to the title bad been waived, that the purchaser had mismanaged the trade: the vendor, not being able to make a title to certain lands and hereditaments, which formed an essential part of the property with which the partnership was carried on, could not have a decree for specific performance; and he then asked to have an inquiry as to the compensation which he might be entitled to in respect of the injury done to the property by the purchaser, while acting as owner: Held, that, upon a bill so framed, the vendor was not entitled to have compensation for any loss alleged to have been sustained in consequence of the conduct of the defendant. Stevens v. Guppy, 6 Law J. Chanc. 164.

A vendee, who has purchased from an heir-atlaw, who claims upon the supposition that his ancestor's will was void, is entitled to have the will produced. Stevens v. Guppy, 4 Law J. Chanc. 59, s. c. 2 S. & S. 439.

A purchases of B a close of land, parcel of a larger estate, and takes a conveyance of it, with a covenant for further assurance, but without the delivery of any title deeds, or any covenant for their production; afterwards, A contracts to sell the close to a third person: Held, that A has an equity to compel B to produce the title deeds.

Quare-Whether, under the covenant for further assurance, a purchaser, who takes a conveyance without a covenant for the production of title deeds, can afterwards call upon the vendor to execute such a deed of covenant. Fair v. Ayres, 4 Law J. Chanc. 166, s. c. 2 S. & S. 533.

Action by vendee, against vendor of a lease, for the deposit: Held, that the vendor was not bound to produce his lessor's title, without an express agreement to that effect. George v. Pritchard, 1 R. & M. 417. [Abbott]

A plaintiff, who has not established his title, has a right to the production of documents in the defendant's custody, by which be alleges that his title will be established. Moons v. Bernales, 1 Law J. Chanc. 185.

A purchaser, who agrees not to require an abstract of title, has nevertheless a right to inspect the deeds which constitute the vendor's title. Harding v. 4 Law J. Chanc. 213.

Purchaser not compelled to take a doubtful title. Price v. Strange, 6 Mad. 159.

A purchaser is not bound to accept a title depending upon a recovery suffered by a tenant in tail of lands, the reversion of which had vested in the crown by attainder of the reversioner. Blosse v. Clan morris, 3 Bligh, 62.

A trustee under a will, who takes a trust clothed with an interest, contracts to sell lands of the testator, in order to pay off charges. In a suit for the administration of the testator's estate, to which the purchaser is not a party, an order is made, with his consent, referring it to the Master to inquire whether a good title can be made to the premises sold. The Master reports, that a good title can be made; but the purchaser objects to the title, on the ground that all that can be given him is an equitable estate, because two commissions of bankrupt had been issued against the trustee, under which, though they had not been proceeded in, any future assignees would have the legal estate: Held, that such a purchaser is not to be considered as a purchaser

541

under the decree of the Court, and will not be compelled to take an equitable title. Cann v. Cann, 1 Law J. Chanc. 219, s. c. 1 S. & S. 285.

The inability to make a good title to one lot, does not authorize the vendee's refusing to complete his purchase as to the other, provided a legal title can be shewn. Lewin v. Guest, 1 Russ. 325.

An act of bankruptcy, committed by the vendor, though no commission of bankrupt issue, is a valid objection to the title. Foster v. Gould, 3 Law J. Chanc. 200.

A, the wife of a bankrupt, her husband being abroad, without the consent of her husband, or a legal ratification by herself, conveys to trustees under his sequestration, lands of which she was seised to her and her heirs. Upon a sale of these lands by public roup, the vendor undertakes to execute a valid irredeemable disposition. Upon a suit by the vendor to enforce the payment of the purchase-money, and a proceeding for suspension by the vendee: Held, on appeal, reversing the judgment below, that it is not such a title as a purchaser is bound to accept. Dick v. Donald, 1 Bligh, N.S. 655.

A contract for the purchase of a farm, described it as containing "349 acres or thereabouts, be the same more or less ;" and stipulated that the premises should be taken at the quantity above stated, whether more or less: in fact, the farm consisted of only 349 customary acres, which were less than the same number of statute acres by about 100 acres or upwards. On a bill being filed for specific performance, the purchaser, admitting that he had been for several months in possession of the property, and had exercised acts of ownership over it, on the faith that a good title to 349 acres would be shewn, insisted, that, in the contract, " acres meant statute acres, and that he was not bound to perform the contract, unless 349 statute acres were conveyed to him: Held, that in such a case, a reference of title would not be directed on motion.

