Pratt v. Hillman, 3 Law J. K.B. 253, s. c. 4 B. & C. 269, s. c. 6 D. & R. $60.

Au action of trespass cannot be maintained by one part-owner of a party-wall against the other partowner. Wiltshire v. Sidford, 6 Law J. K.B. 151, s. c. 8 B. & C. 259 u., s. c. 1 M. & R. 404.

An action of trespass cannot be maintained by one tenant in common of a party-wall against the other.

Nor does the altering of such a wall for the purpose of improvement, (for instance, the heightening of it,) render the party who makes the alteration a trespasser; though he may be liable to an action on the case. Cubitt v. Porter, 6 Law J. K.B. 306, s. c. 8 B. & C. 257, s. c. 2 M. & R. 267.

An account of the expenses of rebuilding a partywall, delivered in pursuance of the statute, 14 Geo. S, c. 78, s. 41, containing a correct statement of the quantity of brick-work done and materials allowed for, is a sufficient account, as required by that section, although it also contains a statement of the prices paid for the brick-work and allowed for the materials, which exceed the prices fixed by the statute; and a demand of payment, referring to that account, is sufficient.

The defence relied on, being that the party-wall was not built half on each side of the boundary, as required by sec. 14 of that act: Held, that the question for the jury was, whether it were fairly built so, without regarding any minute inaccuracy of measurement, or by unfairly and intentionally encroaching on the defendant's premises. Reading v. Barnard, 1 M. & M. 71. [Tenterden]

The defendant took land on a building lease from one N, at the yearly rent of 51. Subsequently he let a part of the ground to one G, who was to build houses upon it, at 201. a year: Held, that he was therefore the owner of the improved rent under the act, and as such liable to contribution to a partywall used in the erection of a house on such land by G. Semble That the notice required by the 41st section of the act, does not apply to the erection of a new building, but only to the renewal of an old party-wall: Held, also, that the owner of the partywall was not confined to ten days to give his notice, but, there being no adjoining house when it was built, might give the notice in reasonable time after the adjoining houses were attached. Collins v. Wilson, 6 Law J. C.P. 107, s. c. 4 Bing. 551, s. c. 1 M. & P. 454.

PATENT.

A specification will be bad, if it use terms calculated to encourage useless experiments to arrive at the desired object, although it give the proper means of arriving at it.

Thus, where a man in his specification used the following terms, "The invention consists in the using certain cloths, which may be made of ANY SUITABLE material; but I PREFER it to be made of linen warp, and woollen weft." The fact being, that he had unavailingly tried other materials, and had found NONE to answer but linen warp and woollen weft, it was held, that the specification was bad. Crompton v. Ibbotson, 6 Law J. K.B. 214.

If A, who has procured a patent for inventing

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three distinct substances which form a particular medicine, does not in the specification describe them by their known and accustomed names, but merely points out the method by which they are to be produced, it renders the specification invalid, as it only tends to make persons believe that an elaborate process is absolutely necessary, when in fact it was known to the patentee that the result of their labours might be purchased in any chemist's shop. Savory v. Price, 1 R. & M. [Abbott]

Where a patent was described to be for "a new and improved method of making of double canvas and sail-cloth, without any starch whatsoever," and the specification stated, that the invention consisted in an improved texture, or method of twisting the thread to be applied to the making of unstarched cloth. The Court determined, that the patent was void, as being taken out for more than the party discovered, it having been shewn that the exclusion of starch in such manufacture had been before adopted. Campion v. Benyon, 6 B. Mo. 71, s. c. 3 B. & B. 5.

Where a specification contained French terms, it was holden, that if there be drawings annexed thereto, and by a comparison of the words and the drawings, the one will explain the other, sufficiently to enable a skilful mechanic to perform the work, the specification is sufficient. Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 C. & P. 558. [Abbott]

A party obtained a patent for the "invention of certain improvements in the smelting and working of iron," and the patentee, in his specification, described the improvements to consist of various processes, by which iron contained in slags or cinders, produced from the several furnaces, was, by smelting, brought into the state of bar iron; and further, in the use and application of lime to iron, subsequently to the operation of the blast-furnace, whereby that quality in iron called "cold short," might be prevented. The patentee then declared, that in the smelting he used a mixture of lime and mine rubbish, and stated their proportions, and also the various processes, compounds and proportions, used in the different furnaces in the smelting and working; and further stated, that he had discovered that the addition of lime or limestone, or other substances, consisting chiefly of lime, and free, or nearly free, from any ingredient known to be hurtful to the quality of iron, would sufficiently prevent or remedy that quality in iron called" cold short," and would render such iron more tough when cold.

