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in the plea, and that the witnesses by whose evidence he could prove their truth are abroad, and therefore praying a discovery from A of the matters so alleged, and one or more commissions to examine witnesses abroad; a general demurrer to such a bill cannot be sustained. Shackell v. Macaulay, 3 Law J. Chanc. 30.

A bill for a commission to examine witnesses abroad, where an action has been begun; and a bill to examine witnesses de bene esse, is liable to a special demurrer, if it has not an affidavit annexed to it of the circumstances by which the testimony sought to be preserved is in danger of being lost. Angel v. Angel, 1 Law J. Chanc. 6, s. c. 1 S. & S. 83.

Å demurrer to a bill to perpetuate testimony as to legitimacy by the eldest son of a peer, in the lifetime of his father, allowed. Belfast v. Chichester, 2 J. & W. 439.

As the construction of written instruments is the same at law and in equity, a demurrer will hold good to a bill which prays to be relieved against a judgment, alleged to have proceeded upon a strict construction of an agreement, in opposition to the true intent of the parties. Ball v. Storie, 1 Law J. Chanc. 214, s. c. 1 S. & S. 210.

An action at law being brought, to recover the produce of some foreign specie, remitted by a merchant abroad to an agent in London, the agent filed his bill, alleging generally, that there were mutual dealings and transactions between the parties, and praying that an account might be taken of them, and for an injunction ;-a demurrer was allowed. Frietas v. Dos Santos, 1 Y. & J. 574.

Demurrer to a supplemental bill, after a decree in the original suit, allowed, on the ground, that it was only a different statement of the case alleged by the original suit, and was, in fact, a fresh suit for the same purposes. Grant v. Grant, 5 Law J. Chanc. 145.

(B) FORM OF.

An allegation, that the defendants pretend that there is an outstanding legal estate, is not an averment which will entitle the plaintiff, upon the argument of a demurrer, to the benefit of an allegation that there is such an outstanding legal estate. Wingate v. Roberts, 2 Law J. Chanc. 164.

Though it is the usual course of the Court to determine on the written demurrer, before it enters upon the consideration of a case of demurrer assigned ore tenus; yet when the demurrer ore tenus is for want of parties, who have an interest in the question raised by the written demurrer, the Court will dispose of the demurrer ore tenus first. Attorney General v. Heelis, 2 Law J. Chanc. 35.

A demurrer ore tenus cannot be offered to part of a bill. Shepherd v. Lloyd, 2 Y. & J. 490.

Unnecessary allegations in a demurrer do not render it a speaking demurrer, if they do not introduce matter which does not appear in the bill. Cawthorne v. Chalie, 3 Law J. Chanc. 125, s. c. 2 S. & S. 125.

A demurrer is not a speaking demurrer, unless when it introduces a statement of a fact material to

support the demurrer. Davies v. Williams, 4 Law J. Chanc. 210, s. c. 1 S. & S. 5.

A demurrer which covers too much cannot be sustained. Wynne v. Jackson, 2 M'Clel. & Y. 65.

Where there is a demurrer extending in principle to the whole bill, though in form purporting to extend only to part of it, the defendant, by answering any part of the bill, overrules his demurrer. Dawson v. Sadler, 2 Law J. Chanc. 172, s. c. 1 S. & S. 542.

(C) PRACTICE.

The eight days within which a demurrer must be entered with the registrar, are eight office days. Bullock v. Edington, 1 Sim. 481.

It is irregular for a defendant who is not in contempt, and has not obtained an order for time, to file a general demurrer, if his solicitor has represented to the adverse clerk in court, that an order for time had been obtained. If that misrepresentation of the defendant's solicitor was called forth by a statement on the part of the plaintiff, that he was in a condition to seal an attachment, when in truth he was not in that condition, the defendant may file a general demurrer. Gray v. Chaplin, 3 Law J. Chanc. 47, s. c. 2 S. & S. 267.