Semble-The stipulation, that the premises should be taken at the quantity before stated, be the same more or less, would not cover so large a deficiency as existed here. Portman v. Mill, 2 Russ. 570.

An entail in the prohibitory clause provided that it should not be lawful to sell, alienate, or put away the lands, &c.; nor to alter the course of succession; nor to contract debts, &c.; nor to do or commit any fact or deed, civil or criminal, whereby the lands, &c. might be adjudged, evicted, or forfeited, &c.; nor to permit the estate to be adjudged or affected by any debts or deeds contracted or committed by the grantor or the heirs of entail;-it contained an irritant clause in the following words: "All which debts, deeds, and contractions, are hereby declared null and void, &c." The resolutive clause provided that the heir in possession, if he should not redeem any adjudication which might be led against the estate, for and upon the debts and deeds of, &c. should forfeit, &c. :

Held, that the word "deeds" in the irritant clause, does not apply to all the things enumerated in the prohibitory clause, but it is restricted by the context to such deeds as are of a nature to create a debt or burden; that it refers especially to the debts and deeds previously prohibited, and cannot be extended to the prohibition against selling.

Upon a sale, therefore, by the heir in possession,

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an objection to the title by a purchaser, on the ground that the irritant clause struck at alienation, was held invalid. Barclay v. Adam, 3 Bligh, 275.

Where an estate is sold free from incumbrances, and, upon production of the abstract of title, it appears that the estate is subject to a mortgage or other charge or incumbrance, the incumbrance does not afford an objection to the title, but is matter of conveyance only. And such is the rule, even if the amount of the incumbrance be greater than the purchase-money. Townsend v. Champernown, 1 Y. & J.

449.

Contract for the sale of the borough, lordship, and manor of H, with the rights, royalties, members, and appurtenances; and all the messuages, lands, tenements, and other hereditaments, and their rights, members, and appurtenances, to the said borough, lordship, and manor belonging, as set forth and described in a particular referred to in the contract. The vendors derived their title under a conveyance in 1809, by the general description of the borough, lordship, and manor of H, with all and singular the rights, members, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or appertaining, with a reference to preceding deeds, containing the same description, through which the title was traced, in the same general manner, to 1744. The purchaser objected that the identity of the several lands mentioned in the particular, as forming part of the manor, was not made out, and it appeared that some of them had been purchased since 1744, and, therefore, could not pass under the ancient and general description. vendors thereupon produced abstracts of the title to such lands, and shewed by stewards' books, that the lands, ever since they had been purchased, had been annexed to and treated as part of the manor; and contended that they passed under the general words "appertaining or belonging," in the conveyance of 1809. To obviate the difficulty, they also obtained a confirmation of that conveyance, with a declaration that the lands in question were intended to be passed by it, under the general words. Exceptions to the Master's report of a good title were overruled, principally, as it should seem, on the ground of the deed of confirmation; the Court declaring, that if it were of opinion that a good title could be made, it would hesitate to decree a specific performance, unless that deed were delivered to the purchaser.

The

Where a deed, dated sixty years back, contains a recital of the creation of a mortgage term, and a subsequent assignment of it, in trust to attend the inheritance, and the term is not subsequently noticed in the title, it will be presumed to have been surrendered; and it is no objection to the title, that the vendor cannot produce the deed creating the term, nor the assignment of it.

It seems to be no objection to a title, that a person, who, sixty years back, was the survivor of three trustees, appointed by will for sale of an estate, did not execute a conveyance, purporting to be made by him and the parties beneficially interested; possession having gone under that conveyance, and the estate in equity being converted into personalty. Townsend v. Champernown, 1 Y. & J. 538.

Upon a contract for a sale of the sublease, the objection to the title, arising from the possibility of a future breach of the covenant by the representa

tive of the original lessee, may be cured, either by an insurance, in the name of that representative, for the whole residue of the term created by the sublease, or by making that representative join in a covenant, that the purchaser shall be at liberty to insure in his name, and to deduct the annual premiums out of the rent. Montresor v. Williams, 1 Law J. Chanc. 151.

In a suit for specific performance, where the vendor cannot make a good title, when the cause comes on to be beard on further directions, the Court will not allow the cause to stand over, in order that he may be able to cure the defects in his title. No counsel having appeared for the plaintiff at the hearing on further directions, and the bill having been dismissed, a petition to have the cause again heard will be refused, with costs, where the ground of application is, that the counsel were instructed on the very day of the hearing, and that, if they had obtained further time from the Court, the defect of the title could have been cured. Boswell v. Mendham, 1 Law J. Chanc. 160.

