« PreviousContinue »
. LAWRENCE v. Dana.
the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to testimony on the ground of irrelevancy, even in common law suits, are not favored, for the reason that the force and effect of circumstantial facts usually and almost necessarily depend upon their connection with each other. Circumstances altogether inclusive, if separately considered, may, by their number and joint operation, especially if corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute full and conclusive proof. Castle et al. v. Ballard, 23 How. 187; 1 Stark. Ev. 58, 862.
Instances quite numerous are also given where clerical and typographical errors and peculiarities, including special translations, are reproduced in the edition prepared by the respondent; and the court is reminded in argument that cases have arisen where the strongest proof of copying consisted “in the coincidence of errors.” Jeremy, Eq. Juris. 322. Where the question is whether the defendant, in preparing his book, had before him and copied or imitated the book of the plaintiff, it is manifest, says Mr. Curtis, that this kind of evidence is the strongest proof, short of direct evidence, of which the fact is capable. Curtis on Copyright, 255; Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drewry, 367; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 353. Other authorities may be cited where the presumptions arising from the identity of inaccuracies is carried much further, and where it is held that when a considerable number of passages are proved to have been copied by the copying of the blunders in them, other passages which are the same with passages in the original book must be presumed, primâ facie, to be likewise copied, though no blunders occur in them. Mawman v. Tegg, supra, 4; Longman v. Winchester, 16 Ves. Jr. 269.
Coincidence of citation is also invoked by the complainant as evidence of copying; and the instances given as examples are many, where the authorities are cited in the same way; that is, by volume and page, or by chapter and section, as the case may be, and from the same edition of the work, and from the same place.
Identity in the plan and arrangement of the notes, and in the mode of combining and connecting the same with the text, is also invoked by the complainant, as strongly supporting the charge of infringement; and it is quite apparent, on a comparison of the two books, that the instances of identity in that respect are numerous and pervading. Copyright may justly be claimed by an author of a book who has taken existing materials from sources common to all writers, and arranged and combined them in a new form, and given them an application unknown before, for the reason that in so doing he has exercised skill and discretion in making the selections, arrangement, and combination, and having presented something that is new and useful, he is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment of his improvement, as provided in the copyright act. Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11; Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 199; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768; Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 309. Books “made and composed” in that manner are the proper subjects of copyright; and the author of such a book has as much right in his plan, arrangement, and combination of the materials collected and presented, as he has in his thoughts, sentiments, reflections, and opinions, or in the modes in which they are therein expressed and illustrated; but he cannot prevent others from using the old material for a different purpose. All he acquires
he exclusive presented
LAWRENCE v. Dana.
mente, a copy and yes the ording such selves, of combinations improveme
by virtue of the copyright is “the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book” for the period prescribed by law. Others may use the old materials for a different purpose, but they cannot copy and use his improvement, which includes his plan, arrangement, and combination of the materials, as well as the materials themselves, of which the book is made and composed. Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768; Curtis on Copyright, 180; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 17.
Many other facts and circumstances are adduced by the complainant in support of the charge of infringement; but the classes mentioned will be sufficient for the present investigation, as it is not the purpose of the court to enter into the details of the evidence. Infringement in any and every form, as alleged in the bill of complaint, is denied in the answer ; and the respondent, in addition to such denials, has presented in proof and in argument very elaborate and minute explanations of all the principal facts and instances adduced by the complainant in support of the charge of infringement. Separate examinations at this time of each one of the explanations so given would be impracticable, and any partial review of them in the opinion would necessarily be unsatisfactory, as it would afford ground for inference that the residue had been overlooked, or that they had not been duly considered. Suffice it to say, that they have all been read, studied, and made the subject of careful comparison with the facts and circumstances adduced by the complainant; but the conclusion of the court is, that they are not of a character, speaking generally, to rebut the particular proofs of the complainant, to which it was intended they should be applied But the respondent contends that, even if it be true that matters of fact, citations, and authorities have been borrowed to a considerable extent, he had a right to take them, as the use he made of them was substantially new, and different from that made by the complainant in the two prior annotated editions of the work, because they were used by him in illustrations of new and original propositions. Secondly, he contends that the complainant is not entitled to any decree on account of any use he has made of the matters of fact, citations, and authorities exhibited in those editions, because, as he insists, the use he so made amounts to no more than a fair and original abridgment of the former editions. The doctrine of new and different use in the law of copyright applies more particularly to the old materials, and not to the materials of a work like that of the last annotated edition of the complainant, where the materials collected are much abridged, and sometimes paraphrased and newly arranged, and combined with the text of the original work. Beyond all doubt he might take the old materials as found in the sources from which the matters of fact, citations, and authorities of the complainant were drawn, and use them as he pleased in illustration of new and original propositions, or for any other purpose not substantially the same as that to which they are applied in the annotated editions edited by the complainant; but he could not borrow the materials as therein collected and furnished, nor could he rightfully use the plan and arrangement, or the mode by which they are combined with the text, beyond the extent falling within the definition of fair use, which rule is only applicable to the materials, and not to the plan, arrangement, and mode of operation Proper attention to the nature of the charge in the bill of complaint will show
LAWRENCE ». DANA.