If a defendant be under terms of pleading issuably, he cannot demur specially to the replication. Sawtell v. Gillard, 3 Law J. K.B. 108, s. c. 5 D. & R. 620.

If pending a demurrer which is overruled, the time allowed by the rules of court for pleading expires, the Court will grant further time to plead. Duncan v. the Manchester Waterworks Company, 8 Price, 698.

Where a demurrer was refused to be received, on a mis-statement that an attachment had previously issued for want of an answer:-The Court set aside an attachment subsequently issued, and gave leave to demur. Evelyn v. Griffith, 1 M'Clel.

& Y. 265.

A defendant against whom an attachment has issued, cannot, upon payment or tender of costs, file a demurrer to the whole bill, without special leave of the Court. Mellor v. Hall, 3 Law J. Chanc. 171, s. c. 2 S. & S. 321.

Judgment of non pros. is regularly signed, if a similiter be not delivered. Hollis v. Buckingham, 3 D. & R. 1.

To a declaration in assumpsit, with several counts, the defendant demurred generally to the first counts, and pleaded the general issue to all the other counts: Held, that the demurrer must be delivered to the plaintiff's attorney, and not filed with the clerk of the papers. Dymock v. Stevens, 3 D. & R. 248.

If a general demurrer be filed instead of delivered, it is unavailable; hence, where the plaintiff signed judgment when it had only been filed, the Court held the judgment regular. Fry v. Champneys,

2 Chit. 295.

The attorney, and not the clerk of the papers, has a right to make up the demurrer books. Herbert v. Taylor, 4 Law J. K.B. 299, s. c. 5 B. & C. 766, s. c. 8 D. & R. 609.

The mere assertion, that a special demurrer is brought for the purpose of delay, is not a sufficient ground to induce the Court to suffer it to be argued on the last day of term. Tibbett v. Perring, 7 B. Mo. 440.

If the period for arguing a demurrer arrive before the paper-book has been delivered to the junior Baron, judgment will pass against him who has

neglected to deliver the same. Rex v. Forman, 11 Price, 161.

The Court will grant a concilium for the last day of term, if there are not four days left in the term, though the demurrer-book has not been delivered to the other side on stamp. Gent v. Vandermoolen, 13 Price, 247: S.P. Milner v. Horton, M'Clel. 493.

On an application for a rule to shew cause why an order for a concilium, granted on the 21st of June, for arguing on the 26th, the last day of term, a demurrer delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff's replication on the 18th of June, the demurrer-book being delivered on the 20th, but no rule given to bring in the demurrer,-the Court refused the rule, as it appeared that the demurrer was filed for delay, the plaintiff having tendered an issue to the country on the defendant's pleas, though four days had not been given to the defendant to return the demurrer. Saville v. Jackson, 11 Price, 357.

A defendant must shew full, reasonable, and ample cause, to induce the Court to permit him to withdraw a general demurrer, and plead specially. Elworthy v. Cowell, 6 B. Mo. 495.

Demandant allowed to withdraw demurrer and reply de novo in a writ of formedon, upon shewing good ground by affidavit. Cholmely v. Paxton, 3 Bing. 1.

If a plaintiff has obtained an order to take a demurrer off the file, and the defendant, before it is taken off, file a plea and answer, it will be irregular. Cust v. Boode, 1 S. &. S. 21.

On demurrer the Court is bound by plaintiff's allegation of fact, but not of law. Cuthbert v. Creasy, 6 Mad. 189.

When there shall be a demurrer to part only of the declaration, or other subsequent pleadings, those parts only of the pleadings to which such demurrer relates, shall be copied into the demurrer-books; and if any other parts shall be copied therein, the Prothonotary shall not allow the costs thereof on taxation, either as between party and party, or attorney and client. Reg. Gen. Hil. 8 & 9 Geo. 4, 6 Law J. C.P. 102, s. r. 1 M. & P. 401, s. r. 4 Bing. 549.

