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it is defective for stating that the said A B, at a court leet there holden, the inquest duly sworn, &c. did present, &c. Rer v. Boycot, 1 Ken. 318.

The word "from," as applied to a parish, in the description of a road, does not of necessity exclude the parish. The word may, after verdict, be treated as inclusive, if, from the whole context of the sentence, it must fairly be understood as being so used, and so understood by the jury.

Indictment for obstructing a highway, charging, "that defendant removed a culvert in the parish of S, opposite to a mill there, in a highway there, leading from S to K: Held good, on motion in arrest of judgment. Rex v. Knight, 6 Law J. M.C. 19, 8. c. 7 B. & C. 413, s. c. 1 M. & R. 217.

An indictment charged that A B, on &c., being the servant of J H, on the same day &c., one gold ring, &c. then and there being in the possession of J H, and being his goods and chattels, feloniously did steal: Held, that the fair import of the charge was, that A B was the servant of J H, at the time when the theft was committed, and that the indictment therefore warranted judgment of transportation for fourteen years. The King v. Mary Somer

ton, 6 Law J. M.C. 92, s. c. 7 B. & C. 463.

Where, in an indictment, a fact is stated, from which another fact is also stated, as a legal inference from the first, a verdict of guilty will not support the indictment, unless there be sufficient on the face of the indictment to shew that the second fact is a legal and necessary inference from the first.

Accordingly, where an information stated, that one R H was employed in the service of the Customs, and that it was his duty, as such person so employed, to seize certain goods, and it then went on to charge the defendant with offering to bribe RH to violate his duty,-it was held, after verdict, that the mere employment of R H by the Customs did not create a duty to seize goods; and, none of the acts of parliament relating to the Customs creating such a duty from such an employment alone, judgment was arrested. Rex v. Everett, 6 Law J. M.Č. 83, 8, c. 8 B. & C. 114, s. c. 2 M. & R. 35.

(C) EVIDENCE.

[See VARIANCE.]

Though an indictment aver an assault with intent to abuse and carnally know, it is supported by proof of an assault with intent to abuse only. Rex v. Dawson, 3 Stark. 62. [Holroyd]

An indictment charging the defendant with having published a libel, with intent to defame certain magistrates, and also to bring the administration of justice into contempt, is supported, if either of those intentions be proved. Rex v. Evans, 1 Stark. 35. [Bayley]

Where a certain parish is named in an indictment for felony, as being in a particular county, it is not necessary to prove that the parish is in that county. Rex v. Dowling, 1 R. & M. 433. [Littledale]

The circumstance of evidence shewing the prisoner guilty of another felony, is no objection. Rex v. Moore, 2 C. & P. 235. [Burrough]

To support an indictment for publishing an obscene snuff-box, the identical box must be produced: shewing a similar one is insufficient. Rex v. Rosenstein, 2 C. & P. 415. [Park]

Where, on an indictment for larceny, the prosecutor rests his case on the prisoner's recent possession of the property, and the prisoner calls a witness to prove that he bought such property of A B, and the prosecutor then calls A B,-A B can only give evidence, which goes to destroy the prisoner's case; and consequently, evidence shewing that he saw the prisoner commit the robbery, will be rejected. Rex v. Stimpson, 2 C. & P. 415. [Garrow]

An indictment against persons for disobedience of an order of justices, to restore a member of a benefit club, stated that the rules of the club had been duly inrolled at the Sessions. The order of the justices recited that they had been so inrolled; but on the trial of the indictment, there being no evidence of the fact, except the recital of the justices themselves, -it was held, that the fact which was necessary for the jurisdiction of the justices was not proved. Rer v. Gilkes, 6 Law J. M.C. 118, s. c. 8 B. & C. 439.

Although, in general, the evidence on the trial of an indictment for felony, shall be confined to the felony.in question; yet, if the transaction relating to the prisoner's conduct be so connected in its facts as to render it necessary that the whole shall be laid before the jury, the whole shall be received in evidence, although it may include other felonies for which the prisoner may yet afterwards be called to account. The question whether the transaction is or is not so connected in its facts, is a question to be decided by the judge on the trial, in his discretion; and it seems the Court will not afterwards review his decision. Rex v. Ellis, 5 Law J. M.C. 1, s. c. 9 D. & R. 174, 9. c. 6 B. & C. 145.