On the trial of an action for the infringement of this invention, it appeared, that the iron had before been extracted from slags; that it had been previously discovered, and even published, that the application of lime would prevent the quality called "cold short"; that such application had been used for that purpose in an extensive iron work, for a series of years previous to the date of the patent; and that the defendants had not worked according to the processes, compounds and proportions described in the specification, for that they frequently varied the proportions, and in one instance omitted one of the ingredients altogether, with an equally successful result: Held, by three Judges, (Gibbs C. J. absente,) that the patent was void, as the invention was not new, and that there had been no infringement of the patent by the defendants. Hill v. Thomp

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son, 8 Taunt. 375, s. c. 2 B. Mo. 424, s. c. 3 Merivale, 622.

Accidental error in the specification of a patent ordered to be corrected. The Master of the Rolls is the proper person to make such order. In re Redmond, 6 Law J. Chanc. 183.

The invention of a servant while in the employ of another, belongs to the servant and not the employer, in the absence of proof that the former was retained for the express purpose of inventing. Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 C. & P. 558. [Abbott]

Semble, It is piracy to use part of an improvement, for which a patent has been obtained, in another improvement. Weiss v. Maw, 4 Law J. Chanc. 224.

If A obtains a patent, and enters into an agreement with B, the effect of which is to make B a partner in the patent, B is entitled, not merely to share in the profits, but to interfere in the management of it; and if, upon a bill being filed, A insists that he alone is entitled to act in the management, and that such was the true intent of the agreement, an injunction will be granted against A. Blackford v. Hawkins, 1 Law J. Chanc. 141.

The Court will not restrain one of the several partners in a patent, from publishing a book containing an account of the invention. Hawkins v. Blackford, 1 Law J. Chanc. 142.

Injunction granted to restrain the infringement of a patent, even where its legal validity was questioned, where, from the nature of the instrument, the market for it might be supplied in a very short time. Weiss v. Maw, 1 Jac. 502.

Where an invention was objected to as not being new, it was bolden, that a drawing of one which the witness had before constructed, might be looked at by him, and that he might be asked if he had such a recollection of the machine made by him as to say it was a correct drawing of it. Rex v. Hadden, 2 C. & P. 184. [Bayley]

The plaintiff alleged in his declaration that he marked his powder-flasks and shot-belts "Sykes Patent ;" and that the defendants made powderflasks and shot-belts, and marked them with the same words, in imitation of the plaintiff's and knowingly sold them so marked as and for powderflasks and shot-belts of the manufacture of the plaintiff, to the injury of the plaintiff.

The evidence was, that the defendants sold the articles as their own manufacture, but that the purchasers re-sold them as being of the manufacture of the plaintiff: The Court held, that the evidence supported the allegation in the declaration. Sykes v. Sykes, 3 Law J. K.B. 48, s. c. 3 B. & C. 641, s. c. 5 D. & R. 292.

A patent does not become void when it has passed to the assignees of bankrupts, who have more than five creditors; for the assignees are, as to this kind of property, the representatives of the bankrupts, and not of the creditors. Bloxam v. Elsee, 3 Law J. K.B. 93, s. c. 1 C. & P. 559, s. c. 1 R. & M. 167. By an act for enlarging the term granted to a patentee for the enjoyment of his patent, it was enacted, that in case the power, privilege, or authority, granted by the letters patent, should at any time become vested in, or in trust for more than the number of five persons, or their representatives, at any one time, otherwise than by devise or succession, (reckoning executors and administrators as and

for the single persons they represent as to such interest as they are or shall be entitled to in right of such their testators or testator,) then, and in every of the said cases, all liberties, privileges, and advantages vested in the patentees, their executors, administrators or assigns, should cease, determine, and become void. The patentees having become bankrupt, and creditors exceeding five in number, having proved under the commission: It was held, that this clause applied only to an assignment by act of the party, and not to an assignment by operation of law; and, consequently, that the interest of the assignees of the bankrupt in the patent had not ceased.