DESCENDANTS.

The word "descendants" is capable of such a construction, as to shew who fall within the class which that word describes. Wright v. Atkins, 1

Turn. 162.

DESCENT.

[See HEIR.]

The true rule of collateral descent is, that the nearest collateral relation of the whole blood, being on the side from which the estate descended, is heir. Therefore, where a person seised of an estate by descent ex parte materná, dies without issue, the descendants of his maternal grandfather must all be extinct before any descendant of a remoter maternal ancestor can inherit, however nearly related to the propositus, ex parte paterna. Hawkins v. Shewen, 1 Law J. Chanc. 148, s. c. 1 S. & S. 257.

If a woman has an equitable fee, subject to a general power of appointment by will, and by will duly executed, not referring to the power, devise all

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her real estates to her only son, charged with legacies, the son takes the equitable fee by descent, and not as appointee under the power.

If the son die under age, without having had or called for a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee, the equitable fee will descend to the heirs ex parte maternd, and not to the heirs ex parte paterná. Langley v. Sneyd, 1 Law J. Chanc. 14.

Where a man, who had married the owner of a customary estate in fee, took a grant of the freehold from the lord, upon which livery of seisin was afterwards given-Semble, the grant operated as an enfranchisement before the livery, and that the course of descent of the customary estate would not be altered. Doe dem. Newry v. Jackson, 1 B. & C. 445, s. c. 2 D. & R. 414.

DETINUE.

An estate having been devised to the plaintiff's wife after marriage, he delivered the title deeds to a certificated conveyancer, and instructed him to prepare a conveyance and levy a fine, to which the plaintiff and his wife were parties, declaring the uses to their second son: Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain detinue for the deeds, as the property in the lands to which they related, was, bythe operation of the fine, conveyed to his second Phillips v. Robinson, 5 Law J. C.P. 111, s, c.

son.

4 Bing. 106.

If a person, who writes an answer to a demand made upon another person of certain things, says, that he has got them, and thereby induces the claimant to bring an action against him, he is liable to such claimant in detinue, although it does not appear that he had the general controlling power over the things. Hall v. White, 3 C. & P. 136. [Best]

In an action of detinue, the goods should be declared to be of some value. The want of a statement of value is bad upon general demurrer. The thing detained being a bill for the payment of a sum of money, does not raise such a presumption of any value as to dispense with the statement. Stevenson v. Addison, 5 Law J. K.B. 265.

DEVISE.

[See WILL; and for BEQUEST, see LEGACY.] (A) CONSTRUCTION OF, IN GENERAL. (B) OF THE Devisee.

(C) WHAT PROPERTY PASSES.

(D) WHAT INTEREST VESTS.

(E) DEVISES IN TRUST.

(F) ESTATES IN FEE.

(G) ESTATES IN TAIL.
(H) ESTATES for Life.

(1) COPYHOLD ESTATES AND CUSTOMARY LANDS.

(K) ESTATES IN MORTGAGE.

(L) JOINT TENANCY AND TENANCY IN COM

MON.

(M) CONDITIONAL AND CONTINGENT DEVISES AND LIMITATIONS OVER. (N) EXECUTORy Devises. (0) DEVISES BY IMPLICATION. (P) DEVISES FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS. (Q) LAPSED OR VOID DEVISES.

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(A) CONSTRUCTION OF, IN GENERAL. Interpretation of particular clauses and words in a codicil, with reference to the general plan of the change intended by the testatrix to be made in her former disposition by her will of her property. Hopkins v. Towle, 1 Law J. Chanc. 155.

In construing a devise, words may be supplied to restrain its generality, if the intent of the testator can be collected from other parts of the will. Strong v. Cummin, 2 Ken. 488, s. c. 2 Burr. 913.

It is a general rule of law, to be collected from a consideration of all the cases, that a particular intent expressed in a will must give way to a general intent; and courts are bound to give effect to the paramount intent. Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh, 49, 51. Whatever the rule may be in the simple case of a rent-charge, in a devise the construction must be according to the intention. Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Bligh, 60.