Where an indictment for a conspiracy alleged "at the Court of Quarter Sessions holden, &c., an indictment against A B was preferred to, and found by the grand jury:" Held, that this allegation must be proved by a caption regularly drawn up of record, and that the minute book kept by the deputy clerk of the peace could not be received as evidence of the finding of the bill, although no record had been in fact drawn up. Rex v. Smith, 6 Law J. M.C. 99, 8. c. 8 B. & C. 341.

An estate descending to an infant heir, subject to a trust to sell for payment of certain incumbrances: Held, that it could not be resorted to for the payment of other specialty debts during the minority of the heir. Scarth v. Cotton, 1 Jac. 635.

On a bill by an executor to recover a fund belonging to a testator, it appearing that the testator's debts were paid, and that the fund was bequeathed to infants, the Court refused to have it transferred to the executor, but secured it in court for the benefit of the infants. Crick v. Binney, 1 Jac. 523.

An objection to a sale in court in execution of a will, that there were infants interested under the will, who could not join in the conveyance, was overruled. Powell v. Powell, 6 Mad. 53.

An infant dying seised of an equitable estate, which descended ex parte materná, his capacity to call for a conveyance of the legal estate (by which course the descent might have been broken), is not a sufficient reason to induce the Court to view the case, as if a conveyance had been really made. Langley v. Sneyd, 1 S. & S. 45.

An infant of the age of sixteen may enter into a recognizance to prosecute a criminal charge. Er parte Williams, M'Clel. 493.

(B) LIABILITIES.

If any portion of goods, supplied to an infant to trade with, be consumed by his family as necessaries, he is liable for that portion. Turberville v. Whitehouse, 1 C. & P. 94. [Hullock]

If proper clothes are supplied to an infant by his father, any others furnished in addition cannot be considered as necessaries; and it is the duty of a tradesman when applied to by an infant for clothes, to make inquiries of his friends, before he gives him credit. Cook v. Denton, 3 C. & P. 114. [Best]

If an infant be tenant in tail, he is as much to keep down the interest of debts charged upon the entailed estates, as any person who is not a minor. Burges v. Mawbey, 1 Turn. 167.

Whether an infant can be bound by a submission to arbitration entered into on his behalf by his guardian-quære.

But a submission to arbitration entered into by himself alone, or by any other person than his guardian on his behalf, is clearly void. Cox v. Dowse, 5 Law J. K.B. 128, s. c. 6 B. & C. 255.

An infant administratrix may be compelled in equity to account. Hindmarsh v. Southgate, 1 Law J. Chanc. 24.

Articles under which A had served his clerkship to an attorney, contained a proviso, that A should not practise within a certain district; and also a covenant on the part of his father, that A should, within a month after he came of age, execute a bond in a specified penalty to ensure his fulfilment of the proviso; A, who was an infant at the time of the execution of the articles, served under them for three years after he attained his full age, but was never called on to execute any bond, and, with the knowledge of the purport of the articles, completed his clerkship, and afterwards began to practise as an attorney within the district from which the articles purported to exclude him; a motion for an injunction to restrain him from practising within that district was refused, with costs. Capes v. Hutton, 2 Russ. 357,

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A commission of bankrupt cannot be supported against a person under age. O'Brien v. Currie, 3 C. & P. 283. [Burrough]

A boy under the age of 14, cannnot be convicted of an assault with intent to commit a rape. Rer v. Aldershaw, 3 C. & P. 396. [Vaughan]

(C) MAINTENANCE.

Maintenance allowed to infants out of a fund in which they had only contingent interests. Prater v. Prater, 6 Law J. Chanc. 90.

Where there are two funds absolutely given by different persons for the maintenance of an infant, the infant's interest determines which of the two shall be appropriated first. Foljambe v. Willoughby, 2 S. & S. 165.

(D) ACTIONS AND SUITS BY AND AGAINST.

