testator's estate at his death. Tyler v. Manson; Manson v. Tyler, 5 Law J. Chanc. 34.

Where a bill had been filed on bonds given by an incorporated society, to pay money borrowed by them under the authority of an act of parliament, which gave the lenders a lien on the profits of the society: Held, not demurrable, on the ground that the plaintiff's remedy was at law. Duncan v. the Manchester Water-works Company, 8 Price, 697.

Papers delivered to a solicitor in his capacity of steward, are not subject to the general lien which usually attaches upon papers delivered to a solicitor. Champernown v. Scott, 6 Mad. 93.

Quare-Whether a solicitor has a right of lien on the proceedings under a commission of bankrupt that has been superseded. Ex parte Shaw, 1 Jac.

276.

A bill for establishing a lien upon deeds drawn for the sale of certain premises, the contract for which had been rescinded, and alleged to have been prepared by the plaintiff, charged a defendant with denying the plaintiff's alleged lien, claiming a lien for himself in respect of the same demand, and the possession of the deeds and other facts tending to shew a connexion with the subject of the suit; and further, that the defendant had contracted with his co-defendants for the purchase of the same premises, the defendant answered to the last charge only, that he had agreed to purchase, as agent for other persons, and disclaimed all other interest. Exceptions to the answer for insufficiency were allowed. Oxenham v. Esdaile, M'Clel. 540.

(C) WAIVER OR DISCHARGE.

As a general rule, it seems, that if a party having a lien on goods demanded of him, justifies his noncompliance upon grounds distinct from his claim of lien, he cannot afterwards resort to his lien as a defence of the retention. But where a party who was indebted to the defendant on a general account for dying goods, after an act of bankruptcy sold them to the defendant; and upon the property being demanded by the assignees, the defendant said nothing respecting the purchase, but only observed, that "he might as well give up every transaction of his life" Held, that such refusal did not amount to an abandonment of the lien. White v. Gainer, 2 Law J. C.P. 101, s. c. 2 Bing. 23, s. c. 9 B. Mo. 41, s. c. 1 C. & P. 324.

Where a party has goods in his possession on which he has a right of lien for a debt due to him from the owner, and afterwards takes those goods in execution for such debt, his lien is thereby destroyed, although the goods were never off his own premises. Jacobs v. Latour, 6 Law J. C.P. 243, s. c. 5 Bing. 130, s. c. 2 M. & P. 201.

LIGHTS.

A grant to open lights may be presumed, although the windows are in a building which does not extend to the boundary of the plaintiff's land.

A purchaser of some premises erected a high building, and obstructed the light from entering windows which had been opened at least thirtyeight years. It appeared that neither the vendor, nor any of his agents, had seen these premises for

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upwards of twenty years; but it did not appear that the tenant had a lease. The Court held, that an action could be maintained against the purchaser. Cross v. Lewis, 2 Law J. K.B. 56, s. c. 2 B. & C. 686, s. c. 4 D. & R. 234.

The enjoyment of a light during a period of twenty years, with the clear knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the adjoining premises, is sufficient to raise the presumption of a grant, and to give a right of action in case of obstruction.

But semble, that where a window has been opened in a building erected by a tenant, for the mere purpose of trade, and which is not annexed to the freehold, but may be removed by that tenant at his pleasure, or at the end of his term, no such right or presumption will arise. Maberley v. Dowson, 5 Law J. K.B. 261.

If a man pull down a building which has ancient lights in it, and erect another in the place of it without windows, he cannot afterwards open a window, and require a person who has erected a building near to it to pull it down, because it obstructs the light of his window. Moore v. Rawson, 3 Law J. K.B. 32, s. c. 3 B. & C. 633, s. c. 5 D. & R. 234.

In an action on the case for the obstruction of lights, a clerk who superintended the erection of the building which led to the nuisance, and who alone had directed the workmen, may properly be joined with the original contractor as a co-defendant. Wilson v. Peto, 6 B. Mo. 47.

To prove an obstruction of ancient lights, it must appear that there is such a privation of light as to render the occupier of his house uncomfortable ;shewing that he has less light than before, is of no avail. Back v. Stacey, 2 C. & P. 465. [Best]

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

(A) WHERE AVAILABLE. (a) At Law.

(b) In Equity.

(B) COMPUTATION OF TIME.

(C) SUBSEQUENT PROMISE OR ACKNOWLEDG

MENT.