If the vendor, at the time of contracting to sell, has no title, and has no title when he calls upon the purchaser to fulfil one of the terms of the contract— Semble, that the purchaser may abandon the purchase, and demand back his deposit.

A deficiency in the smallest portion of interest, in the subject of sale, either as to quantity or duration, is, at law, a total want of title.

Accordingly-a seller contracted to grant a lease for 21 years at a premium, part of which was to be paid on a given day; and on that day, he required payment, and he was then, on the other hand, required to shew his title. He did not then shew it; whereupon the purchaser abandoned the contract; and, it turning out that a term of only five days was outstanding, of which the seller was not aware,-it was held, that the purchaser might recover back his deposit; though the title in other respects was good, and though the seller could, no doubt, have gotten in the five days term. Roper v. Combes, 5 Law J. K.B. 223, s. c. 6 B. & C. 34.

It seems that a contract to sell, implies a promise that the seller has title; and if it turns out that he has not, he is liable in damages to the purchaser, not only to the amount of his expenses actually incurred, but to the value which the bargain would have been to him, if it had been completed.

But, at all events, a person who has not even an equitable interest, but who contracts to sell, in the fair expectation that he will be able to do so, is liable to pay the value which the bargain would have been to the intended purchaser. Hopkins v. Grazebrook, 5 Law J. K.B. 65, s. c. 6 B. & C. 31, s. c. 9 D. & R. 22.

Recitals in deeds 33 years old, are not evidence of pedigree against third persons, unless supported by extrinsic evidence. Fort v. Clarke, 1 Russ. 601.

A vendee will be compelled to complete his purchase where there has been an undisputed possession for sixty years, and under such circumstances, the loss of a deed recited creates no reasonable doubt as to the validity of the title.

The recital of a deed is constructive notice of its contents. Prosser v. Watts, 6 Mad. 59.

A reference of the title will not be ordered upon the coming in of the answer, if the purchaser, in his

answer, objects to the performance of the contract on the ground that the premises are subject to a right of foot-path, and that the vendor represented to him that no such right of foot-path existed. Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 177.

It is unsettled, whether the Master has, or has not, a right to call on the parties to give him, upon a question of title, the opinion of a conveyancer. Flower v. Walker, 1 Russ. 408.

(F) ACTIONS.

To support an action for goods bargained and sold, it is necessary that there should have been a specific appropriation to the buyer of the particular goods, and that appropriation have been expressly or impliedly assented to by the buyer.

Thus, A having a patent for certain spinning machinery, received an order from B to have some spinning-frames made for him. A employed C to make the machines for B, and informed the latter that he had so done. After the machines had been completed, A ordered them to be altered. They were afterwards completed according to this new order, and packed up in boxes for B, and C informed B that they were ready, but he refused to accept them: Held, that C could not recover the price from B in an action for goods bargained and sold, or for work and labour, and materials. Atkinson v. Bell, 6 Law J. K.B. 258, s. c. 8 B. & C. 277, s. c. 2 M. & R. 292.

As a trader, by keeping goods, supplied to him on sale or return, after the credit has expired, makes them his own, the price of them may be recovered under the common count for goods sold and delivered. Harrison v. Allen, 1 C. & P. 235. [Park]

If one order a certain machine, e. g. a thrashingmachine, which, when sent to him, turns out to be unfit for use, he should either return it immediately, or else give immediate notice to the vendor to fetch it away; for, if he keep it a long time without doing either, he will be taken to have waived all objections to its goodness. Cash v. Giles, 3 C. & P. 407. [Park]

If a person purchases an article, and suffers it to remain on his premises for two months without examination, and then finds it to be unfit for use, he cannot, after that length of time, avail himself of the objection in answer to an action for the price, unless some deceit has been practised with regard to the article. Percival v. Blake, 2 C. & P. 514. [Abbott]

If the vendor of goods sold at a specific price, sends goods which do not correspond with the sample, he is not entitled to recover more than the actual value of the goods. Germaine v. Barton, 3 Stark. 32. [Bayley]

A plaintiff cannot recover for goods sold which he knows are to be applied to an illegal purpose, though he be not active himself in their being so applied, and be no sharer in the advantage to be derived therefrom. Hutton v. Wry, 5 Law J. K.B. 220.

