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Vol. II.]

MURDOCK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS..

[No. 3.

or treaties of the United States, it was their policy to vest its cognizance in a court of original jurisdiction, and not in an appellate tribunal.

And we think it equally clear that it has been the counterpart of the same policy to vest in the supreme court, as a court of appeal from the state courts, a jurisdiction limited to the questions of a federal character which might be involved in such cases.

It is not difficult to discover what the purpose of Congress in the passage of this law was. In a vast number of cases the rights of the people of the Union, as they are administered in the courts of the states, must depend upon the construction which those courts gave to the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. The highest courts of the states were sufficiently numerous, even in 1789, to cause it to be feared that, with the purest motives, the construction given in different courts would be various and conflicting. It was desirable, however, that whatever conflict of opinion might exist in those courts on other subjects, the rights which depended on the federal laws should be the same everywhere, and that their construction should be uniform. This could only be done by conferring upon the supreme court of the United States-the appellate tribunal established by the Constitution - the right to decide these questions finally, and in a manner which would be conclusive on all other courts, state or national. This was the first purpose of the statute, and it does not require that, in a case involving a variety of questions, any other should be decided than those described in the act.

Secondly. It was no doubt the purpose of Congress to secure to every litigant whose rights depended on any question of federal law that that question should be decided for him by the highest federal tribunal if he desired it, when the decisions of the state courts were against him on that question. That rights of this character, guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws of the Union, should not be left to the exclusive and final control of the state courts.

There may be some plausibility in the argument that these rights cannot be protected in all cases unless the supreme court has final control of the whole case. But the experience of eighty-five years of the administration of the law under the opposite theory would seem to be a satisfactory answer to the argument. It is not to be presumed that the state courts, where the rule is clearly laid down to them on the federal question, and its influence on the case fully seen, will disregard or overlook it, and this is all that the rights of the party claiming under it require. Besides, by the very terms of this statute, when the supreme court is of opinion that the question of federal law is of such relative importance to the whole case that it should control the final judgment, that court is authorized to render such judgment and enforce it by its own process. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security of the rights claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that the supreme court should examine and decide other questions not of a federal character.

And we are of opinion that the act of 1867 does not confer such a jurisdiction.

This renders unnecessary a decision of the question whether, if Congress had conferred such authority, the act would have been constitutional. It

Vol. II.]

MURDOCK V. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

[No. 3.

will be time enough for this court to inquire into the existence of such a power when that body has attempted to exercise it in language which makes such an intention so clear as to require it.

The omitted clause of the act of 1789 declared that no other error should be regarded as a ground of reversal than such as appears on the face of the record and immediately respects the before mentioned questions.

It is probable that in determining whether one of those questions was actually raised and decided in the state court, this court has been inclined to restrict its inquiries too much by this express limitation of the inquiry "to the face of the record." Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Rector v. Ashly, supra. What was the record of a case was pretty well understood as a common law phrase at the time that statute was enacted. But the statutes of the states and new modes of proceedings in those courts have changed and confused the matter very much since that time.

It is in reference to one of the necessities thus brought about that this court long since determined to consider as part of the record the opinions delivered in such cases by the supreme court of Louisiana. Grand Gulf R. R. &c. Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165. And though we have repeatedly decided that the opinions of other state courts cannot be looked into to ascertain what was decided, we see no reason why, since this restriction is removed, we should not so far examine those opinions, when properly authenticated, as may be useful in determining that question. We have been in the habit of receiving the certificate of the court signed by its chief justice or presiding officer on that point, though not as conclusive, and these opinions are quite as satisfactory and may more properly be treated as part of the record than such certificates.

But after all, the record of the case, its pleadings, bills of exceptions, judgment, evidence, in short, its record, whether it be à case in law or equity, must be the chief foundation of the inquiry; and while we are not prepared to fix any absolute limit to the sources of the inquiry under the new act, we feel quite sure it was not intended to open the scope of it to any loose range of investigation.