The patent was for a machine for making paper in single sheets, without seam or joining, from one to twelve feet and upwards wide, and from one to forty-five feet and upwards in length: Held, that this imported that paper varying in width between those extremes, should be made by the same machine; and that the patentee, at the time of taking out the patent, not having any machine capable of producing paper of different widths, the patent was void. Bloxam v. Elsee, 5 Law J. K.B. 104, s. c. 6 B. & C. 169.

PAUPER.

If it appear that a plaintiff has no meritorious cause of action, the Court will discharge an order, authorizing him to sue in formá pauperis. A judge's order, allowing a plaintiff to sue in forma pauperis, must be made a rule of court, before the Court will entertain a motion to discharge it.-Semble, that an action for penalties is not within the statute 11 H. 7, c. 12. Hawes v. Johnson, 1 Y. & J. 10.

PAWNBROKER.

A pawnbroker received a parcel of goods on one day, and on that and several subsequent days he advanced sums of money, each not exceeding 10l., as on different parts of the parcel, and received pawnbroker's interest of three-pence in the pound per month on those sums: Held, that it was a question for the jury whether this really were one transaction, and a mere contrivance for obtaining the higher interest on the whole sum, in which case it is void; or whether the advances were really distinct. Cowie v. Harris, 1 M. & M. 141. [Tenterden]

built at the expense of the owners of them. The vendor agreed to pay for the pews. After the pews were completed, the plaintiff attempted to occupy them; but he always found them full of persons, who resisted his entrance, saying that he had not paid for them. The vendor promised to pay, but he did not. After waiting upwards of a year, the vendee paid the churchwardens, and brought an action to recover the amount, as money paid for the use of the vendor: The Court held, that inasmuch as neither the churchwardens, nor any person having authority, had disturbed the vendee, it was a voluntary payment. Walker v. Duncombe, 2 Law J. K.B. 80.

A, residing in B, purchases different cargoes for C, in D, one of which A consigns in a vessel chartered by C to his own agent in D. The master of a ship which conveys one of the cargoes, contrary to the terms of the bill of lading, delivers the cargo to C, who had at that time accepted and paid bills drawn by A, to the amount of the first two cargoes, but not to the amount of the whole of the cargoes. In an action against the master by A, for not delivering according to the bill of lading, it is a question for the jury, whether, under the particular circumstances of the case, the accepted bills were agreed to be taken in payment of the particular cargoes. Morgan v. Skirfield, 3 Stark. 46. [Abbott]

Where a party gave a cheque to procure the delivery of goods which were distrained,-it was holden, that no property passed, if he had not reasonable ground for expecting that the cheque would be paid. Hawse v. Crowe, 1 R. & M. 414. [Abbott]

Where, in an action for goods sold and delivered, it appeared that the defendant gave the plaintiff bills of exchange in payment, which were dishonoured, and that the latter afterwards transferred them to J S, who gave his acceptance for them, and that the original bills were still in existence: Held, that the plaintiff was not bound to produce them, as, on their dishonour, he had a right to resort to his original demand, and declare against the defendant for the amount of the goods sold. Hadwen v. Mendezabel, 3 Law J. C.P. 198, s. c. 2 C. & P. 20.

A mere order by a creditor for the payment of his debt to a particular person, may be retracted; but he cannot withdraw the authority, where there has been a pledge by the person to whom the authority is given, that he will make the payment according to the order. Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 B. & C. 842, s. c. 5 D. & R. 735.

Where a debtor directed his bankers, who were indebted to him in a larger amount, to place to the credit of his creditor (a debtor to the bankers,) for goods sold, a sum of money so as to make it the same as a bill at one month, which the bankers consented to do, but who only considered it as a payment to be made at a future day: Held, that this did not amount to a payment; and on the bankers becoming bankrupts before the day on which the credit would expire, that the debtor was not discharged by such payment. Pedder v. Watt, 2 Chit. 619.

The plaintiff and defendant kept accounts with the same bankers in the country, although they resided at a distance from each other; and, the plaintiff having applied to the defendant for payment of rent, the latter, by letter of the 22nd October, stated

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that he had ordered the amount to be transferred to the plaintiff's credit. No transfer, however, was made on that day; but on the 10th of December following, the defendant transferred the sum due to the plaintiff in the bankers' books, and they stopped payment in the afternoon of the same day, but the plaintiff could not receive intelligence of the transfer until two days afterwards: Held, that such transfer was equivalent to payment. Eyles v. Ellis, 5 Law J. C.P. 110, s. c. 4 Bing. 13.