One who has an interest in goods at the time of their being ordered, is liable for their payment; though the vendor may not know of his interest at the time, nor have supplied the goods upon his credit.

And an inchoate interest at the time is sufficient. Therefore, where a person was to have an interest in goods, if they arrived safely, and in good condition, which they afterwards did, he was held to

543

be liable for their payment. Melhuish v. Pearson, 5 Law J. K.B. 78.

Where a brewer delivers beer to be used in a particular public house, he cannot make any person except the licensed keeper of the house primarily liable for it, so as to maintain an action for goods sold and delivered against him. Meux v. Humphreys, 1 M. & M. 132. [Tenterden]

Where, under a warranty, plaintiff delivered a horse to the defendant, for which he was to be paid partly by another horse belonging to the defendant, and partly by money; and the defendant delivered his horse, but refused to pay the money, on the ground that the plaintiff's horse was unsound: It was holden, that the money might be recovered under a common count for horses sold and delivered; though the plaintiff had failed in proving the agreement, as stated in the special count. Sheldon v. Cox, 5 D. & R. 277, s. c. 3 B. & C. 420.

If bills of exchange be given in payment of goods, and be dishonoured, the vendor may, though he has them in his possession, recover in assumpsit for goods without delivering up those bills, and the defendant must seek relief in equity, if they are not forthcoming. Hudwen v. Mendisabel, 2 C. & P. 20. [Best]

The defendant, being indebted to the plaintiff for goods sold, gave him two bills of exchange, which the plaintiff indorsed, and paid to B & B. These bills having been dishonoured by the defendant, the plaintiff sued him for his original demand; and at the trial, it appeared, that when the action was commenced, the bills were still in the hands of the indorsees, and that, about a fortnight before the trial, the plaintiff had sent a clerk to them for the bills, which they returned to him; but it did not appear that any money passed: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Burden v. Halton, 6 Law J. C.P. 61, s. c. 4 Bing. 454, s. c. 1 M. & P. 223.

Receiving a commission on the sale of goods, does not render the party an incompetent witness, in an action for goods sold and delivered. Murley v. Langrick, 1 C. & P. 216. [Abbott]

In an action for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff proved the possession of the goods by himself, and that the defendants had removed them; it appeared that the goods consisted of spar lying on the lands of A, and that the plaintiff claimed under A, by a written agreement, not produced: Held, that the proof of the title to the goods was insufficient, and therefore a contract between the parties could not be implied. Lee v. Shore, 1 Law J. K.B. 48, s. c. 2 D. & R. 198, s. c. 1 B. & C. 94.

In an action for an engraver's bill, the Court will not compel the defendant to produce the copperplate for the inspection of the plaintiff. Dell v. Taylor, 3 Law J. K.B. 225, s. c. 6 D. & R. 388.

Where it appeared that the goods were sent to be sold on commission, and it was alleged in a special count, that, although the defendant afterwards had sold them, he had not accounted: It was held, that some evidence of the sale was necessary. Elbourn v. Upjohn, 1 C. & P. 572. [Best]

Where a purchaser abandons the contract by requiring more title than he ought, or more than he bargained for, semble, that it is not necessary to tender him a draft conveyance previously to bring

544

ing an action against him for damages, by reason of the breach of his contract. Wilmot v. Wilkinson, 5 Law J. K.B. 196, s. c. 6 B. & C. 506.

Where a purchaser has given notice of his intention to abandon the contract by reason of a defect in the title, he may maintain an action against the vendor to recover damages for breach of the contract, although his deposit-money, with interest, has been paid into court; and although he had been let into possession, and had not tendered any conveyance for execution by the vendor. Pearson v. Upton, 6 Law J. K.B. 285.

In an action to recover the deposit on the purchase of an estate, on the ground of a defect in the vendor's title, specified on rescinding the contract, no objection can be insisted on at the trial which was not stated as a reason for refusing to complete the contract, if it be of such a nature that it might, if stated, have been removed. Todd v. Hoggart, 1 M. & M. 128. [Tenterden]

On the sale of an estate by auction, the name of the owner did not appear in the particulars or conditions of sale, and the agreement signed by the purchaser did not mention the owner's name, and was not signed either by him or the auctioneer: semble, that the seller cannot maintain an action for the non-completion of the contract. Wheeler v. Collier, 1 M. & M. 123. [Tenterden]

Where the plaintiff, having agreed by parol for the purchase of an interest in houses, sold the bargain to defendant for 401. and the premises were subsequently conveyed to his nominee, but not in trust for him: Held, that a count upon a promise, in consideration of plaintiff's relinquishing and giv. ing up the bargain to defendant, being proved, the action was maintainable, although there was no legal obligation in the original vendor to convey. Seaman v. Price, 1 R. & M. 195, s. c. 1 C. & P. 586, s. c. 2 Bing. 437, s. c. 10 B. Mo. 34.