It is proper, in this first attempt to construe this important statute as amended, to say a few words on another point. What shall be done by this court when the question has been found to exist in the record and to have been decided against the plaintiff in error, and rightfully decided, we have already seen, and it presents no difficulties.

But when it appears that the federal question was decided erroneously against the plaintiff in error, we must then reverse the case undoubtedly, if there are no other issues decided in it than that. It often has occurred, however, and will occur again, that there are other points in the case than those of federal cognizance, on which the judgment of the court below may stand; those points being of themselves sufficient to control the case.

Or it may be that there are other issues in the case, but they are not of such controlling influence on the whole case that they are alone sufficient to support the judgment.

It may also be found that notwithstanding there are many other ques

Vol. II.]

MURDOCK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

[No. 3.

tions in the record of the case, the issue raised by the federal question is such that its decision must dispose of the whole case.

In the two latter instances there can be no doubt that the judgment of the state court must be reversed, and under the new act this court can either render the final judgment or decree here, or remand the case to the state court for that purpose.

But in the other cases supposed, why should a judgment be reversed for an error in deciding the federal question, if the same judgment must be rendered on the other points in the case? And why should this court reverse a judgment which is right on the whole record presented to us; or where the same judgment will be rendered by the court below, after they have corrected the error in the federal question?

We have already laid down the rule that we are not authorized to examine these other questions for the purpose of deciding whether the state court ruled correctly on them or not. We are of opinion that on these subjects not embraced in the class of questions stated in the statute, we must receive the decision of the state courts as conclusive.

But when we find that the state court has decided the federal question erroneously, then to prevent a useless and profitless reversal, which can do the plaintiff in error no good, and can only embarrass and delay the defendant, we must so far look into the remainder of the record as to see whether the decision of the federal question alone is sufficient to dispose of the case, or to require its reversal; or on the other hand, whether there exist other matters in the record actually decided by the state court which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the federal question. In the latter case the court would not be justified in reversing the judgment of the

state court.

But this examination into the points in the record other than the federal question is not for the purpose of determining whether they were correctly or erroneously decided, but to ascertain if any such have been decided, and their sufficiency to maintain the final judgment, as decided by the state court.

Beyond this we are not at liberty to go, and we can only go this far to prevent the injustice of reversing a judgment which must in the end be reaffirmed, even in this court, if brought here again from the state court after it has corrected its error in the matter of federal law.

Finally, we hold the following propositions on this subject as flowing from the statute as it now stands :

1. That it is essential to the jurisdiction of this court over the judgment of a state court, that it shall appear that one of the questions mentioned in the act must have been raised, and presented to the state

court.

2. That it must have been decided by the state court, or that its decision was necessary to the judgment or decree rendered in the case.

3. That the decision must have been against the right claimed or asserted by plaintiff in error under the Constitution, treaties, laws, or authority of the United States.

4. These things appearing, this court has jurisdiction, and must examine the judgment so far as to enable it to decide whether this claim of right was correctly adjudicated by the state court.

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MURDOCK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

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5. If it finds that it was rightly decided, the judgment must be affirmed.

6. If it was erroneously decided against plaintiff in error, then this court must further inquire, whether there is any other matter or issue adjudged by the state court, which is sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the issue raised by the federal question. If this is found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of the decision on such other matter or issue.

7. But if it be found that the issue raised by the question of federal law is of such controlling character that its correct decision is necessary to any final judgment in the case, or that there has been no decision by the state court of any other matter or issue which is sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court without regard to the federal question, then this court will reverse the judgment of the state court, and will either render such judgment here as the state court should have rendered, or remand the case to that court, as the circumstances of the case may require.

Applying the principles here laid down to the case of Murdock and others against the City of Memphis, we are of opinion that this court has jurisdiction, and that the judgment of the supreme court of Tennessee must be affirmed.

