Vol. II.] LAWRENCE v. DANA. [No. 9. tion of the authorities cited in the prior edition, and that other notes have been enlarged and improved by the addition of new matter, and, in view of those circumstances, he contends that the edition edited by him should be regarded as a new and original work; but the decisive answer to the first and last suggestion is, that no man is entitled to avail himself of the previous labors of another for the purpose of conveying to the public the same information, even though he may append additional information to that already published. Scott v. Stanford, supra; 2 Story Eq. Jurisp. § 940; 2 Kent Com. 382 and 383; Cary v. Faden, 5 Ves. 25, and note; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Bramwell v. Halcomb, supra. Additional remarks in respect to the alleged fact that the contents of the notes copied were condensed is unnecessary, as it is quite clear, as before explained, that the change made in that behalf is not of a character to afford the respondent any defence. Supported by these reasons, the conclusions of the court are as fol lows: 1. That the complainant in a court of equity is the equitable owner of the notes in the two annotated editions described in the pleadings as arranged; and the mode in which they are combined and connected with the text. 2. That the title to the entire text, together with the title to the memoir and indices, is in the proprietor of the book, and not in the complainant, as alleged in the bill of complaint. 3. That there are notes in the edition edited by the respondent of substantial importance in point of number and the value of the materials which do infringe the equitable rights of the complainant, as explained and defined by the court. 4. That all the respondents had notice of the claim of the complainant, as explained and defined by the court. 5. That there are notes in that edition of substantial importance in point of number and the value of the materials which do not infringe any rights of the complainant. 6. That the notes in that edition consisting wholly of citations found in the corresponding notes of the complainant do infringe his rights, as explained and defined by the court, though many of them are unaccompanied by the extracts collected and presented in the next preceding edition. 7. That notes consisting of authorities or collections of authorities, copied in like manner as described in the preceding proposition, and without remarks or comments, do also infringe the complainant's rights, though they are found inserted in, or prefixed or appended to, notes otherwise not objectionable. 8. That notes of which the whole or some substantial and material part is condensed from the corresponding notes in the preceding edition, or from the extracts therein printed and published, without any marks of original labor, or of any such labor except the study of the notes copied and adopted, do also infringe the complainant's rights, as explained and defined. 9. That notes wholly original do not infringe. 10. That notes partly original and partly copied from the preceding Vol. II.J LAWRENCE v. Dana. [No. 9. edition do not infringe, except for the matter copied, if it be practicable to ascertain and define the separate proportions and make the separation of the same; but if not, still the respondent, at the proper stage of the case, must be restrained from using the part copied. 11. That the cause must be referred to a master to examine the pleadings and proofs, and report the extent of the infringement as adjudged by the court in this investigation, and also to examine and ascertain what, if any, other instances of the alleged infringements within the principles here explained and proved; and if any, to classify the same, and report the details, together with the reasons for his conclusions, for the consideration of the court. 12. That all other matters in the cause will be reserved until the coming in of the master's report. 13. That the cause is referred to Henry W. Paine, as master, for his examination and report in the premises, in conformity to the opinion and directions of the court. Equity suits for the infringement of a copyright are usually referred to a master before the final hearing, to ascertain whether the charge is proved, and, if so, for a final report as to the nature and extent of the infringement; and in such cases the general rule is, that the complainant, if he prevails in the suit, is entitled, if at all, to an injunction at the time the decretal order is entered, to restrain the respondent from any further violation of his rights, as the whole case is then before the court. Even when the case is heard before any such reference and report, if the charges of infringement are few and of a character that the extent of the infringement can be conveniently determined by the court, without sending the case to a master, the court, if the case be one where an injunction is the proper remedy, will order it at the same time that the decision is announced upon the merits. But where the cause comes to a final hearing without any such report, the court, if the charges of infringement are numerous and of a character to require extended examination before the the extent of the infringement can be ascertained, will ordinarily send the case to a master for further examination and report, in respect to all matters not previously adjudged by the court; and the general rule in such cases is, that the injunction will not be granted until the nature and extent of the infringement are fully ascertained and determined, as its effects and operation might work great injustice. Obviously the present case falls within the latter rule, and, therefore, an injunction will not be ordered until the court shall have acted finally upon the report of the master. Vol. II.] ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. JOHNSON. [No. 10. SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. (To appear in 67 Illinois.) RAILROAD. - FREIGHT TRAIN.-REFUSAL TO CARRY PASSENGER. DAMAGES. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. v. JOHNSON. A railroad company has the clear right to make a rule that no one shall be carried as a passenger on its freight trains. But when it is in the habit of carrying passengers on such a train, and had its regular hour for departure posted in its office at the station, it will not be justified in refusing to carry a passenger from such station, or in putting him off such train. Where a railroad company adopts a rule prohibiting passengers from being carried on its trains, or on its freight trains, without the purchase of tickets, it must furnish convenient facilities to the public by keeping open the ticket office a reasonable time in advance of the hour fixed by its time-table for the departure of the train. Should it fail to do so, a person desiring to take passage will have the right to enter the car and be carried to his place of destination, on payment of the regular fare to the conductor. Where a person, desiring to take passage upon a freight train which carried pasengers, applied several times to procure a ticket, but could not get one for the reason that the office was closed, and he then got upon the train and tendered the conductor the regular fare, explaining to him his inability to procure a ticket, but the conductor stopped the train and put him off, not at any station or regular place for passengers to get off : Held, that the company was liable to such passenger in an action on the case for damages. Where a passenger was put off the cars of a railroad company by the conductor, for the reason that he had not procured a ticket at the station before getting aboard, and it appeared that the office at the station was closed, so that no ticket could be had; that the passenger so informed the conductor, and offered to pay the regular fare; that the place where the passenger was put off was not at any station or usual place for putting passengers off the train, and that this was done in the night-time, whereby the passenger was compelled to walk back: Held, that $200 damages were not excessive. APPEAL from the circuit court of Macon County; the Hon. A. J. Gallagher, judge presiding. This was an action on the case, by Eugene C. Johnson, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, to recover damages for a refusal to carry him as a passenger, and for putting him off the train of the company at a place which was not a station or usual place for taking on and discharging passengers. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Nelson & Roby, for the appellant. Messrs. A. M. & A. H. Ayers, for the appellee. Mr. Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court. The errors assigned, upon which the appellant seems to rely for a reversal of the judgment in this case, are, first, the court erred in giving instructions in behalf of appellee, and second, the damages found are excessive. The action was brought to recover damages alleged to have been occasioned by being put off a freight train on appellant's road. Appellee was desirous of being carried from Champaign to Rantoul. The train on which he attempted to obtain passage was advertised to leave the former Vol. II.] ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. JOHNSON. [No. 10. place at four o'clock and fifty minutes in the morning, and was made up at that station. Appellee, in company with Mr. Cunningham, applied two or three times at the company's office for tickets, but could get no answer, and consequently could get no tickets. At the hour for the train to depart the parties entered the caboose and took seats. Soon after the train moved out from the station, the conductor came in and demanded the tickets of the passengers. He was told by appellee and Cunningham they were unable to procure tickets, for the reason the office was closed; that they wanted to go to Rantoul, their business being urgent, and tendered the money for the usual fares. The conductor refused to receive the fare in money, but stopped the train and put appellee and Cunningham off some distance from the station, and they walked back. The objections taken to the instructions given for appellee are all answered by the reasoning in the case of Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364, and it is not necessary to discuss them in detail. It is insisted that appellant was not accustomed to carry passengers on the train on which appellee sought passage, and the principles of law announced in the instructions can have no application to the case. This objection is not founded in fact. The evidence does show that the company was in