A devise by testatrix of all her real property to A T and E O, except what she might mention in a eodicil, means except what she shall mention in a valid codicil; and testatrix having made a codicil (which was void from being unattested), devising part of her real estate to other persons: Held, that notwithstanding this, the whole of the real property passed to the devisees under the will, and not to the heirs-at-law. Denn v. Taylor, 2 Chit. 681.

A person possessed of real and personal property, left it, by his will, under certain restrictions, to his wife for her life, or as long as she remained his widow; and after her decease or second marriage, as follows, viz." Then my will is, that all my real and personal estate be divided according to the Statute of Distribution, in that case made and provided:"The Court held, that the real property, after the death or second marriage, went to the heir-at-law, for want of a devise of it. Thomas v. Thomas, 3 Law J. K.B. 121, s. c. 3 B. & C. 825, s. c. 5 D. & R. 700.

A testator gives all his property to his daughter and her heirs, directing, at their decease, their debts, &c. to be paid; he then gives various legacies, and bequeaths the residue to his nephew: Held, that the daughter takes the personal property absolutely, and an estate tail in the real property, and that the legacies were meant to be given only upon the failure of heirs of the body of that daughter. Widdison v. Hodgkin, 2 Law J. Chanc. 9.

There is no distinction between a residuary and a specific devise of real estate, every devise of land being in effect specific, inasmuch as a residuary devise will only pass such real estate as the testator had at the time of making his will, and will not pass real estates subsequently acquired. Spong v. Spong, 1 Y. & J. 300.

Devise of lands to the use of A for life, with remainder to the use of the children of A, as tenants in common, in tail, with benefit of survivorship, with remainders over. A, having seven children, became bankrupt, and the lands were purchased under a local act of parliament by trustees for city improvements, and the value of the interest of the children was ascertained by a jury, without reference to the value of the estate for life of A, or the subsequent contingent remainders; and the amount was paid into the bank in the name of the Accountant-General. The Court doubted the propriety of

the proceeding, and refused to order the dividends to be paid for the maintenance of the children of A. Ex parte Whitehead, 2 Y. & J. 243.

A testator having devised all the residue of his real and personal estate to trustees, upon trust, within six months after his decease, to raise 34,000l., and having out of this sum made a provision for the maintenance of his two daughters E and S during their minorities, directed that a moiety of the interest arising from it should be paid to each daughter on her attaining the age of twenty-one, or marrying, for her separate use during a term of ninetynine years, if she so long lived; and that in case either of them died, leaving no child, or issue of a child, the whole of the interest should be paid to the survivor for her separate use during the remainder of the term, if she so long lived; and subject to these and some contingent gifts, which never took effect, he bequeathed the 34,000l. to his trustees, upon trust, after the decease of his daughters, for such person or persons as should, under the subsequent limitations, be entitled to the residue of his real and personal estate. In these subsequent limitations the trustees were directed, upon each of his daughters attaining twenty-one, or marrying, to yield up to her a moiety of the residue of his real and personal estates, to hold the same to her and the heirs of her body, with remainder to the other daughter, and the heirs of her body, remainder to his own right heirs. In a suit instituted on behalf of the infant daughters, for the administration of the testator's estate, a decree was made for raising the 34,000l., and the personal estate proving insufficient, part of it was raised by the sale of portions of the real estate. Afterwards S, with the concurrence of the heir of the surviving trustee, suffered a recovery of her moiety of the lands to the use of herself in fee, the tenant to the precipe being made, and the uses of the recovery declared, by a bargain and sale, in which both S and the heir of the surviving trustee were conveying parties, but which was not enrolled within due time. At a subsequent period E suffered a recovery of her moiety of the lands; S died, leaving children, having received out of court the moiety of the principal of that part of the charge which had been received, but without having taken any steps to have the remainder of it raised.-It seems that E and S did not take quasi estates tail in the sum of 34,000l.: but held, that if E and S took quasi estates tail in the 34,000l. so as to be entitled to it absolutely, yet, under the circumstances of the case, the unraised portion of S's moiety of the charge was extinguished, and the unsold estates entirely exonerated. Smith v. Frederick, 1 Russ. 174.