The suit was a bill in chancery brought by Murdock and others against the city of Memphis to have a decree establishing their right in certain real estate near that city. The United States having determined to build a navy-yard at Memphis, about the year 1844, or previous thereto, the city of Memphis, on the 14th day of September of that year, conveyed to the United States the land in controversy by an ordinary deed of general warranty, expressing on its face the consideration of twenty thousand dollars paid, and designating no purpose for which the land was conveyed. After retaining possession of the land for about ten years without building a navy-yard, the United States abandoned that purpose, and by an act approved August 5, 1854, ceded the property to the city of Memphis by its corporate name for the use and benefit of said city.

The plaintiffs in error, by their bill, allege that the title was originally conveyed to the city of Memphis, in trust, for certain purposes, including that of having a navy-yard built on it by the United States; that when the title reverted to the city by reason of the abandonment of the place as a navy-yard by the United States, and the act of Congress aforesaid, the city received the title in trust for the original grantors, who are the plaintiffs, or who are represented by plaintiffs. A demurrer to the bill was filed. Also an answer denying the trust and pleading the statute of limitations. On the hearing the bill was dismissed, and this decree was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. Plaintiffs, in their bill, and throughout the case, insisted that the effect of the act of 1854 was to vest the title in the mayor and aldermen of the city in trust for the plaintiffs. It may be very true that it is not easy to see anything in the deed by which the United States received the title from the city, or the act by which they ceded it back, which raises such a trust; but the plaintiffs claimed a right under this act of the United States, which was decided 9

VOL. II.

Vol. II.]

MURDOCK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

[No. 3.

against them by the supreme court of Tennessee, and this claim gives jurisdiction of that question to this court.

But we need not consume many words to prove that neither by the deed of the mayor and aldermen of the city to the United States, which is an ordinary deed of bargain and sale for a valuable consideration, nor from anything found in the act of 1854 (10 U. S. Statutes, 586), is there any such trust to be inferred. The act, so far from recognizing or implying any such trust, cedes the property to the mayor and aldermen for the use of the city. We are, therefore, of opinion that this, the only federal question in the case, was rightly decided by the supreme court of Ten

nessee.

But conceding this to be true, the plaintiffs in error have argued that the court having jurisdiction of the case must now examine it upon all the questions which affect its merits; and they insist that the conveyance by which the city of Memphis received the title previous to the deed from the city to the government, and the circumstances attending the making of the former deed are such, that when the title reverted to the city, a trust was raised for the benefit of plaintiffs.

After what has been said in the previous part of this opinion, we need discuss this matter no further. The claim of right here set up is one to be determined by the general principles of equity jurisprudence, and is unaffected by anything found in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Whether decided well or otherwise by the state court, we have no authority to inquire. According to the principles we have laid down as applicable to this class of cases, the judgment of the supreme

court of Tennessee must be affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE not being a member of the court when the case was argued took no part in its decision.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissenting. I dissent from so much of the opinion of the court as denies the jurisdiction of this court to determine the whole case, where it appears that the record presents a federal question, and that the federal question was erroneously decided to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error; as in that state of the record it is, in my judgment, the duty of this court, under the recent act of Congress, to decide the whole merits of the controversy, and to affirm or reverse the judgment of the state court. Tested by the new law it would seem that it must be so, as this court cannot in that state of the record dismiss the writ of error, nor can the court reverse the judgment without deciding every question which the record presents.

Where the federal question is rightly decided the judgment of the state court may be affirmed, upon the ground that the jurisdiction does not attach to the other questions involved in the merits of the controversy; but where the federal question is erroneously decided the whole merits must be decided by this court, else the new law, which it is admitted repeals the 25th section of the judiciary act, is without meaning, operation, or effect, except to repeal the prior law.

Sufficient proof of the fact that the new law was not intended to be without meaning and effective operation is found in the fact that the provision in the old law which restricts the right of the plaintiff in error or appellant to assign for error any matter except such as respects one of the

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