The tutors of an infant Scotchman executed an agreement inter partes for a lease, whereby they let a salmon fishery for four years. The rent was reserved, payable to the tutors, or to any other person duly authorized to receive it: The Court held, without proof of the infant being of age, that he might sue upon the instrument in his own name. Fitzmaurice v. Waugh, 3 D. & R. 273; Carnegie v. Waugh, 1 Law J. K.B. 89, s. c. 2 D. & R. 277.

If an infant appear and defend by attorney, the Court will order the appearance to be struck out of the filacer's book, and direct, that if the defendant should appear by guardian, the plea should be framed accordingly. Francis v. Thompson, 4 Law J. C.P. 192, s. c. 3 Bing. 609, as Paget v. Thompson.

If an infant is sued for a debt, which he has contracted in the course of trade, and has suffered judgment to be signed by default, the Court will not set it aside. Wright v. Hunter, 1 Law J. K.B. 248.

An infant bought goods. He made a promise to pay after he became of age, but after the commencement of an action against him: The Court held, that such a promise did not support the replication (to a plea of infancy), that the defendant ratified the contract after he became of age. Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 Law J. K.B. 175, s. c. 2 B. & C. 824, s. c. 4 D. & R. 545.

An entry made as to the time a child was born, in the register of the christening, is not of itself sufficient evidence, in an action against an infant, to prove his infancy. Wihen v. Law, 3 Stark. 63. [Bayley]

A person, who makes an adverse entry into, and take an adverse possession of an infant's estate, cannot be treated as the bailiff of that infant; nor can a bill for an account against him in that character be sustained. Hagley v. West, 4 Law J. Chanc. 63.

Where an application is made for a reference, to inquire whether any proceedings will be for the benefit of infants, the interest of the infants must be stated to the Court. Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 33.

An inquiry, whether a suit is beneficial to an infant, unless upon a strong case of no benefit, or improper motive, will not be directed by the Court. Stevens v. Stevens, 6 Mad. 97.

The Court will not grant an application to stay proceedings in a suit commenced on behalf of infants for accounts of their property, upon affidavits that the suit was not for their benefit. Lyons v. Blenkin, 1 Jac. 259.

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Where an infant had put in his answer by guardian, and a supplemental bill was filed-On motion, an order was made, that the guardian who put in this answer to the original bill, might put in the answer to the supplemental bill. Lushington v. Sewell, 6 Mad. 28.

An estate descending to an infant heir, subject to a lien or equitable charge: Held, that the parol does not demur in a suit instituted by other creditors.

Infants being added as parties to a cause after the report had been made, it was referred to the Master to inquire, whether it would be for their benefit that the report should be adopted as to them. Brookfield v. Bradley, 1 Jac. 632.

(A) WHEN GRANTED.

An information lies against overseers for assisting in the promotion of a marriage, in order to relieve the parish of a pauper, by burthening him on another settlement. Rex v. Herbert, 2 Ken. 466.

So, for a conspiracy to raise the price of salt, by several entering into an agreement not to sell salt under a certain price. Rex v. Norris, 2 Ken. 300.

The Court will not grant an information against a party for not accepting a corporate office, in absence of some obstinacy, &c. on the part of the person elected. Rex v. Denison, 2 Ken. 259.

A justice of the peace cannot be criminally proceeded against, until an action for the same offence is discontinued. Rex v. Fielding, 2 Ken. 386, s. c. 2 Burr. 720.

An information lies against justices for refusing to relieve burgesses appealing against a poor-rate. Rex v. Phelps, 2 Ken. 570.

(B) FORM.

[See INDICTMENT.]

An information against a brewer for alleged frauds in mixing beer, contrary to the statute of the 42 Geo. 3, c. 12, contained a count stating, that the defendant being such brewer, after the passing of the said act, and before the exhibiting of this information, to wit, on the 21st day of October, 1819, and on each and every of divers, to wit, twenty days between that day and the day of exhibiting this information, did mix, and cause to be mixed, a large quantity, to wit, 52 gallons of strong beer with a large quantity, to wit, 24 gallons of table beer, in each and every of divers, to wit, five other casks, contrary to the form of the statute, whereby, &c. the said defendant, being such brewer so offending, hath, for each of his said offences, forfeited the sum of 2001., amounting in the whole to a further sum of 21,000l. On a motion in arrest of judgment, the Court held this to be a good and sufficient count. Attorney General v. Freer, 11 Price, 183.