the habit of carrying passengers on this train. It was made up at Champaign station, and had its regular hours for departure, which were noted on the time-card posted in the office. The very fact that the conductor called for tickets and was willing that appellee should be carried if he had one, is very satisfactory evidence of the custom of the company to carry passengers. The company has the clear right to make a rule that no one shall be carried as a passenger on their freight trains, but it is not claimed it had adopted any such regulations in regard to the train in question. The conductor did not object to carrying appellee on the ground that he was not allowed to carry passengers at all, but simply because he had no ticket. In Flagg's case, supra, it was held, that where the company requires tickets to be purchased at the station, it must furnish convenient facilities to the public by keeping open the office a reasonable time in advance of the hour fixed by the time-table for the departure of the train. Should it fail to do so, a person desiring to take passage would have the right to enter the car and be carried to his place of destination, on payment of the regular fare to the conductor. In this case the company did not keep its office open. Appellee was unable to procure a ticket. He had the clear right to enter the train, and on the payment or tender to the conductor of the regular fare, it was his privilege to be received as a passenger. The instructions given state the law substantially as it has been announced by this court in its former decisions, were applicable to the facts in the case, and were therefore proper. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Sutton, 53 Ill. 399. Appellee was put off the train at a point other than a station. It was not far distant, it is true, but still it was not at a station, or any usual place for putting passengers off freight trains. That appellee was entitled to recover something, we do not entertain the slightest doubt. The jury found a verdict for $250. A remittitur of fifty dollars was entered, and the court rendered judgment for $200. This amount is claimed to be ex Vol. II.] ORTWEIN V. THE COMMONWEALTH. [No. 10. cessive. We do not think so. Appellee had the clear right to be received as a passenger. The company only was in fault. His business was urgent, and this he explained to the conductor and was captiously told it made no difference. He was put off in the night-time and compelled to walk some distance back to the station. The act of the company was an open and wilful defiance of the law, as it has been repeatedly declared by the decisions of this court. In Flagg's case, the circumstances were not more aggravated than in the case at bar, and a judgment for $100 was permitted to stand. It was the first of this class of cases, and the law had not been previously settled in this state. The instructions given by the company to their conductors to put off passengers not holding tickets, who, in good faith, had endeavored to procure them, but could not do so on account of the neglect of its own agents, was known to the principal officers to be unlawful. If these corporations. will not willingly obey the law in this regard, they must expect to be visited with exemplary damages for its infraction. Perceiving no material error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. (To appear in 26 P. F. Smith.) CRIMINAL LAW.-INSANITY IN MURDER CASES.- EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH.-COMPETENCY OF JUROR WHO ENTERTAINS UNSETTLED OPIN ION. ORTWEIN v. COMMONWEALTH. 1. Under sect. 66 of Act of 31st March, 1860 (Criminal Code), the jury, before finding the fact of insanity specially, must be satisfied of it by the evidence. 2. A reasonable doubt of the fact of insanity in a criminal case is not a true basis for the finding of it as a fact, and as a ground of acquittal. 3. The evidence to establish insanity as a defence in a criminal case must be satisfactory, not merely doubtful. 4. A person charged with a crime must be judged to be a reasonable being, until a want of reason positively appears. 5. To make a want of reason to appear, the evidence must be satisfactory, not merely doubtful; nothing less than satisfaction can determine a reasonable mind to believe a fact contrary to the course of nature. 6. Insanity, as a defence, must be so great as to have controlled the will and taken away the freedom of moral action. 7. When the killing is admitted, and insanity is alleged as an excuse, the defendant must satisfy the jury that insanity actually existed at the time of the act; a doubt as to the insanity will not justify the jury in acquitting. 8. Where a juror had formed his opinion in part from testimony taken before the coroner, as read in the newspapers, and part from rumor, but his opinion was so unfixed that he could hear and determine the case from evidence given on the trial uninfluenced by previous impressions, he was not incompetent. 9. The inquiry as to the juror's incompetency from previous opinion is, whether his opinion is a prejudgment with such fixedness and strength as would probably influence and control his judgment, or formed upon the same evidence as will be given on the trial. 10 Evidence before a coroner has not the same weight as that given on the trial. |