(D) PLEADINGS.

(A) WHERE Available. (a) At Law.

A demand of a rent-charge is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Cupit v. Jackson, M'Clel.

495.

To an action founded upon a breach of duty, the Statute of Limitations is a good answer, though the action be framed in case for the consequential damage resulting within the six years. Howell v. Young, 4 Law J. K.B. 160, s. c. 5 B. & C. 259, s. c. 8 D. & R. 14, s. c. 2 C. & P. 238.

A landlord, on letting his lands, undertook to pay all the rates. For many years he charged his tenants 31. 10s. per acre. One of them died, and his administratrix paid another year's rent, including that charge. Another of the tenants spoke to the landlord, and told him, that he and all the tenants had

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paid him too much: he answered, that if there was any mistake, it should be rectified. He had paid but 11. 10s. per acre.

The administratrix brought an action to recover the sums overpaid by the intestate. The landlord pleaded the Statute of Limitations: The Court held that she could recover the money. Clark v. Hougham, 1 Law J. K.B. 249, s. c. 2 B. & C. 149, s. c. 3 D. & R. 322.

Where a debtor, at the time of contracting a debt, is abroad, his return to this country, though for a very short time, (a day or two, for instance,) without any intention to remain, and without the knowledge of the creditor, is yet a return within the meaning of the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 19; and the time reckoned by the Statute of Limitations will thereupon begin to run. Gregory v. Hurrill, 4 Law J. K.B. 262, s. c. 1 Law J. C.P. 115, s. c. 1 Bing. 324, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 189, s. c. 5 B. & C. 341, s. c. 8 D. & R. 270.

Semble-That a latitat properly returned and continued, may be connected with a bill of Middlesex sued out afterwards, so as to save the Statute of Limitations. Page v. Newman, 5 Law J. K.B. 263.

A writ sued out, in order to save the Statute of Limitations, must be returned and filed with the proper officer, (Clerk of the Treasury in K.B.; Custos Brevium in C.P.) The mere indorsement by the sheriff of the words of his return, the writ itself remaining in the sheriff's office, will not be sufficient. Gregory v. Hurrill, 4 Law J. K.B. 262, s. c. 5 B. & C. 341, s. c. 8 D. & R. 270.

(b) In Equity.

Courts of equity are bound to act according to the spirit of the statute; and even in cases where it is not too late to maintain an ejectment, courts of equity have refused to interfere, because evidence has been lost. Whalley v. Whalley, 3 Bligh, 17.

The Statute of Limitations cannot be pleaded to a suit for specific performance.

If there has been such a lapse of time, that the Court, proceeding upon a rule adopted by analogy to the Statute of Limitations, would refuse to enforce specific performance; these circumstances, if not disclosed in the bill so as to enable the defendant to demur, ought to be stated in the plea; and the Court, for the purpose of applying its own rule, will advert to the statute, though not pleaded. Talmarsh v. Muggleston, 4 Law J. Chanc. 200.

Where, under misrepresentations as to the terms of a bond, the executors paid the property-tax,—it was holden, that they were entitled to have the whole amount of that duty refunded, notwithstanding a space of more than six years had elapsed since the last of the payments. Smith v. Alsop, M'Clel. 622.

If a tenant for life has rendered accounts to the remainder-man, of timber cut by him, during a period of more than six years, before a bill is filed against him for an account of such timber, and of the value of it, the Statute of Limitations cannot be pleaded to the bill; for though, if the remainderman had brought an action of trover, the tenant for life might, notwithstanding the rendering of the accounts, have pleaded the statute, he could not have done so, if the remainder-man had brought an action of assumpsit. Hony v. Hony, 1 S. & S. 568.

To a bill, by a remainder-man, for an account of timber wrongfully cut by the tenant for life and her assignee, the Statute of Limitations cannot be pleaded. Alderman v. Bannister, 4 Law J. Chanc. 126.

The Statute of Limitations may be pleaded in bar to a bill, to prevent the setting up of outstanding terms. Jermy v. Best, 1 Sim. 373.

A bill filed by one creditor on behalf of himself and the others, will prevent the Statute of Limitations from running against any of the creditors who came in under the decree. Sterndale v. Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393.

(B) COMPUTATION OF TIME.

The Statute of Limitations on a note payable on demand runs from the demand. Thorpe v. Coombe, 8 D. & R. 347, semble s. c. 1 R. & M. 388.

