances of the

party disfigured. Ib. 6. A pier erected in the navigable water of the Mississippi River for the sole use of the

riparian owner, as part of a boom for saw-logs, without license or authority of any kind except such as may arise from his ownership of the adjacent shore, is an unlawful structure, and the owner is liable for the sinking of a barge run against it in the

night. Atlee v. N. W. Union Packet Co. 317. 7. Pilots on the navigable rivers of the interior are selected, examined, licensed mainly

for their knowledge of the topography of the streams where they are employed; and a constant and familiar acquaintance with the towns, banks, trees, &c., and the relation of the channel to them, and of the snags, sand-bars, sunken barges, and other dangers of the river as they may arise, is essential to the character of a skilful pilot. Hence, the pilot in this case, who ran his vessel against a pier which he should have known was there, but did not, was in fault for want of that knowledge. He was also in fault for hugging the shore, near where he knew the mill and boom of appellant were, in a dark night, when the current of the river would have carried him into safe and deep water further out. Both parties being in fault, the damages are to be divided according to the admiralty rule in such case.

Ib. 8. Whilst the general maritime law is the basis of the law of the United States, as well

as of other countries, it is only so far operative in this, or any country, as it is adopted by the laws and usages thereof. It has no inherent force of its own. The Lotawana,

290. 9. In particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character, the

received maritime law may differ in different countries without affecting the general

integrity of the system as a harmonious whole. 1b. 10. The general system of maritime law, which was familiar to the lawyers and states

men of this country when the Constitution was adopted, was intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Thus

adopted, it became the maritime law of the United States, operating uniformly in the

whole country. Ib. 11. The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is ex

clusively a judicial question, and no state law or act of Congress can make it broader or narrower than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in the maritime usages of this coun

try, and on such legislation as may have been competent to affect it. Ib. 12. The decisions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to

the laws and Constitution, are especially to be considered ; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they have been governed. Ib. 13. It is settled by repeated adjudications of this court, that material-men furnishing

repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port do not acquire thereby any lien

upon the vessel by the general maritime law as received in the United States. ib. 14. Whilst it cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that

the maritime law should remain unchanged, the courts cannot change it ; they can only declare it. If within its proper scope any change is desired in its rules, other

than those of procedure, it must be made by the legislative department. Ib. 15. Semble, That Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, has authority to es

tablish a lien on vessels of the United States in favor of material-men, uniform throughout the whole country

Ib. 16. In particular cases, in which Congress has not exercised the power of regulating

commerce, with which it is invested by the Constitution, and where the subject does not in its nature require the exclusive exercise of that power, the states, until Congress acts, may continue to legislate. 16. 17. Hence, liens granted by the laws of a state in favor of material-men for furnishing

necessaries to a vessel in her home port in said state are valid, though the contract to furnish the same is a maritime contract, and can only be enforced by proceedings in

rem in the district courts of the United States. 1b. 18. Any person having a specific lien on, or a vested right in, a surplus fund in court,

may apply by petition for protection of his interest under the 43d Admiralty Rule. 1b. 19. Separate libels were filed in 1871 against a steamboat, for wages, for salvage, for

supplies furnished at her home port, and for the amount due on a mortgage. Held, on the evidence, that the lien for supplies had not been perfected under the state law; and, if it had been, that the libels for such supplies could not be sustained prior to the recent change in the 12th Admiralry Rule. Held, also, that the libel upon the mortgage could not be sustained as an original proceeding ; but that the mortgagees, havi petitioned for the rplus proceeds of the vessel, were entitled to have the same applied to their mortgage. Ib.

See INSURANCE, 4, 5.

ATTACHMENT.
See JURISDICTION, 9.

Ib.

BANKRUPTCY. 1. Accrued interest constitutes part of a debt provable against the estate of a bankrupt.

Slonn v. Lewis, 259. 2. Where a record shows jurisdiction, an adjudication can only be assailed by direct

proceedings in a competent court. 3. Two notes were discounted by plaintiff in error. Before their maturity, upon urgent

request, defendant in error took them up, and gave, in lieu of them, a single judgment note equal in amount to the two. A few days afterwards judgment was entered for the amount of the new note, and a levy and sale made. The defendant in error, having been adjudged a bankrupt, suit was instituted by his assignee to recover the value of the property sold, on the ground that the giving of the judgment note was a fraudulent preference, the debtor being at the time insolvent. The court below gave certain instructions appropriate to the case, upon which a jury found for the plaintiff on the question of insolvency. The several instructions, which were the alleged grounds of error, are here examined and approved, the appellate court refusing to disturb the decrce, which was to the effect that the giving of the judgment note was a preference.

First Nat. Bank of Clarion v. Jones, 135. 4. In case of a sale in the bankruptcy court of property subject to two mortgages, and

the proceeds are sufficient to pay the senior mortgage in full and all costs and expenses, the senior mortgagee is entitled to be paid his debt in full, the same as he would be in case of a sale by way of foreclosure of his mortgage. In re Bartenback, 33.

See VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE, 6.