that the doctrine of new and different use is wholly inapplicable to the matter in issue between the parties, because the charge is that the respondent has borrowed the matters of fact, citations, and authorities collected and presented in the notes of the complainant, and not that he has made the same use of the old materials. On the contrary, the charge is that he has not consulted the old materials at all, but that he has borrowed the matters of fact, citations, and authorities exhibited in his book from the matters of fact, citations, and authorities as collected, arranged, and combined with the text in those two annotated editions. Even supposing the rule to be otherwise, and that a second writer may take bodily the matters of fact, citations, and authorities collected, arranged, and combined, as in the two annotated editions before the court, if the use he makes of the materials is substantially new and different, still the concession will not benefit the respondent, as his edition of the work, except the new materials collected and presented, occupies the same field and was designed for the same class of readers, and was “made and composed” for the same general purpose. Unsupported by the evidence, as the theory of fact involved in the proposition is, it is quite clear that it cannot furnish any defence for the respondent, even if the principle is correct. Argument to show that an author may have a copyright in his notes to an older work, though the materials collected are not new, is unnecessary, as the proposition is elementary, if it appear that they have never before been collected and embodied. Gray v. Russell, supra.
The respondent's second proposition deserves more consideration, as it presents a defence applicable to the main issue involved in the pleadings. Concisely stated, the proposition is, that even conceding that he borrowed materials from the prior annotated editions to a considerable extent, still the quantity so taken and used did not amount to more than a fair and original abridgment of the former annotated editions. Third persons cannot make any use of a patented invention without the consent or license of the patentee, because he acquires, by virtue of his letters patent issued under the patent act, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making and using his invention, as well as of vending it to others to be used, for the term allowed by law; but the right secured to the author or proprietor of a book is only “the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book," which, as construed by the courts, means the exclusive right to multiply copies for the benefit of the author or his assigns. Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 330; Reade v. Lacy, 1 Johns. & Hem. 526 ; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2311; Stowe v. Thomas, 5 Am. L. Reg. 228. Courts have sometimes supposed that the same rule of decision should be applied to a copyright as to a patent for a machine, and consequently that an abridgment of an original work made and condensed by another person without the consent of the author of the original work ought to be regarded as an infringement; but the language of the respective acts of Congress making provision for the protection of such rights is different; and the opposite doctrine has been too long established to be considered at the present time as open to controversy. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 309. Whatever might be thought if the question was an open one, it is too late to agitate it at the present time, as the rule is settled that the publication of an unauthorized but bonâ fide abridgment [No. 9.
LAWRENCE v. Dana.
or digest of a published literary copyright, in a certain class of cases at least, is no infringement on the original. Phillips on C. 171; Newbery's case, Lofft, 775 ; Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Ambler, 403 ; Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Swanst. 428; Giles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141.