A vendee, having agreed to purchase a certain number of trees for a specific sum, and pay for the same according to the condition of sale, afterwards cut down and carried away part of the trees without making any such payment, and refused to discharge the debt until the remainder of them had been delivered: Held, that although the executors of the vendor had failed in establishing a count on the spe cial contract, yet they might recover the value of the trees felled by the vendee, under the counts for goods sold and delivered, as the defendant, by such taking, had disaffirmed the entirety of the contract. Bragg v. Cole, 6 B. Mo. 114.

An averment in a declaration, that the defendant himself became the purchaser, is supported by proof, that a conveyance was executed to a person nominated by the defendant. Seaman v. Price, 1 C. & P. 586. [Best]

The defendants, in the month of September, undertook to deliver tallow to the plaintiff, "in all next December," at a fixed price per cwt. In October they informed him, that they had disposed of the tallow, and therefore could not perform the contract: Held, that, tallow having risen in price, the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages according to the market-price on the last day on which the contract would have been performed, viz. 31st day of December, as he had not acquiesced in its being rescinded when the defendant refused to per

The vendor may confirm an order nisi obtained by the purchaser, if the latter neglect to do so. Chillingworth v. Chillingworth, 5 Law J. Chanc. 147, s. c. 1 Sim. 291.

Upon a bill filed by creditors, whose debts are charged upon the real estate, no decree for the sale of the real estate can be made, unless by consent, until the Master has reported that the personal estate is insufficient, even though its insufficiency should be admitted by the executors. Owen v. Pugh, 3 Law J. Chanc. 194.

The Court will compel the vendor to permit a valuation, where there is a contract to sell at a valuation by A B and C, and the time of valuation is according to the contract; but the defendant cannot take advantage of it, if he improperly occasions delay. Morse v. Merest, 6 Mad. 26.

Old buildings which have been pulled down, and which are incapable of repair, are to be valued as old materials only, on estimating the value of lasting improvements. Robinson v. Ridley, 6 Mad. 2.

Upon a bill by the vendor, seeking to rescind the sale on the ground of fraud and oppression in the transaction, and error in the accounts, although the prayer to rescind the sale was refused, the account was opened after a considerable lapse of time. M'Neill v. Cahill, 2 Bligh, 228-9.

Where a sum of money (part of the price of an estate) is set apart in the hands of the trustees, as a security to the purchaser against the claims of judg ment creditors of the vendor, who have a general equitable lien on the estate sold, the judgment creditors must be parties to a bill which seeks to have this money disposed of. Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 16.

(H) COSTS.

Interpretation of a subsequent correspondence, in reference to the original contract.-The agreement is not impaired or altered by proposals which the purchaser makes subsequently, with a view to an amicable arrangement. Such proposals may have an influence on costs. Bunning v. Bunning, 1 Law J. Chanc. 56.

A contract being entered into for the sale of certain lands, with a weir, reservoirs, and the privilege of using the water of an adjacent river, and the vendor being unable to make a good title to all the rights in their full extent, which he bad agreed to convey, the purchaser gives him notice that he will no longer be bound by the contract, and thereupon the vendor files his bill. If, at the hearing of the cause, it appears that the vendor could not make a good title, either then, or at the time of the bill filed, or at the time of the notice given, an opportunity of

mending his title in the Master's office will not be given him, but his bill will be dismissed with costs. Wright v. Howard, 1 Law J. Chanc. 94.

If, however, the purchaser in his answer, besides insisting on the want of title in the vendor, sets up a defence that he was seduced into the contract by fraud and misrepresentation, and that defence is not supported by evidence, he will be loaded with so much of the expense of the suit as was occasioned by those improper allegations.

If the defendant, in such a cause, files a cross bill to have the agreements cancelled, not relying merely on the vendor's want of title, but charging him with fraud and misrepresentation (which charges are disproved); though the agreements will be decreed to be cancelled, yet no costs will be given. Wright v. Howard, 1 Law J. Chanc. 94, s. c. 1 S. & S. 190.