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BILLS AND NOTES. 1. An accommodation acceptor of a bill of exchange transferred before maturity by the

drawers in liquidation of their own preëxisting debt cannot defend an action against himself on the bill by alleging that he was an accommodation acceptor only, and that

the fact was known to the holders of the bill when they took it. Jerrett v. Hone, 97. 2. An indorsee of a negotiable promissory note made for the accommodation of the in

dorser, taking the note in good faith as collateral security for an antecedent debt, and without other consideration, is entitled to the position of holder of such paper for value, and therefore not affected by the defence of the want of consideration to the

maker. Maitland v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 261. 3. It is no defence that the note sued on was known to the plaintiff to be an accommoda

tion note between the maker and the payees, provided the plaintiff took the note for

value bonâ fide before it was due. Ib. 4. Where the payee of the note received it from the maker, with authority to use it as

collateral security for a specified indebtedness, and the payee exceeds his authority, and transfers it to the indorsee as collateral security for a larger indebtedness, the latter is not to bear the consequence of this excess of authority, unless it be shown that

it was taken with knowledge of the fact, that the payee had so exceeded his authority. 5. But if the fact of such knowledge be established, the indorsee would be affected by it,

and could have no right to recover, except for amounts due on the indebtedness for

which the note was authorized to be pledged. Ib. 6. Where the maker of the note, in an action against him brought by the indorsee, seeks

to avail himself of the defence of such excess of authority, it is for him to prove it. Ib. 7. In such action in order to make the defence effectual, on the ground of the want of

authority in the payee to pledge the note for past discounts, there should be such proof as would justify the conclusion, that the indorsee had actual knowledge of the limited purpose for which the note was made, and consequently of the excess of authority by

the payee in applying it to a different purpose. Ib. 8. The plaintiff

' was not bound to make inquiry, and mere negligence however gross, not amounting to wilful and fraudulent blindness, while it may be evidence of mala fides, is not the same thing. 1b. 9. In an action against the maker of a promissory note, brought by the indorsee to whom

it was passed as collateral security for the payment of notes discounted by the indorsee for the benefit of the indorser, the measure of the plaintiff's right of recovery is the amount due on the debts embraced by the security. And it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show what debts were intended to be secured by the note, and the amounts remaining due in respect thereof. Ib.

See CONTRACT, 1, 2, 3; EVIDENCE, 11 ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

BONDS.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. The “civil rights act” unconstitutional. Judge Emmons's charge to the Grand Jury, 198.

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COMMON CARRIER. 1. Defendant was a railroad company which received certain goods for transportation to

a point beyond its terminus. The bill of lading contained a provision as follows : * The E. & C. R. R. Co. will not be liable for loss or damage by fire from any cause whatever.”. Held, that the exception was not confined to the defendant's line alone

but covered the entire route. E. & C. R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 485. 2. An agreement, that in case a common carrier shall fail to deliver goods intrusted to it

to the consignee, a claim for the goods shall be made within a specified time, is liable to no sufficient objection, provided the period is a reasonable one.

In the case of an express company ninety days is a proper limitation. So. Express Co. v. Caldwell, 162.

See ADMIRALTY, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ; COXTRACT, 1, 2, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. An act of the Legislature of the State of New York, passed in 1871, in relation to

the widening and straightening of Broadway, in the city of New York, authorizing the supreme court of the state to vacate an order made in 1870, confirming the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment respecting the property taken, from which order no appeal was allowable, if error, mistake, irregularity, or illegal acts appeared in the proceedings of the commissioners, or the assessments for benefit or the awards for damage, or either of them, had been unfair and unjust, or inequitable or oppressive as respects the city or any person affected thereby, and to refer the matter back to new commissioners to amend or correct the report, or to make a new assessment, is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a person of a vested right without due process of law. Garrison v. Mayor of New

York, 167. 2. In the proceeding to condemn property for public use there is nothing in the nature

of a contract between the owner and the state, or the corporation which the state, in virtue of her right of eminent domain, authorizes to take the property; all that the Constitution of the state or of the United States or justice requires in such cases being that a just compensation shall be made to the owner ; his property can

then be taken without his assent. 16. 3. The proceeding to ascertain the compensation to be made to the owner of property

taken for public use is in the nature of an inquest on the part of the state and is under her control ; and to secure a just estimate of the compensation to be made, she can vacate or authorize the vacation of any inquest taken by her direction where the proceeding has been irregularly or fraudulently conducted, or in which error has intervened, and order a new inquest, provided such methods of procedure be observed as will secure a fair hearing from the parties interested in the property. Until the property is actually taken and the compensation is made or provided, the power of the

state over the matter is not ended. Ib. 4. A state statute provided, in substance, that a school tax should be levied without re

gard to the race or color of the owner of the property taxed ; that all children, without regard to race or color, should be included in the enumeration for school purposes, the colored children to be enumerated in separate lists, and separate school-houses and teachers to be provided for them. In the event of there not being a sufficient number of colored children in any district to warrant the erection of a school-house and the employment of a teacher for their separate use, it was made the duty of the proper officers to consolidate adjoining districts, or otherwise provide for the education of such children, their full proportion of the school revenue to be expended for their benefit. Held: 1. That the act was not an infraction of the section of the Constitution of the state which provides that the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which shall not equally belong to all citizens. 2. That it was not an infraction of the section of the Constitution of the state which provides for the establishment of a uniform system of public schools, equally