The Statute of Limitations does not begin to operate between creditors and an executor, until he has either proved the will or exercised some act of executorship. Douglas v. Forres, 6 Law J. C.P. 157, s. c. 4 Bing. 686, s. c. 1 M. & P. 663.

Where, in an action against the London Dock Company for an injury by undermining a wall, it appeared that the excavation had been made in the lifetime of the plaintiff's ancestor, who had an interest under a devise to him for life, remainder to the plaintiff in fee; and that the wall had not fallen in until after the plaintiff's title accrued; that the undermining had taken place two years previous to the falling of the wall; and that the dock act contained a clause that no action should be brought unless within six months after the fact committed: It was holden, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, notwithstanding the alteration of title, and notwithstanding the limitation of the action, inas much as it meant six months after the falling of the wall. Gillon v. Boddington, 1 C. & P. 541, s. c. 1 R. & M. 161. See 39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 47, s. 151.

The cause of action, within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations, arises when the party has the right to apply to a court of equity: as where a reversion, alleged to have been fraudulently purchased, descends in equity to the heir by the death of the ancestor.

Semble-that the time of limitation begins to run from the time when the fraud is discovered, either in the lifetime of the ancestor, or upon the descent. Whalley v. Whalley, 3 Bligh, 12-17.

Where an officer seized a vessel on the 23d day of August, and detained her until the 24th of September following: Held, that the time within which the action should have been brought, must be calculated from the first day of seizure, as the 28 Geo. 3, c. 37, s. 28 enacts, that "every action commenced against any person, for any act done by bim relating to the public revenue of Customs or Excise, shall be commenced within three months after the matter or thing done."

The word "month," in that section of the act, is to be construed as a lunar, not a calendar month. Crook v. M'Tavish, 1 Law J. C.P. 43, s. c. 1 Bing. 167.

The 23 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 34 enacts, that "any action or suit against any person or persons, for any matter or thing done by any officer or officers of Excise, or any others acting in his or their aid, must be commenced within three months next after the

cause of action." Semble, that this section extends to the officers themselves, and others acting in their aid; at all events, an action against officers of excise, &c. not brought within the time limited, is barred by the 28 Geo. 3, c. 27, s. 23, which extends to any action against any person or persons, for anything by him or them done in pursuance of any act or acts relating to the revenues of Custom or Excise. Hendry v. Biers, 2 D. & R. 9.

In an action of trespass against a constable and others, for seizing and taking away goods, it appeared that they were directed to search for, and take certain black cloth alleged to have been stolen, and that they had taken other cloth, and carried it before a justice of the peace: Held, that as the action was not brought within six months, they were protected by the 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 8. And, semble, that that section applies to all cases of constables acting as such. Smith v. Wiltshire, 5 B. Mo. 322, s. c. 2 B. & B. 619.

(C) SUBSEQUENT PROMISE OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

The defendant having pleaded the Statute of Limitations to an action on a promissory note, the plaintiff gave in evidence, as proof of an acknowledgment within six years, the following letter from the defendant to the plaintiff : "Business calls me to Liverpool; should I be fortunate in my adventures, you may depend on seeing me at Bristol, or otherwise I must arrange matters with you as circumstances will permit.' The defendant did not shew that there were any other matters except the promissory note to which the letter could refer: Held, that the question, whether this letter referred to the matter of the promissory note, was properly left to the jury; and that the acknowledgment was sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. Frost v. Bengough, 1 Law J. C.P. 96, s. c. 1 Bing. 267.

A having employed B as his solicitor and agent for some years, on the 23rd April 1813, writes to him a letter, in these words :-"I have for a length of time been in expectation of receiving the account of whatever I may stand indebted to you, let me again request you will oblige me with it, that everything may be settled." A died on the 27th August 1814, having made his will, by which he devised his real and personal estates, in trust for sale, and directed his trustees to stand possessed of the monies to arise by the sale thereof, after paying his debts, and the charges and expenses attending his will, upon the trusts therein mentioned. B, shortly after A's death, delivered his bill, the last item of which was on the 19th of August 1808, and on the 18th November 1820, he files his bill on behalf of himself and the other creditors of the testator. The Court held, that the debt was taken out of the Statute of Limitations by the testator's letter of the 23rd April 1813, and was continued to be kept out of that statute by the devise in the testator's will; and decreed for the plaintiff accordingly: but, in consequence of his laches and some misconduct, without costs. Rendell v. Carpenter, 2 Y. & J. 484.