A purchaser under a decree, who succeeds on exceptions to the Master's report approving the title, cannot then have the costs of the reference on title; but must obtain the report in his favour, and then present a petition to be discharged from his purchase and to have his costs. Hyde v. Hyde, 3 Law J. Chanc. 130.

Objections to a title being taken by a purchaser under a decree of the Court, the Master reports against the title, no person having appeared to support it. The purchaser, on moving to be discharged from his purchase, cannot have costs as between solicitor and client. Anon. 3 Law J. Chanc. 83, s. c. as Reynolds v. Blake, 2 S. & S. 117.

Where, on a reference of title, the property having been sold under the decree of the Court, the Master reports against the title, the purchaser is entitled to his costs, even when there is no fund standing to the credit of the cause. Smith v. Nelson, 4 Law J. Chanc. 175, s. c. 2 S. & S. 557.

A purchaser brought into court upon a doubtful title, ought to be discharged with costs. Blosse v. Clanmorris, 3 Bligh, 62.

One of the terms of an agreement was, that the contract should be void if the purchaser's counsel should be of opinion that a marketable title could not be made by a certain time; the counsel being of that opinion, a bill by the purchaser for a specific performance, with a compensation, was dismissed with costs and an application, afterwards made by the plaintiff, that his deposit might be set off against the defendant's costs, and the surplus (if any) paid to him, was refused with costs. Williams v. Edwards, 2 Sim. 78.

VETERINARY SURGEON.

The certificate of a veterinary surgeon having attended lectures at the Veterinary College, and signed by the professor and others, cannot be received in evidence, inasmuch as it does not come from any body known to the law.

Although an usage, that a veterinary surgeon shall charge for attendance when there is not much medicine required, is too uncertain, yet if there be a general custom applicable to a particular profession, parties employing an individual in that profession are supposed to deal with him according to that usage. Sewell v. Corp, 1 C. & P. 392. [Best]

Digest, 1822-1828.

VENIRE.

[See PRACTICE.]

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A venire issued against one of several partners, who is abroad, for a separate debt, cannot be served at the counting-house of the partnership. Petty v. Smith, 2 Y. & J. 111.

Where the plaintiff elects to proceed by venire and distringas, according to the ancient practice of this Court, a personal service of the venire is not requisite. Kemp v. Summer, 2 Y. & J. 405.

VENUE.

(A) WHERE LAID.
(B) WHEN CHANGED.
(C) WHEN NOT.

(D) RULE FOR CHANGING.

(A) WHERE LAID.

[See ARBITRATION.]

The venue in a penal action for non-residence must be laid in the county in which the living lies. Whitehead v. Wynne, 2 Chit. 120.

The plaintiff, in transitory actions, has a right to elect in what county he will bring his action. Jenkins v. Hulton, 7 B. Mo. 520.

(B) WHEN CHANGED.

Where the Vice Chancellor directed an action to try the validity of a commission of bankruptcy, it being sworn by the defendant, without contradiction by the plaintiff (the bankrupt), who had laid the venue in M, that, previously to the issuing of the commission, the plaintiff resided in Y; that all his dealings had taken place in Y, and its vicinity; and that the defendant's witnesses resided there and the plaintiff not having disclosed by affidavit that he had any material evidence to give in M, the Court permitted the defendant to change the venue to L, on payment of costs. Parker v. Eastwood, 8

Taunt. 635.

The Court granted a rule nisi to change the venue from Y to L, the witnesses being Greenland fishermen, who would be absent at the time the assizes where held at Y. Atkinson v. Sadler, 2 Chit. 419.

The Court granted a rule nisi to change the venue from London to York, four witnesses living at Leeds, and only one of the facts occurring in London. Anon. 2 Chit. 418.

The Court allowed a declaration, in an action for a penalty in a road act, to be amended by changing the venue. Griffith v. Hollier, 1 Ken. 368.

Where the London agent of a Lancashire attorney laid the venue at Lancaster, a judge, upon the production of the letter, containing the instructions to lay the venue in London, ordered the declaration to be amended, and the Court refused a rule to set that order aside. Gardner v. Whiteside, 1 Law J.K. B. 55.

The venue, in an action on a specialty, cannot be changed until issue has been joined between the parties. Weatherby v. Goring, 3 B. & C. 552, s. c. 5 D. & R. 441.

The Court directed the venue to be changed, in an action by a clergyman against a person for not setting out tithes, where anonymous letters had been inserted in provincial papers reflecting on the

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