Where there is a general running account, and no intermediate rest, and the debtor remits money without any specific appropriation, it is prima facie a payment in liquidation of the earliest balance due from the debtor; and under such rule, remittances made by C D to his London bankers generally, after the death of A B, held applicable, in the first place, to the liquidation of the partnership balance due at the death of A B. Simson v. Cooke, 2 Law J. C.P. 74, s. c. 1 Bing. 452, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 588.

It is a general rule of law, that if a person indebted to another on two accounts, pay him a sum of money, he has a right to say to which of those accounts it shall be placed and if he does not expressly make any election, yet if it can be inferred from circumstances, to which account he intended to place it, the receiver cannot put it to the other account. Shaw v. Picton, 4 Law J. K.B. 29, s. c. 4 B. & C. 715, s. c. 7 D. & R. 201.

In general, when a man owes money on more accounts than one, he may, when he makes a payment, apply it to which of the accounts he pleases.

And if he do not so apply it at the time, the creditor who receives the money may apply it to which of the accounts he pleases: but, in such a case, he cannot apply it to a claim upon any transaction forbidden by law; or a claim which he may have upon a security which is so defective that it cannot be enforced either at law or in equity.

But he may apply it to a claim which might be enforced in equity, though not at law.

Accordingly, A, the acceptor of two bills for 251. and 501. both over due, paid 22l. 10s. to B, the holder," on account." B said, "he wished to have the full amount of the 25l. bill." A replied, "he had no more money then, but would pay some more soon." B then indorsed on the 251. bill, "Received 221. 10s. in part of two bills": Held, that B might appropriate the payment to the 251. bill, though void for want of a stamp. Biggs v. Dwight, 6 Law J. K.B. 45, s. c. 1 M. & R. 308.

It seems that the payment of money ought to be personally demanded, since writing a letter requesting payment, will not support the issue of a demand and refusal. Edwards v. Yeates, 1 R. & M. 360. [Abbott]

Where, to ground an attachment for non-payment of money, a demand of money is essential; the affidavit in support of the application must state when the demand is made-by a person authorized by letter of attorney; and that the authority was shewn at the time of the demand. Jackson v. Clarke, 13 Price, 208, s. c. M'Clel. 72.

The prosecutor called on A, who had been committed for a forgery, and said he had no wish to appear against him, but that the attorney concerned (an attorney of the Court C.P.) would proceed, if his costs were not paid, which the prosecutor had no

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means of paying; he then proposed that A should advance the money, which he did, and it came into the hands of the prosecutor's attorney. Notwithstanding this, A was put on his trial, and the prosecutor appeared against him; A, however, being acquitted, applied to the Court of C.P. to compel the prosecutor's attorney to refund the money, putting in an affidavit of his innocence of the offence charged on him, and that he paid the money, because, from his knowledge of the parties, he believed his life in danger. But the Court refused to interfere. Ex parte Brookes, 1 Bing. 105.

The lex loci contructus, and the law applicable to cases of money charged as a rent payable out of land, where no provision as to the place of payment is made by the instrument, are inapplicable to a case where the instrument itself furnishes the means of interpretation. Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Bligh,

60.

(B) OF MONEY, INTO AND OUT of Court.
(a) In Equity.

[See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.]

A defendant will not be ordered to pay into court money which he admits he has received, unless there is an admission that it is still in his hands. Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 21.

A defendant, who admits in his answer the possession of property upon a trust, will be ordered to pay it into court, although he sets up a claim to it; if, upon the facts disclosed in the answer, the Court is satisfied that this claim is not well founded. Del Pont v. De Tastet, 2 Law J. Chanc. 140.

Payment of money into court, after a decree and report, ordered upon admissions in the answer, the defendant being at liberty to discharge himself of any part of the sums so admitted, by an affidavit of subsequent receipts and payments. Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 72.

The Court will order an executor, who admits himself to have been indebted to the testator at the time of his death, to pay the amount into court. Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2 S. & S. 217.

Whether, on granting a commission abroad, the underwriters are bound to bring the whole or any of the money insured into court, is a question dependent on the circumstances. Marryatt v. Noble, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 101.