Where, to an action of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and the plaintiff gave in evidence a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff's attorney, stating that he had received his letter re

333

specting the plaintiff's demand-that it was not a just one-that he was ready to settle the account whenever the plaintiff thought proper to meet him on the business-that he was not in his debt 901., nor anything like that sum-and that he should be happy to settle the business by the plaintiff's meeting him in London: Held, that the judge was warranted in telling the jury, that, after this letter, the Statute of Limitations was out of the question, as there was a clear admission of an existing debt upon the face of the letter itself. Colledge v. Horn, 3 Law J. C.P. 184, s. c. 3 Bing. 119.

The Court held, that the words, "It is ten years ago, and I cannot pay my new debts, much less my old ones," were not such an acknowledgment of an existing debt as to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. Knott v. Farren, 2 Law J. K.B. 122, s. c. 4 D. & R. 179.

Semble-That after the lapse of six years it is not a sufficient acknowledgment to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, to say, "I will see my attorney, and tell him to do what is right." Miller v. Caldwell, 3 D. & R. 267.

The Statute of Limitations is avoided by the debtor saying to his creditor, "I shall go to my attorney's and pay the debt and settle it." Triggs v. Newnham, 1 C. & P. 651. [Best]

Where, on the defendant's being arrested at the suit of the plaintiff, for a debt due more than six years, he said to the officer, "I know that I owe the money; but the bill I gave is on a wrong stamp, and now I am arrested I will never pay:" Held, that this was not such an acknowledgment of the debt as to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. A'Court v. Cross, 4 Law J. C.P. 79, s. c. 3 Bing.

329.

Where to a plea of the Statute of Limitations, on which issue was joined, and the plaintiff proved that three years after the original cause of action accrued, and within six years of the commencement of the suit, the defendant, on being called on for payment, said he could not pay the debt, that he would do so as soon as he was able: Held, that this was a conditional promise only, and did not take the case out of the statute. Scales v. Jacob, 4 Law J. C.P. 209, s. c. 3 Bing. 638.

To a plea of the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff proved, that having demanded payment of his debt within six years from the commencement of the suit, the defendant said, that he should be happy to pay him if he could; that money was due to him from JG; and that if the plaintiff could get it, he might pay himself: Held, that this was only a conditional promise, and that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to shew the defendant's ability to pay. Ayton v. Bowles, 5 Law J. C.P. 109, s. c. 4 Bing.

105.

In assumpsit, brought to recover a sum of money, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and upon that issue was joined. At the trial the plaintiff proved the following acknowledgment by the defendant within six years :-"I cannot pay the debt at present, but I will pay it as soon as I can:" Held, that this was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, no proof being given of the defendant's ability to pay. Tanner v. Smart, 5 Law J. K.B. 218, s. c. 6 B. & C. 603.

The borrower of money gave the lender the fol

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lowing memorandum :-"I owe you 100l., C.R., 30th July 1821;" underneath was written, August 17, received 501., C.R.:" Held, that the latter item, which was within six years of the commencement of the suit, did not amount to such an acknowledgment of the existence of the prior debt, so as to take it out of the statute. Robarts v. Robarts, 6 Law J. C. P. 117, s. c. 1 M. & P. 487, s. c. 3 C. & P. 296.

Subsequent admission of having committed a trespass, will not take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. Hurst v. Parker, 2 Chit. 249.

The defendant, upon being requested to pay a bill for dinners and other matters, by the keeper of an hotel, answered, "I am not bound to pay it, for I was invited to their dinners." He afterwards paid a small sum into court: The Court held, that neither the answer, nor the circumstance of the defendant having paid money into court, took the case out of the Statute of Limitations. Long v. Greville, 2 Law J K.B. 205, s. c. 3 B. & C. 10, s. c. 4 D. & R. 632. The defendants, being sued for a sum due for principal and interest from their testator, pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and paid the principal into court, but refused to pay the interest: Held that the payment of the principal into court did not amount to an implied promise to pay the interest, so as to take that out of the statute. Collyer v. Willock, 5 Law J. C.P. 181, s. c. 4 Bing. 313.