A videlicet in an information laying the number of things seized, is conclusive as to the number so laid;

therefore a verdict and judgment cannot be beyond the number so specified.

If an information for forfeitures of machinery, under the 21 Geo. 3, c. 37, does not contain an averment of the quantity of things seized, it cannot be supported. Attorney General v. Jefferys, 13 Price, 545, s. c. M'Clel. 270.

An information upon the statute 11 Geo. 1, c. 30, s. 30, against a candle-maker for mixing unweighed with weighed candles, must charge the act to have been done with intent to deceive His Majesty of his duties. Attorney General v. Barrell, 1 Y. & J. 495.

An information stating that the defendant imported or caused to be imported foreign silks, is bad for uncertainty. Rex v. Moorley, 1 Y. & J. 221.

(C) PRACTICE.

A rule nisi for an information cannot be served on a clerk in court, who has been formerly employed by the defendant. Anon. 2 Ken. 496.

The commencement of a suit by information by the Attorney General on the part of the crown, for the recovery of forfeitures under a penal act of parliament, must, with reference to the Statute of Limilations, be taken to be the issuing of process, and not the actual filing of the information. Attorney General v. Hall, 11 Price, 760.

(A) WHERE GRANTED OR REFUSED, IN GENERAL.

Where a plaintiff states upon his bill a case entitling him to be relieved against a bond, and the defendant protects himself from answering several of the circumstances which are essential to the plaintiff's equity, on the ground that the discovery of them would expose him to pains and censures in the Ecclesiastical Court, but admits other circumstances connected with these; if the Court, comparing what is admitted with what is refused to be answered, sees reason to think that the case is one which is fit for inquiry in equity, an injunction will be granted. v. Donovan, 2 Law J. Chanc. 56.

A, being the owner of two adjoining houses, demises one to B, and afterwards demises the other to C. Neither A nor C can make such alterations on the premises demised to the latter as will prevent the comfortable enjoyment of the house demised to B.

Under an act of parliament, any owner of mines, &c. lying within a certain distance of a canal, was authorized to apply to the commissioners of the navigation, to have a railway made over the lands of other proprietors, intervening between them and the canal, for the purpose of communicating with it; and if it should appear to the major part of the commissioners, that such road was fitting or necessary, it was to be lawful for the proprietor of the mine, &c. to make it, subject to certain restrictions expressed in the act; and it was provided, that if any person should think himself aggrieved by anything done in pursuance of the act, he might within six calendar months appeal to the quarter sessions: under this act, the commissioners, by their award, authorized the defendant to make a railway over the lands of the plaintiff;-the plaintiff having filed his bill to restrain the execution of the work, on the ground that the railway was not fitting and necessary, an injunction was granted. Dudley v. Horton, 4 Law J. Chanc. 104.

Where persons, who were merely hirers and occupiers of seats or pews in a dissenting meeting-house, which was held in trust for the use of the congregation, but who did not take the sacrament there, had been excluded from voting at the election of a minister to officiate in the meeting house, an application for an injunction to restrain the individual so elected from acting as minister, or receiving the emoluments attached to his office, was refused. Leslie v. Birnie, 2 Russ. 114.

French stock, which, there was reason to believe, belonged to a bankrupt, was transferred into the name of his wife; she transferred it into the name of B, and died, having previously appointed to B certain sums in the English stocks, which she had a power of disposing of; and B, who generally resided in France, took out administration to her in England in a suit by the assignee of the bankrupt to recover the French stock, an injunction was granted to restrain the transfer of the English stock. Stead v. Clay, 6 Law J. Chanc. 138, s. c. 1 Sim. 294.

An injunction will not be granted to a landlord, who has relaxed, in favour of some of his tenants, a covenant entered into for the benefit of all, to restrain the other tenants from infringing the covenant. Roper v. Williams, 1 Turn. 18.

Where there is a fair doubt, whether the law would give damages for the piracy of a work, a court of equity will not maintain an injunction granted ex parte, but will leave the plaintiff to establish his legal right, before it interferes in his behalf. Lord Byron v. Dugdale, 1 Law J. Chanc. 239.