GE, in his lifetime having by voluntary settlement conveyed his manor of M to trustees, in trust to secure the payment of an annuity to his wife for life, and subject thereto to the use of himself in fee, by his will confirmed that settlement; and having then an only daughter, devised his freehold and copyhold estate in S and his freehold estate at H, to trustees, in trust for the children of his daughter by her then husband, under certain limitations; by the residuary clause he devised all the residue of his freehold and copyhold estates, money in the funds, &c. to the same trustees, upon trust, to sell and convert the same into money, and set apart 50,000l. three per cent. consols for such son of his

daughter who, under the trust of a settlement then intended to be forthwith made, should become possessed of an estate tail in the manor of M; and the residue to be divided among the other children of his daughter. At the date of the will, G E's daughter had no children. Some time after making this will, the testator, G E, drew a line across the direction to sell the property devised by the residuary clause. After so doing he purchased a considerable freehold estate in W. and II. By a codicil to his will, made ten years subsequently, after reciting the erasure before mentioned, and that he was apprehensive that such erasure not being witnessed might lead to litigation, he declared that the sole intention of such erasure was to revoke that part only of the will, whereby he directed the sale of bis freehold property; and then proceeded—“ And I do hereby direct and appoint that the son, lawfully begotten of my daughter D, who shall first attain the age of twenty-one years, shall, on attaining such age, change his name for that of E; and I give and devise to the said son of my daughter, on his attaining the age of twenty-one years, and changing his name to E, all my freehold property, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, to have and to hold to him, his heirs and assigns for ever." By the same codicil he ratified and confirmed the aforementioned will, except as before excepted. GE died without again altering his will or codicil, and without making any settlement, stated in the residuary clause to be then in immediate contemplation, leaving his widow and daughter him surviving. At the death of the testator, D and her husband had, and now have, one infant son and four infant daughters. Upon a feigned issue from the Court of Chancery, it was holden-1st. that the devise of the freehold of part of the estate at S and of the freehold farm and estate at H contained in the will, was not revoked by the codicil ;-2nd. that the manor of M did pass under the residuary devise contained in the will, and that such devise was revoked by the codicil;-3rd. that the manor of M did pass under the codicil to the first son of D who shall attain twenty-one years, and change his name to E; -4th. that the estate at W and H, purchased after the testator made his will, passed under the devise in the codicil to the first son of D who shall attain twenty-one, and change his name to E;-5th. that the surplus rents and profits of the copyhold estates at S, and of the freehold estate at the same place, and of the freehold farm and estate at H, after providing for the maintenance of the devisee thereof, belong to the surviving trustee under the will until a first son of D shall attain twenty-one;-and lastly, that the intermediate rents and profits of such of the testator's freehold estates as are effectually devised by the codicil to D's son, who shall first attain the age of twenty-one, and change his name to E, until such events take place, belong to the surviving trustees. Duffield v. Elwes, 3 B. & C. 705, 8. c. 5 D. & R. 764.