A verbal promise or admission is not indispensable, to take a case out of the Statute of Limitations: therefore, where persons liable consulted, attended, and advised as to the mode of proceeding against other persons also answerable,-it was holden sufficient to preclude the statute from being a bar against he former persons. East India Company v. Prince, 1 R. & M. 407. [Abbott]

An acknowlegement within six years, by one of the joint makers of a promissory note, will revive the debt against the other, although he has made no acknowledgment, and only signed the note as a surety. Perham v. Raynal, 2 Law J. C.P. 271, s. c. 2 Bing. 306.

Where a man and his sister made a joint promissory note; but six years had elapsed without an acknowledgment from either of them; but after the marriage of the sister, and within six years, the man promised to pay it: Held, that in a declaration without counts laying promises made after the marriage, the case was not taken out of the Statute of Limitations. Pittam v. Foster, 1 Law J. K.B. 81, s. c. 1 B. & C. 248, s. c. 2 D. & R. 363.

A payment of interest by A on the joint and several note of A and B, is evidence of a promise by B, and takes the note out of the Statute of Limitations, though B was a mere surety, and the payment was made without his knowledge. Burleigh v. Stott, 6 Law J. K.B. 232, s. c. 8 B. & C. 36, s. c. 2 M. & R. 93.

To take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, there must be an express promise by all the executors, since a mere acknowledgment by all, or an express promise by one, is of no avail. Dunn, 1 R. & M. 416. [Abbott]

Tullock v.

An admission of a debt by the executrix of a trader, within six years before the filing of a creditor's bill, will not take the debt out of the Statute of Limitations, so as to enable the creditor, under the 47 Geo. 3, c. 74, to claim payment out of the real

If the declaration be entitled generally, and the defendant plead that the cause of action did not accrue within six years before the exhibiting of plaintiff's bill, the defendant may prove the exact day on which the bill was filed. Granger v. George, 5 B. & C. 149, s. c. 7 D. & R. 729.

When the Statute of Limitations is pleaded in bar to a bill of discovery, the plea must shew that the statute has been pleaded with due averments to the action at law. Macgregor v. East India Company, 4 Law J. Chanc. 173.

Where a bill is filed for discovery in aid of an action, to which the Statute of Limitations has been pleaded, and the plaintiff states in his bill that several pleas have been pleaded at law, of which the general issue is one: the defendant, in pleading the Statute of Limitations in bar to the discovery, must make it appear on his plea, that the Statute of Limitations bas been pleaded at law. Macgregor v. East India Company, 4 Law J. Chanc. 23.

A creditor's bill being filed against an executrix and heir-at-law of a person who died in 1820, charging, that the testator had, within six years before his death, and also within six years before the filing of the bill, admitted the debt, and that the executrix, since his decease, had admitted the debt; to the whole of the bill, except certain specified parts, (which exception did not contain the allegation that the executrix bad admitted the debt,) the defendants pleaded the Statute of Limitations, but the plea did not aver that the executrix had not admitted the debt: Held, that the plea was bad in substance. Bosworth v. Cotchett, 4 Law J. Chanc. 21.

A replication to the Statute of Limitations, setting out a number of writs, the first of which was sued out within six years after the return of the plaintiff to England, need not state that it was the first return of the plaintiff, or that the writs are alias pluries, &c.; and it is no objection that some of them were not bailable, and the last bailable, if it be stated that the non-bailable writs were sued out with the intent to declare on the promises actually declared on. Plummer v. Woodburne, 4 Law J. K.B. 6, s. c. 4 B. & C. 625, s. c. 7 D. & R. 25.

To a declaration in trover by an administrator, charging a conversion after the death of the intestate, the defendant pleaded, Not guilty within six years: Held, bad upon special demurrer. It should have been that the cause of action did not accrue within six years. Pratt v. Swaine, 6 Law J. K.B. 353, s. c. 3 B. & C. 285.

When the recovery of a debt has been impeded by the Statute of Limitations, and the plaintiff relies upon a new promise, semble, he should declare on the new promise, and not on the original cause of action.

At all events, he cannot reply such new promise, to a plea of "action not accrued within six years." Nor, if he take issue on such a plea, will a qualified or conditional admission entitle him to recover, if his declaration has proceeded on the original cause of action. Tanner v. Smart, 5 Law J. K.B. 218, s. c. 6 B. & C. 603.

To a plea of the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff proved a promise by the defendant to pay the debt due within six years, although the original cause of action accrued thirteen years before: Held, a sufficient acknowledgment to take the case out of the statute, and that the plaintiff need not declare specially on the subsequent promise. Upton v. Else, 5 Law J. C.P. 108.