In a suit to set aside post-obit securities, an injunction being granted, the principal and interest will be ordered into court, and will not be paid to the defendant. Marsack v. Farlow, 1 Jac. 572.

Where the plaintiff gave tenants notice not to pay the rent to the defendant's trustees, and the trustees had given the tenants also notice not to pay their rent to the plaintiff, it was ordered, on the motion of the plaintiff, and with the consent of all parties, to pay their rent into court, though the tenants themselves cannot make such a motion. Belhee v. Belbee, 6 Mad. 28.

Where a defendant on his marriage covenanted to pay a certain sum into the hands of trustees, and neglected so to do; in a suit for a specific perforthe Court directed the sum to be paid into court. Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2 S. & S. 217.

mance,

An order will not be made on motion, that money should be paid into court, where a sum is reported

to be due, and exceptions are taken to the Master's report. Creak v. Capell, 6 Mad. 114.

In moving upon admissions in an answer for the payment of money into court, the plaintiff may shew that, upon the case stated in the answer, he has an interest in the sum in question, though the defendant, in his answer, expressly denies that the plaintiff has any such interest. Domville v. Solly, 2 Russ. 372.

Where, by mistake, sums paid into court under the decree were included in the balances reported due from the defendant, and the decree on further directions ordered these balances to be paid into court: Held, that the mistake could not be rectified without re-hearing the cause on the latter decree. Brookfield v. Bradley, 2 S. & S. 64.

If an application to rescind an order for paying money into court, on a certain day, be made before the same has been brought into court, it will be refused with costs. Dane v. John, 13 Price, 117.

An injunction to restrain proceedings at law, applies to money paid into court; therefore, where a defendant applied for leave to take money out of court which he had paid in, the Court refused the motion, with costs. Parke v. Shrewsbury, 13 Price, 289, s. c. M'Clel. 103.

As a general rule, the Court requires, in all petitions under acts of parliament for local improvements, &c., for payment of money out of court, that the parties applying shall, by affidavit, shortly verify their title, and state that, to their knowledge and belief, no other person has any title to, or claims any interest in the estate. In re Fleet-Market Improvement Act, ex parte Shears, 2 Y. & J. 493.

Where money has been brought into court upon obtaining an injunction, and afterwards that injunction is dissolved upon motion, the party against whom the injunction issued, is not entitled to have the money in court paid to him upon that motion. Furnival v. Bogle, 6 Law J. Chane. 91.

A fund paid out to persons entitled to it, subject to the contingency of a female of advanced age having children, on their recognizance to refund in case of that event happening. Long v. Hodges, 1 Jac. 585.

The amount of certain bills of exchange being paid into court by the acceptor on his obtaining an injunction against the bolder, if the suit of the plaintiff in equity is dismissed at the hearing, the money will be paid out of court to the defendant. Wynne v. Jackson, 5 Law J. Chanc. 55, s. c. 2 Russ. 351.

Where the title to money paid into court is clear, and does not depend on any complicated circumstances, a petition need not be presented. Heathcote v. Edwards, 1 Jac. 504.

The application to take money out of court which had been paid in by the party may be made by motion. A petition for that purpose is not necessary in the Court of Exchequer.

Ordered under circumstances, on payment of costs of the motion but without prejudice to the lien of the opposite party's solicitor on the residue of the fund in court. Oliver v. Dobson and Anderson, 12 Price, 156.

(b) At Law.

Money may be paid into court after tender made. Anon. 3 Law J. K.B. 175.

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In a penal action the Court permitted half the amount sued for, to be paid into court. Walker v. Keene, 2 Ken. 292.

When money is paid into court on counts for goods sold and delivered, and for money had and received, and the latter only applies to the plaintiff's demand, such payment admits a cause of action on that account only. Stafford v. Clark, 3 Law J. C.P. 48, s. c. 2 Bing. 377.

Where the defendant has pleaded a tender, and paid money into court, which the plaintiff takes out, and the defendant takes down the record by proviso, and the plaintiff does not appear, the defendant is not entitled to a verdict, but the plaintiff must be nonsuited. Anderson v. Shaw, 4 Law J. C.P. 53, s. c. 3 Bing. 290.