A testator, by his will dated in 1558, after reciting that he had erected a free grammar-school at Tonbridge, did for the maintenance and continuance thereof, give unto the master and wardens of the Skinners' Company various messuages, specifying their respective yearly values, which amounted in the whole to 60%. 13s. 4d: then proceeding to direct

189

how the rents should be applied, he ordered that 201. should be paid yearly to the master of the school, and 81. to the usher; that the master and wardens of the Skinners' Company should visit the school once a year, for which they were to have 107. yearly; that 4s. a week should be paid to certain almsmen; that 258. 4d. yearly should be expended in coals, to be distributed among the almsmen; and that the renter warden should have 10s. for his pains; the residue of the rents were to be employed by the master and wardens upon the needful reparations of the aforesaid messuages and tenements, and the overplus was to go to the use and behoof of the Skinners' Company, to order and dispose of at their wills and pleasures: Held, upon the recitals and language of two private acts of parliament, which the Skinners' Company had accepted. That certain of the lands, the yearly rental of which in 1558 was 431., did not pass by the will, but were subject to a prior trust, which was exclusively for the support of the master and the under-master of the school, and for the reparation of the said lands and tenements; and that the increased rents of those lands were to be applied to the maintenance of the shool on an enlarged scale; that the Skinners' Company were entitled to the rents and profits of the remainder of the premises mentioned in the will for their own use and benefit, subject only to the payment to the almsmen and renter warden, to the payments for coals, and to contribution towards the expenses of repairing such part of the premises used for a school as bad been originally erected for that purpose, as well as towards an increased sum of 2001. yearly allowed to the company for the expenses of visiting the school. Attorney General v. the Master and Wardens of the Skinners' Company, 2 Russ. 407.

A testator, who died in 1818, after devising a freehold house to his wife and her heirs, devised the residue of his freehold estates, situate in four specified parishes, or elsewhere in the county of Cambridge, to two trustees and their heirs, upon the trusts thereinafter declared concerning the same; that is to say, upon trust that they should sell his several copyholds in the parishes aforesaid, and after satisfying the costs of the sale out of the monies thence arising, should pay the residue to his executor for the purpose of satisfying, in the first place, certain legacies; and he then devised all the residue of his real and personal estate to A B. The testator, besides freeholds and copyholds situate in the four parishes, had freeholds not situate in the county of Cambridge, and copyholds not situate within the four parishes; and all the copyholds had been surrendered to the use of his will: Held,

That the beneficial interest in all the freeholds, whether situate in the county of Cambridge or elsewhere, passed to the residuary devisee.

That the legacies were a charge only on the copyholds situate in the four parishes.

That no estate in those copyholds passed to the trustees, but only a power to sell.

That any surplus of the monies arising from the sale, which might remain after satisfying the legacies, passed by the residuary clause.

That the copyholds not situate within the four parishes passed to the residuary devisee. White v. Vitty, 2 Russ. 484.

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Where the devisor of an estate, resident at Irchester, devised the same to trustees in trust for the testator's grand-daughter for life, remainder to her children in tail, with cross-remainders, and for default of issue to testator's daughter for life, remainder to any one or more of her daughters as she should appoint, for their lives, remainder to all and every the children of such daughter so appointed; if such appointment should be to one daughter, then to her and her heirs, if to more than one, then the children to take their mother's share respectively per stirpes, as tenants in common, with cross-remainders between them, as to such their mother's share respectively, and on failure of issue of such daughters, with cross-remainders to the others of their issue; and for default of appointment, and of any appointment not exhausting the whole fee, as to the whole or any part of the devised estate, to his said daughter for life, remainder to all his daughters for life, with cross remainders for life between them, remainder to support, &c., and for default of issue of any of the daughters of his said daughter, to her and her heirs; in the event, the grand-daughter died without issue,, and the daughter had nine daughters, several of whom married and had issue : Held, 1st, That the testator's daughter took an estate for her life, with an ultimate reversion in fee; 2dly, that in default of appointment, the daughters took respectively estates for life in remainder as tenants in common, with cross-remainders to themselves in tail respectively; 3dly. that in default of appointment, the issue of the daughter had no estate in the devised premises; and, 4thly, that the testator's daughter had power to designate which one or more than one of her daughters were to take; if more than one, they would take as tenants in common for life, with remainder to their respective children, as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders between them in tail, to take place as well with regard to the shares of their respective mothers, as of the shares of their aunts, failing their issue. Medlycott v. Jortin, 6 B. Mo. 1, s. c. 2 B. & B. 632.