3. That it was not in conflict with section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution of the United States which declares that the citizens of one state shall enjoy the privileges of citizens in the several states. 4. That it was not in conflict with the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States, nor any of the amendments of earlier date ; nor with the act of Congress known as the

«« Čivil Rights Bill.” Cory v. Carter, 73. 5. Held, that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments do not impose limitations

upon the powers of the states to fix, secure, and protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of their citizens as such, of whatever race or color they may be. That the only restrictions which said amendments impose upon the sovereignty of the states are (1) to prevent slavery ; (2) to prevent negroes or mulattoes being deprived of national rights; (3) to compel the states to recognize negroes and mulattoes as their citizens ; (4) to compel the states to give to negroes or mulattoes the same rights

which their white citizens enjoy. Ib. 6. The “natural, essential, and inherent” right of " protecting property," is the right

to do whatever, under the circumstances of each case, is reasonably necessary to be done in defence. The statute (of N. H.) prohibiting the destruction of certain furbearing animals between May 1 and October 15, is not applicable to cases in which such destruction is an exercise of the constitutional right of protecting property. The killing of wild vermin in defence of property may be apparently reasonably necessary in apparent danger not actual. Such a case is not governed by the tests of imminent

open to all.

danger and of the duty of retreating to the wal), applied in cases of homicidal defence.

Aldrich v. Wright, 49. 7. A legislative act which provides that on the failure of a township treasurer to make

return of a tax warrant issued to him in the time therein provided, the county treas. urer shall issue execution for the collection of the amount of the taxes from the township treasurer and his sureties, is not in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments to the federal Constitution ; those amendments being restrictions only on the power of the federal goverment and not on that of the states. Nor is it a violation of the provision in the state Constitution forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures ; the searches and seizures contemplated by that provision being something very different from an open levy upon property under process having the apparent sanction of law. Nor is it a violation of the provision in the state Constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Weimer v.

Bunbury, 37. 8. Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process. Administrative process, which

has been regarded as necessary in government and sanctioned by long usage, is as much due process of law as any other. And summary process to enforce the payment by a collector and his sureties of the taxes not returned by him, having been in use by express legislation both before and ever since the adoption of the Constitution, must be considered permitted by that instrument and be regarded as due process. But where the statute provides for the issue of such process by the county treasurer, and by law, and he could have no evidence of the collector's default beyond the presumption that the supervisor, who was to make out and deliver the tax warrant to the collector, had performed his duty, it at least questionable if the process can be sus

tained. Ib. 9. Where the statute required the supervisor to deliver to the collector a tax roll with

warrant attached, authorizing him to collect the same from the persons taxed, and then made the collector subject to summary process on his failure to make return in due season ; it was held, that where the supervisor delivered a tax roll without any warrant attached, the collector was not subject to this process. Held, further, that where the county treasurer's warrant failed to recite the facts which would warrant the issue of such summary process, and the proofs showed one jurisdictional fact did not exist, the process constituted no defence to the officer who executed it by seizure

of property. Ib. See Civil Rights Act; Divorce; EVIDENCE, 2 ; INSANITY, 1; MUNICIPAL COR

PORATION, 3 et seq.

CONTRACT. 1. The plaintiffs gave to the agent of the defendants, an express company, a promissory

note, telling him they wanted him to send it by express for collection upon the makers at H. The agent took the note, saying he would send it. The defendants' line did not extend to H., but their practice was to deliver packages and demands for collection going beyond the terminus of their own route to R. & Co.'s Express at L. Between R. & Co. and the defendants there was no business connection, nor any division of profits or compensation for carriage or collections ; but, with respect to demands for collection received by R. & Co. from the defendants, R. & Co. reported to the general agent of the defendants in Boston and followed his directions. Held, these facts did not, as matter of law, impose any obligation upon the defendants with regard to the collection of the note after its delivery to R. & Co.; but they were evidence of a contract on the part of the defendants to do with the note according to their custom and usage with respect to business of that description, even though a part of that undertaking was to be carried out at a point beyond their line, and by agents not in

their immmediate employ. Knapp v. U. S. & Canada Express Co. 475. 2. Where the defendants' agents were accustomed to receive notes for collection in the

circumstances above recited ; held, the defendants were estopped to deny that such agents were authorized to make contracts on behalf of the company to transact busi

ness of such character beyond the limits of the defendants' route. 1b. 3. The makers of the note had property sufficient to pay the same when the defendants

received it for collection; but by reason of the defendants' negligence with regard to its collection, the note became worthless upon the failure of the makers of the note.

Held, the damages were the amount of the note and interest. Ib. 4. During the war neither the law of the United States, nor any policy of their govern

ment, was in force in any part of the Confederate States, not in the possession or under the control of the United States. Bier v. Dozier, 229.

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