Where the surname of one of three joint plaintiffs, in an action on a contract, was inserted on the record, but the defendant pleaded a tender, and paid money into court on the whole declaration, and failed at the trial in proving it, and a verdict of 1s. damages was found for the plaintiff, to be increased to 23l. 9s. 5d., if the Court should be of opinion that the variance was not fatal: The Court, on motion for that purpose, refused to interfere. Longridge v. Brewer, 1 Law J. C.P. 42.

Where two breaches had been assigned on the same contract, and the defendant paid money into court upon one of them, it was determined that he thereby admitted bis liability on both. Dyer v. Ashton, 1 Law J. K.B. 8, s. c. 2 D. & R. 19, s. c. 1 B. & C. 3.

Payment of money into court upon a general indebitatus assumpsit, is no admission of a contract beyond the amount of the sum paid in. Seaton v. Benedict, 6 Law J. C.P. 208, s. c. 5 Bing. 28, s. c. 2 M. & P. 67.

Where, in several actions on a policy of insurance, the defendant paid money into court on one, and obtained a rule to stay proceedings in the others, on the terms of admitting their subscription to the policy and the interest of the plaintiff-the plaintiff refusing to enter into the consolidation rule: It was holden, on the defendant obtaining a verdict in that action, that the plaintiffs were entitled to costs in the other actions, up to the time the money was paid into court. Powell v. Parkinson, 6 M. & S. 107.

The plaintiff is entitled to costs up to the time of paying money into court by the defendant, even after a double default to try the cause, and peremptory undertaking given.

A plaintiff, after proceedings had, may take out of court the money paid by the defendant, without an application to the Court for that purpose; and by his so doing, all proceedings are stayed. Foulstone v. Blackmore, 1 Y. & J. 213.

PEER.

The Court will not quash a writ in which a person has been arrested, because he swears that he is a peer, unless he sets forth some acts which he has done in exercising the rights and privileges of a peer. Storey v. Birmingham, 2 Law J. K.B. 34, s. c. 3 D. & R. 488.

An Irish peer cannot be arrested for a debt. Coates v. Huwarden, 6 Law J. K.B. 62, s. c. 7 B. & C. 388, s. c. 1 M. & R. 110.

PENALTY.

[See CONTRACT, and PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.] Penalties imposed by a French law, must be enforced in a French court, and not in England. Le Louis, 2 Dods. 255.

If an existing statute imposes a penalty upon an act, which was before subject only to forfeiture, whether the recorded conviction of the act of forfeiture may be invoked for the purpose of enforcing the penalty, quære. Rex v. Whitaker, 1 Hag. 153.

Where an informer sues upon a penal statute, which gives the penalty with costs, half to the informer, and half to the poor of the parish in which the offence is committed, he cannot deduct from the moiety payable to the parish a contribution for costs incurred in maintaining the judgments in a court of error, which court had refused to allow the costs of affirmance. Willans v. Taylor, 5 Law J. K.B. 319, s. c. 7 B. & C. 111.

The Court will not compel a defendant to answer allegations which may subject him to penalties.

This protection extends not only to the question which directly may tend to criminate him, but to every link in the chain of proof.

Where the chairman of a joint-stock company, with a knowledge that the company had been dissolved, and that the managing committee had determined to buy up the shares, sent his shares into the market and sold them as good and available shares ; the Court protected him from answering these allegations, upon the ground that there existed a reasonable probability that he might be indicted for the fraud. Maccallum v. Turton, 2 Y. & J. 183.

To a bill filed against the defendants stating a partnership between them and the testator, as notaries, and praying an account, &c., they answered, that the testator had not taken out his certificate, according to the statute 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 72, s. 7, and that, inasmuch as by the statute 1 Geo. 3, c. 79, s. 10, any notary acting for a person not qualified to act as a notary, was liable to be struck off the roll, they ought not to be compelled to answer as to the alleged partnership; this answer being excepted to, the exceptions were overruled by Leach, V. C. and Lord Eldon, C. Nelme v. Newton, 2 Y. & J. 186.

PENSION.

A pension during pleasure was granted by his Majesty, Geo. 3. His Majesty Geo. 4, upon his accession, granted, by a fresh warrant, a pension of equal amount to the same person: Held, that an assignment of the pension, made during the life of Geo. 3, did not give the assignee any right to the existing pension. Clay v. St. John, 2 Law J. Chanc. 151.