Construction of general words of devise, with reference to preceding words of specific devise, and the actual situation of the real estate of the testator. Hougham v. Sandys, 6 Law J. Chanc. 671.

Where a testator by will directs his real estate to be sold, and the produce to be invested in the same manner as his personal estate,-that produce, so far as it is not disposed of by the will, goes to the heir, unless there is on the will satisfactory proof of the intention of the testator, that the money to be raised by the sale should go to the same persons, who would be entitled to his original personal estate. Mudgin v. Lumley, 1 Law J. Chanc. 236.

A testator directs, that at a proper time his real estates be sold, and the money divided between A and B, but makes no other devise of them: the executor is not entitled to sell them.

A, being an infant, no sale of the lands can be made during her minority, except by the intervention of the Court. Batho v. Fulton, 2 Law J. Chanc. 196.

A testator directs his real estates, which are to be purchased, to be conveyed to trustees upon the same trusts as were in his will thereinafter limited concerning certain devised estates :-It being clear, that the intention of the testator would be defeated, if

the purchased estates were conveyed to the same trusts as were thereinafter declared concerning the devised estates, and that it would be accomplished, if they were conveyed to the same trusts as were thereinbefore declared concerning the devised estates: Held, that the Court was bound to substitute "therein before" for "thereinafter." Bengough v. Edridge, 5 Law J. Chanc. 113, s. c. 1 Sim. 173.

A testator devised certain lands to the defendant for life, without impeachment of waste, except as to timber growing in the park, avenues, demesne lands and woods adjoining to the capital messuage called Arbury, with various remainders over: Held, that by the phrase "woods adjoining to the capital messuage called Arbury," was meant all woods which served for ornament or shelter to that mansionhouse, whether growing or not on the demesne lands. Newdigate v. Newdigate, 5 Law J. Chanc. 52, s. c. 1 Sim. 131.

Construction of the word "principal" in a will, with reference to the invested accumulations of the interest of specific sums. Harvey v. Cooke, 6 Law J. Chanc. 84.

In a will, the words "thereunto belonging" may, under circumstances, be construed in a popular sense in contradistinction to their strict legal interpretation; thus, under a devise of the rectory or parsonage of Minster, with the messuages, &c. thereunto belonging: Held, that a messuage and lands, not parcel of, or strictly belonging to such rectory, but which had been purchased by the proprietors of such rectory, at different times, between the 5 Jas. 1. and the year 1632, and had by the testator been purchased therewith, and as parcel thereof, were comprehended in and would pass under such devise; and so held, although, by the adoption of such construction, a general residuary devise of real estate might have nothing beneficially to operate upon. Ongley v. Chambers, 2 Law J. C.P. 49, s. c. 1 Bing. 483, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 665.

The word " appurtenances" in a devise, is not confined to the legal meaning of the word; and that which seems to be appurtenant to a messuage devised shall pass with the messuage, without the word " appurtenances," such appearing to be the intention of the testator; though he may have used the word "appurtenances" in other parts of his will when speaking of a messuage. Doe d. Sims v. Sims, 5 Law J. K.B. 140.

"

To a devise of" all my Briton Ferry estate," and "all my Penline estate," which lie in the county of Glamorgan, there were annexed certain deeds of lease and release made upon the marriage of the devisor, purporting to contain an account of the several parishes and tenements comprehended in the estates of the devisor's father, from which it appeared, under the head of the Brecon estates," there was a parish called Lywell, in which was the messuage for which the ejectment was brought; and under the head of "Glamorgan estates," was a parish called Briton Ferry. At the trial, the defendant offered in evidence, account-books of former stewards of the devisor, and former owners of the lands devised, charging themselves with receipts of monies on account of such owners, amongst which was an entry-Briton Ferry estate, in the county of Brecon; and also in evidence, that the land in the declaration, together with the lands mentioned in