A tenant having violated the conditions of an agreement for a lease of a farm, under which he had taken possession, the landlord brought an ejectment against him, upon a bill being filed by the tenant,

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for a specific performance of the agreement, and to restrain proceedings at law, the Court refused an injunction, on the ground that the tenant had himself violated the agreement. Porrett v. Barnes, 2 Law J. Chanc. 141.

(B) TO STAY OR RESTRAIN PRoceedings.

In ejectment between two defendants, the Court refused an injunction, where the plaintiff as landlord might have made himself defendant at law. Moses v. Lewis, 1 Jac. 502.

The Court will grant an injunction to stay proceedings in the Common Pleas at Lancaster. Hine v. Fiddes, 2 S. & S. 370.

The Court granted an injunction against a party residing abroad, to restrain proceedings in an action at law, and refused a motion to allow the defendant to proceed to trial before the defendant had answered. M'Cullum v. Beale, 10 Price, 130.

Injunction granted ex parte to stay proceedings at law in a court of great sessions of a Welch county, where the action was commenced at so late a period as to render it impossible for the plaintiff in equity to obtain the common injunction in time to serve any useful purpose. Jones v. Bassett, 2 Russ. 405. An injunction may be obtained to stay an infant from proceeding at law upon admissions contained in the infant's answer. v. O'Donovan, 2 Law J.

Chanc. 56.

To an action brought by a creditor, after a decree for the administration of assets, against the executor, who pleaded a false plea in order that he might have an opportunity to apply for an injunction to restrain the action, the Court granted the injunction, and held that the creditor was not entitled to a judgment against the executor de bonis propriis. Fielden v. Fielden, 1 S. & S. 255.

Motion by a plaintiff for an injunction to restrain an action brought by one defendant against a codefendant, granted. Kingham v. Maisey, 2 Sim. 41.

To entitle a party to an injunction to stay execution on a verdict passed against him at law, he must pay the sum recovered into court, though he has since obtained a rule calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why a new trial should not be granted. Austen v. Thomson, 11 Price, 1.

On a bill stating, that since a verdict had been obtained against the plaintiff, he had acquired an amount against the defendant, exceeding that for which the verdict had been given, the Court will not grant an injunction to restrain proceedings on the verdict. Whyte v. O'Brien, 1 S. & S. 551.

The Court will not grant an injunction to stay proceedings, and thereby repeal letters of administration, if it appear that a judgment will consequently be released, &c. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 2 Ken. Chanc. 26.

Where a bill has been filed to obtain a discovery from a defendant proceeding at law, to recover against the plaintiff, the amount of a bill of exchange, whether the defendant did not know that it was accepted by one of the partners, in the name of the firm, for his own private debt, and on an injunction to restrain further proceedings, and that the bill of exchange might be declared to be fraudulently accepted, and ordered to be delivered up to be cancelled; to which the defendant, the plaintiff at law,

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bringing the action, answered, that he had such knowledge; the Court refused to grant an injunction to stay proceedings, because there was a defence at law; but as there was a prayer for relief, requiring the bill of exchange to be delivered up to be cancelled, and as one of the defendants had not answered, and there was a direct charge of fraudulent collusion in the bill, which was not sufficiently denied, they ordered the injunction to stay execution. Houlditch v. Nias, 8 Price, 689.

The injunction on an interpleading bill prevents (unlike a common injunction) the plaintiff from proceeding any further. Warington v. Wheatstone, 1

Jac. 205.

The injunction in the Court of Exchequer restrains all proceedings, unless issue is or can be joined ; which is, unless the record be in such a state that, by an act of the plaintiff, issue can be joined. Rolfe v. Burke, 1 Y. & J. 404.

In an action of ejectment, a party having obtained a verdict, the defendant obtained an injunction to stay execution, and nothing was done in the suit for many years; during which time, the term in the declaration expired. The Court of K.B. would not amend the declaration by enlarging the term, because it was not shewn, that, by so doing, they should not do any injustice to the opposite party. Bardney v. Hasselden, 1 Law J. K.B. 59, s. c. 1 B. & C. 121, 8. c. 2 D. & R. 227.