LOAN.

Quare, Whether a resident here can raise money by way of loan, to assist subjects of another state in alliance with this country, without licence of the king. De Wutz v. Hendricks, 3 Law J. C.P. 3, s. c. 2 Bing. 314.

Where a sum of money has been advanced, upon the surrender of copy bold property to the use of the party making that advance, on condition that such surrender shall become void, if payment with interest be made at a particular time, otherwise to be of full force and virtue; and interest has been paid from time to time, subsequent to the day appointed for re-payment; and where other circumstances in the conduct of the party to whom the advance was made, shew that it was considered as money borrowed: This transaction will not be treated as a conditional purchase, but as a loan for which the surrender is a collateral security; and the administrator of the lender may recover principal and interest in arrear, in an action of assumpsit. Allenby v. Dalton, 5 Law J. K.B. 312.

LONDON POLICE ACT.

The London Police Act, 3 Geo. 4, c. 55, s. 16, authorizing the apprehension of suspected persons or reputed thieves, only applies to the apprehension of persons of general bad character, as rogues and vagabonds, not to apprehension on suspicion of a particular felony. Cowles v. Dunbar, 1 M. & M. 37. [Abbott]

LORD'S ACT. [See PRISONER.]

LORD'S DAY.

A contract entered into on a Sunday, in the making of which either party is exercising his ordinary calling, is void, under the statute 29 Car. 2, c. 7; and it is of no consequence whether the act be done openly or concealedly, or whether it be an act of work and labour or not. Fennell v. Riddler, 4 Law J. K.B. 207, s. c. 5 B. & C. 406, s. c. 8 D. & R. 204.

A contract made on a Sunday is void, although

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it was entered into by a broker without the knowledge of his principal, and at the special request of the purchaser, who afterwards refused to fulfil it. Smith v. Sparrow, 5 Law J. C.P. 80, s. c. 4 Bing. 83.

The driving of a stage coach on Sunday is not prohibited by 3 Car. 1, c. 2, or 29 Car. 2, c. 7. Sandeman v. Breach, 5 Law J. K.B. 298, s. c. 7 B. & C. 96.

A contract of biring and service for a year, made between a farmer and a labourer, on a Sunday, is not within the prohibition in 29 Car. 2. c. 7, s. 1; and due service under it confers a settlement. Rex Whitnash, 6 Law J. M.C. 26, s. c. 7 B. & C. 596, 1 M. & R. 452.

A gentleman, on a Sunday, bargained with a stage-coach proprietor for a horse, which was warranted sound. On the next Tuesday, the horse was delivered, when the money was paid; but the horse proved to be unsound. The seller was a horse-dealer, but the buyer did not know that fact: The Court held, that the contract was not complete until the horse was delivered, and therefore that the contract was not void under 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 2; but even if it was, still they held that the buyer, not knowing that the seller was exercising his calling on a Sunday, might recover back his money. Bloxsome v. Williams, 2 Law J. K.B. 224, s. c. 3 B. & C. 232, s. c. 5 D. & R. 82, s. c. 1 C. & P. 294.

LUNATIC.

(A) PRIVILEGES. (B) COMMISSION. (C) COMMITtee. (D) PROPERTY.

(A) PRIVILEGES.

A lunatic may be arrested. Ex parte Hall, 1 Jac. 161.

Unsound mind in defendant no defence to an action on a contract unless it was known, or in any way taken advantage of, by the plaintiff. Browne v. Joddrell, 1 M. & M. 105, s. c. 3 C. & P. 30. [Tenterden]

(B) COMMISSION.

The Chancellor said, that he could not make a grant of a committeeship of lunacy, on a return to a commission, that the party was a lunatic enjoying lucid intervals, and that during such intervals he was competent to the government of himself and his affairs; but that the commission should be quashed and a new one issued. Ex parte Atkinson, 1 Jac. 333.

Ill treatment by the nearest relatives is a ground of granting a commission of lunacy to strangersand the former will be compelled to pay the costs occasioned by their opposition. In re Smith, 1 Russ. 348.

The issuing of a commission of lunacy in Jamaica is no bar to issuing one here upon the lunatic's coming into England. In re Houstoun, 1 Russ. 312.

(C) COMMITTEE.

In choosing a committee for a lunatic, those who can visit frequently will be preferred.