Strong doubts are expressed by Mr. Curtis, whether the definition of an allowable abridgment, as given in the earlier classes, can be sustained, except as applied to such works as histories, or works composed of translations, and others of like kind; but it was decided in this court, in the case of Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 105, that an abridgment in which there is a substantial condensation of the materials of the original work, and which required intellectual labor and judgment to make the same, does not constitute an infringement of the copyright of the original author; and the court, as now constituted, is inclined to adopt that rule in cases where it also appears that the abridgment was made bona fide as such, and that it is not of a character to supersede the copyrighted publication. Unless it be denied that a legal copyright secures to the author “ the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending the book " copyrighted, it cannot be held that an abridgment, or digest of any kind, of the contents of the copyrighted publication, which is of a character to supersede the original work, is not an infringement of the franchise secured by the copyright. What constitutes a fair and bonâ fide abridgment in the sense of the law is, or may be under particular circumstances, one of the most difficult questions which can well arise for judicial consideration ; but it is well settled that a mere selection or different arrangement of parts of the original work into a smaller compass will not be held to be such an abridgment. Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 38, and note; Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 107. Substantially the same views are expressed in the case of Tinsley v. Lacy, 1 Hem. & M. 753 ; and the vice-chancellor in that case, in speaking of the authorities by which fair abridgments have been sustained, goes on to say that the courts have gone far enough in that direction, and adds that it is difficult to acquiesce in the reason sometimes given, that the compiler of an abridgment is a benefactor to mankind, by assisting in the diffusion of knowledge. Viewed in the light of these principles, it is quite clear that the book of the respondent, even if it could be regarded as an abridgment of the prior editions, must still be held to be an infringement of the same ; but the court is of the opinion that it is not an abridgment of those editions, in any sense known to the law of copyright. Instead of being an abridgment of the prior editions, it is precisely what it purports to be, a reprint of the text of the author, with notes by a new editor; and the proofs are full to the point that he was employed to edit a new edition of the work, to supersede the antecedent editions annotated by the complainant. Instructed as he was to make no use of the complainant's notes, his principal defence still is that he complied with those instructions, and that he did not make any use of the notes in his edition beyond what is allowable as fair quotations from the published work of a prior author treating upon the same subject. Copying is not confined to literal repetition, but includes also the various modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated, or transferred, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise Vol. II.)
LAWRENCE v. DANA.
the source from which the material was derived ; nor is it necessary that the whole or even the larger portion of a work should be taken, in order to constitute an invasion of a copyright. Some use may be made by a subsequent writer of the contents of a book or treatise antecedently made, composed, and copyrighted by another person, in making and composing a new book upon the same subject, whether the contents of the antecedent book or treatise were wholly original, or were partly original, and partly made up of selections from other authors. Copyright differs in this respect from patent right, which admits of no use of the patented thing without the consent or license of the patentee. Persons making, using, or vending to others to be used, the patented article, are guilty of infringing the letters patent even though they may have subsequently invented the same thing without any knowledge of the existence of the letters patent; but the recomposition of the same book without copying, though not likely to occur, would not be an infringement. Coincidence, if perfect, is sufficient to prove the infringement of a patent, as the charge is that the defendant, if it be a machine, has made machines in the similitude of the patented machine, and with the same mode of operation. Copying is essential to constitute an infringement of copyright, but identity of contents, arrangement, and combination is strong evidence that the second book was borrowed from the first, as it is highly improbable that two authors would express their thoughts and sentiments in the same language throughout a book or treatise of any considerable size, or adopt the same arrangement or combination in their publication. Reade v. Lacy, 1 Johns. & Hem. 526. Great difficulty attends every attempt to define in definite terms the privilege allowed by law to a subsequent writer to use without consent or license the contents of a book or treatise antecedently made, composed, and copyrighted by another author; or to mark the boundaries of the privilege of such subsequent writer to borrow the materials in a book like the annotated editions of the complainant, where the materials have been selected from such a variety of sources, and where the materials so selected are arranged and combined with certain chosen passages of the text of the original work, and in a manner showing the exercise of discretion, skill, learning, experience, and judgment. Decided cases are referred to where the principal criterion of determination is held to be the intent with which the person acted who is charged with infringement. Remarks to that effect are to be found in the opinion of the court in the case of Carey v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. R. 170, and the decision in the case of Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 353, refusing the application for an injunction, turned to some extent upon the same consideration ; but the vice-chancellor (now chancellor) refused to apply that doctrine in the subsequent case of Scott v. Stanford, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 722, and explained the grounds of his ruling in the former case, which show that he would not sanction that rule in any case unless it appeared that the defendant had bestowed such mental labor upon what he had taken as to produce an original result. Evidence of innocent intention may have a bearing upon the question of "fair use;" and where it appeared that the amount taken was small, it would doubtless have some probative force in a court of equity in determining whether an application for an injunction should be granted or refused; but it cannot be admitted