(F) EXTENDING AND CONTINUING.

Where some directors of an insurance company, constituted by deed, filed a bill against another director, alleging misconduct, the Court refused to interfere, by continuing an injunction, the plaintiffs not having made use of the powers of regulation given them by the deed. Ellison v. Bignold, 2 J. & W. 503.

An injunction will not be extended to stay trial, where the bill sets forth mere matter of equity, and does not make a case which will afford the plaintiff in equity a defence at law. Cole v. Shelley, 1 Law J. Chanc. 125.

A chartered and loaded a vessel from E, consigned to a house at H, to be loaded there with produce from T, out of the proceeds of H's shipment, and to be consigned to B, on whom A drew bills on the credit of the cargo, which B agreed to accept, and the bills were drawn and endorsed by C, and sent to B, who accepted them under protest as to A, for the honour of C, and they were paid when due. In consequence of a disagreement between A and H, A disclaimed the cargo proceeding to T, and apprised B that he had done so, directing him to attach so much of it as would be sufficient to cover what was due to him from H, on account of H's shipment, and which was more than enough to repay B the amount of the bills so accepted and paid by him; B agreed to do so, and required a power of attorney to be sent out to him for that purpose, which was accordingly sent; H afterwards employed B to dispose of the cargo at T, on their account, and B wrote to A, stating, that he had agreed to do so, on account of the large commission, whereupon A gave him notice that he should hold him responsible. Under these circumstances, B having brought an action against C, the indorsee of the bills,-it was

held, that B was the accredited agent of A, and had so bound himself by what he had done, as to have made it his duty to act for A as directed; that as he might have paid himself out of the goods which he would have had in his possession, if he had done so, but had, in breach of his trust, neglected to do so, to the prejudice of his principal, he ought, in conscience, to be suffered to proceed in his action at law against the indorser, in which he must necessarily succeed; and then the indorser would be entitled to recover the amount from the drawer, who had an equity against the plaintiff at law, although at law he had a clear right to recover, and that, therefore, he ought to be enjoined from proceeding further in the action; but the plaintiff at law having a legal right against the indorser, and there being some doubt on the case of the plaintiff in equity, with respect to the question in whose favour the balance was, the injunction was continued on the terms of his paying the amount into court, with such interest as would be recoverable at law. Solby v. Moore, 8 Price, 631.

After judgment suffered by default, the plaintiff at law proceeding to assess damages under a writ of inquiry, an injunction will not be extended to stay trial. Monteira v. Bannister, 3 Law J. Chanc. 177. A bill was filed by a person in possession of certain lands for the specific performance of an alleged parol agreement to grant him a lease for seven years, and for an injunction to restrain an ejectment; the defendant, by his answer, admitted that he had been disposed to permit, and would have permitted the plaintiff, if he had been satisfied with his conduct, to remain in possession for the time and on the terms alleged to have been specified in the supposed agreement; and that the plaintiff probably expected to remain in possession for that time and on those terms; but he expressly denied that any such agreement had been made; and he insisted that the plaintiff was tenant only from year to year, and had done many acts which would have been breaches of the covenants of the lease supposed to have been contracted for: The Court, upon this answer, refused to make the order nisi absolute, and continued the injunction upon terms. Attwood v. Barham, 2 Russ. 186.

The Court refused to grant a motion made ex parte to extend an injunction to stay trial, till two or three defendants, who had not appeared to the bill, and were in contempt, should have appeared and answered; observing that non constat, if they had been served with notice of the motion, that they might not have shewn that they had appeared and cleared their contempts. Highham v. Antwis, 11 Price, 759.

In an affidavit in support of a motion to extend an injunction to stay trial, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to swear, "that it is believed, that the answer will afford discoveries material to the defendant at law." Anon. 1 Law J. Chanc. 120.

Where an answer is filed on the seal day, it is too late to prevent a motion to extend the common injunction, although the motion was not made until the following day, on account of the pressure of business. Whitehouse v. Hickman, 1 Law J. Chanc. 34, s. c. 1 S. & S. 102.

Motion to extend the common injunction, granted, where the answer, which was filed on the same morning, was insufficient, and the trial was coming